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Background


Introduction 
Over the past two decades considerable interest has developed in the sub­
ject of the victims of crime. This interest reached a peak in 1982 with the 
establishment and report of the President's Task Force on Victims of 
Crime (1982), which made numerous recommendations for legislative, ex­
ecutive, and other institutional action on both the federal and state levels, 
including an amendment to the United States Constitution. However, the 
momentum continued. Subsequent developments have included the estab­
lishment of an Office for Victims of Crime in the Office of Justice Pro­
grams, a flurry of legislative activity across the nation, and the declaration 
of National Crime Victims' Rights weeks with the participation of the U.S. 
president. The interests of victims have been taken up not only by special 
organizations established for the purpose, such as the National Organiza­
tion of Victims' Assistance (NOVA), the Victims' Assistance Legal Organi­
zation in Virginia, and the National Victim Center (founded in honor of 
Sunny von Bulow), as well as more narrowly focused groups such as 
MADD (Mothers against Drunk Driving), but also by such mainstream 
professional bodies as the American Bar Association (ABA), the National 
Association of Attorneys General, the National Conference of the Judi­
ciary, the American Psychological Association, and the National Institute 
for Mental Health. Landmark legislation at the federal level includes the 
Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, the Victims of Crime Act of 
1984, and the Victims' Rights and Restitution Act and other related provi­
sions of the Crime Control Act of 1990. (See also the Attorney-General's 
Guidelines for Victim and Witness Assistance, issued in pursuance of the 
1982 and the 1990 acts.) A review of victim-oriented legislation both at the 
federal and at the state levels, conducted by the Bureau of Justice Statistics 
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in 1984, reproduced 1,489 pages of such legislation (Bureau of Justice Statis­
tics, 1984). Additional legislative updates were compiled annually by the 
National Organization for Victim Assistance (see, e.g., NOVA, 1989). 
Similar trends have begun to emerge in other countries (see, e.g., 
Joutsen, 1987; Melup, 1991). In 1990 Britain issued its "Victim's Charter" 
to coincide with European Victims Day (Hannaford, 1991). National organi­
zations on behalf of victims have become the norm. Some examples are the 
Canadian Organization for Victim Assistance (COVA), the National Asso­
ciation of Victim Support Schemes (NAVSS) in Britain, the Weisser Ring in 
Germany, and the National Institute for Assistance for Victims (INAVEM) 
in France. 
Campaigns on behalf of crime victims have also been launched on the 
international level (Bassiouni, 1988). The World Society of Victimology 
and the World Federation of Mental Health, as well as national bodies and 
individuals, were instrumental in pressing for a United Nations declara­
tion on victim rights; and following a recommendation on the part of the 
Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the 
Treatment of Offenders in 1985, the General Assembly adopted the Decla­
ration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of 
Power in the same year. This, in turn, appears to have further stimulated 
national legislation (Melup, 1991). 
Among the specific proposals calculated to ameliorate the situation of 
the victim which have been raised and in many cases adopted are the 
following: provision for crisis intervention, protection orders, victim/ 
witness-assistance programs, informal mechanisms of dispute resolution, 
victim participation in plea bargaining and sentencing procedures, victim-
impact statements, victim compensation programs, restitution, escrow 
laws, and third-party liability. These concepts and proposals will be elabo­
rated below. 
Background to Contemporary Interest in Victims 
An attempt to offer an explanation or explanations for these developments 
might be considered somewhat speculative: the study of social movements 
is a complex topic (Etzioni, 1976), and the "victim movement" seems to be 
no exception (Rock, 1986: esp. chap. 3; Mawby and Gill, 1987:35). Never­
theless, some of the developments that appear to be associated with this 
movement will be briefly considered here, partly because of their intrinsic 
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interest, and partly because in the course of the evaluation to be under­
taken in subsequent chapters of the various programs and proposals de­
signed to ameliorate the situation of crime victims, it may be relevant to 
consider which social forces gave rise to these programs and proposals (cf. 
Casper and Brereton, 1984). 
While surveys of the development of the victim movement (Elias, 1986: 
chap. 2; Rock, 1986: chap. 3 ; Joutsen, 1987: chap. 2; Van Dijk, 1988; 
Karmen, 1990: chap. I)1 diverge somewhat in their analysis, it seems that 
at least seven developments pertaining to recent sociolegal history may be 
relevant in considering the current focus on the victim. 
The Rise of Victimology 
The term victimology has been credited to Beniamin Mendelsohn in the 
early 1940s (Mendelsohn, 1974). In the postwar years a number of criminolo­
gists (von Hentig, 1948; Ellenberger, 1955; Wolfgang, 1957; Fattah, 1967; 
Amir, 1971; Curtis, 1974) devoted considerable attention to the role played 
by the victim in the commission of the offense, while academic debate on 
this issue took place in Japan (Mendelsohn, 1963:243-44). Additionally, a 
cry was sporadically raised in favor of better treatment for victims of crime, 
in particular for financial compensation (Fry, 1959; Schafer, [1960] 1970), 
and an example was set in this respect by government-sponsored schemes in 
New Zealand in 1963 and Great Britain in 1964. These two fields of interest 
converged in 1973, when the First International Symposium in Victimology 
was held under the auspices of the International Society of Criminology, 
resulting in the publication of five volumes of proceedings (Drapkin and 
Viano, 1974-75). Since that time, international symposia have been held on 
a triennial basis, two journals of victimology have been founded, the World 
Society of Victimology has been established, and a proliferation of literature 
has emerged.2 
This duality of themes which gave rise to the development of victimol-
ogy—interest in the victim-offender relationship on the one hand, and in 
victim welfare on the other—is not without significance. To some extent 
these foci of interest remain distinct today, contributing in part to the frag­
mentation of this area of study—other facets of which will be noted subse­
quently. Moreover, while these two areas continue to be discussed within 
the same organizational framework, namely, "victimology," victim welfare 
seems to have superseded the first topic (victim-offender interaction) as the 
dominant area of interest. This has in turn led to an orientation toward 
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policy formulation on the part of victimologists as well as political activism 
directed at the enhancement of the victim's rights (Fattah, 1974; Rock, 
1986: chap. 3; Joutsen, 1987: chap. 2). 
Victimization Surveys 
Since the pioneering surveys conducted in the 1960s by Ennis and Biderman 
on behalf of the President's Commission for Law Enforcement and the Ad­
ministration of Justice (1967), victimization surveys have become a routin­
ized procedure in the United States as a source of criminological.data. The 
invention and institutionalization of victimization surveys may have been 
even more significant, both academically and politically, than the rise of vic­
timology. In a sense, this development, too, is part of victimology, in that the 
surveys are extensively referred to and relied upon in the literature. To this 
extent they constitute a third focal area, in addition to the two mentioned 
above—the victim-offender relationship and victim welfare. However, the 
surveys were developed primarily as a contribution to the more traditional 
areas of criminology, for they serve as a source of data for the dimensions of 
criminality, complementary to or substituting for police statistics. Indeed, 
the National Crime Survey in the United States, and equivalent surveys 
elsewhere, now constitute the primary source for measuring trends in crimi­
nality. These surveys offer a persuasive response to the traditional criticism 
of criminologists, that the official criminal statistics ignore the "dark fig­
ures" of crime. Only rarely or marginally, however, do such surveys provide 
meaningful information regarding the individual victims.3 Nonetheless, 
some researchers have endeavored to develop theories of criminal victimiza­
tion (such as the "lifestyle" theory) based upon macro data derived from the 
surveys (cf. Fattah, 1991: chap. 12), thereby creating an analytical link with 
the early victimologists, with their focus on victim-offender relationships. 
The political, as opposed to the academic, importance of the victimiza­
tion surveys derives from the fact that the surveys have indicated that a 
considerable amount of crime goes unreported. This has led to a number of 
conclusions being drawn by policy makers as well as by academicians, to 
the effect that (a) crime rates are really much higher than indicated by 
previous assessments, based upon police or FBI statistics; (b) victimization 
is a very widespread phenomenon,4 and thus victims constitute a consider­
able constituency; and (c) the failure of many victims to report crimes 
suggests a degree of malaise either on the part of these victims or in the 
system as a whole. 
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"Law and Order" 
In recent years there have been vociferous demands for more stringent 
law enforcement measures against offenders. These demands seem to 
have been stimulated by the general belief that crime, in particular vio­
lent crime, was on the rise, leading to an increasingly pervasive "fear of 
crime." They may also be seen as a "backlash" (Brownell, 1976), a reac­
tion against the liberal extensions of the constitutional guarantees be­
stowed by the U.S. Supreme Court on suspects and defendants in the 
1960s.5 The conservative Republican administrations of Presidents Nixon 
and Reagan were particularly sympathetic to such demands,6 which found 
academic respectability in the views of James Q. Wilson (1975), Ernest 
van den Haag (1975), and others, with respect to the merits of deterrent 
punishment and incapacitation. 
This development resulted in proposals for restrictions on the granting 
of bail, the abolition or modification of the exclusionary rule, limitations 
on the collateral attacks on conviction by means of habeas corpus proceed­
ings, mandatory and sometimes enduring prison terms, demands for in­
creased prison building, and the reintroduction of the death penalty. Many 
of these proposals were placed on the agenda of the Reagan administration 
by the Attorney General's Task Force on Violent Crime (1981) and paved 
the way for somewhat repressive and impersonal penal policies (Feeley and 
Simon, 1992). 
It is a short step from the advocacy of harsher measures against offend­
ers to the demand for greater protection for the victim. Indeed, in many 
instances the latter is seen as the direct justification for the former. Deten­
tion before trial, higher conviction rates, longer prison sentences, and the 
abolition of parole are thought by their advocates to prevent victimization 
and are sometimes advocated specifically in these terms. The interrelation­
ship of these causes is well illustrated by the Attorney General's Task 
Force referred to above, which, while focusing on the violent criminal, 
made a number of proposals for the benefit of victims (see recommenda­
tions 13, 14, 62, 63, and 64). Conversely, Frank Carrington's book The 
Victims (1975) advocated a number of the above-mentioned measures di­
rected at offenders—as did the President's Task Force on Victims of Crime 
(1982) and California's "Proposition 8" (Ranish and Shichor, 1985). Even 
more explicitly, one victim-advocate group bears the name "Victim Advo­
cates for Law and Order" (VALOR). 
Further, the "fear-of-crime" syndrome, coupled with the statistics 
drawn from the victimization surveys (see, e.g., Attorney General's Task 
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Force, 1981:87), undoubtedly produced a large constituency sympathetic 
to victim-oriented policies. Moreover, this dual trend of increasing tough­
ness toward offenders coupled with victim protection measures seems to 
have been little affected either by the falling off in crime rates (Zawitz et 
al.; 1993:7-8) or by the advent of a Democratic administration, tradition­
ally more liberal on law and order issues. President Clinton's Crime Act 
has incorporated both mechanisms for the incapacitation of offenders 
("three strikes and you're out") and new measures for the protection of 
victims—in particular, women (educational programs to prevent sex 
abuse, domestic violence hotlines, etc.). Harsher sentences continue to be 
perceived as a means of victim protection (see, e.g., the provisions for the 
protection of the elderly). 
Feminist and Other Grassroots Movements 
One of the main focal concerns of the women's movement has been the 
sexual exploitation of women, notably in the context of rape (see, e.g., 
Brownmiller, 1975). Attention has been drawn to the discrepancy between 
the presumed high rates of victimization and the low reporting rates, attrib­
uted to the social definitions applied to sexual assault and social pressures 
exerted on the victims. The feminist critique also alluded to the absence of 
appropriate assistance following the trauma, and to the harrowing experi­
ences undergone by complainants during the investigatory and judicial 
processes. Women activists have pressed for and secured reformed rape 
laws and police and judicial procedures and the establishment of rape crisis 
centers. A similar interest has been shown in the area of domestic vio­
lence, attention being drawn to the reluctance of the law enforcement 
system to classify victimized women as "true" victims and to the absence 
of legal or social remedies. These developments stimulated considerable 
research on the topic of women victims (e.g., Holmstrom and Burgess, 
1978; Chapman and Gates, 1978) and led to the establishment of special 
services for this constituency. Thus, even though not all feminists identify 
their exploited gender as "victims,"7 there can be little doubt that the 
wider movement in favor of assisting victims generally, as epitomized by 
the National Organization of Victims' Assistance, benefited from this 
highly motivated special-interest group. 
Similarly, other grassroots organizations have labored on behalf of bat­
tered children, elderly victims, and the victims of drunken drivers (cf. 
Karmen, 1990:36-38; Rock, 1986:90). In addition, there have been con­
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tributions by individual "moral entrepreneurs," such as Irvin Waller in 
Canada (Rock, 1986: chap. 3) and Marlene Young of NOVA, who have 
been instrumental in translating the aims of the pressure groups into 
policy. 
Radicalism 
The victim movement has not generally been identified with political or 
social radicalism. Victimologists have in the past generally been identified 
with positivist criminology and thus either ignored by radicals or criticized 
for their methodology or focal interests (Quinney, 1974; Bruinsma and 
Fiselier, 1982; Falandysz, 1982). More particularly, the victim movement is 
often perceived as part of the "war against crime," as reflected in the law-
and-order camp, whereas radicals have tended to regard those waging the 
war as the aggressors and the offenders as the oppressed. Recently, however, 
a new emphasis may be discerned in radical thinking. Victimization sur­
veys have shown that the so-called underclass—the poor and in particular 
poor blacks—suffers relatively high rates of victimization in respect of 
violent crimes (Skogan and Maxfield, 1981; Zawitz et al., 1993). Indeed, 
some observers (Jones et al., 1986) claim that initially there was an empha­
sis on such findings, with their implicit concern to radicals. Thus Ramsay 
Clark is cited as having noted as early as 1970 that the poor, black, urban 
slum dweller "faces odds five times greater" than the average citizen of 
being a victim of violent crime (ibid., 1); Jones et al. detect here "a senti­
ment . .  . which pervades the work of the new radical, realist approach to 
crime today" (ibid., 7). They argue that the victimization issue was subse­
quently appropriated by the political right and so-called administrative 
criminology, which advocated increased punitiveness and other conserva­
tive solutions. Whatever their historical contribution, contemporary 
radicals—particularly in England—have become involved in victim sur­
veys, while radicals have generally been active in various community-
oriented victimization prevention programs (Hudson, 1987:177-79). 
Moreover, studies of the criminal justice system, including the applica­
tion of the death penalty, indicate that the victimization of blacks and other 
minorities is treated by the system as though it were less serious than that of 
whites, indicating to civil rights activists that society discriminates in the 
level of protection it provides for different groups (Karmen, 1990:34-36). 
Such activists thus have an interest in promoting certain aspects of victims' 
rights. Conversely, it has been argued that victims have benefited from some 
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of the civil rights or civil liberties successes of the 1960s in such areas as 
equal protection under law and improved services (ibid., 36). 
Another area of interest to some radicals is the potential for developing 
an interrelationship between criminal victimization and socioeconomic 
or political oppression or human rights abuses. This is the theme of 
Robert Elias's The Politics of Victimization (1986), which he subtitled 
Victims, Victimology and Human Rights. The same focus led to pressure 
on the international level to extend the application of the United Nations 
declaration on the rights of crime victims to "victims of abuse of power." 
Finally, there often is a radical component both in the grassroots move­
ments referred to in the previous section and in the move toward infor­
malism discussed below. 
The "Just-Deserts" Philosophy 
The next development to be discussed under the present heading has a 
more tenuous causal connection with the rise of the victim movement, if 
indeed it has any such connection. As is by now well known, criminolo­
gists have in recent years become disillusioned with their traditional objec­
tive of rehabilitation of the offender, following the researches of Martinson 
(1974) and others, who argued that rehabilitation programs did not work, 
and of more radical groups who argued that rehabilitative penal systems 
were oppressive and discriminatory (see, e.g., American Friends' Service 
Committee, 1971). This led to advocacy of the so-called justice or just-
deserts model of punishment (Fogel, 1975; von Hirsch, 1976), based on a 
notional balance between the seriousness of the offense and the severity of 
the punishment. The implications here regarding victims are twofold. 
First, criminologists were released from their hitherto dominant mission 
of searching for the optimal methods of rehabilitating the offender and 
could devote some of their displaced energies to the advantage of the vic­
tim. Second, the just-deserts model sought measures for determining the 
seriousness of the offense, or the offender's "desert"; and the degree of 
harm inflicted on the victim was proposed as an appropriate measure for 
this purpose (see, e.g., Wolfgang, 1976). Whether the debt was owed by the 
offender to society as a surrogate for the victim was left ambiguous. (These 
issues will be discussed below.) As noted, whether this revolution in penal 
philosophy had any direct effect on promoting the victim movement or 
victim welfare is unclear, but that it has far-reaching conceptual implica­
tions regarding the role of the victim in the criminal justice system is 
incontrovertible. 
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Informalism 
While the just-deserts movement has advocated a formalized criminal jus­
tice system, with the almost inexorable application of predetermined penal­
ties, another movement has developed contemporaneously in the opposite 
direction, namely, in support of informal processes of justice. This move­
ment has been supported by traditionalist rehabilitationists and adherents 
of labeling theory, who have sought to maximize the offender's reforma­
tion, or to minimize the stigma incurred, by means of diversion and "com­
munity corrections" rather than more punitive penal sanctions. While on 
the face of it this movement (like the justice movement) is not directly 
related to victims, some of the informal procedures (which will be ex­
panded upon in subsequent chapters) involve restitution for or reconcilia­
tion with the victim—objectives that are assumed to benefit the victim as 
well as the offender. At the same time, some advocates of "informalism" 
(such as Nils Christie)8 have been concerned primarily with the victim. 
They have noted the victim's inferior status in the formal criminal justice 
system and seek to enhance his or her role by means of civil-law, "aboli­
tionist," or informal procedures. 
These developments, which coincidentally have all taken place within the 
last 20 to 25 years, seem to have contributed in varying degrees to the 
present interest in the victims of crime, and thus also to the proliferation 
of victim-related policy reforms and legislative measures. Some in-depth 
studies have emerged of the evolution of these measures in particular 
settings. Thus Smith and Freinkel (1988) and Sayles (1991) have com­
mented upon the importance of coalitions of divergent groups in securing 
reforms on the federal level and in Florida, respectively. McCoy has also 
referred to the "confluence of conditions" that led to California's famous 
(infamous?) Proposition 8, but mainly to the "manipulation by a dedicated 
group of right-wing entrepreneurs" (1987:44-45), although these same pro­
ponents perceived their activity as "a grassroots outpouring of frustration 
against insensitive officialdom" (ibid., 18). Rock (1988), in his detailed 
studies of the development of victim reforms in Canada and Britain, noted 
the relative significance in this context of (a) government policies, (b) 
voluntary associations, and (c) moral entrepreneurs—central government 
policies having played the main role in Canada, voluntary associations in 
Britain. However, the identification of such factors in these particularist 
studies is not necessarily inconsistent with the seven "macro" influences 
noted above; indeed, it is in some cases illustrative of these influences. 
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Analysis of the dynamics of victim-related reforms is not, however, the 
main objective of the present study. Suffice it for present purposes to note 
that the plethora of victim-related programs and proposals (to be elabo­
rated in chap. 1) were novel, were speedy in their development, and were 
the product of a constellation of influences. 
Aims of the Present Study 
It is evident from the foregoing that considerable energy has been devoted 
to the development of new ideas and new programs for the benefit of 
victims. However, because of the novelty of these proposals and programs, 
and the dynamics of their implementation, progress has been somewhat 
hasty and unreflecting. The precise objectives of these programs have not 
always been carefully defined, nor has much attention been devoted to 
their conceptual analysis and implications. Joutsen (1987) has presented a 
paradigm according to which victimological theory led to scientific re­
search, the results of which "were then marshalled by the victim move­
ment and criminal justice practitioners for reforming the operation of the 
criminal justice system" (51). This seems at best to be an idealization of 
the process that has been taking place; the political and emotional (or 
moral) forces for change have surely been at least as powerful as the scien­
tific ones, and possibly considerably stronger (Landau and Sebba, 1991). 
Adequate evaluation has been wanting with respect both to the novel 
programs themselves and to the underlying needs they are designed to 
meet, although considerable progress on this last topic is evidenced in 
recent research publications (see, e.g., Lurigio et al., 1990). Subject to this 
welcome development, however, it is still probably true that "to date, 
there has been no comprehensive, systematic effort to view the problems, 
and the needs involved from the standpoint of the victims" (Victims of 
Crime, 1985:56). Certainly there has been none that endeavors to consider 
at the same time the needs and the interests of other relevant parties (see 
below). 
Further, little thought has been given to the relationships among the 
various programs, either conceptually or in practice. As one legal scholar 
has observed, the victims' movement "raises fundamental issues about the 
purposes of criminal law, its sanctions and remedies" (Goldstein, 1982:529); 
and while the paucity of scholarly literature in this area noted by Gittler 
(1984) has been partially rectified, the emphasis has been upon action and 
legislation rather than upon conceptualization and evaluation. 
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Of course, literature relating to the victim and the criminal justice 
system is not lacking. Indeed the last years have produced something of an 
avalanche. Following the seminal work of Schafer (1968), which presented 
the historical background, MacDonald (1976) and his fellow contributors 
considered many of the (then) current developments. Ziegenhagen (1977) 
analyzed some of the conceptual issues related to victims and social con­
trol. The problems encountered by victims in the criminal justice system 
were studied by INSLAW (Hernon and Smith, 1983), while comparable 
studies were conducted in Canada (Hagan, 1980) and Britain (Shapland et 
al.; 1985). The American Bar Association, too (following their review of the 
then-prevailing legislation—see ABA, 1981), commissioned some papers 
in this area, leading to the publication of a special issue of the Pepperdine 
Law Review in 1984, to be followed by further special issues of the Wayne 
Law Review in 1987, the Pepperdine Law Review in 1989, and the Interna­
tional Review of Victimology in 1994. A most comprehensive (particularly 
in the geographical sense) multivolume review of the victim and the crimi­
nal justice system has recently been published by the Max Planck Institute 
for Foreign and International Penal Law in Freiburg (Kaiser et al., 1991). In 
the area of victim needs and services, pioneering studies were published by 
Knudten et al. (1976) and Salasin et al. (1981), the latter emphasizing men­
tal health issues. Further publications have emerged in connection with 
New York City's Victim Services Agency, evaluations having been con­
ducted or supported by the Vera Foundation or the National Institute of 
Justice. The latter has also supported evaluations both of specific programs 
and of general overviews of particular areas. Included in this last category 
are works by Carrow (1980), McGillis and Smith (1983), and Parent et al. 
(1992) on victim compensation programs; Hudson et al. (1980) on restitu­
tion programs; and Cronin and Borque (1981), Finn and Lee (1983), and 
Skogan et al. (1990) on victim/witness-assistance programs. Other recent 
evaluations of this last topic include Roberts (1990) and, in Britain, Ma­
guire and Corbett (1987) and Mawby and Gill (1987). A vast literature is 
also available on alternative mechanisms for dispute resolution (see, e.g., 
Alper and Nichols, 1981; Tomasic and Feeley, 1982; Abel, 1982a, 1982b; 
Marshall, 1985; Matthews, 1988; Galaway and Hudson, 1990). 
The above overview is confined to full-length volumes and reports, to the 
exclusion of numerous journal articles. Also useful are the wide-ranging 
edited volumes of Hudson and Galaway (1975), Galaway and Hudson (1981), 
Fattah (1986, 1989, 1992), Maguire and Ponting (1988), and Lurigio et al. 
(1990), as well as a special issue of Crime and Delinquency (1987), the 
proceedings of the international symposia of the International Society of 
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Criminology and the World Society of Victimology (Drapkin and Viano, 
1974-75; Schneider, 1982; Separovic, 1989; Miyazawa and Ohya, 1986; 
Ben-David and Kirchhoff, 1992), and student textbooks by Karmen (1984, 
1990) and Doerner and Lab (1995) in the United States and by Walklate 
(1989) in Britain, and textbooks in other countries. Other publications are 
directed at a broader public, such as The Crime Victim's Book of Bard and 
Sangrey (1979) and the American Civil Liberties Union Handbook (Stark 
and Goldstein, 1985). 
However, in spite of this vast literary outpouring, integrative analysis of 
the field under discussion has generally been lacking, although two at­
tempts to undertake such analyses must be noted, the one from a political 
science perspective (Elias, 1986), and the other having a criminal justice 
orientation (Joutsen, 1987; see also Ashworth, 1986). 
The Structure of This Book 
The first aim of the present study will be to provide an overview of the 
reforms that have been adopted or are currently being proposed, accompa­
nied by an attempt to place them in a more meaningful perspective (chap. 
1). This will be followed by a review of our knowledge of the role of the 
victim in the traditional criminal justice system (chap. 2), with a view to 
ascertaining the backdrop against which these reforms are being devel­
oped. Part 2 will attempt to identify the parameters of a justice system 
which any reforms should take into consideration (chap. 3) and then to 
examine these parameters in depth (chaps. 4-6). In this way, the criteria for 
evaluating the appropriateness and the success of any reforms will be estab­
lished. These criteria then, in part 3, will be applied to the new proposals 
and programs, insofar as sufficient data are available for this purpose 
(chaps. 7-11). Part 4 will endeavor to integrate the analysis conducted in 
the preceding chapters, considering (in chap. 12) the implications of the 
various reforms reviewed for the type of criminal (or noncriminal!) justice 
system which might emerge, and developing a dichotomy of alternative 
models into which most of the reforms or proposals can be integrated. 
Chapter 13 briefly considers some developments indicative of a possible 
third model. Some final reflections will be presented in chapter 14. 
An Overview of Victim-
Oriented Reforms 
The remedies proposed for the amelioration of the victim's lot—some now 
widely adopted, others still at the experimental stage1—are diffuse in char­
acter. As noted in the previous chapter, scant consideration has been de­
voted to analysis of the theoretical foundations of the different proposals, 
of the relationships between these proposals, or of the degree to which they 
are conceptually consistent with the prevailing criminal justice system. 
An essential preliminary is to evolve a taxonomy of the remedies or propos­
als under consideration. 
A fourfold classification may tentatively be suggested: 
1. Proposals concerned with improving upon the traditional criminal pro­
cess from the victim's standpoint. 
2. Proposals concerned with providing alternatives to the traditional pro­
cesses of the criminal law. 
3. Proposals designed to ameliorate the victim's situation without imping­
ing upon the nature of the criminal process. 
4. "Catch-all" remedies. 
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The reforms or proposals falling within each category will be briefly re­
viewed here with a view to clarification of the subject matter of this study,-
their detailed analysis will form the basis of part 3 below.2 
Proposals for Modifying the Criminal Process 
Since the desire for change derives primarily from the perception that the 
victim has fared badly under the traditional criminal justice system, it is 
hardly surprising that the main focus of reform has been on the introduc­
tion of modifications to this system. The reforms proposed may be classi­
fied in the following ways: (1) according to the extent to which emphasis is 
placed upon changing the procedures involved as compared with changing 
the outcome of the process, (2) according to the degree of activism it is 
sought to attribute to the victim's role within the framework of the re­
form, and (3) according to the stage of the proceeding it is sought to reform. 
Although in subsequent chapters considerable emphasis will be placed on 
the first two modes of classification, it will be convenient at this point to 
list the proposed reforms by employing the last-mentioned framework of 
analysis, namely, according to the stage of the criminal process to which 
the reform relates. 
Bail Hearing. Historically, the bail hearing dealt with the issue of the 
risk that a suspect or defendant might not appear for trial. In recent years it 
has been asserted that the danger of the defendant committing "further 
offenses" (bearing in mind that the offense for which he or she has been 
apprehended has not yet been proven) is also a legitimate consideration in 
determining bail, hence the concept of "preventive detention." Since the 
victim of the suspect's alleged offense may again be at risk in the case of a 
repeat offense, it may also be pertinent to consider this particular risk at 
the bail hearing. Moreover, there may be an additional risk here—that the 
suspect will attempt to intimidate the victim (or any other witness) in 
order to inhibit him or her from testifying at the trial. It is thus seen to be 
proper for the judge to take these factors into account in determining the 
bail decision. In spite of the constitutional objections to the placing of 
limitations on bail, it has been recommended that "bail be conditioned on 
the defendant's having no access to victims or prosecution witnesses" 
(National Conference of the Judiciary on the Rights of Victims of Crime, 
1983:11; see also sec. 8 of the Federal Victim and Witness Protection Act of 
1982). Further, following a recommendation of the President's Task Force 
on Victims of Crime, the Bail Reform Act was enacted to allow federal 
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judges and magistrates to consider danger to the community when deter­
mining whether a defendant is eligible for pretrial release (Office of Justice 
Programs, 1986:15). Many states also require that the victim be notified of 
bail or pretrial release (NOVA, 1989:14). 
Moreover, the use of both criminal sanctions and civil "restraining or­
ders" has been sanctioned by the Federal Victim and Witness Protection 
Act of 1982, as well as by state legislation (see ABA, 1981:3Iff.; Bureau of 
Justice Statistics, 1984:11). Similarly, "protection orders" are particularly 
recommended in cases of domestic violence (ABA, 1981:63-66; Finn and 
Colson, 1990). While these proposals are not necessarily related to bail 
proceedings, this appears to be the optimal stage of the proceedings for 
considering issues of risk and intimidation. 
Plea Negotiation. In the majority of criminal cases the outcome is deter­
mined in the course of a plea bargain conducted between defendant's coun­
sel and the prosecuting attorney and generally ratified subsequently by the 
judge. (For the variations in participants and dynamics, see Miller et al., 
1978.) The result is generally a guilty plea, whether to a lesser charge than 
the one originally specified, or in exchange for an understanding that a 
relatively lenient penalty will be sought. It thus becomes unnecessary to 
call witnesses for the prosecution—including the victim. Not only will the 
latter have no opportunity to express his or her views as to the appropriate 
sentence, but the case will be determined without the court receiving any 
direct impression of the victim or the true extent of his or her injury or 
suffering. 
To remedy this situation it was suggested by Norval Morris (1974) that 
victims—and indeed the defendants themselves—should be enabled to 
participate in the plea-bargaining process. Experiments of this nature 
were conducted in Florida and other states (Kerstetter and Heinz, 1979; 
Heinz and Kerstetter, 1980; Buchner et al., 1983), and by 1988, 24 states 
had made express legislative provision for such participation (NOVA, 
1989:12), while an even larger number of states required that the victim 
be notified (ibid., 14). 
Victim-Impact Statements. An alternative method of assuring that 
the court has a complete picture of the nature of the injury inflicted upon 
the victim,3 and one that would also apply to cases that went to trial, is 
for the court to request a special report on this facet of the case. In the 
Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Congress introduced the 
"victim-impact statement" (VIS), whereby in federal courts the pre­
sentence report would include "information concerning any harm, includ­
ing financial, social, psychological harm, done to or loss suffered by any 
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victim of the offense." By 1988, 48 states had made some provision for 
victim input in sentencing, mostly by means of the victim-impact state­
ment (ibid., 10). Such statements may be submitted to the court as part of 
the presentence report, as under the federal legislation, or directly, by the 
victim or by an advocate on the victim's behalf. (The model provisions 
drafted by the National Association of Attorneys General and the Ameri­
can Bar Association would allow for both methods in combination; see 
NAAG/ABA, 1986, sec. 105.) 
A separate issue is whether the victim should be enabled to express an 
opinion as to his or her attitude toward the offender and as to the decisions 
to be made by the various agencies, in this case the court. Many states now 
allow for a "victim statement of opinion" (VSO), which may be submitted 
orally—called the "right of allocution"—or in writing. This type of reform 
raises fundamental issues regarding the respective rights of victims and 
offenders, on which the Supreme Court has been divided in recent years. 
We shall return to these issues subsequently. 
Sentencing Options. Certain sentencing options have been developed in 
recent years for the benefit of the victim. The most notable is the use of 
compensation or restitution orders, whereby the offender must compensate 
the victim for the loss, suffering, or injury he or she has inflicted. Courts of 
common law have traditionally had the power to make such orders, but 
such powers were limited, and they were rarely exercised (Vennard, 1978; 
Lamborn, 1979). Criminal courts were reluctant to become involved in the 
quantification of losses, which they regarded as the function of civil courts. 
Moreover, this remedy was rarely sought by victims themselves (who have 
had no standing in the criminal court) or by prosecutors on their behalf. 
Finally, when issued, such orders might remain unenforced, since at best 
they would have the force of civil judgment debts, execution proceedings 
being left to the initiative of the individual beneficiary. 
Concern for the victim's predicament has led to an expansion of the use of 
victim restitution (Harland, 1981). By 1988, all 50 states had restitution laws 
"that provide statutory reinforcement of states' common law authority" 
(NOVA, 1989:12). Moreover, this remedy has gained support as a sanction to 
be imposed upon the offender from two camps: persons disillusioned with 
offender rehabilitation who would rather emphasize the latter's debt to 
society in general and to the victim in particular;4 and traditional rehabilita­
tionists who regard the obligation to pay restitution itself as a rehabilitative 
measure for the offender. (This was a recurring theme of the National Sympo­
sia on Restitution; see Hudson and Galaway, 1977,1980; Galaway and Hud­
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son, 1978.) The result has been "a dramatic upsurge" in the use of restitu­
tion orders (ABA, 1981:17). Moreover, legislation has been introduced in 
many states and on the federal level to require the court to consider a 
restitution order in every case, or even to mandate a restitution order where 
the defendant is able to pay (ibid., 17-20; NOVA, 1989:13; Victim and 
Witness Protection Act of 1982, amending sec. 3580 of the U.S. Code). 
Restitution programs were also developed as a form of diversion, rendering 
the trial itself unnecessary. The objective here is similar, but in this case the 
process may, in obviating the need for a criminal trial, have additional objec­
tives, calculated to bring benefits to all parties concerned.5 
Other noncustodial alternatives may be of assistance to victims, notably 
community service orders, which may be directed to the victim's benefit 
rather than the community in general (Beha et al., 1977). Finally, another 
practice adopted in recent years has been to impose financial penalties or 
"surcharges" upon offenders, not for the benefit of their immediate victims 
but in order to finance victim-welfare programs, thereby lessening the need 
to resort to public funds for this purpose. 
The Sentencing "Equation." Victim harm may be relevant at the sen­
tencing stage not only in determining a disposition that will have imme­
diate practical relevance (such as those considered under the previous 
heading) but also, in a symbolic sense, in determining what will be the 
"just" measure of punishment in the particular case. 
Generally speaking, the definition of the offense under law reflects the 
gravity of the injury inflicted: murder is a more serious offense than aggra­
vated battery, while a simple assault is less serious. However, from the 
second half of the 19th century onward, the prevailing view among crimi­
nologists was that a sentence should be individualized according to the 
needs of the offender, rather than "looking back" to the nature of the 
offense. Recently, the pendulum has swung again, toward a sentencing 
"tariff" based upon the gravity of the offense. Some would go further than 
the traditional legal categories and fix the sentence according to the precise 
degree of harm inflicted upon the victim (Wolfgang, 1982), resulting in a 
new form of individualization of the sentence but now individualized ac­
cording to the victim's suffering. The trend in this direction is apparent in 
some of the emergent "sentencing guidelines" which specify the degree of 
victim harm among the aggravating circumstances that a court should 
consider in determining sentence, or among the grounds for deviating from 
the standardized norms (see chap. 3 of the federal sentencing guidelines; 
see also title 4 of the Crime Control Act of 1990). 
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The Parole Decision. Similar consideration may arise where a parole 
board retains the discretion—sometimes "guided" by published norms— 
to determine early release dates for prisoners. In addition to the consider­
ation of the degree of harm inflicted on the victim, the board may also 
consider subsequent developments in the offender-victim relationship, in­
cluding the adjustment of financial claims (e.g., the implementation of a 
restitution order) and future risks to the victim. A proposed variation of 
this, whether at the sentencing or at the parole stage, would be to strike a 
"bargain" with the offender whereby restitution was bartered for a reduc­
tion in time served (Hassin, 1979). 
The President's Task Force on Victims of Crime recommended the aboli­
tion of parole, and this policy has been adopted by the federal and a number 
of state systems. Where preserved, however, it has been recommended that 
victim participation be permitted (Office of Justice Programs, 1986:34); 
many states have enacted appropriate legislation for this purpose (NOVA, 
1989:12), and model legislation has been developed for both victim notifica­
tion of and participation in parole hearings (NAAG/ABA:1986). 
Victim Representation. It has been suggested that protection of the 
victims' interests requires the appointment of special advocates to plead 
their cause. Thus some states have experimented with the appointment of 
victim/witness coordinators or locally appointed advocates who would 
have the general function of assisting victims through the complexities of 
the criminal justice system (ABA, 1981:39).6 
The question arises whether a victim advocate should not also have the 
right to represent the victim in the judicial proceedings themselves. So far 
this has generally been proposed only in a very narrow context, where the 
victim's conduct may itself be placed in question during the course of the 
proceedings (see the New York Legislature's proposal, ibid., 45). However, 
the question may legitimately be raised whether the victim should not 
have the right to be represented by counsel throughout all the stages of the 
criminal process—pretrial proceedings, plea bargaining, trial, sentencing, 
and parole—even though "both prosecutors and defense attorneys are 
likely to consider it as an unnecessary—and unwelcome—intrusion into 
the criminal justice process" (ibid., 44). 
The personal participation of the victims in the trial might be expected 
to attract similar, or perhaps greater, criticism, yet the final report of the 
President's Task Force on Victims of Crime (1982) recommended that the 
victim be granted constitutional rights "to be present and to be heard at all 
critical stages of the judicial proceedings" (114), and a number of states 
have now adopted provisions of this nature. 
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Proposals Providing Alternatives to Traditional Criminal 
Justice Processes 
Insofar as modification of traditional criminal justice procedures may not 
provide adequate solutions for the victim's needs, other approaches may be 
considered—namely, whether to replace or to supplement these procedures. 
Private Prosecution. One way to ensure that the victim has a visible 
role in the criminal process is to enable him or her to prosecute the 
offender, rather than this function being fulfilled by the state's representa­
tive. The historic power of the private citizen to instigate a private prose­
cution is still maintained in a number of jurisdictions (McDonald, 1976a). 
Although controversial (Ward, 1972), it has strong historical roots (Emsley 
and Storch, 1993); indeed, it may be considered the "true" form of the 
adversary system (Sebba, 1982). It may be appropriate to consider how far 
a revival of this procedure would be consistent with the reemergence of 
the victim in the criminal process. 
Civil Proceedings. The historic response to criticisms of the inade­
quacy of the criminal process to deal with the victim's needs was that this 
was a matter for the civil courts. Thus any reform of civil procedures that 
renders civil remedies more accessible to the victim must be considered in 
this context. A case in point is the growth of the small claims court. 
Another possibility is the adoption of the system available in some Euro­
pean countries whereby the victim may be "joined" as a civil party to the 
criminal process, such that both criminal and civil issues may be deter­
mined simultaneously. Various intermediary models of procedure may also 
be considered.7 
Informal Modes of Dispute Settlement. In the light of the inaccessibil­
ity and unattractiveness of formal legal institutions of justice, it has be­
come popular in recent times to develop alternative processes, such as 
mediation and arbitration (see also the discussion of "informalism" in the 
introduction). Generally, the emphasis is on reconciliation between the 
parties. These procedures are designed to bypass the established bureau­
cratic procedures and to resolve the dispute as informally as possible. It is 
claimed that whereas traditional legal processes, particularly the adversary 
system, are confined to dealing with a specified charge or claim, informal 
procedures may resolve the whole spectrum of problems existing between 
the parties of which the alleged wrongful act was merely a symptom. This 
type of approach inevitably gives rise to the merger of criminal and civil 
claims, such formal differentiation being foreign to the informal nature of 
the proceedings. 
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Unlike the first two proposals under the present heading—the revival or 
strengthening of private prosecution or of civil-law remedies—there has 
been extensive experimentation in recent years with informal modes of 
dispute resolution, and a vast literature has developed (Sander and Snyder, 
1982; Sebba, forthcoming) that discusses the issues involved. 
Amelioration of the Victim's Situation without Reference to 
the Criminal Process 
Many reforms have been designed to improve the position of the victim of 
crime irrespective of the nature of the trial process (or its alternatives). 
Indeed, some of these programs may take effect even if the wrongdoer is 
never apprehended. 
Criminal Injuries Compensation Boards. The establishment of state 
compensation boards has perhaps been the most widely heralded measure 
resulting from the recent revival of concern for the victim. Early victim 
advocates, notably Schafer ([I960] 1970), took the view that any remedies 
victims might seek from the offender were likely to be inadequate, and 
ultimately (or at least in the first instance) the burden of redress must fall 
upon the state. While the pioneering model for a victim compensation 
board was adopted in New Zealand in 1963 (as mentioned in the introduc­
tion), in recent years most of the states of the United States have adopted 
legislation of this type (see Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1984:5-8; NOVA, 
1989:1-5), and Congress provided for federal support under the Victims of 
Crime Act, 1984. Unresolved issues remain, however, regarding the opti­
mal scope of these programs and the criteria for admissibility, affecting 
such issues as minimum and maximum claims, the relationship between 
the parties, victim precipitation, and the types of losses to be covered. 
Moreover, there has been controversy regarding the very idea of state com­
pensation (Meiners, 1978), as well as the appropriate mode of financing 
such programs (Thorvaldson and Krasnick, 1980). However, the tendency 
has been for continual expansion of these programs—partly in order to 
qualify for federal funding (NOVA, 1989:2; Office for Victims of Crime, 
1994:26). 
Crisis Intervention and Welfare Services. Services to the victim are, 
together with victim compensation, seen to be the main focus of victim-
related reforms (de Liege, 1985; Roberts, 1990). In this analysis they will 
be discussed under the next heading, in the framework of "catch-all" 
remedies. 
 21 An Overview of Victim - Orien ted Reforms
Insurance. It is well known that many property owners recoup the mate­
rial losses suffered through crime, at least partially, by means of private 
insurance. One method of ameliorating the victim's situation would be to 
encourage this form of self-help, whether merely by the dissemination of 
information or by providing financial taxation incentives to property own­
ers, insurance companies, employers, and so on. A federal insurance pro­
gram has also been of assistance here (Lamborn, 1979). However, there has 
in recent years been a trend to limit the liability of insurance companies for 
compensation due from an insured tort-feasor on the grounds of an "insur­
ance crisis" (NOVA, 1989:29). 
Third-Party Liability. The fear of crime has resulted in an emphasis in 
recent years on crime prevention measures. While such measures are gener­
ally adopted for the purposes of self-protection, in some instances they 
may be necessary for the protection of others. There is now developing an 
area of litigation whereby persons victimized by crime bring claims for 
damage against individuals, corporations, or public bodies that are alleged 
to have been negligent in taking adequate measures to prevent the victim­
ization (Carrington, 1977; Castillo et al., 1979; Carrington and Rapp, 
1991). This may apply to landlords who have failed to secure premises, 
police departments that have provided inadequate protection, or psychiat­
ric hospitals or parole boards that have released persons with a high risk of 
violence into the community, as well as to common carriers, employers, 
and educational institutions. A Victims Advocacy Institute was estab­
lished primarily for the development of such remedies for crime victims. 
A further extension of third-party liability would impose upon the "in­
nocent bystander" a duty to provide assistance even where there was no 
special relationship with the offender. 
Escrow. Following the notorious "Son-of-Sam" murders in New York, 
the defendant apparently capitalized on his notoriety by selling his story to 
the press. Most states have introduced "Son-of-Sam" or "notoriety-for-
profit" laws to ensure that any such financial gains be attached for the 
benefit of the victims of the crime (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1984:10; 
NOVA, 1989:16). Federal provisions were enacted for this purpose under 
the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982. 
"Catch-All" Remedies 
Victims' Bills of Rights. Some supporters of victim programs (such as 
NOVA) appeared to take the view that piecemeal achievements were 
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unlikely to guarantee sufficient consideration for the victim. They pro­
posed that a comprehensive "victim's bill of rights" be adopted. There is 
clearly an analogy here with the first ten amendments to the U.S. Constitu­
tion which are known collectively as the "Bill of Rights" and are seen to be 
protective mainly of the rights of the criminal suspect or defendant. 
The rights incorporated in such a bill would normally overlap with the 
areas discussed under previous headings, some provisions dealing with 
victim treatment in the criminal process, others providing a guarantee of 
state compensation. In some respects, however, such bills would go further 
and provide for more symbolic and unspecific rights, such as the "right to 
dignity." 
The Attorney General's Task Force on Violent Crime (1981), while sup­
porting in principle the establishment of "Federal Standards for the Fair 
Treatment of Serious Crime," declined to use the nomenclature "victim's 
bill of rights," "out of concern that the public or the courts might construe 
[it] as the creation of a new cause of action." Their preferred objective was to 
establish a standard that "would serve as a model toward which all prosecu­
tors' offices throughout the country could strive"—clearly a weaker prin­
ciple than that advocated by NOVA. Such standards or guidelines have 
meanwhile been issued both by the attorney general and by the judiciary. 
During the 1980s, however, most states enacted some form of bill of 
rights (NOVA, 1989:6-8). Unlike the original Bill of Rights, such enact­
ments were mostly at the simple legislative level. However, in 1982 Cali-
fornia's constitution was amended by a citizens' initiative to incorporate a 
victim's bill of rights. Rhode Island, Florida, and Michigan adopted consti­
tutional amendments in 1986-88, and by the end of 1994, 16 more states 
had followed suit (National Victim Center, 1994). 
In 1990 Congress passed the Victims' Rights and Restitution Act of 
1990 (as part of the Crime Control Act), which incorporated a list of victim 
rights and provision for their implementation. The list includes the right 
to be treated with fairness and "respect for the victim's dignity and pri­
vacy"; the right to reasonable protection from the accused; the right to 
notification of court proceedings; the right in principle to be present at 
court proceedings,- the right to confer with the government attorney; the 
right to restitution; and the right to information about conviction, sen­
tence, and release of the offender. The erstwhile fears of the Attorney 
General's Task Force were met by an express provision that no cause of 
action would arise as the result of the failure to accord the rights specified. 
It is interesting to note, however, that while the list of rights granted to 
victims under the federal system by the above legislation is not expressly 
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referred to as a "bill of rights," the same enactment incorporates a section 
entitled "Sense of Congress with Respect to Victims of Crime," whereby 
individual states were encouraged to "make every effort to adopt the fol­
lowing goals of the Victims of Crime Bill of Rights" (emphasis added). 
Moreover, the list of rights which follows, while similar to that introduced 
into the federal system under the earlier section, is nevertheless wider in 
scope. In particular, it includes a "statutorily designated advisory role" for 
the victim with regard to both prosecutorial and early release decisions. It 
concludes with the sweeping exhortation that "the victim of crime should 
never be forced to endure again the emotional and physical consequences 
of the original crime." 
Finally, it may be observed that the concept of a victim's bill of rights 
has derived support from the adoption of the UN Declaration of Basic 
Principles of Justice for the Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, which 
may be perceived as endowing victim rights with an elevated, universalist, 
or quasi-constitutional status. 
Victim/Witness Assistance. While a somewhat more specific concept 
than the previous heading, victim/witness assistance tends to be used as 
an all-embracing label that may entail a diffusion of programs or services, 
some directed at witnesses (including victims who are witnesses), others 
designed to assist victims per se. In this category reference may be made to 
the numerous crisis intervention programs (developed in particular for 
sexual assault victims). 
Victim/witness programs have multiplied in recent years. A review pub­
lished in 1980 identified 280 (Cronin and Bourque, 1980), but by 1990 there 
were an estimated 5,000 (Skogan et al., 1990). These programs are designed 
to keep victims and witnesses informed about the developments taking 
place in the cases in which they are involved, and to achieve such objec­
tives as a reduction in waiting time, the prevention of intimidation by 
defendants, the provision of specially trained personnel to deal with 
victim/witness problems, and the obtaining of financial compensation for 
time spent in appearances before the police and the courts. Some provide 
crisis intervention and other assistance before the victim's involvement 
with official criminal justice agencies. (A brochure published by Victim 
Services in New York City—a pioneer in the field—lists 30 programs or 
services provided by the agency, with a budget of $19 million and 500 
employees, in addition to volunteers.) 
By 1988, provision had been made by 33 states for funding general vic­
tim or victim/witness services, and by 48 states for domestic violence 
services (NOVA, 1989:5); federal support for such programs was authorized 
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by Congress under the Victims of Crime Act of 1984 and extended in 1988 
and 1992 (Office for Victims of Crime, 1994:4). 
The above attempt at a classification of the proposed remedies consti­
tutes only a very preliminary stage in the task of conceptualizing and 
evaluating the contribution or potential contribution of these reforms. For 
a more meaningful evaluation to be undertaken, criteria must be devel­
oped whereby the innovations may be judged. An attempt to develop such 
criteria will be undertaken in part 2 of this study. However, evaluation of 
the innovative proposals is also dependent upon the fulfillment of an addi­
tional precondition, namely, some familiarity with the system prevailing 
before the initiation of the reforms, from the point of view of the victim's 
role in that system. Yet while "neglect of the victim7' has become a univer­
sally accepted slogan, documentation has been surprisingly sparse. Thus 
the reformist literature—and legislation—has been hasty in proposing so­
lutions to problems, the nature of which have been only superficially stud­
ied, with conclusions generally reached on an impressionistic basis. It will 
be the task of the next chapter to attempt to fill this gap in the literature. 
The Victim's Traditional Role in 
the Criminal Justice System 
As may be evident from the introduction, it has in recent years become 
accepted dogma, almost a truism, that the contemporary criminal justice 
system has dealt with the victim harshly and unfairly—at least before the 
current innovations. This view is reflected in the concept of "secondary 
victimization" [Canadian Federal-Provincial Task Force, 1983:60; Mawby 
and Walklate, 1994:33), a term designated to express the view that the 
initial victimization at the hands of the offender may be followed by fur­
ther victimization on the part of society, particularly in the context of the 
functioning of the criminal justice system.1 
This message has been delivered in a number of ways. Some writers 
have emphasized the phenomenology and the pathology of victimization: 
"The traumatic effects of a violent crime are multiplied by neglect, lack of 
immediate resources, and the failure of such support systems as the courts, 
the police, the legal profession" (Reiff, 1979:75). "In this state of height­
ened vulnerability, [the victims] must cope not only with their everyday 
lives but also with a whole new set of problems created by the victimiza­
tion" (Bard and Sangrey, 1979:106). Sociolegal writers, on the other hand, 
have observed the "alienation" and the "distinctly secondary role" (Gold­
stein, 1982:516-19) played by the victim in the criminal justice process, 
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and have noted the historical decline of the victim's role in this process 
(Schafer, 1968; McDonald, 1976b; Sebba, 1982; Joutsen, 1987: chap. 2). 
Finally sociologists and political scientists have shown how the organiza­
tional and bureaucratic character of the criminal justice system inevitably 
leads to a sacrifice of—or at least the placing of a low priority on—the 
interests of the victim (Ziegenhagen, 1977; Hagan, 1980; Elias, 1986).2 
Moreover, the criticism is not necessarily limited to the institutions of 
criminal justice as such. Some writers have pointed to the limited role of 
extra-legal agencies, including mental health programs, in coming to the 
assistance of the victim (Salasin, 1981:15; Reynolds and Blyth, 1976; Fried­
man et al., 1982). 
Accepted dogma, however, does not always correspond with empirical 
fact. Indeed, two of the earliest surveys endeavoring to investigate the role of 
the victim in the criminal justice system expressed strong reservations as to 
the accuracy of such generalizations about the victim's exclusion from, and 
dissatisfaction with, the system (Hall, 1975:981, n. 263; Knudten et al., 
1976). It may also be asked whether disregard of the victim, insofar as it 
takes place, has been a universal phenomenon, or whether its incidence 
varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, in the way that "legal cultures" are 
said to vary (Ehrmann, 1976). 
Another factor to consider is whether negative occurrences related to 
victims may be connected with particular types of offense. As noted above, 
much attention has been devoted by feminists to the plight of rape victims 
and battered women, but these may not necessarily be representative of 
crime victims generally. Indeed, one study (Smith, 1983) has focused upon 
possible differences in the treatment of victims of offenses committed by 
offenders who were known to them as compared with victims of offenses 
committed by strangers. 
Until fairly recently, there have been very few empirical studies of the 
criminal justice system that examined the role of the victim. Most studies 
tended to focus on the police and to a lesser extent on the prosecution, the 
judicial sentencing function, and other criminal justice agencies. Thus, 
much of the more general criticism relating to the predicament of victims 
has been of an impressionistic nature, based upon anecdotes or individual 
cases. Fortunately, however, revival of interest in the victim has spawned a 
number of empirical studies from which a certain amount of hard data may 
be derived regarding interactions of criminal justice agencies with victims. 
Other research focuses on victim decision making, and in particular on the 
decision to complain to the police (see Gottfredson and Gottfredson, 1988: 
chap. 2; Greenberg and Ruback, 1992). 
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A number of these studies are associated with the Victim Services 
Agency and the Vera Foundation in New York (see, e.g., Davis, Russell, and 
Kunreuther, 1980; Connick and Davis, 1981; Friedman et al., 1982), while 
other relevant recent studies have been conducted by the Institute of So­
cial Analysis (Smith, 1983) and INSLAW (Hernon and Forst, 1983). Earlier 
studies of relevance include those reported by Hall (1975), Knudten et al. 
(1976), and Ziegenhagen (1976). Some studies are confined to a particular 
type of victim, such as the victim of rape (Holmstrom and Burgess, 1978). 
Two of the most comprehensive studies have been conducted outside the 
United States but in closely comparable legal systems (Hagan, 1980, in 
Canada; Shapland et al., 1981, in England). Finally, some of the nonvictim­
oriented research that has focused on the police, the courts, or other agen­
cies has alluded directly or indirectly to victim-related factors, such as the 
relevance of the seriousness of the injury to the decision making of the 
agency in question (see below). 
The present chapter endeavors to summarize the evidence emerging 
from this literature relating to the role of the victim in the criminal justice 
system. It will deal with the following topics: (1) the victim and the police, 
(2) the victim and the prosecution, (3) the victim and the trial, (4) the 
victim and the jury, (5) the victim and the sentencing judge, and (6) other 
stages in the criminal justice system. Additional sections will deal with 
traditional legal remedies available to overcome the limitations of the 
criminal justice system and will discuss the role of certain agencies operat­
ing outside the system. Regarding the victim's relationship with each of 
the main decision-making bodies in the criminal justice system (police, 
prosecution, court) particular attention will be paid to the following is­
sues: (1) the nature and frequency of the victim's contact with that agency; 
the degree to which the agency takes into account (2) victim harm and (3) 
other victim characteristics; (4) the extent to which the victim's views are 
taken into consideration by that agency; and (5) the extent to which the 
victim is kept informed about its decisions. 
It should be noted that this chapter is not directly concerned with 
victim attitudes toward the criminal justice system, which forms the 
subject matter of chapter 5. The purpose here is rather to present an 
objective descriptive analysis of the victim's role in the system. Further, 
as noted, the emphasis is on the victim's interaction with formal crimi­
nal justice agencies rather than on the preliminary decision as to the 
submission of a complaint. Finally, the analysis here relates to the vic-
tim's role in the "traditional" criminal justice system. This chapter does 
not attempt to assess the possible effect on the victim's role of various 
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innovations that may be intended to ameliorate this role, which will be 
considered in part 3 of this study. It focuses on the system as it operated 
prior to these innovations. It may be noted that, in addition to the evalua­
tion research specifically applied to existing criminal justice institutions, 
there has also developed a body of experimental research in social psychol­
ogy that may also be relevant to our understanding of prevailing concepts 
of justice. Three theories of particular interest in the present context are 
(1) attribution theory, (2) the "just-world" theory, and (3) equity theory. 
An attempt to clarify these concepts will be made in the appendix. While 
other psychological approaches, particularly in the realm of procedural 
justice, will be considered subsequently, the three theories alluded to here 
appear to be particularly relevant to our understanding of certain aspects 
of the traditional decision-making processes in the criminal justice 
system—and in particular to perceptions of the victim (to be considered 
further in chap. 5). Some reference will consequently be made to these 
theories in the course of this chapter. 
The Victim and the Police 
Research findings indicate that in a very real sense the victims rather than 
the police are the "gatekeepers" of the criminal justice system, for most 
offenses would not be known about were it not for initiatives taken by 
victims. Thus, Black (1980), in his study of 5,713 incidents, found that 
"only 13% of the incidents came to police attention without the assistance 
of citizens" (88). The police, for the most part, tend to fulfill a "reactive" 
rather than a "proactive" function in dealing with crime. Hindelang and 
Gottfredson (1976) point out that since "decisions made at the earliest 
point in the system have the greatest potential for affecting the system . . . 
it seems more appropriate to conceive of the victim, rather than the police, 
as the initial decision maker" (76). 
Since the police force is the criminal justice agency with which the 
victim will normally have the first—and often the only—contact,3 its func­
tioning and treatment of the victim may be expected to have particular 
importance. It is at this point that the victim transfers his "gatekeeping" 
function to the representatives of the state. 
Contacts. The initial contact between victim and police is dependent 
on two decisions that must be made by the victim, before his or her initial 
contact with the system. First, there must have arisen a situation that the 
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victim has defined as the commission of a crime (see Sparks, 1982:14; Burt, 
1983). Second, the victim must have reached a decision to report the of­
fense to the police. 
While studies of the police (e.g., Piliavin and Briar, 1964; LaFave, 1965) 
have for many years shown how the police exercise discretion in reaching a 
decision whether to define a citizen's conduct as a criminal act by perform­
ing an arrest and instigating an investigation (McCabe and Sutcliffe, 1978), 
it has been clearly shown that victims, too, exercise a similar discretion. 
The automatic reporting of offenses is neither the legal norm—there is 
generally no sanction for nonreporting—nor the behavioral norm. For vic­
tim surveys have shown that the majority of acts defined as offenses are 
not reported by the victims to the police (Sparks, 1982:98; Greenberg and 
Ruback, 1992:8). 
The reasons for nonreporting, and the degree to which these reasons are 
connected with attitudes to the criminal justice system in general or the 
police in particular, will be considered in chapter 5. In the context of this 
chapter the point of emphasis is the sudden metamorphosis in the victim's 
role. In conveying to the police the information regarding the commission 
of the offense, the victim concomitantly transfers to them the role of 
decision maker, or gatekeeper, who determines whether or not a criminal 
process may ensue. It is perhaps this metamorphosis that serves to high­
light the limitations on the victim's role from this moment onward—as 
illustrated by the very fact that further contacts between the victim and 
the criminal justice agencies generally occur only on the initiative of these 
agencies. 
While there appears to be no study dealing specifically and comprehen­
sively with the initial contact between the victim and the police, some 
information is now available on the number of contacts that take place in 
the course of an investigation and the nature of these contacts. 
The leading English survey notes that the police force is the agency with 
which the victims are likely to have the largest number of contacts. Notifi­
cation of the offense is followed by the making of statements, participation 
in photographic and identification procedures, and so on (Shapland et al., 
1985: chap. 3). However, Hemon and Forst (1983) reported on the basis of 
their American survey4 that the modal number of contacts was only one or 
two for all crime types, although the estimated mean number of contacts 
ranged from 3.7 contacts for burglary to 9.5 for homicide5 (the victim in 
this case being the family of the deceased). Moreover, in the sites surveyed 
in their study, the mean, but not the modal, number of contacts with 
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prosecutors tended to be as great, and sometimes greater. Thus the preemi­
nence of police over prosecutors in this respect noted by Shapland in En­
gland may not apply in the United States. 
The purpose or content of these contacts as reported in the American 
study referred to were generally connected with the evidence or the facts of 
the case. These accounted for between 61% (police estimate) and 68% 
(victim estimate) of the conversation time spent, as compared with the 
14%-15% of the conversation time that was devoted to "victim's prob­
lems and concerns," the remainder being concerned primarily with "court 
matters" (Hernon and Forst, 1983). 
Relevance of Victim Harm. A large number of studies of police decision 
making have been published. Many of these were designed to determine 
the weighting, if any, attributable to such variables as race and socioeco­
nomic status of the suspected offender. Such studies usually control for 
type or seriousness of offense, which are generally assumed to be signifi­
cant. Offense seriousness, in turn, may be expected to reflect, or even be 
measured by the amount of harm inflicted upon the victim, a topic to be 
considered below in the context of the sentence of the court. 
At the same time, the weight to be attributed to offense seriousness in 
general, and to victim harm in particular, may depend on the orientation of 
the decision maker, as well as on the normative and bureaucratic frame­
work within which he or she is operating. Thus when police adhere to a 
"law enforcement" philosophy (cf. Wilson, 1978), or when a "deterrent" 
approach seems appropriate in view of the characteristics of the suspect 
(Landau, 1978), victim harm may be expected to assume greater impor­
tance than when a welfare or "labeling" philosophy has been adopted. 
The evidence available from studies specifically concerned with the 
effect of victim harm on criminal-justice decision making is, indeed, not 
unequivocal. Hernon and Forst (1983) found that 48% of the police officers 
interviewed in their study said that they did not consider victim harm in 
their decisions to arrest, but some expressed the view that it would affect 
the decision to investigate the case in the first place. Moreover, when 
considering a number of hypothetical cases ("scenarios"), police tended to 
regard the degree of physical injury suffered by the victim, indicated by his 
or her having been hospitalized for at least 10 days, as relevant to the 
likelihood that the case would be accepted for prosecution.6 This applied 
both to knife assaults and to sexual assaults, but not to robbery. However, 
the fact that the victim needed psychological counseling or had suffered a 
property loss of at least $1,000, did not significantly affect their views. 
A study by Bynum et al. (1982) of "official records of a medium-sized 
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midwestem police department" indicated a direct correlation between the 
amount of property loss inflicted in the course of property offenses and the 
amount of investigative effort applied.7 However, for personal offenses the 
degree of personal injury was not significantly correlated with this vari­
able, nor were either of these measures of harm (property loss or personal 
injury) significant in the multivariate analysis. This led the authors to 
suggest that "the routine approach to processing cases may override any 
influence of victim characteristics." Similarly, a recent British study based 
on assault victims located at a hospital found "almost a random relation­
ship between seriousness, as we defined it, and the reporting, investiga­
tion, and prosecution of assault" (Cretney and Davis, 1995: 130). More­
over, Black (1980) found that arrest rates were only moderately higher for 
felonies (58%) than for misdemeanors (44%) (90). He nevertheless con­
cluded that "the probability of arrest is higher in legally serious crime 
situations than in those of a relatively minor nature" (103). 
Finally, in a study of decision making by the Philadelphia police, 
Hohenstein (1969) found that the seriousness of the offense, as measured 
by the Sellin-Wolfgang scale, was one of the three most important factors 
determining whether the police decided to make an arrest.8 
Relevance of Other Victim Characteristics. Some studies have indi­
cated that police decision making—in particular the decision to arrest—is 
influenced not only by the sociodemographic characteristics and demeanor 
of the suspect (cf. Piliavin and Briar, 1964) but also by similar variables 
relating to the victim. Bynum et al. (1982), who were concerned not with 
arrests but with the intensity of the investigation, found some slight sup­
port for this hypothesis. For personal offenses, "victim-employment sta­
tus" had a significant zero-order correlation with the dependent variable, 
but this disappeared in the multivariate analysis.9 However, for burglary 
offenses the victim's income bracket emerged as a significant variable in 
the multivariate analysis. Race of the victim did not emerge as a signifi­
cant variable in this study but has been found in some studies to be a 
relevant factor (Elias, 1986:143). 
Gender and age of the victim are sometimes thought to be relevant vari­
ables in police decision making, perhaps on the basis of the just-world 
theory which renders "defenseless citizens," that is, females and the elderly, 
more deserving of police support (Bynum et al., 1982:303). In the latter 
study, however, the findings in this respect were generally neither consis­
tent nor significant; but for personal offenses, cases in which victims were 
under 21 or over 45 were more likely to result in intensive investigation. 
Somewhat mixed findings also emerged in this respect from the INSLAW 
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study (Hemon and Forst, 1983). Police respondents considered that the sex 
of the victim would be relevant to the decision to prosecute only in the case 
of armed robbery, where the probability of prosecution was thought to be 
lower for female victims. Age of the victim was perceived as relevant in 
cases of robbery and sexual assault, but neither age nor sex were perceived as 
relevant to the prosecution decision in cases of burglary, assault with a 
knife, or homicide.10 
Finally, many studies have indicated that the existence of a prior rela­
tionship between victim and suspect reduces the probability of a formal 
action on the part of the police (Reiss, 1971; Black, 1980).11 LaFave (1965), 
whose study of arrest practices conducted on behalf of the American Bar 
Foundation was based upon a survey of practices in three states, observed 
that where the parties concerned "are in a continuing legitimate relation­
ship with each other, such as neighbors, landlord and tenant or parties to a 
contract," the police generally feel that "such disputes are principally pri­
vate in nature and that as long as the conduct is not serious, enforcement 
resources need not be diverted to it" (119). This attitude was adopted more 
forcefully where a "domestic dispute" was concerned. LaFave cited the 
Detroit police manual of 1955 exhorting the police to "recognize the sanc­
tity of the home and endeavor diplomatically to quell the disturbance and 
create peace without making an arrest" (ibid., 121). 
Police respondents in the INSLAW study also believed that in physical 
assault cases prosecution would be more likely where the parties were 
strangers. Further, where "nonstranger" cases were processed by the police, 
there was some indication that the type of offense may be downgraded.12 
However, the question of police response in nonstranger cases—and in par­
ticular domestic violence cases—has been the subject of considerable con­
troversy in recent years owing to dissatisfaction on the part of feminist 
groups and their sympathizers with the effective "decriminalization" of 
domestic violence. Practices may have been changing in this area even 
before the widespread legislative reforms that have been adopted in recent 
years (Zalman, 1991). 
Relevance of Victims' Views. The police force is generally perceived 
in the literature as a bureaucratic institution whose decision making will 
be influenced by institutional norms and requirements, exercised in accor­
dance with professional judgment. This view does not seem to allow 
much scope for sensitivity to the views expressed by the complaining 
citizen (Elias, 1986:142). Data supporting this hypothesis are cited by 
Ziegenhagen (1977), who points out, drawing from the survey data col­
lected by Ennis in 1967, that the police did not respond to 23% of calls on 
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the part of citizens, and that in a quarter of the cases in which they did 
respond, the matter was not regarded by the police as a crime. 
However, many studies of police decision making indicate that, even 
before the recent victim-related reforms, the victim's views have carried 
considerable weight in the process. Thus Black (1980:93) found that in 
cases in which the victim expressed a desire for an arrest, an arrest was 
made in 72% of the felony cases and 87% of the misdemeanors, whereas 
where the victim wished no arrest to be made the respective percentages 
were 9% and 14%.13 The author differentiates between incidents where the 
police observed the offenses and other cases, and concludes: "Plainly the 
complainant's preference is a more powerful situational factor than evi­
dence, although the two operate jointly" (ibid.). LaFave (1965) observes 
that "in many cases involving minor offenses, police feel that prosecution 
should be undertaken only if this is the desire of the victim" (49). 
Hohenstein (1969), in the study referred to above of police dispositions 
regarding juveniles in Philadelphia, concludes that "the attitude of the 
victim was the primary factor influencing the decision" (149; see also 
Lundman et al., 1978). 
The findings of Hernon and Forst (1983) were less positive in this re­
spect. While 58% of the victims reported at least some influence in the 
handling of their cases, 65% of the police respondents were of the opinion 
that the victim was "not involved at all." Forty-eight percent thought that 
he or she should be more involved. Moreover, "involvement" may be a 
very limited phenomenon, having been defined in this study as "non­
binding involvement—the victim is consulted and may express an opin­
ion, but the decision maker is not required to follow the victim's wishes." 
Similarly, some ambiguity and mutuality in police-victim decision making 
were observed by Cretney and Davis (1995:chap. 4) in their British study. 
Cases in which there was a prior relationship between the suspect and 
the victim present a special problem in this context. It has been noted that 
the police often view such cases as "private disputes" (LaFave, 1965; see 
also Parnas, 1967; Smith, 1983:4). This may lead to a reluctance on their 
part to process the complaint as a criminal case (McLeod, 1983:395-98). 
However, it may also lead the police to take special note of the victim's 
views when deciding how to proceed.14 Police reluctance to proceed with 
these cases is based partly on their anticipation that the victim will subse­
quently change his or her mind and attempt to withdraw the complaint 
(LaFave, 1965:120). 
Smith (1983) studied two samples of nonstranger violence, one resulting 
in court adjudication, the other in a mediation process. She found that 
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while the police arrested the suspect in 49% and 27% of the respective 
samples, "between 81% and 94% of the complainants would have wanted 
an arrest to be carried out" (Smith, 1983:30). When compared with Black's 
data cited above, which indicates that victims' views were generally taken 
into account, these findings seemed to lend some support to the first of the 
two hypotheses posited here, namely, that there was a greater reluctance 
on the part of the police to accede to the victim's wishes in prior-
relationship cases. 
Victims' Information. One characteristic of the victim's relationship 
with the police, as with other criminal justice agencies, is the unidirec­
tional flow of information. The victim is called upon to supply all the 
information in his or her possession, but the police have traditionally been 
under no duty to reciprocate, even to the extent of keeping the victim 
informed about the degree of progress made in the investigation, about 
whether or not the suspect has been arrested or released on bail, about the 
filing of charges, and so on. Thus the English study referred to above found 
that victims' knowledge about their cases was "both scanty and rather 
patchy" (Shapland et al., 1985:49). Similar findings emerged from the 
American study conducted by Hernon and Forst (1983).15 
The Victim and the Prosecution 
Although most prosecutions are generated as a result of an act perpe­
trated against an individual (or corporate) victim, the public prosecutor 
assumes the role of representative of society as a whole. Insofar as the 
prosecutor is concerned with the victim's interests, this derives either 
from his or her recognition that it was the victim's complaint which gave 
rise to the file being considered, or from more practical concerns regard­
ing the victim's testimony, on which the possibility of a successful prose­
cution may rest. However, while "prosecutors have been in the forefront 
of the victims' rights movement, and many are sensitive to victims' inter­
ests" (Gittler, 1984:144), there may be institutional pressures militating 
against consideration of victims' interests on the part of prosecutors. The 
available data on the prosecution's relationship to the victim will now be 
reviewed. 
Contacts. "Prosecutors work, over a period of time, with police offi­
cers, defense attorneys, and judges, and develop continuing relationships 
with such individuals. In contrast, the prosecutor's contact with any one 
victim is relatively brief and limited" (ibid.). 
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The modal response for the estimated number of contacts with the prose­
cutor for victims of robbery, burglary, and assault in the Hernon and Forst 
study was one or none.16 The mean number of contacts, however, ranged 
from 2.3 to 3.0 for burglary to 10.9 to 11.1 for homicide (Hernon and Forst, 
1983:24-27). These figures do not differ substantially from the estimated 
number of contacts with the police. As to the topic of conversation, "evi­
dence, facts of the case" accounted here for between 51 % (victim's estimate) 
to 55% (prosecutor's estimate) of the conversation time—somewhat less 
than for the police-victim contacts. However, the difference is accounted for 
by a greater attention to "court matters" (35% in the victim's estimate, 26% 
in the prosecutor's), while the proportion of the conversation time devoted 
to "victim's problems and concerns" was very similar here (13% in the 
victim's view, 17% in the prosecutor's) as compared with 14%-15% of the 
police-victim contacts. 
Relevance of Victim Harm. The somewhat limited evidence available 
seems to indicate, surprisingly, that the amount of harm inflicted on the 
victim may not have played an important role in the decision to prosecute. 
Hernon and Forst (1983) found that prosecutors did not perceive the fact 
that the offense resulted in the loss of at least $1,000 worth of property, or 
that the victim needed psychological counseling, as relevant to the prosecu­
tion decision for any of the following five offenses considered: homicide, 
sexual assault, aggravated assault, robbery, and burglary. Moreover, the fact 
that the victim had to be hospitalized for at least 10 days affected only 
prosecutions for sexual assault. However, these negative findings (sup­
ported also by Fisher, 1984) may have been a function of the arbitrary 
choice of variables;17 perhaps correlations between prosecution decision 
making and physical injury would have been significant. Further, the au­
thors of this study found that there was a large amount of variance among 
respondents. This, in a relatively small sample, would tend to reduce the 
significance of the other variables. 
Further evidence of the limited significance of victim harm in prosecu­
torial decision making was found in the study conducted by Stanko (1981­
82). Her study, conducted in New York County's prosecutor's offices in 
1975 and 1976, concluded that a critical factor in the screening decision 
with regard to serious felonies18 was the prosecutor's prediction of the 
court (judge and jury) reaction to the victim's evidence—or what the au­
thor termed the victim's "stereotypical credibility" (see below). "The re­
sult may be that the victim's quest for justice is often determined more by 
stereotypes than by actual harm rendered against them by assailants" 
(238). 
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Relevance of Other Victim Characteristics. Hernon and Forst (1983) 
found that sex, age, and prior relationship were generally perceived by 
prosecutors as not relevant to the prosecution decision, with the exception 
that for knife assault, prosecution was more likely where the suspect was a 
stranger, and for sexual assault where the victim was over 65 years old. 
Stanko (1981-82), as noted, found that prosecutors were apparently influ­
enced by factors that they believed would influence judges and juries (but 
perhaps were also consistent with their own philosophies, see p. 238): "A 
pleasant appearance, residence in a good neighborhood, a respectable job or 
occupation, lack of nervous mannerisms, and an ability to articulate 
clearly, are decided advantages. Inferences that a victim might be a prosti­
tute or pimp, a homosexual, or an alcoholic, on the other hand, may seri­
ously damage a victim's credibility" (230). 
Similarly, Williams (1976), in her study of 5,042 alleged violent crimes 
brought before the District of Columbia prosecutors in 1973, hypothesized 
that prosecutors would be influenced by the extent to which the victim 
appeared to be an innocent and conforming citizen, taking note of such 
factors as the victim's contributory responsibility for the commission of 
the offense and his or her prior relationship with the suspect. The victim's 
employment and degree of cooperation were also hypothesized to influ­
ence the decision to prosecute. The author found that these hypotheses 
were partially validated, in particular that cases of "perceived provocation 
or participation were more likely to be 'no-papered' " (Williams, 1976:205). 
The author concluded that the prosecutor, more than the court, took vic­
tim characteristics into consideration in the decision-making process, "per­
haps in anticipation of how the judge and jury will perceive the victim" 
(207). This might explain the findings of another researcher that the prose­
cution in South Carolina was less likely to seek the death penalty when 
the victim was black (Paternoster, 1984). 
Smith (1983), in her study of nonstranger violence, reviewed the find­
ings of the studies conducted in New York City by the Vera Institute and 
the Victim Services Agency, and concludes: "The findings of these studies 
suggest that prosecutors often believe (a) that, in general, complainants 
who know the defendant often make uncooperative witnesses, (b) that 
defendants in relationship cases should normally be prosecuted only if the 
complainant demands it, and (c) that defendants in relationship cases, 
when prosecuted, do not merit as severe a punishment as defendants con­
victed of victimizing a stranger" (4). Williams (1976) also found that "cases 
appeared to be dropped if they involved a family relationship and pursued if 
the victim and defendants were strangers" (206). 
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Relevance of Victims' Views. Since the prosecutor's initial "contact" 
with the victim is generally in the form of a file conveyed by the police, it 
might be anticipated that such depersonalization would limit the influ­
ence of the victim's views on the progress of the case. Moreover, since the 
prosecutor is concerned with processing large numbers of files with a maxi­
mum amount of efficiency in a minimum amount of time, his or her main 
reference groups for this purpose are inevitably defense counsel and the 
courts, with whom the processing must be negotiated.19 Thus "there is 
simply little that compels prosecutors to seek and consider the opinions of 
complainants." Indeed, it is "functional to distance them from the deci­
sion making process" (Davis, Russell, and Kunreuther, 1980:58, 59). 
Nor do ideological considerations necessarily weigh in favor of prosecu­
tors' taking into account the views of victims. Prosecutors perform a public 
function and may not necessarily identify with the victims whose injuries 
led to the state's involvement. Indeed, English bar etiquette expressly pro­
hibits contacts between prosecuting barrister and complaining witness 
before the giving of evidence (Shapland et al., 1985:68-69) -20 American prose­
cutors, while not subject to such restrictions, were reported to have taken 
steps to neutralize the potential impact of the victims' views on the court 
proceedings (McDonald, 1977). Moreover, they were thought to have been 
particularly suspicious of victims who appeared to be using the criminal 
justice system to be furthering their own "private disputes" in such matters 
as check forgery and domestic disputes (McDonald 1976a; and see Hall, 
1975:950, n. 97). However, even before the recent developments in this area, 
the American Bar Association Standards specified that prosecutors should 
take into account victim attitudes and sentiments (McDonald, 1982). 
Whether they were influenced by the American Bar Association Stan­
dards or not, the limited data available seem to indicate a somewhat higher 
level of victim input into the prosecutors' decision making than seems to 
have been generally thought (cf. Miller, 1969; Hall, 1975). The prosecutors 
themselves, at least, were of the opinion, according to the INSLAW study, 
that victims were involved in the criminal justice system, with 59% tak­
ing the view that the victim is "somewhat" involved, and 20% responding 
that he or she is involved "a great deal" (Hernon and Forst, 1983). Whether, 
when considering the victim's involvement in the criminal justice system, 
respondents had in mind the prosecution stages is an open question. An­
other study conducted by INSLAW (Buchner et al., 1983, 1984) found that 
while most prosecutors stated that their decisions were influenced by the 
victim's needs, at only one of three sites surveyed did they consult victims 
before negotiating a plea bargain in more than 50% of the cases. Similar 
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unevenness was found in a survey conducted by Georgetown University of 
six jurisdictions in which 74% of prosecutors responded that the victim's 
views were taken into consideration before a plea bargain was concluded 
(McDonald, 1982). In a simulation study reported in the same paper, only 
41% of the sample of prosecutors selected the "Victim Attitude" card 
before making a decision on a plea bargain. Moreover, among Elias's sam­
ple (1983) of 342 victims of violence in Brooklyn and Newark, only 12% 
indicated that they had been consulted by the prosecutor. Of these, approxi­
mately one-half felt that their views had been adopted (108). 
The low consultation rate reported in Elias's study is consistent with 
the criticisms of victims' rights advocates, but not with the responses of 
prosecutors presented above. It may be that there are cases in which prose­
cutors feel that they have formed an impression of the victim's attitude, 
yet the victim feels he or she has not been consulted. 
The degree of input on the part of the victim may be connected with 
the type of case. Thus McDonald (1976a) found that prosecutors fre­
quently consult the victim in serious cases. Hall, on the other hand, 
found from his Tennessee survey that while in serious cases (such as 
homicide) "the adamant victim could overcome the prosecutor's reluc­
tance to charge" (1975:948),21 in nonserious cases it was the reluctant 
victim's desire not to prosecute that was likely to be honored by the 
prosecutor (951). Further, Davis et al. (1980) found that in nonstranger 
cases prosecutors were reluctant to proceed "without a clear expression of 
interest from the complainant" (see also Smith, 1983). 
Victims' Information. The frequency of contacts between prosecutor 
and victim and the topics of these contacts do not indicate much attempt 
on the part of prosecutors to keep the victim informed. Kress (1976) al­
luded specifically to the prosecutor's "cavalier attitude" and failure to 
keep the victim informed (10). However, Connick and Davis (1981) noted, 
on the basis of a small-sample study in New York City, that where the 
victim and offender were personally acquainted, considerably more effort 
was taken in this respect; in 42% of these cases the victim received expla­
nations as compared with only 11% of the stranger cases (16). 
The Victim and the Trial 
The problems encountered by victims in their capacity as witnesses in the 
criminal trial are by now widely recognized, as evidenced by the rapid 
growth of victim/witness programs and related legislation (see below, part 
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3). However, there have been only a few empirical studies concerned spe­
cifically with witness-related problems. Notable examples are Cannavale 
and Falcon's (1976) study of witness cooperation, and the Vera Founda-
tion's study of the role of the complaining witness in an urban criminal 
court (Davis, Russell, and Kunreuther, 1980). Reference may also be made 
to a seminal article by Ash (1972). However, some of the studies referred to 
earlier that focus on the experiences and attitudes of victims in the crimi­
nal justice system, such as the Holmstrom and Burgess (1978) rape study, 
the study by Elias (1983) of victims of violent crimes, and the English study 
by Shapland et al. (1985), included sections dealing with this stage of the 
criminal process. Another pioneering study specifically differentiated be­
tween the experiences and attitudes of victim/witnesses and witnesses 
who had not been victims (Knudten et al., 1976). There has also been a 
small amount of research relating specifically to the courtroom experi­
ences of victims, notably in Britain (see, e.g., McBamet, 1976; and the 
recent in-depth study by Rock, 1993). 
The generally neglectful attitude toward the victim at this stage of the 
criminal process was summarized by Davis et al. (1980) as follows: "No­
one seems to have the time or the interest to find out what he wants, nor to 
make an effort to let him know what is happening, or why" (64). Citing the 
earlier work of Ash, the authors note that the result of this situation for the 
victim is an experience that is "dreary, time-wasting, depressing, confus­
ing, frustrating, numbing and seemingly endless." (See also Shapland et al., 
1985:62-63; McDonald, 1977.) Among the specific complaints alluded to 
by Davis et al. were (a) trial delays; (b) failure to keep victims informed; (c) 
inappropriate physical accommodation in the waiting room and the court­
room, often involving undue proximity to the defendant and his or her 
supporters; (d) victimization by the defendant and/or his or her supporters; 
(e) loss of time; (f) expenses not compensated for; (g) delay in returning 
property required as evidence, and damage to such property. 
A different type of criticism relates to the nature of the adversary pro­
ceedings in the courtroom. Much of the literature on this topic has been 
connected with proceedings at rape trials and the cross-examination of 
women victims (Berger, 1977; Adler, 1987). The defense strategy of "blam­
ing the victim" (Holmstrom and Burgess, 1978:212) is often considered a 
particularly oppressive characteristic of the adversary system. Moreover, 
the "degradation" inherent in the course of cross-examination, such as 
cutting into answers and using vilifying techniques (Shapland et al., 
1985:65-66; Rock, 1993:34), is not restricted to rape victims (McBarnet, 
1976:7). Prosecutorial management strategies may be even more unsettling 
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(Shapland et al.; 1985:67). However, while most of the writers in the 
victim-oriented literature seem to be in agreement on the existence of 
these problems, it is not clear how far these techniques have a destructive 
effect on the victim/witness. Shapland's study found that "victims . .  . ex­
pected some problem in being able to tell their story and in being able to 
convey their idea of their identity as victims. They took active steps to 
accomplish this, mostly to their own satisfaction7' (ibid.). Moreover, 
McBamet (1976:14) suggests that a "morally indignant and highly involved 
victim" may even adopt an active, aggressive role. 
The lack of consideration for the victim/witness at this stage, as at 
other stages of the criminal justice system, seems to have stemmed primar­
ily from a combination of two factors. The first factor, which will be 
considered further in chapter 12, is the absence of any legal or conceptual 
role for the victim at these stages. Although he or she is the prime mover 
in the process that has been set in motion, legally the victim's role in court 
has been merely that of a witness (Forer, 1980). The second factor derives 
from the bureaucratic needs and interests of the institutionalized agencies 
(judge, prosecutor, and defense counsel) which control the process. For if 
students of the court system such as Blumberg (1979) and Feeley (1979) 
have pointed out how the interests of the defendant, who has a recognized 
role in the process, tend to become submerged by bureaucratic consider­
ations, how much more true is this of the victim, who until now has had 
no recognized role. In most cases there would be a "deal" (plea bargain), to 
which the victim would not be a party; in other cases, the indignity of the 
courtroom experience described above. 
The Victim and the Jury 
Theoretically, there is little opportunity for juries, in the course of their 
decision making, to take into consideration victim-related factors. For, 
unlike the other agencies reviewed in this chapter, the jury is not in­
vested with discretionary powers. Except in the relatively rare—albeit 
significant—cases in which the jury has a sentencing function, its official 
function is to determine whether the legal requirements of the defen-
dant's guilt have been established and to convict or acquit accordingly. In 
the majority of cases the conduct of the victim will not formally affect 
this verdict but will be relevant only as an aggravating or mitigating 
factor in determining the sentence. To this rule there are some excep­
tions: the most notable case in which victim conduct will be legally 
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relevant to the verdict involves the issue of consent in rape. Consent, of 
course, would be a valid defense to many other charges, such as theft and 
trespass, but is rarely an issue in such cases. The concept of provocation 
has only limited recognition in criminal law, while "victim precipita­
tion" and contributory negligence are generally considered irrelevant to 
issues of criminal responsibility (see Gobert, 1977; Wolfgang, 1985.) 
However, the research conducted by Kalven and Zeisel (1966) and their 
colleagues—the so-called Chicago Jury Project—established that juries are 
not guided solely by the official legal norms. Where they feel that the 
conviction of a defendant would be unjust, even if the elements of the 
offense have been proven, they will register an acquittal. This is known as 
"jury equity." The victim's conduct could clearly provoke such a verdict, if 
the jury were to feel that he or she was in some way blameworthy and that 
consequently it would be unfair to lay all the responsibility at the defen-
dant's door. 
Possibilities of this nature have led social psychologists to formulate 
various hypotheses regarding jury decision making given certain victim 
characteristics. These hypotheses have been developed within the theoreti­
cal frameworks referred to earlier, in particular, attribution theory and the 
just-world theory. Since there seems to have been little opportunity to 
explore the hypotheses referred to in the course of actual jury deliberations 
at a trial, the experiments are generally conducted with student samples or 
with samples of citizens qualified for jury service. 
While there is no place here for an in-depth analysis of the extensive 
literature in this area, fraught as it is with conflicting hypotheses and 
methodological problems (Luginbuhl and Frederick, 1978), brief mention 
will be made of some of the findings. The following summary is derived in 
part from the studies themselves, but mainly from the reviews by Selig­
man et al. (1977), Field (1978), Luginbuhl and Frederick (1978), and Koch 
and Bean (n.d.). Following the analysis in the previous sections, here, too, 
one may distinguish between findings related to the effects of (a) victim 
harm, (b) victim characteristics in general, and (c) victim-offender relation­
ships. Contacts with the victim, taking into account the victim's desires, 
and keeping the victim informed do not seem to be relevant in the present 
context. It should be noted that the research summarized here relates 
almost exclusively to the offense of rape. 
Victim Harm. Gold et al. (1978) found that victims were assigned less 
responsibility the more severe the crime ("sympathetic reaction pattern"). 
Field (1978) cites studies indicating the relevance of the degree of force 
used against the victim. Krulewitz and Nash (1979), on the other hand, 
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hypothesized that rape victims would be held more responsible where the 
rape succeeded than where an attempt failed. 
Victim Characteristics. A number of studies are cited in the reviews 
referring to the importance of the appearance of the victim (Field, 1978), 
and in particular his or her (usually her) attractiveness (Seligman et alv 
1977; Field, 1978; Luginbuhl and Frederick, 1978) and dress (Field, 1978). 
Similarly, importance is also attached to the age of the victim (Field, 1978), 
marital status (Seligman et al., 1977; Field, 1978), social role (Seligman et 
al., 1977), and "respectability" (Luginbuhl and Frederick, 1978; Koch and 
Bean, n.d.). Finally, attention is paid in rape cases to the victim's prior 
sexual experience (Field, 1978) and previous rape history (Seligman et al., 
1977). The hypotheses do not always operate in the expected direction. 
Thus, according to some studies, the more "respectable" victim of a sexual 
assault is perceived to be more at fault than the less "respectable" 
victim—perhaps because the observer, especially if female, identifies with 
the victim and wishes to protect herself from such an occurrence. Simi­
larly, while physical attractiveness in a rape victim may be seen by some to 
provoke a rape and thereby increase the victim's responsibility, an alterna­
tive hypothesis holds that a less attractive victim is the more responsible, 
since she must have provoked the offender in some way (Seligman et al., 
1977). 
Victim-Offender Relationship. The victim's prior relationship with the 
offender is seen to affect the respondent's attitudes (Seligman et al., 1977; 
Luginbuhl and Frederick, 1978; Field, 1978). Other studies attribute impor­
tance to the degree of resistance displayed by the victim. The experimental 
nature of the research in this field and the lack of unanimity in the findings 
clearly limit the policy conclusions that may be drawn at this stage. How­
ever, they clearly suggest that victim characteristics may play a part in the 
decision-making processes of the criminal justice system beyond the role 
legally attributed to these characteristics, in particular with regard to deci­
sions by lay persons. Moreover, these decisions appear generally to dero­
gate in some way from the victim's recognized role—or nonrole—in the 
system, since it appears that decision makers may often be "judging" the 
victim, not just the defendant.22 These issues clearly require further eluci­
dation. Note should also be taken of the distinction made by Luginbuhl 
and Frederick (1978) between attributions by persons such as jurors who 
have been explicitly invested with the task of judgment (labeled by the 
authors as the "jury process model") and attributions made in a less struc­
tured situation (e.g., observing a criminal incident in the street, labeled the 
"naive observer model"). Attributions falling in the second category are 
 43 The Victim's Traditional Role in the System
also relevant to this study, but not in the context of jury decision making. 
The authors suggest that the failure to make this differentiation may have 
contributed to the conflicting nature of the research findings. 
The Victim and the Sentencing Judge 
Victim-fudge Contacts. Unlike in the case of the police and to some 
extent the prosecutor, the traditional criminal justice system does not 
provide for informal contacts between victims and the sentencing judge. 
The main opportunity for contact between these two parties would nor­
mally be during the course of the trial, when the victim testifies. However, 
this opportunity is limited to the minority of instances in which the case 
goes to trial, whereas the majority of cases terminate in a plea bargain. In 
these cases, insofar as the judge obtains information regarding the victim, 
it will generally be secondhand via the prosecutor or the probation officer's 
report (Hall, 1975:953), or occasionally at the rather brief pretrial proceed­
ings, which will be considered below. Thus, judges are the least likely of all 
criminal justice agencies to have contact with victims, and the number of 
contacts they do have are fewer than for most other criminal justice offi­
cials (Hernon and Forst, 1983).23 In her study of nonstranger violence, 
Smith (1983) found that "only 26% of the victims reported any interaction 
with the judge" (35). 
Relevance of Victim Harm. Traditional concepts of criminal law have 
measured the seriousness of crime in terms of two main dimensions: the 
amount of harm inflicted, and the mental state of the perpetrator. Thus 
manslaughter is more serious than wounding because of the greater harm 
inflicted; murder is more serious than manslaughter because of a higher 
degree of intentionality or foreseeability. 
The relevance of these concepts to the issue of sentence and punish­
ment, as distinct from the issue of guilt, was seriously questioned by the 
positivist school of criminology with its concept of the individualization 
of punishment (Saleilles, 1911). According to this approach, the serious­
ness of the crime was relevant only to the issue of guilt, whereas the 
disposition was based entirely on characteristics related to the personality 
of the offender, in particular his or her potential for rehabilitation on the 
one hand, and dangerousness (l'etat dangereux) on the other.24 However, 
the older concepts, while they never disappeared from the courtroom, have 
recently been reaffirmed in the academic literature with the rise of the 
justice or just-deserts model of criminal justice (Fogel, 1975; von Hirsch, 
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1976), which has revived the view that punishment should be a function of 
the measure of harm inflicted by the offense and the degree of culpability 
of the offender (von Hirsch, 1976).25 Moreover, while the perceived rele­
vance of the offender's culpability—in the sense of his or her mental atti­
tude to the criminal act—has been the subject of some controversy in the 
literature (see Sebba, 1984), the relevance of the degree of harm inflicted in 
determining the appropriateness of the punishment seems to be widely 
acknowledged.26 Indeed, considerable thought has been devoted to the ques­
tion of scientific methodology for developing measures to establish a scale 
of offense seriousness based upon the degree of harm inflicted, and, as 
noted, it has been suggested that such a scale should form the basis of 
sentencing policy (Wolfgang, 1976; and see below, chap. 6). It would thus be 
expected that the degree of victim harm would be reflected not only in 
legal categories laid down by statute but also in the actual dispositions 
ordered by the sentencing court. 
How far have modern court practices—before the introduction of recent 
reforms such as "structured" sentencing and victim-impact statements— 
taken into consideration victim harm in determining the sentence? The 
examination of this issue is fraught with methodological difficulties. First, 
because of the virtually unlimited number of variables relating to offense, 
offender, victim, judge, and so on, which may theoretically affect the disposi­
tion, it is extremely difficult to obtain sufficiently accurate and complete 
data and a large enough sample to enable adequate control of these poten­
tially relevant variables. Second, the degree of harm inflicted, the indepen­
dent variable being considered here, is difficult to measure across different 
types of offense, since the nature of the harm inflicted may be qualitatively 
different; the use of psychophysical scaling (Sellin and Wolfgang, 1964, 
1978) has been proposed as one of the more sophisticated methods of over­
coming this problem. Third, the dependent variable is also problematic, 
since dispositions, too, may vary not only quantitatively but also qualita-
tively—prison, fine, probation, and so on (cf. Sebba, 1978). However, some 
attention has been devoted in recent years to the possibilities of unidimen­
sionable scaling of this variable (see Erickson and Gibbs, 1979; Sebba and 
Nathan, 1984). Perhaps because of these methodological difficulties, the 
findings of the studies have not been unequivocal regarding the impact of 
victim harm. 
Edward Green's analysis (1961) of a large sample of convictions in the 
Philadelphia criminal court in 1956 and 1957 attributed considerable im­
portance to victim harm in the sentencing decision. After determining the 
probability of a penitentiary sentence for each type of offense, the author 
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commented: "The above scale of offenses suggests that the criteria by 
which the judge weighs the relative gravity of different forms of criminal 
behavior consist of three interconnecting variables, each an aspect of the 
offender-victim relationship" (Green, 1961:39; emphasis added). 
The three victim-related variables referred to by Green were "the speci­
ficity of the victim" (whether an individual, a business, or "the public"); 
"the degree of personal contact between the offender and the victim"; and 
"the degree of bodily injury." He considered that these three combined 
variables reflected a moral principle, which he called the "inviolability of 
personality"; and while he noted other variables which affected the sever­
ity of the sentence, inviolability of personality appeared to be "the para­
mount value . . . around which the reorganization of penal values is taking 
place." 
There are certain limitations to this analysis. First, the classification of 
offenses was somewhat arbitrary; in particular, it is questionable whether 
"narcotics violations" should have been classified with offenses involving 
"personal contact between the offender and the victim" (40). Second, the 
dependent variable, as noted, related not to the duration of prison sen­
tences but only to their probability of imposition. Third, the analysis dealt 
with a single independent variable rather than being multivariate. The 
main weakness, however, is that comparisons were exclusively among 
offense categories. It was shown that felonious assault was dealt with more 
severely than robbery because of the assumed greater seriousness of the 
injury inflicted by such offenses. But it was not shown that assaults involv­
ing greater harm were sentenced more severely than assaults inflicting 
lesser harm. 
Hogarth (1971), in his study of the sentencing philosophy of Ontario 
magistrates, employed more sophisticated multivariate modes of analysis, 
such as discriminant function analysis, and found that the seriousness of 
crime, as measured by the Sellin-Wolfgang scaling system, which, as noted, 
lays emphasis on the amount of harm inflicted, was a predictor of both the 
type of sentence imposed and the duration of institutional sentences (347­
49). However, when a sample of magistrates was asked to specify what 
information was relevant for the sentencing decision, only 29% responded 
that information on the "degree of personal injury or violence" was essen­
tial and 12% that the "amount of damage or loss to property" was essential. 
Of the sample, 42% and 59%, respectively, stated that this information was 
nonessential (232, 281). The magistrates attributed greater importance to 
information regarding the offender's culpability, in particular the degree of 
planning and premeditation involved in the commission of the offense, with 
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62% stating that this information was essential. The author commented 
that "most magistrates consider the 'moral quality' of the criminal act to be 
more important than the actual harm incurred by the victim" (233). It may 
also be noted in this context that Green (1961) in his elaboration of his 
degree-of-bodily-injury variable explained that "the severity of the sen­
tences varies directly with the extent to which the criminal intent or the 
criminal act embodies the element of bodily harm" (41). Thus, the signifi­
cance of victim harm for the sentencing court may be related more to the 
harm intended than the harm inflicted. 
Some later studies dealt more specifically with the impact of degrees of 
victim harm on the sentencing decision. Most of these tended to detract 
somewhat from the hypothesis regarding the relevance of victim harm for 
this decision. Myers (1979), in her study of 205 dispositions following trial 
in Indiana, found that harm sustained was not a significant variable. This 
variable was measured by the type of harm inflicted: injury to the person, 
to property, to both, or to neither. The dependent variable was whether or 
not a prison sentence was imposed. Hernon and Forst (1983) found on the 
basis of their "scenario" cases27 that the judges' responses on their sentenc­
ing decisions were affected by victim harm only in the case of knife as­
saults, and only in respect of one of the three indicators harm variables 
employed, namely, "10 days hospitalization." 
Conklin (1972), on the other hand, in a study of robbery cases in Boston 
in which he used multiple regression analysis, found that the infliction of 
physical injury on the victim or the loss of more than $100 increased the 
probability that the offender would be bound over to a superior court, 
"where he was usually indicted and often sentenced to a state prison" 
(171). However, the author also found that robberies involving $100 or 
more were less likely to result in findings of guilt (168-69). Mention may 
also be made here of a study of the lower court in New Haven, Connecticut 
(Feeley, 1979:130-41), where regression analysis indicated that a more 
serious offense or the use of a weapon increased the probability of convic­
tion but not the severity of the sentence (for which a scale was employed). 
However, "public order" offenses were sentenced less severely than other 
types of offense, providing some support for Green's thesis regarding the 
"inviolability of the victim," since public order offenses have no personal 
victim, whereas most, although not all, of the other types of offense have 
such victims. 
There are certain cases in which there is irrefutable evidence that the 
court has taken note of victim harm, namely, where the disposition in­
cludes an order to the defendant to pay restitution to the victim, whether 
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as a condition of probation or otherwise. As noted above, although this 
power has traditionally been vested in the court, until recently its use was 
somewhat circumscribed (McDonald, 1977). It seems that in the past nei­
ther prosecutor nor judge placed a high priority on determining the amount 
of loss inflicted upon the victim in a process that was concerned primarily 
with proving the offender's guilt. The recent attempts to revive and expand 
this remedy imply the placing of increased emphasis on victim harm (see 
chap. 7). 
Perhaps too much significance should not be attributed to those studies 
that appeared to indicate that the degree of harm inflicted upon the victim 
was of only limited relevance to the severity of the sentence. As noted, there 
are a number of methodological problems complicating research in this 
area. It should also be taken into account that, at least in nontrial cases, the 
offense for which the sentence is being imposed is, as a result of plea bargain­
ing, not that which the defendant was actually thought to have committed, 
and this may inhibit a genuine attempt to take victim harm into account. It 
has also been suggested that judges may have paid limited attention to the 
degree of victim harm on the assumption that this had been considered at 
the earlier stages of the criminal justice process, such as the prosecution 
decision or the probation officer's recommendation (Myers, 1979), although 
in this last study victim harm as such was not found to have affected these 
decisions either. 
It certainly seems surprising, if, as some of these studies suggest, the 
degree of harm inflicted on the victim has been of only marginal relevance 
to the severity of the sentence. It is equally surprising how little informa­
tion is available on this very fundamental matter, which touches on the 
root of the penal system. On the one hand, insofar as there is a trend 
toward the adoption of structured sentencing, based upon a "desert" phi­
losophy (see below, chap. 7), it may be anticipated that victim harm will be 
reflected therein, although the court's discretion in this matter will be 
reduced. On the other hand, victim-impact statements are intended to 
enhance the court's sensitivity to victim harm at the sentencing stage. 
Relevance of Other Victim Characteristics. Unlike victim harm, which 
is regarded as a legitimate factor in the determination of the severity of the 
punishment, other victim characteristics such as sociodemographic vari­
ables are not generally formally recognized as relevant to conviction or 
sentence, although certain forms of victim conduct, such as provocation, 
might be considered relevant (see, e.g., Dawson, 1969:91-92). However, 
attribution theory has been invoked to hypothesize that such variables 
might in fact have considerable significance, and some support has been 
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found for such hypotheses both in the social psychological literature (see 
Denno and Cramer, 1976:217-19; Ziegenhagen, 1977:83-84) and in crimi­
nological and sociological studies. 
Thus, while Hernon and Forst (1983) found the sex variable not to be 
significant, Myers (1979) found that a prison sentence was somewhat more 
likely where the victim was a woman (0.1 > p > 0.05; 1979, table 2). The 
victim's age, employment record, and criminal record were not found to be 
significant. Hernon and Forst (1983) found the victim's age to be significant 
only for homicide and sexual assault. Denno and Cramer (1976), who at­
tempted specifically to test hypotheses derived from attribution theory, 
found victim characteristics such as age, ethnic identity, appearance, and 
attractiveness to have rather low correlations with the sentencing deci­
sion. There were slightly stronger associations between ethnic identity 
(Kendall's Tau, B = 0.23) and attractiveness (0.26) and "judge's reaction."28 
However, there has been considerable research indicating that defendants 
in capital cases are more likely to be sentenced to death when the victim is 
white (see, e.g., Carter, 1988:440), although the decisions in these cases are 
often those of juries rather than judges. Finally, Conklin (1972) found that 
robberies committed against a business were more likely to result in a 
finding of guilty, and following a finding of guilt, defendants in such cases 
were likely to be bound over to a superior court and consequently to 
receive a more severe sentence. 
Victim conduct and victim-offender relationships, however, seem to be 
more strongly associated with disposition outcome. As noted earlier, 
Green (1961) found in his Philadelphia study that there were three critical 
variables, all of which he considered to be connected with victim-offender 
relationships; one of these—specificity of the victim—was also found to 
be significant in the study of Ontario magistrates conducted by Hogarth 
(1971:347, 349). Other studies have paid particular attention to the exis­
tence of a prior relationship. It is sometimes hypothesized that the sen­
tence will be less severe where such a relationship existed. However, 
Hernon and Forst (1983) found support for this hypothesis only in respect 
of the judges' responses regarding homicide. Myers (1979:537) did not find 
this variable significant for judges; her finding for probation officers in this 
respect will be referred to below. "Alleged victim misconduct," on the 
other hand, did have a moderate association with the type of sentence 
imposed in the above study (significant at the 10% level). Similarly, Denno 
and Cramer (1976) found that victim provocation was "moderately re­
lated" to the defendant's sentence (Kendall's Tau, B = 0.28), and "strongly 
associated" [B = 0.41) with "judge's reaction." 
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Relevance of Victims' Views. Where a full trial takes place, the court 
may form some impression regarding the effects of the offense on the 
victim on the basis of the victim's own testimony. In other cases, some 
information in this respect may be conveyed indirectly by the prosecutor, 
or possibly by the probation officer, at the sentencing stage. However, 
before the introduction of "victim-impact statements" and "victim state­
ments of opinion," which will be considered below in chapter 8, the sys­
tem did not provide any clear opportunity for the victim's views to be 
made known to the court. 
Bard and Sangrey (1979) observed, however, that "in some jurisdictions 
provision is made for victims to express their feelings to the judge after a 
conviction and before sentencing" (130). Moreover, the effort made by 
prosecutors in some cases to prevent the judge from observing the victim's 
attitude (McDonald, 1977) indicated that such attitudes were thought to 
have a meaningful effect upon the outcome. A study conducted in New 
York showed that victims were much more likely to have an opportunity 
to express their views on the disposition where they had a prior relation­
ship with the offender. In 52% of the prior-relationship cases, the victims 
were consulted on this matter by the prosecutor, as compared with only 
4% of the stranger cases [p < 0.01; see Davis et al., 1980: table 4.1). More­
over, in 21% of the prior-relationship cases, bench conferences were held 
in which the victim's wishes were considered, as compared with 3% of the 
stranger cases [p < 0.1). This supports the view that in prior-relationship 
cases the dispute has to a greater extent been perceived as the victim's 
rather than the state's alone. 
Nevertheless, even in nonstranger cases, it would be unlikely that the 
victim would feel that his or her input had been decisive. Smith (1983), 
whose sample was confined to nonstranger violence, found that 66% of the 
113 victims whose cases reached court felt they had had "little or no 
influence" (37-38). 
Victims' Information. How far is the victim informed of the final out­
come of the case, whether or not he or she was consulted hitherto on the 
course it should follow? Although lack of information was one of the 
recurring complaints referred to by the various studies, the data emerging 
from these studies have not been uniformly negative. 
Hemon and Forst (1983) found that 78% of their sample knew the out­
come of the case in which they were involved, and, where the outcome was 
a sentence by the court, 76% knew what this sentence was. Moreover, they 
found that these figures for the overall sample did not vary greatly across 
sites. 
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Connick and Davis (1981) reported on the results of two studies con­
ducted in New York City. The first study, of victims whose cases were tried 
in the Brooklyn Criminal Court, found that in 66% of the prior-relationship 
cases, but in only 50% of the stranger cases, were victims aware of the 
outcome. Moreover, the later study, of a sample of cases dealt with by the 
Brooklyn Supreme Court, showed that in only 41 % of the stranger cases was 
the victim aware of the outcome. Hagan (1980) found that knowledge of the 
outcome of a case was primarily a function of attendance in court. Overall, 
49.5% were aware of the court's disposition. 
The disparity between the findings of these studies may be partly con­
nected with the relatively small size of the samples. However, while it 
may be considered satisfactory to find samples where more than three out 
of four victims were aware of the outcome of their cases (and some of the 
remainder may have been indifferent), samples in which less than one-half 
were so informed provide fuel for the critics of the system. Moreover, it 
appears that some victims may even be unaware that the court has ordered 
restitution in their favor (Hudson and Chesney, 1978:137). 
Other Stages in the Criminal Justice System 
In addition to the main stages of the criminal justice system discussed 
above—police, prosecution, trial, and sentence—there are other decision-
making stages, also of concern to the victim. In respect to most of these, 
however, little direct information on the victim's role has been available, 
reflecting the absence of any role for the victim at these stages. 
Perhaps the most important decision not included in the previous dis­
cussion is the bail hearing. In most cases, a suspect arrested for alleged 
injury to the victim, having been taken into custody, will be released on 
bail, although in recent years the concept of "preventive detention" has 
increasingly gained recognition. Apart from general considerations of pub­
lic safety and the risk of evasion of justice (which have to be balanced 
against the presumption of innocence and the constitutional prohibition 
on excessive bail), release on bail may present immediate danger to the 
victim. A released suspect may seek vengeance against the victim for 
having complained to the police, or may attempt to intimidate the victim 
in order to prevent incriminating testimony in court; and the risk may be 
aggravated where the parties are known to each other. 
Until recently, however, the bail hearing has not been concerned with 
the victim. According to the Nashville, Tennessee, survey conducted in 
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the 1970s, the victim was only rarely present, and although some prosecu­
tors and judges thought he or she might influence the decision, the author 
concluded that "the victim's impact on this phase of the criminal proceed­
ing is seemingly minimal" (Hall, 1975:946). Studies both in the United 
States and in Britain have indicated that ignorance as to whether the sus­
pect has been released on bail is also an issue of serious concern (Elias, 
1983:105; Shapland et al., 1985:52). 
A related proceeding is the arraignment, at which the charges are for­
mally read and the defendant's plea is heard. Elias (1986) noted that "more 
victims appear at this proceeding than the others," although in his own 
sample "less than one-half of the respondents questioned were present" 
(147, 104). The British survey, on the other hand, found that only 22% of 
respondents knew of any pretrial appearances (Shapland et al., 1985:56-
57). As to their contribution to the proceedings, Elias found that the vic­
tims' role at the arraignment was limited, their main potential input being 
their ability to have charges dropped (1983:104). 
Another important stage where victim-related variables may be relevant 
is the presentence report of the probation officer. Myers (1979) found a weak 
correlation (0.1 < p < 0.05) between victim gender and probation officers' 
recommendation. She also found—contrary to expectations—that proba­
tion officers were "more likely to recommend a prison sentence if the victim 
knew the defendant and had not engaged in conflict with him prior to the 
crime" (537). Myers thus took the view that probation officers were to some 
extent "individualizing" for the victim as well as for the offender. Similarly, 
it appeared from the INSLAW study (Hernon and Forst, 1983) that victims 
occasionally had contact with probation officers, who sometimes referred to 
the victim in the presentence report, a practice subsequently adopted in the 
"victim-impact statement" to be discussed in chapter 8. 
Different views are expressed in the literature as to the consideration 
given to the victim's views in the presentence report (Gittler, 1984: n. 177). 
Historically, the probation officer's role was seen to focus on the offender 
and the offender's needs, and he or she could not be expected to protect the 
victim's interests, which may be in direct conflict with those of the of­
fender. However, here again, as noted, new procedures are developing. 
The final stage of the criminal process in which the victim has an 
interest relates to procedures resulting in the release of the offender from a 
penal institution, by way of parole or clemency. According to the Tennes­
see survey, a victim could appear personally before the Board of Pardons 
and Paroles to express an opinion regarding a parole release or clemency 
decision. However, there were few cases in which victims made their 
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views known to the board either directly or through their influence on the 
opinions of judges or district attorneys. It appears that victim's views, 
when expressed, were taken into account but were given relatively little 
weight (Hall, 1975:963). 
Recent reforms and guidelines aimed at improving the victim's position 
in the justice system (see especially chap. 8 below) have included parole 
and clemency procedures within their ambit. Moreover, added weight may 
now be attributed to victims' views at prerelease proceedings, owing to the 
risk of lawsuits based upon negligent release from institutions (see below, 
chap. 13). 
Remedies for Nonrecognition and Civil Alternatives 
Where the victim is aware of a decision made in the course of the criminal 
process and is dissatisfied with this decision it may be possible to adopt 
one of the following three courses: (1) to compel the criminal justice 
agency to alter its decision, (2) to prosecute or compromise the case, or (3) 
to file a civil claim. 
Where a public agency acts wrongly, or refuses to act, it may be possible 
for an aggrieved citizen to obtain a writ of mandamus from the courts. 
However, there are two serious limitations to this remedy in the present 
context (Miller, 1969; Hall, 1975). First, the courts are reluctant to inter­
fere with the exercise of discretion by a public official. Second, a petitioner 
must prove "standing," that is, that he or she is an interested party. Tradi­
tionally, courts have held that criminal justice is a matter concerning the 
community as a whole rather than any particular individual, including the 
victim (see, e.g., Eacret v. Holmes, 333 P. 2d. 741, 1958). Thus the same 
considerations that gave rise to the victim's grievance—the lack of any 
recognized role in the system—have also operated to prevent the victim's 
securing a judicial remedy for this grievance. However, a number of states 
have provided a statutory remedy in some cases, and one writer (Green, 
1988) has proposed a model statute to enable aggrieved citizens to seek 
declaratory actions in order to bring about the instigation of prosecutions 
by the authorities. 
Some states maintain the possibility of private prosecution; this enables 
a victim, through his or her attorney, to prosecute the alleged offender him­
self. However, the survival of this power has been severely criticized (Miller, 
1969; Ward, 1972; Green, 1988; but see Note, 1955), and at the federal level 
it has been precluded by the Supreme Court (Green, 1988:495). Moreover, it 
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has often been limited by the rule that "private prosecutors may participate 
only if the district attorney controls and manages the prosecution" (Hall, 
1975:976).29 Thus the private prosecution does not serve as a remedy where 
the district attorney refuses to prosecute. 
Conversely, some states have "compromise" statutes, which provide for 
the dismissal of a case where the parties have reached a civil settlement, 
thus providing the victim with some power to prevent a prosecution. How­
ever, this power, too, is subject to limitations (Hall, 1975), and an agree­
ment not to file a complaint may constitute the offense of compounding. 
Most criminal offenses give rise to civil actions in tort—for assault, 
conversion, and so on. The institutional response to the victim's limited 
standing in the criminal justice system is to point to the availability of 
civil remedies. While there is indeed no normative obstacle in the way of 
this remedy, the practical obstacles have generally been almost insur­
mountable: (1) ignorance of the law on the part of the victim,- (2) inability 
to pay legal fees, or the charging of legal fees out of proportion to the 
amount of the claim; (3) ineligibility for legal aid; (4) difficulty in locating 
the offender and proving the case; and (5) the offender's lack of means to 
pay. The possible expansion of these alternatives—the private prosecution 
and the civil suit—will be considered in chapter 12. 
Agencies outside the Criminal Justice System 
While the legal norm traditionally designates the criminal justice system 
as the official mechanism for dealing with victimization in society,30 in 
practice other agencies, both formal and informal, may serve a similar 
function. Indeed, the same social institutions that are thought to fulfill a 
social control function (and thus to contain deviance; see, e.g., Landis, 
1956) may also be of assistance to the victim. Victims may thus have 
recourse to medical, welfare, religious, or educational institutions, as well 
as to the more informal family, peer group, and network units. 
Information regarding the use of these various mechanisms is rather 
sparse. Victimization surveys are usually concerned only with reporting to 
the police and not with the use of alternative agencies. However, a few of 
the in-depth studies of victim experiences (Holmstrom and Burgess, 1978; 
Shapland et al., 1985) have considered the role of hospitals in personal 
injury cases, and mental health professionals have discussed their role in 
the provision of assistance to victims (Evaluation and Change, 1980; Sa­
lasin, 1981). 
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A Victim Services Agency study (Friedman et al., 1982) has cast some 
light on the availability of informal support networks in New York City, as 
well as on the degree to which victims refer to other agencies. A somewhat 
similar study of domestic violence victims has been conducted in Britain 
(Smith, 1989), and a comprehensive Canadian report [Canadian Federal-
Provincial Task Force, 1983) considered possible sources of support for the 
victim both inside and outside the criminal justice system. 
Available data suggest that alternative agencies are of limited usefulness 
to victims (ibid., 70). Medical treatment is frequently depersonalized 
(Holmstrom and Burgess, 1978:2-31), and medical services may be subser­
vient to legal and evidentiary needs (Shapland et al., 1981: chap. 3). As for 
mental health services, when "110 upper-level officials" responsible for 
mental health policy were interviewed, "the majority of respondents in 
most cases classified all types of services to victims as being a low priority 
or not a priority at all" (Rich, 1981:136). However, rape and domestic 
violence victims were given a higher priority than "other crime." 
Knudten et al. (1976) identified more than 200 agencies functioning in 
Milwaukee in the 1970s which could provide a variety of services to vic­
tims {N = 159) and witnesses [N = 56), including counseling, financial, 
legal, and medical assistance. The widespread failure to take advantage of 
these services was explained in part by ignorance of their existence, but in 
part by the fact that "sizeable proportions of victims and witnesses either 
did not think they would benefit from such agencies, or simply did not 
want any help" (54). 
Friedman et al. (1982) also reported on the limited resort by victims to 
community agencies, including special victim-assistance agencies with 
which the victims were often not familiar. However, victims did often 
resort to informal support systems. Victimizations involved an average of 
four other persons besides the victim, and the availability of such persons 
was found by the authors of the study to be critical in determining the 
victim's ability to cope with the experience. The expansion of victim-
assistance programs, and the effectiveness of their contribution, will be 
considered in chapter 10. 
Conclusions 
In spite of the intensive activity generated by the need to reform the role of 
the victim in the criminal justice system, precise knowledge about his or 
her role in the preexisting system remains inadequate, rendering specula­
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tion as to the outcome of proposed reforms somewhat uncertain. The 
preceding discussion suggests that the information available on the opera­
tion of the system with regard to the victim may be summarized at three 
different levels: (1| the normative, (2) the pragmatic, and (3) the subliminal. 
The Normative Level. According to the legal norms prevailing before 
the recent spate of victim-oriented legislation, the victim had virtually 
disappeared from the criminal justice system, which was guided almost 
exclusively by "public policy" interests, the relevant agencies acting in the 
name of the state or the people rather than of the victim. At such critical 
decision-making stages as arrest, bail, prosecution, verdict, sentence, pa­
role, and clemency, the victim was not generally considered a relevant 
party. There were some exceptions to this—such as the citizen's arrest, 
certain archaic prosecution practices, and the ordering of restitution by the 
court—but these constituted the exception rather than the rule. Also, in 
some locations, prosecution authorities were exhorted in their instruc­
tions to take note of victim desires in certain types of cases. Finally, the 
degree of victim harm was, according to many legal analysts, one of the 
fundamental dimensions for deterrnining the degree of the offender's culpa­
bility, but, apart from an element of doubt emerging from the empirical 
studies on whether this was in fact the case, such attention to victim harm 
was regarded primarily as a measure of the offender's injury to society, and 
any direct connection with the victim as a person was on a somewhat 
abstracted level. 
The Pragmatic Level. In general, the actual role attributed to victims by 
criminal justice agencies has not differed substantially from their norma­
tive role: it has been very limited. These agencies, however, have been 
governed by other considerations than the official legal norms—partly 
ideological ones related to the individual philosophy of the decision maker, 
but mainly pragmatic ones related to the efficiency of the processes in­
volved. These pragmatic considerations might operate in favor of or against 
the victim's interests. Thus, on the one hand, some prosecutors have given 
special weight to the views of victims in cases where they feared that the 
complainant might retract before the court hearing. They might, on the 
other hand, for the same reason, refuse to prosecute such cases in the first 
place. Moreover, some law enforcement officials would see certain cases as 
"really private matters," in spite of their being legally undifferentiated 
from any other criminal complaint. Further, many prosecutors have been 
concerned with how the case will be projected in the courtroom, resulting 
in certain "stereotypical" cases that would not be prosecuted for fear of 
anticipated failure to secure a conviction. 
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The Subliminal Level. Whether there are processes at work in the crimi­
nal justice system whereby cases, and victims, are stereotyped and then 
treated according to the stereotype is in essence an empirical issue. Social 
psychologists have attempted to study the validity of alternative ap­
proaches and hypotheses in this area, such as attribution theory, just-world 
theory, and equity theory. This research is still in its infancy, and the 
tentative findings are somewhat conflicting, as are some of the hypotheses 
themselves (see appendix). Nevertheless, the impression is created from 
these studies that processes of this nature do in fact operate and that the 
perception of the victim on the part of criminal justice personnel, espe­
cially in nonstranger cases or cases involving alleged victim precipitation, 
is not necessarily governed solely by rational and objective analysis of the 
relevant data. This results in deviations from the decision-making patterns 
indicated by both normative and pragmatic considerations. 
The treatment of victims on all three levels described above—the nor­
mative, the pragmatic, and the subliminal—attests to the vulnerability of 
their standing in the traditional criminal justice system. The most notable 
deficiencies have been the failure to grant the victim any formal status in 
the decision-making process, or even to notify him or her of the decisions 
taken. How the victim perceives such treatment will be the topic of chap­
ter 5; and how far the various innovations or proposed innovations are 
calculated to remedy the deficiencies in the system from the victim's 
standpoint will be the main focus of part 3 of this study. 
Two final observations: First, there has been little evidence, at least 
before the most recent reforms, that agencies outside the criminal justice 
system have been capable of filling the void left by the criminal justice 
agencies with respect to caring for the victim, although many victims 
receive help from informal support systems. Second, in spite of the enor­
mous quantity of research conducted on various aspects of the criminal 
justice system, our knowledge of the victim's role, on all the different 
levels considered above, is still—even after the recent wave of victim-
related literature—rather limited, since research directed specifically at 
the focal issues as defined here has been comparatively sparse. 
Part II

The Parameters of Justice


The Framework of Analysis

Having established in the preceding chapter that there is substantial truth in 
the rhetoric that points to the limited role of the victim in the criminal jus­
tice system and to certain disturbing features resulting therefrom, the ques­
tion arises whether the remedies recently adopted or currently proposed (as 
described briefly in chap. 1) are appropriate, in both conceptual and practical 
terms, to rectify the problems described. It is not sufficient, however, 
merely to evaluate these remedies against the background of the various 
criticisms implied in the description of the victim's traditional role in the 
system. Rather, remedies must be developed in the light of a more compre­
hensive consideration of the victim's needs, while taking into account other 
characteristics that a system of justice might be expected to possess. 
In this and the following chapters in this section, an attempt will be 
made both to assess the victim's needs more comprehensively and to iden­
tify the other qualities of an optimal justice system. Only then will it be 
possible to evaluate the specific proposals intended to ameliorate the vic-
tim's situation. 
The first premise upon which the framework of analysis proposed here 
rests is that there are three parties whose needs must be met and whose 
interests must be protected by a system of justice. While the present study 
focuses primarily upon the victim, it would clearly be unreasonable to 
propose a scheme of justice designed to take account of the needs and 
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interests of the victim while totally ignoring the needs and interests of the 
offender (or the suspected offender)—except under an extreme absolutist 
neo-Kantian philosophy whereby a transgressor were to sacrifice all his 
rights. Moreover, such a principle could not in any case be applied to a 
mere suspect or accused person. Similarly, in a democratic society, the 
interests of the public at large must be taken into account, both for prag­
matic considerations and as a matter of principle. This need for a balance 
of interests has been only rarely referred to in the victim-oriented litera­
ture, which has tended to focus too narrowly upon the victim's needs. The 
main exception to this has been the concern expressed in some quarters 
(such as the American Civil Liberties Union) that certain victim-related 
reforms, especially those advocated by the political conservatives referred 
to in the introduction, might derogate from the rights of the defendant. 
Such criticism was expressed about the Californian Victims' Bill of Rights, 
which ostensibly deprived defendants of certain presumed advantages, 
such as the possibility of a plea bargain.1 Nevertheless, the triadic approach 
presented here—consideration of the needs of victims, offenders, and 
public—seems rarely, in spite of its obviousness, to have been spelled out 
explicitly in the literature2 (but cf. Ashworth, 1986). 
This triadic approach is of course simplistic and raises some difficult 
issues. The first issue relates to the relative importance of the three catego­
ries which the justice system must take into account. Should each cate­
gory be attributed equal weight? A "gut reaction" seems to dictate that the 
victim's interests should be worthy of greater consideration than the of-
fender's, inasmuch as the latter has been labeled the wrongdoer. Surely, 
however, the framers of the U.S. Constitution—and in particular of its 
Amendments—had good reason for providing offenders (and suspected of­
fenders), rather than victims, with guarantees. Could victim advocates 
justify a total reversal of this position? 
Similarly, the degree of importance to be attributed to the public's in­
terests may also be controversial. Some professional law enforcement or 
rehabilitationist personnel may see the public's interest as a somewhat 
secondary consideration, whereas persons with a more "populist" orienta­
tion would stress its importance. It is beyond the scope of the present 
study to explore further, let alone to determine, what should be the relative 
weight attributed to these three interest groups, or even to speculate about 
the degree of consensus that prevails in this respect.3 Further consideration 
should be given to these questions on the levels both of empirical research 
and of theoretical analysis. For the purposes of the present study it will 
suffice to draw attention to the need to consider the different interests of 
the various parties. 
 61 The Framework of Analysis
A second major issue raised by the triadic approach presented here is the 
problem of defining the categories that have been identified, and in some 
instances of differentiating between them. Undoubtedly, the most difficult 
problem in this context is that of defining victimization. This is an issue 
with which much of the victimological literature has been concerned (see, 
e.g., Friedrichs, 1983; Elias, 1986:28-32; Fattah, 1991: chap. 4). One of the 
pioneers of victimology (Mendelsohn, 1974) took the view that the concern 
of victimology was not confined to victims of crime but included victims 
of other trauma and misfortune, such as road accidents and natural disas­
ters. This view was conceptualized by Young-Rifai (1982a) to include vari­
ous situations in which persons have "imbalances in their relationships or 
communication with their environments" (76). Moreover, psychological 
literature has drawn attention to the similarity between the traumatic 
effects of criminal and other forms of victimization (Janoff-Bulman and 
Frieze, 1983). 
Others have adopted a more relativist perspective, arguing that victim­
ization is a "social construct" (Quinney, 1974) or an "act of interpretive 
reality construction" (Holstein and Miller, 1990:107), and that perceptions 
of victimization are dependent on the social context and on the viewpoint 
of the observer. This point is well illustrated by the Goetz case: if youths 
coming from socioeconomically deprived or ethnically-historically de­
prived (Carter, 1988) backgrounds attempt to rob a white man of a few 
dollars and he shoots them, who is the victim? Even the norm-oriented 
legal system has a problem with this type of case, as well as in other areas 
of conflict between social or cultural groups, such as rape cases. 
Conflicting values may, again, lead to definitions of victimization not 
recognized by the prevailing legal system. Radicals have long held that the 
criminal law and its implementation reflect the power structure in society. 
Laws against theft, poaching, and so on, are designed to protect prevailing 
inequalities (although the new "left realists" have perceived that they also 
protect the underprivileged), while much "true crime/' involving eco­
nomic oppression of the underprivileged, has not been formally penalized. 
This approach, whereby victimization is not limited to cases of formal 
breaches of the criminal law, has been echoed, in a human rights context, 
in the UN Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime 
and Abuse of Power. This declaration, as its name implies, grants rights to 
victims of "abuse of power" and of other violations of international norms 
relating to human rights, even if such violations have not been crimi­
nalized by the country in which they took place (see sec. 18 of the declara­
tion; Lamborn, 1988). 
However, the present study will adopt a more conventional definition of 
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victimization, partly because most of the literature—in particular the em­
pirical literature—that is available for analysis is concerned with conven­
tional victimization, but mainly because the innovative programs this 
study seeks to evaluate have also been developed for such cases, most of 
the programs having been adopted by legislative or law enforcement bodies 
guided by traditional concepts of crime and victimization. 
Even within the conventional criminal justice definitions of victimiza­
tion, however, there may be alternative criteria for determining whether 
such definitions have been fulfilled. As Burt (1983) has pointed out, the 
infliction of criminal harm does not in itself give rise to the attribution of 
victim status but is merely the first stage in this process. Additional stages 
are required for this to occur. The second stage is for the ostensible victim 
to perceive that a harm has been inflicted;4 the third, that he or she should 
claim a victim role from the agents of social control and significant others,-
and the fourth, that the latter should concur with the appropriateness of 
ascribing this status in the instant case.5 While many of the remedies for 
victimization considered in this study will in practice be operational only 
when all the above requirements are fulfilled, in principle the first and 
second stages are sufficient to bring the incident in question within its 
terms of reference. The study is concerned with the remedies available to a 
person who perceives him- or herself as a victim of a criminal offense.6 
Indeed, in a sense it may be said that the second stage alone is sufficient. A 
person who perceives him- or herself to be a victim of a criminal offense, 
even if this is not the case, should be entitled to the pursuit of appropriate 
remedies and should have access to certain procedures for this purpose, 
even if ultimately the claim of victimization will fail. 
Miers (1980) has argued that the legal definition of victim is itself flexi­
ble and relative, since, for example, victim compensation boards may ex­
clude certain types of victims, such as victims who contributed to the 
commission of the offense or who are related to the offender, thereby 
depriving them of their victim status for certain purposes. As Christie 
(1986) has pointed out, there are stereotypical traits that the "ideal" victim 
should possess to gain popular sympathy—and perhaps also material 
support—from society. Thus the infliction of a crime does not guarantee 
all the benefits of victim status. On the other hand, insofar as compensa­
tion may be awarded to a person victimized by a perpetrator who was not 
criminally responsible for his or her conduct, there may be a victim of 
crime without the existence of a criminal (Lamborn, 1968). 
Other types of classification of victim are employed in the literature 
(see, e.g., Silverman, 1974; Landau and Freeman-Longo, 1990), some of 
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which have important legal or sociological implications; these include 
classification according to type of offense, relationship with the offender, 
or previous victimization. Such classifications have no a priori bearing on 
the subject matter of the present study, with one exception. Victims of 
crime may be divided into (a) individuals, (b) corporations or other com­
mercial entities, and (c) the community or state (Wolfgang and Singer, 
1978).7 These categories raise very different issues and may call for differ­
ent solutions. Clearly, for example, the dynamics of informal dispute reso­
lution between offender and victim would not be the same where the 
victim was a corporation or the state. In spite of the importance of these 
categories (especially the corporate victim: see Hagan, 1980) the present 
study will focus on the type of victimization with which most of the 
proposed remedies have been concerned, namely, personal victimization.8 
In sociological terms there are also problems in differentiating between 
the main categories referred to—"victims," "offenders," and "public." On 
certain levels of analysis, victims and offenders are not discrete categories. 
First, they tend to come from the same populations (Singer, 1981; Fattah, 
1991: chap. 5). Second, a relatively high proportion of individual victims 
are self-reported offenders (Singer, 1981) or have had contacts with law 
enforcement authorities as suspects or offenders (Ziegenhagen, 1976:270; 
Maxfield, 1984; Sampson and Lauritsen, 1990).9 The causal connection 
here has been recognized by the federal Crime Control Act of 1990, section 
251 of which provides for grants to "provide treatment to juvenile offend­
ers who are victims of child abuse and neglect, and to their f amilies so as to 
reduce the likelihood that such juvenile offenders will commit subsequent 
violations of the law." Third, in an individual case (e.g., a domestic dispute) 
it may be difficult to determine who is the offender and who is the victim. 
Fourth, for the radical, as indicated above, it may be the offender who is 
seen to be the victim of the criminal law (see Balkan et al., 1980; Fried­
richs, 1983; and cf. Victims of Crime, 1985:9). However, while the prob­
lems are very real, they are bypassed by the law, which creates a notional 
dichotomization or ideal typology of victim on the one hand and offender 
on the other, with hardly any recognition of intermediary status (Gobert, 
1977; Wolfgang, 1989); and subject to the previous comment regarding 
access to remedial procedures according to subjective definitions of victim­
ization, it is the legal definitions that constitute the terms of reference for 
the present study. 
There may be similar difficulties in differentiating in behavioristic terms 
between victims and "the public." Since crime is "extraordinarily com­
mon" (Skogan and Maxfield, 1981:13), many, perhaps all, of the "public" 
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have been victimized in the past or will be in the future. Moreover, in any 
specific case of victimization there may be eyewitnesses who may suffer 
both from the experience itself and from the subsequent involvement with 
the legal system.10 In addition, the immediate victim's support system cre­
ates further indirect victimization. Studies have shown that most victimiza­
tions result in some degree of suffering or inconvenience to a number of 
additional persons (Shaplandetal., 1981:213; Salasin, 1981:26; Friedman et 
al., 1982; Riggs and Kilpatrick, 1990; Mawby and Walklate, 1994:43). Such 
indirect victims, with the exception of surviving family members in homi­
cide cases or the families of minors or incapacitated persons, have not 
generally gained official recognition,n and clearly greater attention must be 
devoted to this issue. 
Finally, like the victims, the offender population may also merge in 
some respects with the "general public." Self-report studies indicate that 
virtually the whole population commits offenses on occasion; attachment 
of the "offender" label must therefore depend upon the seriousness and the 
frequency of the criminal acts committed (as well as their discovery), 
rather than representing an absolute dichotomization between offenders 
and nonoffenders. Further, the "suspect" or "defendant" whose guilt has 
not been established has an intermediary status between "offender" and 
"public." It appears that the U.S. Supreme Court has attempted to differen­
tiate in this respect between suspects whose innocence is fully presumed 
and whose constitutional rights must be guaranteed, and those who are 
found in compromising circumstances that tend to identify them as poten­
tial offenders (see O'Neill, 1984). Such differentiation, however, may be 
problematic both in principle and in practice. At any rate, no convincing 
grounds have yet been raised for its adoption when considering the vic-
tim's rights vis-a-vis those of the suspected offender. 
Having established, at least for operational purposes, that there are three 
distinct interest groups that a justice system must take into consideration, 
the needs of these parties—and of the system as a whole—have to be 
ascertained. The identification of these needs entails the development of 
an additional dimension for inclusion in the theoretical framework of 
analysis. While the literature has enumerated a variety of problems encoun­
tered by crime victims (see, e.g., Salasin, 1981; Waller, 1982; Shapland et 
al., 1985; Skogan et al., 1990), it seems that the interests and concerns of 
victims, as well as of other parties, involved in the justice system may be 
translated into three levels of need at which the system will have to pro­
vide satisfaction: (1) coping needs, (2) perceived justice needs, and (3) funda­
mental principles of justice. A brief elaboration of these terms will follow. 
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Coping Needs 
Many of the programs being developed are clearly designed to overcome 
the material discomforts and needs of the victim, and also to compensate 
him or her for the losses and injuries inflicted in the course of the crime, 
for the loss of time expended in the subsequent proceedings, and so on. 
Thus some reformers favor state compensation schemes over offender resti­
tution, on the ground that the latter will prove inadequate to meet the 
victim's needs. 
The coping needs of the victim are also taken here to include his or her 
immediate treatment needs, such as medical attention and counseling. 
The expression is thus used in a wide sense to include restoration of both 
the property and the person of the victim and to cover needs both objec­
tively and subjectively defined. It also includes the victim's long-term 
needs, including immunity from further victimization. Thus a measure 
that is designed to bring the victim effective financial compensation, but 
that will result in a vengeful offender remaining at large, may ultimately 
prove to be counterproductive in terms of coping. 
At the same time, while the victim's coping needs may be the dominant 
consideration, the offender's coping needs must also be taken into account, 
not in the sense that the system must necessarily provide for all such 
needs, but that it should not make excessive demands. The offender should 
not, for example, generally be deprived of all expectations of future earning 
capacity. This is partly out of concern for the public and the prevention of 
vengefulness, and partly because society has an intrinsic interest in facili­
tating the offender's ultimate rehabilitation. 
Finally, in developing appropriate remedies for the victims, the public's 
coping needs, too, must be considered. On the one hand, the public has an 
interest in limiting the costs of any proposal for which taxpayers may have 
to bear the burden, victim compensation schemes being the obvious exam-
ple.12 On the other hand, the public has a coping interest of a different 
nature in any developments resulting either in the rehabilitation of the 
offender who has been apprehended or in the deterrence of this and other 
potential offenders, in order to reduce further victimization. 
The public may also have psychological coping needs. Reports in the 
press (or via communication networks) of violent attacks upon innocent 
citizens may have a traumatic effect on the general public, in particular 
those sections of the public having a greater degree of vulnerability, real or 
perceived (cf. Skogan and Maxfield, 1981). The reaction of the justice system 
must take into account the need to mitigate this trauma and to assuage the 
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fears created. The precise dimensions and extent of the coping needs of the 
parties, however, should not be a matter for speculation. Once the concept 
has been acknowledged, it is for empirical research to determine the nature 
and extent of these needs. The data currently available on this topic will be 
considered in the next chapter. 
Perceived Justice Needs 
In addition to the victim's need to cope with the material harm and 
emotional trauma inflicted by the victimizing act, it may be anticipated 
that if this act has been defined by the victim as having a criminal 
character, this will give rise to certain expectations on his or her part of 
the institutions of law enforcement and justice. Thus, even if the vic-
tim's essential material needs are met (e.g., by compensation from the 
state), if in his or her perception the wrongdoer has gone unpunished, the 
victim may yet remain dissatisfied. Further, it may not be sufficient that 
the outcome of the proceedings accord with objective standards of propri­
ety and reasonableness. To cite the old adage, justice must also be "seen 
to be done." The procedures themselves must be designed to maximize 
the victim's perception that the measures taken are appropriate in the 
circumstances. 
The above comments apply in substance to the offender also. While 
there may be no consensus that offender satisfaction is a sine qua non for 
the justice system, clearly a system under which the offender's sense of 
justice could be enhanced without cost to other interests would be prefera­
ble; it might also reduce his or her inclination to recidivate. 
Last, the degree of public satisfaction with any adopted system must 
also be considered. If it is true that the current victim orientation in crimi­
nal justice derives partly from public concern with crime, it follows that 
any reforms introduced should be consistent with the general wishes of the 
public. This would apply not so much to the procedures followed in the 
course of the administration of justice, which would be of less concern to 
those not directly involved, but rather to the outcomes, that is, the ulti­
mate fate of the offender and victim respectively, information about which 
is likely to be more widely disseminated. 
Like coping needs, identifying the perceived justice needs of the parties 
is also a matter of empirical research. The complexity of this topic and the 
limited scope of the information currently available will emerge from the 
review of the available data in chapter 5. 
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Fundamental Principles of Justice 
On a purely utilitarian approach to social change, it might be sufficient to 
confine one's concern to the coping and perceived justice needs of the 
relevant parties. Any change justified according to these criteria could be 
unequivocally advocated. On another view, there may be certain values or 
ideals inherent in a legal or social system, certain absolute principles, 
which may not be infringed; or there may be social goals that are desirable 
in themselves. This view is held by certain schools of moral, social, politi­
cal, and legal philosophy and has been applied both to retributive justice, 
as illustrated by Kant, and to distributive justice, as reflected in the writ­
ings of John Rawls. Similarly, social philosophers have developed theories 
of justice based on recognition of prior right, on desert, and on need (Miller, 
1976). Moreover, natural law and social contract theories, which had fallen 
victim to positivist thinking, have been given new impetus as a result of 
the Rawlsian debates. De facto recognition of fundamental rights is evi­
denced further by the fact that most nations have adopted written constitu­
tions in which such rights are entrenched. 
Unlike coping and perceived justice needs, fundamental principles of jus­
tice are sought on an abstract, ideological, rather than empirical, level.13 The 
recognition of the relevance (or perceived relevance) of such fundamental 
principles adds a third tier to the present analysis. The interaction of the rele­
vant parties and levels of need may be presented schematically as follows: 
Parameters of Justice by Levels of Need and Relevant Parties 
Victim Offender Public 
First Level: Compensation Inexcessive drain Reasonable drain 
Coping Needs Treatment on resources on resources 
Protection from Protection from Protection from 
further vengeance future 
victimization victimization 
Second Level: Satisfaction with Satisfaction with Satisfaction 
Perceived procedures and procedures and with outcome 
Justice Needs outcome outcome 
Third Level Fundamental principles of justice complied with 
A detailed analysis of these three levels of need, with emphasis on the 
victim's perspective, will be presented in the three following chapters. 
Coping Needs

As noted in the preceding chapter, the designation "coping needs7' includes 
here financial, medical, and emotional needs, subcategories into which 
this chapter is divided.1 This classification of needs is not absolute, how­
ever. "For most victims, physical, emotional and financial effects tended to 
occur together as part of a complex process" (Shapland et al., 1981:7). For 
example, while fear of crime has been classified as an emotional reaction, 
it may have, at least in part, a rational basis and may result in rational and 
practical consequences. The literature refers to the case of parents who, 
having fallen victim to a crime, were no longer willing to leave their 
children alone at home in the evening. In this example, while fear of crime 
may be classified as an emotional consequence, requiring a babysitter is a 
financial one. 
Moreover, the nature of the impact is, to some extent, a function of the 
selection of response by the victim; some victims react at the "instrumen­
tal" level, by taking appropriate preventive action, while others experience 
anxiety or otherwise internalize their reaction, that is, at the "stress" level 
(Friedman et al., 1982:8). Thus, although presented here under the heading 
coping needs, the data accumulated relate rather to an elucidation of the 
impact of victimization than specifically to the needs following from it (cf. 
also Maguire and Corbett, 1987:76; Maguire, 1991:391 (/Indeed, few of the 
impact studies, with the notable exception of Skogan et al. (1990) and the 
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comprehensive study by Maguire and Corbett (1987), attempt specifically 
to determine victims' needs resulting therefrom. 
Further, the topics dealt with in this chapter under the heading of cop­
ing needs may also merge with the "perceived justice needs" to be dis­
cussed in the next chapter. This is particularly true of the victim's emo­
tional needs. Emotional consequences of victimization may be related to 
the victim's view of society and to the victim's allocation of responsibility 
for what has occurred. This point was emphasized by Symonds (1980), who 
claimed that the perception of inadequate support resulted in a "second 
injury." This, in turn, seems conceptually related to—although not identi­
cal with—the idea of "secondary victimization" alluded to by other 
sources2 (see, e.g., Joutsen, 1987:54). This term refers to the victim's treat­
ment at the hands of the justice system, the subjective aspect of which 
relates to the victim's "perceived justice needs." 
Particularly relevant in this context is the rape victim's reportedly un­
happy experience with the police and the justice system (see, e.g., Veronen 
et al.; 1979), an instance where emotional consequences will interact with 
justice consequences. Again, psychotherapy, which appears to reflect an 
emotional need, and legal measures, which appear to reflect a justice need, 
may be alternative avenues of dealing with the same victimization symp­
toms, in particular the relief of anger (Waller, 1982:14).3 Thus it may some­
times be hard to differentiate between emotional consequences and per­
ceived justice needs. 
The problem of classification was until recently outweighed by the 
problem of inadequate documentation. Despite the intensity of legislative 
and administrative policies designed to ameliorate the lot of the victims, 
relatively little was known about the effects of crime on them (Sparks, 
1982:109; Skogan, 1987:136). The studies were fragmented, and the find­
ings appeared to be widely inconsistent. Moreover, in many cases their 
conclusions reflected a political agenda (cf. Maguire, 1991:381). However, 
the two studies referred to above (Maguire and Corbett, 1987; Skogan et al., 
1990), together with recent attempts to analyze systematically the litera­
ture on the impact of crime and the needs of the victim (Lurigio and 
Resick, 1990; Maguire, 1991; Mawby and Walklate, 1994: chap. 2), have to 
some extent clarified the confusion. 
The available literature was classified by Waller (1982) into the follow­
ing categories: victimization surveys; studies of the impact of particular 
types of crime (burglary, robbery, mugging, and rape); studies of particular 
types of victim (women, children, and the elderly); and surveys conducted 
by victim-assistance agencies or sponsored by local authorities in order to 
70 Chapter 4 
assess victim needs. Maguire and Corbett (1987) and Skogan et al. (1990), 
however, endeavor to integrate the second and fourth of these objectives. 
Note should also be taken of a group of researchers (e.g., Baril, 1984) who 
adopted a qualitative, "in-depth" approach in an attempt to empathize 
with the victim, in the belief that a more meaningful picture of the impact 
of victimization would be produced. 
No attempt will be made here to document all the evidence available 
from the existing studies. It is proposed to mention only the most salient 
findings and to draw attention to some of the more problematic issues. 
Financial Problems 
A report, The Economic Cost of Crime to Victims, was published by the 
Bureau of Justice Studies on the basis of National Crime Survey data 
(Shenk and Klaus, 1984). This report showed that the total losses inflicted 
on victims of crime in the United States amounted in 1981 to $10.9 billion: 
$2.8 billion through "personal crimes" and $8.1 billion through "house­
hold crimes." The equivalent figures for 1990 were $4.6 billion and $14.6 
billion, respectively (U.S. Dept. of Justice, 1992:148), but they underwent a 
modest decline between 1990 and 1992 (Klaus, 1994). 
On the macro level, therefore, victim losses are of enormous magnitude. 
However, since the losses are distributed over a very high number of vic­
timizations (33.6 million in 1992), the loss to each individual or household 
victimized was relatively modest: the median loss for "personal victimiza­
tion" was $45 and for "household" victimization $65 (Shenk and Klaus, 
1984:1). Apart from motor vehicle theft, for which the median loss was 
$1,500, the highest median loss for the offenses included in the 1981 analy­
sis was $160 for burglary, $145 for rape, $85 for robbery, and $64 for assault. 
For larceny offenses the median was $40-$50. It was also noted that some 
36% of the total losses reported were recovered or reimbursed (Shenk and 
Klaus, 5). However, the mean losses inflicted in the course of these of­
fenses in 1992 was considerably higher: $3,990 for motor vehicle theft, 
$834 for burglary, $234 for rape, $555 for robbery, and $124 for assault. 
These differences may reflect the passage of time and the fact that means, 
unlike medians, are influenced by outlying responses—that is, a few very 
high losses will substantially inflate the figures produced (especially for 
burglary and robbery). 
There is, of course, considerable variety in loss levels. Thus the mini­
mum loss for the top quartile of burglary victims in the National Crime 
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Survey for 1981 was $645, and for rape victims it was $400 (Shenk and 
Klaus, 1984:3). Moreover, while "medical expenses contributed relatively 
little to the economic cost of crime to victims" (ibid., 4)—only about 2% 
of the total cost, for those victims of rape and robbery who incurred medi­
cal expenses (nearly one-half of the rape victims but less than 10% of the 
robbery victims)—these medical expenses were relatively high, with medi­
ans of $200 and $195, respectively (cf. also Klaus, 1994:2). By 1990, in 
62.5% of crimes of violence in which the magnitude of medical expenses 
were known, these amounted to $250 or more (based on data in U.S. Dept. 
of Justice, 1992: table 84). 
On the other hand, even the infliction of relatively high losses does not 
necessarily mean that the material aspect of the victimization was the 
most important for the victim. The study conducted in New York City for 
the Victim Services Agency (Friedman et al., 1982) found a relatively high 
incidence of material loss but a relatively low salience. "Property loss" 
was the problem most frequently referred to by respondents, 68% of the 
sample, but only 32% were designated by the researchers as having "finan­
cial loss" as their primary concern. Similarly, in a British study of burglary 
victims, only 28% of the victims named financial loss as the worst aspect 
of the offense, while 60% specified "intrusion upon privacy" or "emo­
tional upset" (Maguire, 1991:395). Finally, a study of a sample of 323 vic­
tims in Pima County, Arizona, found that, when asked whether they had 
"enough resources to meet their daily living expenses"—that is, whether 
they could cope—the vast majority (83%-84%) replied affirmatively, both 
at the initial interview conducted shortly after the victimization and at the 
follow-up interview conducted four to six months later (Smith et al., 
1984:27, 52-53). 
Losses vary significantly, however, both in terms of amount and in terms 
of impact according to sociodemographic variables. The 1981 National 
Crime Survey study found that losses for blacks were higher than for whites 
for all categories of offense (Shenk and Klaus, 1984: table 8). Females in­
curred higher losses for crimes of personal violence, males for crimes of theft 
(ibid., table 7). The study indicated evidence of relatively greater losses being 
inflicted upon more vulnerable groups of the population—blacks and fe­
males. Further, for most personal crimes, the lower-income (less than 
$7,500) or middle-income ($7,500-$ 14,999) groups suffered as great or 
greater losses as compared with persons belonging to higher-income groups. 
Moreover, it should be noted that persons earning under $7,500 have the 
highest victimization rates for personal crimes, including robbery, and are 
the second highest category in respect to crimes of theft (U.S. Department of 
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Justice, 1992:33; the highest category was the wealthiest, with incomes of 
$50,000 or more). Thus while victimization losses (other than car theft) 
inflicted upon individuals are generally rather low, for some populations not 
only is the risk of victimization relatively high but the implications are 
substantial. 
Medical Problems 
The 6 million violent victimizations in 1990 (U.S. Dept. of Justice, 
1992:16) resulted in 1.3 million victims receiving medical care (88); 10.4% 
of violent victimizations, and 31.0% of those involving injury, resulted in 
medical expenses being incurred (89). In 8.2% of violent victimizations— 
24.2% of those involving injury—the victim received hospital care (91). In 
over 60% of these cases, treatment took place in the emergency room; in 
7.5% hospitalization exceeded three days (91). Only 63.8% of injured vic­
tims had health insurance coverage or were eligible for public medical 
services (90), but this figure appears to have risen to 69% by 1992 (Klaus, 
1994:2). Moreover, lower-income victims were more likely to sustain in­
jury than higher-income victims (U.S. Dept of Justice, 1992:88). 
The latter is only one of the variables affecting the probability of injury; 
cumulative data analyzed by the Bureau of Justice Statistics from 1979 to 
1986 show that "white male central city residents under 25 and with 
family incomes of less than $10,000 had the highest average annual rate of 
injury from crime" (Harlow, 1989:5-6). Finally, nonstrangers were more 
likely to sustain injuries than strangers (U.S. Dept. of Justice, 1992:88), but 
a somewhat lower proportion of such injured victims were likely to need 
hospital treatment (91). 
The survey conducted for the Canadian Federal-Provincial Task Force 
(1983) found that only 22% of the 1.6 million crimes included in the 
sample involved personal contact, but that these resulted in 50,500 nights 
in hospital and 405,700 days lost owing to some form of incapacitation 
(59). In Shapland's English sample of victims of offenses of violence more 
than 65% of the victims used medical services, but only a small number 
were detained in hospital (Shapland et al., 1985:102). Thus medical (other 
than psychological) problems, while generally confined to victims of 
crimes of violence, appear to be fairly serious for a substantial number of 
such victims. The financial costs involved were referred to in the previous 
section. How far crime victims are in need of specialized medical services, 
whether because of the nature or circumstances of the injury or because of 
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the interaction with law enforcement personnel, is a question worthy of 
greater attention. Hitherto such special needs have been recognized primar­
ily in connection with rape. Shapland et al. (1985:102-3), in their English 
study, concluded that much could be done to provide support for victims in 
this context. 
Emotional Problems 
Although emotional problems, as noted, seem to be more difficult to re­
search than the previous topics, a growing literature is emerging. Some 
writers are quite unequivocal as to their findings. Thus, the survey con­
ducted by the New York Victim Services Agency reached the following 
conclusions: 
1. "The most common problems (affecting three-quarters of the sample) 
from which crime victims suffered, were psychological problems includ­
ing fear, anxiety, nervousness, self-blame, anger, shame and difficulty 
sleeping." 
2. "Emotional problems affected victims of property crime (burglary) as 
well as victims of violent or personal crimes (robbery and assault)." 
3. "Although crime-related problems had declined in severity four months 
after the incidents, half the victims continued to have problems." (Fried­
man et al., 1982:5-6) 
How far are these three conclusions supported by the other literature 
dealing with the emotional effects of victimization? Lists of reactions simi­
lar to those noted above—although varying in order of frequency or 
salience—appear in other victim studies. These include anger, shock, and 
confusion (Maguire, 1980:262, on the basis of a study of burglary victims in 
England), and "worry, fear, loss of confidence" for the same type of victim 
in the British Crime Survey (Hough, 1984: table 2). However, the Canadian 
burglary victims studied by Waller and Okihiro (1978:37) were most likely 
to specify surprise. Baril (1984) referred to "numbness, disbelief and fear" 
(see also Baril, 1980).4 Smith et al. (1984:8) listed "fear, anxiety, vulnerabil­
ity, disorientation, anger, revengeful, self-blame, embarrassment" as the 
victim's emotional problems, but they selected anxiety, fear, and stress as 
the emotions to be measured in their study. Smale (1984), in an intensive 
study of samples of victims of both violent and property crimes, found that 
"fright" and "fear of recurrence" were present for almost all victims, while 
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between one-quarter and one-half experienced "the need to air feelings," 
"distrust of others," "sense of sharing responsibility," and "fear" (87). An­
other study referred to by Waller (1984) identified seven symptoms of "vic­
tim crisis," namely, "serious residual effects (!), memory loss, physical 
upset or nausea, confused state of shock, fear, crying or shaking, and ner­
vousness" (98; see also the specific fears listed by rape victims in Veronen 
etal., 1979:157). 
Even less consistency is found in the extensive literature analyzing the 
specific clinical syndromes associated with victimization and its emo­
tional impact, pioneered in Bard and Sangrey (1979, 1980), Evaluation and 
Change (1980), and Salasin (1981) and reviewed in Lurigio and Resick 
(1990) and Maguire (1991). Some of these writers have traced a number of 
stages in the emotional reactions to victimization. Thus Bard and Sangrey 
(1979, 1980) referred to three stages: (1) the impact stage, (2) the recoil 
stage, and (3) the reorganization stage. However, the three stages described 
by Paap (1981) are different: (1) discovery, (2) "working the case," and (3) 
resignation; while Symonds (1980) describes four stages of response: (1) 
shock, disbelief, and denial; (2) "frozen fright"; (3) depression and hostility; 
and (4) integration with lifestyle. Other characteristic syndromes noted in 
the literature are guilt and self-blame (Friedman et al., 1982:2), helpless­
ness (Symonds, 1980), and "idiocide," or the denial of status and stature 
(Weiss, 1980). 
Despite inconsistencies, the clinical literature has granted recognition 
to Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), which is said to be applicable to 
crime victims—27.8% of one sample of female victims (Kilpatrick et al., 
1987). This syndrome has been recognized by the American Psychiatric 
Association (Waller, 1982; Janoff-Bulman and Frieze, 1983) and the World 
Health Organization (cf. Victims of Crime, 1985). 
Much of this clinical literature may be of doubtful general validity (see 
Maguire, 1991), as evidenced by the diverse patterns of emotional reaction 
indicated by the different theories. Friedman et al. (1982) cite the literature 
review conducted by Silver and Wortman, who concluded that there was 
"no evidence of stages of adjustment"; see also Young (1990:198) and 
Smith et al. (1984:5). Friedman and his colleagues endeavored to employ a 
more objective measure of emotional impact, the Affect Balance Scale, 
comprising four positive indicators (joy, contentment, vigor, and affection) 
and four negative measures (anxiety, depression, guilt, and hostility). A 
comparison between their New York sample of victims and a group of 
college students produced significant differences on all measures (Fried­
man et al., 1982:110), but these may have been due to differences between 
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the samples. Smith et al. (1984), in their study of victims in Pima County, 
Arizona, employed scales designed to measure anxiety, fear, and stress. The 
mean score for the anxiety items was found even at the second interview to 
be substantially higher than the average for female college students, and to 
approximate the average score for "neuropsychiatric patients diagnosed as 
suffering from an 'anxiety reaction' " (39). 
Lurigio (1987), too, found significant differences between victims and 
nonvictims on a number of measures of vulnerability and "a wide range of 
symptomology," including "uncontrollable urges to retaliate" (463); and 
Maguire and Corbett (1987:66-67) found that female victims of serious 
offenses were twice as likely to show symptoms of psychiatric disturbance 
as the general population three to six months after the crime. The findings 
as to the prevalence of emotional problems varies among the different 
studies. Knudten et al. (1976), in their Milwaukee study, found that only 
20% of the victims in their sample, but 57% of the victims reaching the 
courts, suffered mentally or emotionally. Similarly, only 32% of the "com­
plaining witnesses" in a Brooklyn sample referred to emotional difficul­
ties. In the British Crime Survey, "Over half of the victimizations were 
said to have caused no practical problems, while two-thirds did not lead to 
any emotional upset" (Mayhew, 1984:5). However, it seems that more than 
one-half of burglary victims encountered some emotional problem (Hough, 
1984: table 2); while 60% of all victim respondents in the 1988 survey 
reported that a family member showed some emotional reaction, generally 
anger (Mawby and Walklate, 1994:42). Finally, 75% of the New York City 
sample referred to above suffered from the emotional reactions specified 
(Friedman et al., 1982:86). 
These differences in the findings have been attributed to methodologi­
cal factors, such as the nature of the sample, the use of open or closed 
questions, and the mode of interviewing (traumatic and emotional effects, 
it is believed, are more likely to be referred to in personal interviews than 
in telephone interviews or survey questionnaires) (cf. Mayhew, 1984:18 n. 
8; Maguire, 1991). Thus the range of British victims responding that they 
were "very much affected" by the offense varied from 12% in the British 
Crime Survey to 79% of those interviewed by victim-assistance personnel 
(Maguire, 1991:394). 
The second conclusion of the Victim Services Agency study was the 
generality of emotional problems for all types of victimization, not only for 
victims of violence. There is support for this view elsewhere in the litera­
ture. While the earlier studies tended to concentrate on offenses of vio­
lence (especially rape; cf. Resick, 1990), studies of burglary victims reveal 
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that they, too, suffer emotional reactions. Indeed, 65% of Maguire's bur­
glary victims were still experiencing stressful reactions for up to 10 weeks 
after the incident (Maguire, 1980:264). 
However, other studies indicate that the impact of property offenses is 
generally less than that of violent offenses (Maguire, 1991:395)—burglary 
being an exception, owing to its perceived intrusiveness into the victim's 
life. Thus the British survey conducted by Maguire and Corbett found that 
while 36%-40% of victims of reported robberies, serious assaults, and 
burglaries responded that they were "very much affected" by the offense, 
the corresponding figures for most thefts—as well as for minor assaults— 
were under 15% (ibid., 396; cf. Mawby and Walklate, 1991:42). 
Similarly, care must be taken not to assume that the emotional trauma, 
where it occurs, is of uniform character, magnitude, and duration for all 
types of offense. It should not be anticipated that the impact of property 
offenses, even where traumatic, would have the same magnitude as rape or 
incest. Smale (1984) found that victims of violence were more likely to 
experience psychological problems, while victims of property offenses were 
more concerned with the probability of recurrence of the offense. Sales et al. 
(1984:131), who interviewed 127 victims at a rape crisis center, found that 
"the recovery process for assault victims lasts longer than the several 
months predicted by crisis theory," and advocated controlled comparisons 
of different populations of victims. It should be noted in this connection 
that some writers on crisis theory have hypothesized the generalizability of 
crisis or victimization pathologies, whereby not only would types of crime 
victim not necessarily be differentiated from one another, but crime vic­
tims would be undifferentiated from other forms of victimization and even 
from other "undesirable life events" (ibid.). This issue recalls the debate 
referred to in the preceding chapter on the issue of defining the term victim. 
Similar confusion relates to the third point specified by the New York 
study, on the question of the duration of negative emotional effects. In their 
discussion of the literature, Friedman et al. (1982) refer to crisis reaction up 
to six weeks. They found that most problems designated as serious in the 
first interview were no longer so designated by the second interview, after 
four months (table 5.1; cf. also Smith et al., 1984). Moreover, the tendency 
for problems generally to disappear during this period applied to all catego­
ries of victim (Friedman et al., 1982: tables 5.2, 5.3). However, even after 
four months, differences between certain subgroups continued; for exam­
ple, more problems were indicated by low-income victims (under $15,000 
per year) and injured victims. Affective reaction scores improved during 
this period for seven out of eight items (ibid., 197-98). 
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Wide divergencies appear in other studies, particularly in relation to 
sexual assault (Maguire, 1981:400-402). Fear and anxiety among rape vic­
tims were measured by Kilpatrick et al. (1981) over a six-month period, over 
which a gradual decline was found. Sales et al. (1984), however, found that 
their sexual assault victims, while appearing to have recovered after six 
months in terms both of behavior and stress symptoms, subsequently experi ­
enced a relapse in the latter respect. Holmstrom and Burgess (1978) claimed 
that 26% of the rape victims in their study had not recovered after six years, 
and Silver et al. (1983) found that three-fourths of their sample of incest 
victims were still "searching to find some meaning" in the incest twenty 
years later (87).5 It is evident that violent sexual offenses are more traumatic 
than other types of offense, but some other victims of violence "may suffer 
analogous problems" (Maguire, 1991:401). Shapland et al. (1985:99) found 
that psychological effects persisted among victims throughout a two-and-a-
half-year follow-up but then declined (Shapland, 1986:220). Some writers 
claim that certain residual symptoms of victimization are never erased 
(Sales et al., 1984:120; see also Maguire and Corbett, 1987:64). Finally, 
Connick and Davis (1981) note that the emotional impact of the crime is 
more likely to be bounded in space and time when the offense was commit­
ted by a stranger; in other cases there is a greater probability of reminders 
after long intervals. This finding is not confirmed by the review of Lurigio 
and Resick (1990:56-57) in the context of sex offenses. This topic is worthy 
of further study, since it may have implications regarding the optimal modes 
of resolution of nonstranger conflicts. 
Postcrime distress and recovery are also related to preexisting emo­
tional problems and to sociodemographic variables (Lurigio and Resick, 
1990:52-54; Maguire, 1991:197-98); thus most studies—but by no means 
all—indicate that more vulnerable groups, such as older victims, females, 
and those with lower incomes, are more adversely affected (ibid.). 
Similarly, Lurigio and Resick (1990) point to the significance of post-
victimization variables, based in the social psychological literature, in 
determining the degree of traumatization by the offense. They refer to 
behavioral self-blame, which will lead the victim to believe that he or she 
can avoid such traumas by behaving differently; this is part of a wider 
literature on attributions of causality or responsibility for the victimizing 
experience. (See, inter alia, vols. 39 (2) and 40 (1) of the Journal of Social 
Issues.) They also refer to "cognitive restructuring," whereby the experi­
ence is reinterpreted, for example, in comparison with the lot of other 
less fortunate persons. 
According to another approach based in this literature, victimization 
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problems derive primarily from the shattering of three types of generally 
shared assumptions. "The three assumptions are: 1) the belief in personal 
invulnerability; 2) the perception of the world as meaningful and compre­
hensible; 3) the view of ourselves in a positive light" (Janoff-Bulman and 
Frieze, 1983:3). This hypothesis, however, as well as the others referred to 
above, requires testing and validation no less than the more psychoanalyti­
cally oriented theories. 
Somewhat more systematic information has been gathered on the sub­
ject of the fear of crime. It may be surmised that persons who have been 
victimized would live in greater fear of victimization than persons who 
had not had the experience. However, the survey data are somewhat am­
biguous on this point. Garofalo (1977a) found that certain types of victims 
had greater fear levels but that there was no overall trend in this respect.6 
Some writers have even suggested that victimization may reduce fear, 
since the actual experience proves to be less traumatic than anticipated (cf. 
Skogan, 1985:2). Skogan and Maxfield, on the other hand, in their study of 
fear in Chicago, Philadelphia, and San Francisco in 1977, found that vic­
tims were between 30% and 60% more likely to indicate fear than 
nonvictims (1981:62); this finding was reaffirmed in a "panel" study con­
ducted by Skogan (1986), in which samples drawn from Houston, Texas, 
and Newark, New Jersey, totaling 1,738 persons, were interviewed twice, 
with a 12-month interval between interviews. 
The salience and intensity of fear, however, seem to emerge more un­
equivocally not only from the clinical literature reviewed above but also 
from smaller surveys of victim populations. The New York Victim Ser­
vices Agency study found that "a major emotional response to crime was 
fear. More than 60 percent of victims reported feeling 'very much' or 'some­
what7 less safe in their homes, and more than 40 percent felt less safe in 
their neighborhoods. After the crime, 60 percent of the 274 victims inter­
viewed reported taking added precautions in their homes and 38 percent 
said they went out less at night. Twenty-four percent went out less during 
the day" (Friedman etal., 1982:71). 
A degree of discrepancy between the picture emerging from some of the 
general survey data and that presented by the New York study may be 
explained partly in terms of the nature of the sample, and partly in terms of 
the measure of fear adopted. The surveys use a miscellany of such mea­
sures, none of which relate directly to the incident, since the same ques­
tions are designed for nonvictims. They therefore elicit the respondent's 
general attitude on the issue, rather than measuring whether any modifica­
tion of this attitude took place consequent to the offense.7 Further, per­
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sonal fear is not always distinguished from a general concern about crime 
(Mayhew, 1984). Finally, New York City may not be a representative loca­
tion for testing manifestations of fear; compare, for example, the more 
moderate impact noted by Smith et al. (1984) in Pima County, Arizona. 
The effects of victimization on fear may vary by type of offense, but the 
findings are not uniform as to the types of offense arousing greater fear 
levels. Surprisingly, however, some American studies have associated in­
creases in fear levels primarily with offenses involving an element of prop­
erty loss (Garofalo, 1977a-, Smith and Hill, 1991). It has, of course, been 
established that certain more vulnerable sections of the community, such 
as females and the elderly, are more likely to be fearful of crime (see, e.g., 
Skogan and Maxfield, 1981), but it does not follow that these groups are 
more strongly affected by victimization experiences in this respect. 
Insofar as the experience of victimization results in increasing fear and 
the resultant spread of fear and suspicion in the community as a whole, 
this result would seem to negate the Durkheimian hypothesis that a crime 
leads to an increase in social solidarity (Conklin, 1972). Increase in mutual 
suspicion was suggested by the findings of a study conducted by Lejeune 
and Alex (1977); however, the survey reported by Smith et al. (1984) found 
that this phenomenon was only modest and did not reach pathological 
dimensions. Friedman et al. (1982) found that in 32% of the cases victim­
ization was likely to affect adversely the victim's ability to relate to other 
people, but at the same time more than half the sample "felt better about 
people's willingness to help" as a result of sympathetic support systems or 
favorable police response" (205; and cf. Young, 1990:198), a finding that 
would tend to validate the Durkheimian thesis. This last finding may also 
be indicative of the importance of support networks, whether formal or 
informal. It has also been suggested that fear could be a useful and cost-
effective learning experience giving rise to rational consequences such as 
the taking of proper precautions (Skogan, 1985:13). 
Effects of Crime and Needs of Victims 
As noted earlier, the literature reviewed in this chapter generally analyzes 
the "effects" of crime rather than attempting to define the needs of vic­
tims. This is partly owing to the arbitrary or subjective element in the 
definition of a "need"8 as compared, for example, with a "problem" or an 
"inconvenience" (Maguire and Corbett, 1987:60-61). Maguire and Corbett 
also point out that many adverse effects of victimization do not necessarily 
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give rise to a need, since the victim does not require any outside help in 
overcoming the problem (61). Skogan et al. (1990) found that most prob­
lems were overcome with the help of family and friends, so that assistance 
was not usually required from outside agencies. 
Nevertheless, these studies did endeavor to assess the nature and extent 
both of "needs" and "unmet needs" (Skogan et al., 1990) and of "unre­
solved problems" (Maguire and Corbett, 1987). Thus Skogan et al. (1990) 
"asked about seventeen categories of assistance that victims might possi­
bly need" (21). Most of the victims (of robbery, assault, and burglary) had 
either no needs (39%) or only one (20%) (22). The main clusters of need 
which victims had were counseling and advice (36%), household repair/ 
security (22%), and financial or housing assistance (16%) (25), although, as 
the authors point out, the latter "needs" are related less to the victimiza­
tion experience itself than to the prevention of future crime. 
However, most needs were, as noted, met by family and friends or, to a 
lesser extent (see also chap. 10), by victim-assistance agencies. The unmet 
needs were mainly of a practical nature, particularly assistance in filing 
insurance claims (Skogan et al., 1990: fig. 5), specified by more than one-
half of the sample. Maguire and Corbett (1987:77) calculated that some 
30%-40% of victims of recorded offenses of burglary or violence in Britain 
are in need of support from a victim-assistance scheme; for other catego­
ries their assessments were much lower. 
Conclusions 
While the impact of victimization in terms of the financial and medical 
needs to which it gives rise may require further examination, the general 
picture in these respects is clear. Most victims have no medical needs follow­
ing their victimization and will have suffered relatively modest financial 
losses. A minority of victims, however, may have serious problems either 
because of the greater injuries or losses they have incurred, or owing to their 
reduced ability—whether because of objective or subjective factors—to 
deal with these problems. 
In relation to the emotional impact of victimization, the methodologi­
cal issues are incomparably more complex and the findings inconsistent. 
However, there is evidence that the emotional problems accompanying 
victimization are the dominant ones, even for victims of property crimes. 
The New York survey cited above found that psychological problems domi­
nated all others: "The impact of the crime . . . was first and foremost 
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psychological. . . . Even when describing practical problems stemming 
from the crime—stolen property, disruption of daily routine, damaged prop­
erty, medical complications, medical expenses, lost income, problems 
with employers—three-quarters of the victims described the impact of the 
crime in psychological terms" (Friedman et al.; 1982:xvii). The authors 
noted in the concluding section of their report that they were "stunned at 
the general impact of a crime on the victim's psychological state, and at 
the alterations in daily life which were so often a part of the post-
victimization experience" (266). 
A similar conclusion was also reached by Smith et al. (1984). Moreover, 
Shapland (1984) refers to "the persistence and consistency of the preva­
lence of physical, social and psychological effects over time, compared to 
the low level and decrease over time of financial loss" (142). Maguire 
(1991:395-96), however, suggests that the more serious effects are con­
fined to offenses of violence and burglary, owing to its intrusive element. 
For most offenses are probably trivial, and victims have trouble in recollect­
ing them (Fattah, 1981). 
The nature of the emotional problems identified appears also to depend 
to some extent on the perspective of the researcher; writers with a welfare 
orientation emphasize such "routine" effects as fear and anxiety, those 
adopting a more psychoanalytic orientation tend to identify traumatiza­
tion on a deeper personality level. Social psychologists diagnose problems 
in terms of being a threat to the victim's assumptions about the world, 
including his or her attributions of responsibility to him- or herself and 
others. 
Identification of the dominant problems encountered by victims and the 
diagnosis of their causes will tend to determine the optimal remedies 
proposed. Further, insofar as victims appear to be in need of assistance to 
overcome their problems, the question arises whether such assistance 
should be professional or voluntary, whether those providing assistance 
should be specialists in providing service to crime victims, or whether the 
answer lies in the strengthening of existing support networks. The identity 
of the helping agent may determine, inter alia, whether the victim adopts a 
"stress" or an "instrumental" reaction,- a psychoanalyst may emphasize 
therapy, and a behaviorist may suggest instrumental reactions such as the 
purchase of a lock. The nature of the intervention may also influence the 
victim in his or her decision to seek a remedy from social services or 
within the criminal justice system, the main dichotomy around which the 
present study revolves (see esp. chap. 12). 
It is clear from existing studies that insofar as victims continue to be 
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handled by traditional law enforcement personnel, these should be re­
quired to display a greater sensitivity than in the past, and that, for exam­
ple, "the collection of evidence should not override the provision of care 
and support that the victim needs during a period of crisis" (Shapland et al., 
1981:65, and 1985:30). This principle has of course been recognized by 
policy documents (see, e.g., President's Task Force, 1982; ABA, 1983) and 
reflected in the subsequent legislative and administrative reforms. How­
ever, the American Psychological Association (1984) pointed out that 
while "to some extent these laws are likely to significantly aid victims and 
reducing [sic] the impact of the victimization experience," "it is also 
likely . . . that some of the provisions in these laws will have just the 
opposite effect" (142). Attention is implicitly drawn here to the need for 
evaluation of the reforms referred to. 
The above warning on the part of the American Psychological Associa­
tion also serves as a reminder of the oft-heard allegation of "secondary 
victimization," whereby the emotional impact of the victimization itself 
may be further aggravated by the victim's experience with the criminal 
justice system, or possibly even with other social agencies, such as the 
compensation board (see chap. 9). However, favorable experiences may be 
expected to reduce this trauma. 
The question of what is a favorable or an unfavorable experience with 
the justice system cannot be assessed exclusively on the basis of the poli­
cies and attitudes adopted by that system as documented in chapter 2, or 
by the coping needs of the victim as documented in the present chapter. 
They are also a function of the victim's perceived needs and expectations 
from that system. This will be the topic of the next chapter. 
Perceived Justice Needs

This chapter deals with the perceived justice needs of the main parties 
involved in the criminal justice system. Unlike the next chapter, which 
will be concerned with abstract concepts of justice, the issues to be con­
sidered here are essentially empirical ones. Perceived justice needs cannot 
be determined a priori, but only as the result of evidence obtained by 
means of surveys or research. However, as will become evident from the 
following discussion, most of the evidence regarding these needs is of a 
somewhat indirect nature. When considering perceived justice needs it 
seems appropriate to differentiate between what seem analytically to be 
two different questions: (1) What is known about people's fundamental 
attitudes, concepts, and sentiments regarding the institutions and func­
tions of justice in society? (2) How far are people satisfied with the crimi­
nal justice system as it actually operates, or as it is perceived by them to 
operate, today? 
Naturally, these two questions are interrelated, since it would be ex­
pected that the greater the extent to which the present system is attuned to 
people's fundamental concepts of justice, the higher the degree of satisfac­
tion that will be expressed with this system. Conversely, satisfaction, or 
nonsatisfaction, with the prevailing criminal justice system may serve as 
an indicator, albeit indirect, of fundamental attitudes to justice. Partly for 
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this reason, and partly because considerably more direct evidence is avail­
able on this topic, the degree of satisfaction with the current system will 
be examined first. 
Data Sources 
The sources of knowledge in this area derive both from surveys and from 
specific research projects. Thus, a number of public opinion surveys of the 
Harris-Gallup variety have dealt with questions related to criminal justice. 
Academic criminologists are familiar with the General Social Surveys con­
ducted by the National Opinion Research Center; an analysis of public 
attitudes to crime and punishment deriving from these sources was pub­
lished by Stinchcombe et al. (1980). Other surveys have been conducted on 
a localized basis in individual states, by state crime commissions and other 
local bodies. The proliferation of such studies was documented some years 
ago by the International Center for Comparative Criminology in Montreal, 
which located "well over 500 studies" published in the years 1967-76 
alone (Baril, 1984:75). The scientific merit of these studies is, however, 
often limited. A recent comprehensive analysis of both the sources and the 
findings was conducted by Roberts (1992). 
Another important source that has emerged in recent years is the vic­
timization surveys, notably the National Crime Survey. These have pro­
vided data on certain aspects of the topic; in particular, some impression 
of the public's attitude to the police may be gleaned from responses by 
victims on the nonreporting of offenses committed against them, and the 
reasons for such nonreporting. One advantage of such surveys is that they 
enable comparisons to be made between the attitudes of victims and 
those of nonvictims. In general, however, information deriving from these 
surveys on the victims7 attitudes to, and expectations from, the criminal 
justice system has been very limited. The British Crime Survey is notable 
for its attempt to explore these issues more widely; this orientation was 
also adopted by the European-based International Crime Survey launched 
in 1989. 
In-depth research on attitudes to the criminal justice system, on the 
other hand, is rather sparse. A number of studies deal with specific issues, 
such as the problems encountered by rape victims (see esp. Holmstrom 
and Burgess, 1978) or racial differences in attitudes to the police (Jacob, 
1971). There is no doubt that since the publication of the review by 
Mackay and Hagan (1978), which identified only four studies of victims' 
attitudes, this literature has been considerably enriched by a number of 
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detailed studies, such as one conducted by Hagan (1980) in Canada, 
Shapland et al. (1985) in England, and the series of studies conducted by 
the Vera Institute of Justice and the Victim Services Agency in New York 
City (Davis, Russell, and Kunreuther, 1980; Davis, Tichane, and Connick, 
1980; Connick and Davis, 1981; Friedman et al., 1982). Some studies of 
victims' attitudes have been carried out in the context of particular 
victim-oriented programs, the most notable example being Umbreit's 
study of the meaning of "fairness" in the context of offender-victim media­
tion (Umbreit, 1988) and some recent research on victim-impact state­
ments (Davis and Smith, 1994b; Erez et al., 1994). Finally, the in-depth 
"qualitative" studies and the experimental literature should also be noted. 
However, while the cumulative contribution of these studies to the litera­
ture should not be underestimated, most of the research has limitations, 
whether geographical or methodological, such that our knowledge of vic­
tim attitudes and their implications is still somewhat rudimentary. 
Studies of the defendant's attitude to the criminal justice system are 
probably fewer still in number (but see Casper, 1978; Casper et al., 1988), 
although more research has been conducted on prisoners' attitudes (see, 
e.g., such classics as Sykes and Messinger, 1960), perhaps because prisoners 
constitute, in the most literal sense, a "captive audience." 
The above-mentioned studies are relevant not only to the question of 
the attitudes of the different parties to specific criminal justice agencies as 
they function today, but also to the wider question of fundamental con­
cepts and attitudes regarding justice and its proper functioning. In this area 
experimental studies may be more appropriate than empirical ones, since 
the concern is with "basic" justice needs and "ideal" justice systems, 
unrelated to the practices prevailing in the "real world" (although even 
experimental situations will not be entirely uninfluenced by real-world 
considerations). 
The experimental studies that are relevant in this context belong 
mostly to the areas of social psychology which were referred to in chapter 
2, but in particular to equity theory. Whereas attribution theory and the 
just-world theory are concerned mainly with the reactions of third parties, 
and tend to focus on causality and blame rather than the appropriateness of 
the societal response, equity theory is more concerned with the interpreta­
tions and reactions of the parties to the victimization themselves. Another 
distinct but related area of research to have developed rapidly in recent 
years pertains to the perceived fairness of the procedures rather than the 
outcomes (cf. Lind and Tyler, 1988:10-12). The relevance of these areas of 
research will be demonstrated below. 
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Finally, the most significant attempt to orientate the experimental lit­
erature of social psychology to the predicament of the crime victim is 
found in the recent monograph by Greenberg and Ruback (1992), but the 
focus here is mainly on the dynamics of victim decision-making—and in 
particular the decision whether to report the crime—rather than on the 
broader issues of justice needs and perceptions with which this chapter is 
primarily concerned. 
Methodological Issues 
While a considerable amount of data are now available regarding people's 
feelings about the police and other criminal justice agencies, the validity of 
these data is questionable and their interpretation problematical. Research 
on attitudes is a highly complex area fraught with ambiguities (Robert, 
1979; Skogan, 1981; Walker and Hough, 1988; Roberts, 1992; Durham, 
1993).l Responses may depend not only on the sample selected but also on 
the phrasing of the question and the "set" within which it is presented. 
Terms and concepts prevailing in the criminal justice vocabulary may con­
vey varying messages or images to different respondents (Robert, 1979; 
Baril, 1984). This problem can perhaps be reduced by conducting explor­
atory, qualitative research prior to the quantitative survey (Robert 1979:81). 
However, rejection of quantitative research in favor of qualitative (see, e.g., 
Baril, 1984) results in other disadvantages, such as the lack of representative­
ness and a risk of "analysis which smacks of psychoanalysis" (Robert, 
1979:86). 
Another general problem of attitude research is the difficulty in reach­
ing conclusions regarding people's behavior on the basis of their verbal 
expressions. Attitude studies would be on firmer ground if in addition to 
the eliciting of responses to attitudinal questions, it were also possible to 
study the conduct of the research population giving expression to such 
attitudes. However, while such research may sometimes be feasible in 
relation to courts and the police,2 it is extremely difficult to do this for the 
general public or for victims. These groups have few opportunities to give 
expression to their attitudes by means of specific and recorded conduct, 
other than their decision to report an offense and to "cooperate" with the 
criminal justice agencies. Even these decisions may be difficult to docu­
ment, particularly on the "micro" level necessary for the measure of, or at 
least the elucidation of, their attitudes. 
Mention must be made here of the pioneering attempt of Greenberg et 
al. (1982) to compare the results of adopting alternative methodological 
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approaches to the study of victim behavior in relation to the reporting of a 
crime. Their main concern was the relative influence of victim characteris­
tics and situational factors—and especially the conduct of third parties— 
on the decision to report. The authors compared the merits of (1) "archival 
analysis/' that is, the study of police reports, (2) interviews with victims, 
(3) simulative studies (interviewing respondents), and (4) the experimental 
approach, whereby a "crime" was constructed and the conduct of the "vic­
tim" (as he or she believed him- or herself to be) was observed. Certain 
similarities as well as inconsistencies emerged, and the authors attempted 
to account for the latter. The overall impression created regarding the 
respective merits of the four methods was that (a) official records are 
lacking in the type of data required; (b) interviews create problems of 
reconstruction of the event; (c) simulated situations may be too remote 
from "real life"; and (d) experimentation seemed to produce both valid and 
relevant results. The authors, indeed, "placed more confidence in the ex­
perimental findings than in the simulation findings" (81). However, such 
research is complicated and expensive and may be difficult to apply to 
certain areas such as homicides. The authors in fact concluded that "no 
single methodology has a monopoly on virtue" (82). 
Most of the surveys considered in this chapter are considerably less 
sophisticated and rely instead on verbal responses to questions in determin­
ing attitudes to the criminal justice system of the population surveyed. 
Moreover, they generally adopt somewhat simplistic criteria for the depen­
dent variable. The most common measures of a positive attitude on the 
part of the respondent are whether he or she was "satisfied" with the 
functioning of the agency in question, or whether this agency was regarded 
as "fair," "just," or "effective." An obvious problem here is the subjective 
nature of the criteria. Differentiated responses may reflect the different 
experiences undergone by the respondents at the hands of the agency in 
question, or different notions of the standard ("justice," "fairness," etc.) 
according to which the agency is being measured. 
Further, it may not be clear whether the agency is being evaluated by 
reference to some ideal standard perceived by the respondent to be the 
appropriate criterion, or whether the baseline according to which the 
respondents are measuring their perceptions of the agency in question are 
the anticipated standard of conduct that they expected from that agency. 
This last interpretation was adopted by Kelly (1982:14) in order to inter­
pret her findings on the relatively favorable evaluation of the police by 
her sample of rape victims, who at the same time voiced considerable 
criticism of the police. Indeed, in a well-known article on attitudes to the 
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police, one researcher operationalized the concept of injustice as "incon­
gruence, or a gap between expectations and perceptions7' (Jacob, 1971:69). 
The extent of this gap between expectations and perceptions may not, 
however, suffice as the sole measure of the respondents' feelings about 
the performance of the agency concerned, for, as Jacob points out, "the 
gap may be large but the person may feel injustice is not very salient to 
him" (70). 
More common methodological issues which arise here, in particular in 
the context of victim attitudes, relate to the need for longitudinal studies 
for the purpose of measuring change and to the question of control and 
comparison groups. These issues are dealt with in the article by Mackay 
and Hagan (1978) referred to above and will be alluded to in the course of 
this chapter. 
The research pertinent to the determination of fundamental concepts of 
justice,3 as distinct from attitudes toward the operation of existing agen­
cies, raises its own methodological problems. First, what are the fundamen­
tal questions pertaining to notions of justice which are raised, explicitly or 
implicitly, by the available studies, or which should be raised by any other 
studies which may be designed? Second, how much of the evidence emerg­
ing from the surveys and studies conducted can be seen to be pertinent to 
the more fundamental questions, rather than merely reflecting attitudes to 
the existing system? 
On the first issue, one of the fundamental issues relevant to this study is 
the degree to which the relevant parties, in this case the victim and the 
public, are punitive, that is, to what degree of severity they feel that the 
perpetrators of an offense should be punished. While this question may be 
raised in the context of the same types of survey in which the evaluations 
of present-day criminal justice agencies are elicited, it is distinct in its 
implications, since it need not be logically related to the functioning of 
these agencies. It may instead be concerned with either of the following 
dichotomies: (a) punitiveness versus leniency, that is, how far respondents 
wish to impose relatively harsh, as opposed to relatively light, sanctions on 
offenders; and (b) punitiveness versus rehabilitation, that is, how far the 
sanctioning system favored would have a backward-looking orientation to 
the offense committed rather than a forward-looking orientation to chang­
ing the offender (cf. Walker and Hough, 1988).4 
The second issue is more problematical. Not only in the survey data but 
even in the experimental data it may be difficult, when endeavoring to 
study "fundamental" justice needs, to control satisfactorily for respon­
dents' attitudes toward the prevailing system. Perceptions of justice can­
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not be studied in a void. Even if respondents are not relating explicitly to 
the prevailing criminal justice practices, they may be influenced indirectly 
by them. Moreover, they are inevitably responding within the frame of 
reference of contemporary values and institutions. In indicating their ex­
pectations of a justice system, respondents may or may not be able to 
transcend some of the traditional principles or conventions upon which 
the present system is founded, but they are unlikely to be able to liberate 
themselves entirely from prevailing socioeconomic and political values 
and mores. Nevertheless, the distinction between attitudes to the present 
system and "fundamental" attitudes is useful in the context of the present 
study, which is based upon the somewhat optimistic premise that changes 
in the structure of the criminal justice system are negotiable, whereas 
changes in the socioeconomic and political systems are beyond its terms of 
reference. 
The following sections of this chapter will review the data available on 
attitudes of the public in general, and of victims in particular, to the exist­
ing system. The more fundamental issues will be discussed subsequently. 
Citizens' Attitudes toward Police 
Surveys of citizens' attitudes to the police have consistently indicated a 
high degree of support for that body. The surveys conducted for the Presi-
dent's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice 
indicated considerable support for the police even among groups who were 
sympathetic to civil liberties and not in favor of wide police powers. One of 
these surveys "found that 91 percent of the respondents believed that their 
local police were doing an excellent (22 percent), good (45 percent), or fair 
(24 percent) job of enforcing the laws7' (Ennis, 1967:53, cited in Garofalo, 
1977b: 11). Similarly, "35 percent felt that the police were respectful to­
wards persons like themselves, and 88 percent felt that the police in their 
neighborhoods were honest" (Thomas and Hyman, 1977:309). Evaluations 
of data relating to 13 cities included in the National Crime Survey in 1972 
and 1973 and in 1975 revealed that between 79% and 81% of respondents 
rated their local police "good" or "average." This, however, seems to indi­
cate less enthusiasm than evidenced by the earlier surveys. Moreover, 
"fully two-thirds (68 percent) of the respondents felt that some improve­
ment was needed in their local police." 
Other studies tend to support the generally favorable image. Smith 
and Hawkins (1973) conducted a survey in Seattle "designed to assess 
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respondents' views of the fairness of the police as a group," using five 
measures related primarily to the impartiality or selectivity of law en­
forcement. Seventy-two percent of the respondents were in the "most 
favorable" or "more favorable" categories. Thomas and Hyman (1977) 
whose study was based on 3,334 households in Virginia, concluded that 
"the vast majority of those in our sample described the police as effective, 
equitable in their treatment of citizens, and respectful" (316). Among 892 
respondents in a British Columbia sample, 70% evaluated their local 
police as "good," and 22.6% as "very good" (Koenig, 1980:246). Later 
surveys in the United States and Canada indicated that 84% and 86%, 
respectively, of the population were satisfied with the police (Brillon, 
1983:81). However, a survey conducted in 1991 on behalf of the National 
Victim Center found that only 64% of the public rated the functioning of 
the police as "excellent" or "fair" (Flanagan and Maguire, 1992:178). 
Finally, while the 1988 British Crime Survey found that 85% of respon­
dents rated police performance as "good" or "very good," this constituted a 
decline as compared with earlier surveys, a decline that was "consistent 
with the findings of independent polls" (Skogan, 1990:1, 2). Moreover, the 
1989 International Crime Survey found that in most of the participating 
European countries (including Britain) the view that the police were doing 
a good job of controlling crime was nearer to 60%, while on average "16% 
did not feel capable of expressing an opinion" (Van Dijk et al., 1990:71). 
The evaluations of the non-European countries, including the United 
States and Canada, were higher. 
Support for the police indicated by these studies was by no means 
uniform across all components of the population. Thus, Garofalo (1977a) 
found "very large differences between racial groups on evaluation of po­
lice performance in the 'impact cities' " (28). The proportion of whites 
who evaluated local pohce performance as good was more than twice the 
comparable proportion of African Americans (54% versus 25%; see also 
Garofalo, 1977b: 13). Other studies, too, have drawn attention to differen­
tial perceptions of the police according to respondents' race (see Jacob, 
1971, and the studies referred to therein; Ku, 1977; Thomas and Hyman, 
1977:315, who found that "the majority of blacks in this sample are 
highly critical of the police"; Skogan, 1990:15). Age, too, is a variable that 
has been found to be related to attitudes toward the police: positive eval­
uations according to age group increased from 29% in the lowest age 
group (16-19) to 60% among the "65 or older" (Garofalo, 1977a:86, table 
38; see also Garofalo, 1977b: 15; Skogan, 1990:15; Van Dijk et al., 
1990:72). 
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Victims' Attitudes toward Police 
A number of studies have attempted to determine how far attitudes toward 
police are influenced by victimization experiences. It is sometimes hy­
pothesized that the experience of being victimized would be found to re­
sult in a lower opinion of the police. This might follow either from the 
victim's feeling that the police had failed to provide protection, or as a 
result of negative experiences with the police as such. The validity of this 
hypothesis is directly relevant to the present research, both in order to 
determine whether persons with victimization experience represent a spe­
cial constituency in the context of the public's attitudes to the criminal 
justice system, and, more specifically, to determine how far victims seem 
to have been satisfied with their experiences in the course of their encoun­
ters with this system. 
The National Crime Survey data analyzed by Garofalo (1977a), being a 
victimization survey, was able to throw light on this topic. In general, it 
was found that there were "only small differences in evaluation of police 
performance" between victims, defined as persons who reported having 
been victimized during the previous twelve months, and nonvictims (29, 
table 38). Six percent fewer victims than nonvictims gave good ratings, and 
six percent more gave poor ratings. This trend was consistent for whites 
among the different age groups, but less consistent for blacks (table 42). 
A number of other surveys have examined the differences between vic­
tims and nonvictims in attitudes toward police. An earlier analysis using 
the National Opinion Research Center data collected for the President's 
Commission in 1967 also found that victims of crime were less likely to 
express support for the police (Black, 1971, citing Black, 1970).5 This find­
ing was confirmed by Koenig (1980) and by the International Crime Survey 
(Van Dijk et al., 1990:72). Moreover, the decline in support for the police in 
Britain has been attributed to "mounting dissatisfaction among those who 
contacted the police," particularly crime victims (Skogan, 1990:24). How­
ever, as noted by Garofalo (1977b), "the evidence concerning the relation­
ship between victimization and attitudes towards the police is somewhat 
conflicting" (21). Thus Parks (1976) listed a number of studies on the rela­
tionship between attitudes toward police and victimization experience, 
and concluded that "the consensus is that these relationships are weak or 
non-existent" (89), although he himself questioned the validity of this 
finding. Smith and Hawkins (1973), in their Seattle study referred to above, 
concluded that "there was no difference in attitudes about police fairness 
among victims and non-victims" (140). Similarly, Thomas and Hyman 
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(1977) concluded from their Virginia survey that "victimization per se is 
not a significant correlate of evaluations of police performance" (316). 
Moreover, Garofalo (1970:21) cited a number of other studies lending sup­
port to this proposition. 
The inconsistencies between the surveys that found differences be­
tween the attitudes toward the police of victims and nonvictims and those 
that found no such differences may be partly explainable in terms of meth­
odological problems in the operationalizing of satisfaction with the police 
(cf. Thomas and Hyman, 1977:311). Moreover, in the nonnational surveys 
local factors may be operating. There are other findings, however, emerg­
ing from some of the studies referred to which raise different types of 
explanations. 
One type of explanation relates to the degree of victimization. Some 
studies indicate that attitudes toward the police are less favorable on the 
part of victims of more serious offenses. Thus, in Garofalo's analysis of the 
National Crime Data for 1982 and 1983, among white persons whose experi­
ence with victimization was with robbery or assault, between 16% and 22% 
evaluated police performance as poor, as compared with single-digit percent­
ages for victims of other types of offense, and 6% for nonvictims (1977a:96, 
table 43).6 Similarly, in his later analysis, Garofalo offered an explanation of 
the discrepancy in the findings between the different studies, namely, that 
"victimization is defined here only on the basis of personal crimes that 
involve contact between the victim and offender" (1977b:21). 
Further support for the hypothesis that it is only relatively serious victim­
ization that substantially affects attitudes toward the police is found in two 
additional measures adopted in Garofalo's second survey: (1) the number of 
victimizations experienced during the preceding 12 months, and (2) the 
seriousness of the victimizations "scored by a method derived from Sellin 
and Wolfgang (1964)" (ibid., 22; see also 57-58). Both measures were associ­
ated with respondents' ratings of police. With regard to the number of victim­
izations, the most negative rating was given by 12% of the nonvictimized 
respondents, 22% of the once-victimized, 27% of the twice-victimized, and 
33% of those victimized on three or more occasions. Similarly, such ratings 
were given for 13% of the respondents whose victimization was so minor 
that it had a seriousness score of zero, 14% of respondents with a score of 1 
to 2,23% of respondents with a score of 3 to 5, and 33% of respondents with 
a score of 6 or more. Comparison between the nonvictimized and the vic­
tims with a low seriousness score is particularly significant here, since it 
suggests that a minor victimization, even in the case of "personal" crime, 
has little effect on attitudes toward the police. 
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These findings raise the possibility that the routine differentiations 
between victims and nonvictims adopted in the victimization surveys 
may not be adequate in the context of the present analysis of attitudes. 
Victimization as such may not be a meaningful event (cf. chap. 4, above). 
There is indeed some support for this hypothesis, there being some 35 to 
40 million offenses committed in the United States every year (U.S. Dept. 
of Justice, 1992:3-4). The statistical probability of being victimized over 
a five- or ten-year period must therefore be extremely high. Paradoxically, 
however, Skogan and Maxfield (1981), writing when victimization rates 
were at their peak, took the view that "recent and personal experience 
with crime are relatively infrequent" (44; see also Sparks, 1982:95). It is 
thus quite plausible that only serious, or recent and serious, victimiza­
tions will give rise to any meaningful differentiation in attitudes between 
victims and nonvictims. 
Finally, in the context of the seriousness hypothesis, mention must be 
made of a counterhypothesis. Poister and McDavid (1978), on the basis of a 
survey conducted in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, found that victims of more 
serious offenses were more satisfied with the police than victims of less 
serious offenses. The explanation offered by the authors of this study was 
that the police were perceived to have invested greater efforts in dealing 
with the offenses, thereby giving rise to a higher level of satisfaction. This 
study, however, seems to run counter to the picture emerging from the 
studies and surveys reviewed above. It may, on the other hand, be consis­
tent with the next hypothesis. 
The second—and highly plausible—hypothesis that may be offered to 
explain the data is that attitudes toward the police depend neither upon the 
fact of victimization as such, nor upon the degree of victimization, but 
rather upon the nature of the respondent's experience in contacts with the 
police, whether as a result of victimization or otherwise. This was the 
finding of Smith and Hawkins (1973), who concluded that attitudes toward 
the police, as measured by "opinions on police fairness," were positively 
correlated with "degree of satisfaction with police action" and negatively 
correlated with "observing police officers 'do wrong' "—an experience 
claimed by 27% of the sample—and with previous arrest experience on the 
part of the respondent. In this context it is important to recall that many 
victims have had other experiences of contact with the police, whether as 
suspects or "consumers of police services" (Maxfield, 1984). Some British 
studies support the view that the more the contacts were urgent and crime 
related, the less likely the consumer was to be satisfied (Skogan, 1990:14). 
Koenig (1980), in the Canadian study referred to above, concluded that 
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"evaluation of local police appears much less favorable among those who 
have experienced or observed a police field practice perceived as improper 
and slightly less favorable among individuals who have experienced a puni­
tive legal sanction or been victimized by some types of crime—particularly 
crimes against the person" (247). Parks (1976), reporting on a survey of some 
4,000 respondents in the St. Louis area, found that evaluations on the part of 
respondents who were satisfied with the police response resembled those of 
the nonvictims, but those "who were dissatisfied with the police response 
after they were called were much more negative in their evaluations and 
perceptions" (98). Finally, Jacob (1971), in his Wisconsin study, found that 
"evaluations of actual police were most related to satisfaction with specific 
agencies and much less related to income, age, sex, or education of the 
respondent" (86). This was in addition to the race factor, which, as noted 
above, was found to be significant. 
It thus seems to emerge that while race, and perhaps age, appear to have 
a generalized effect on attitudes to police, these attitudes are significantly 
affected by the personal experience of the respondent whether as victim, 
suspect, or observer. Moreover, it should be noted that this may also ac­
count for the "generalized effect" of race and age,- for the categories holding 
the lower evaluations, that is, blacks and younger respondents, are more 
likely to have come into contact with the police not only in the capacity of 
victim but also as offenders or suspects (cf. Thomas and Hyman, 1977:316) 
and are thus more likely to have undergone negative experiences. 
The survey data reviewed above, which suggest that attitudes toward 
the police may be a product not only of sociodemographic and cultural 
factors but also of particular experiences of victims and witnesses, have 
been supplemented in recent years by the surveys and in-depth studies, 
some conducted on a longitudinal basis, of victims and witnesses. These 
studies have begun to enrich our knowledge of victims' experiences at the 
different stages of their encounters with the criminal justice system, and 
their reactions to these experiences. 
These studies generally report a high level of satisfaction with the police 
on the part of victims. Knudten et al. (1976), in a pioneering survey of 386 
crime victims in Milwaukee County, reported that 41% of the sample 
stated that they were "very satisfied" with the police, while another 40% 
were "satisfied." In the study by Davis, Russell, and Kunreuther (1980), of 
295 complaining witnesses in the Brooklyn Criminal Court, 86% of the 
sample expressed a favorable opinion of the arresting officer (table 5.1). 
Even in a sample of victims generally thought to suffer from discriminatory 
treatment on the part of the police, the general evaluation of the police was 
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not unfavorable. Smith (1982), for her sample of nonstranger violence in 
Charlotte, Minneapolis, and Los Angeles, found that 74% of the victims 
whose cases reached the court were satisfied with the police, while 17% 
had "mixed feelings." In Kelly's (1982) sample of rape victims in Washing­
ton, D.C., 75.6% expressed satisfaction with patrol officers and 79.6% with 
detectives. Similarly, Baril (1984) in her in-depth study of small shopkeep­
ers in Montreal, found that the police officer was "clearly the most re­
spected and appreciated among the various agents of the legal system" (80). 
One of the most detailed of these studies was that conducted by 
Shapland et al. (1985) in two English Midland cities, Coventry, and North­
ampton, in the course of which samples of victims of physical violence 
were interviewed at different stages of the criminal process.7 At the first 
interview, 76% to 77% of the victims stated that they were either satisfied 
or very satisfied with the police at the first contact. Some of the relevant 
considerations on the part of these victims will be referred to below, but 
particular attention was devoted to the crucial but unresearched second 
stage of the process, the victim's experience in making a statement to the 
police (required from 93% of the sample). This usually occurred within 24 
hours of the commission of the offense (71). A few respondents "were very 
unhappy about the statement being taken when they were shocked or in 
pain and knew that they did not do it well" (73). This was particularly true 
where the statement was taken in the hospital casualty ward. The pre­
ferred solution would have been to have made the statement in the vic-
tim's home (73). While most victims were satisfied that the statement 
recorded precisely reflected their own words, sometimes the victim "felt 
that the police had already decided what should be in the statement and he 
was just being asked to sign it" (75). Nevertheless, 42% were satisfied and 
30% very satisfied with the way the statement was taken. This account is 
presented here in some detail—and in spite of the uncertainty of its applica­
bility in other cultures—since it indicates a critical area of research on 
which there is little knowledge available. 
Victims tended to be more dissatisfied with the police as the proceed­
ings developed, such as when no suspect was apprehended (97-99), or 
when a suspect was released on bail or "cautioned," a form of diversion 
(100). However, this dissatisfaction arose not from these developments 
themselves—the police were credited with having done their best (99)— 
but from the failure to keep the victims informed (99, 111). Further, the 
decision not to prosecute or to plea-bargain, decisions that in England are 
often vested in the police, was often resented. Victims "often considered 
that the power to decide that the offender should not be prosecuted should 
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rest with the victim, not the police, whatever their criteria might be" 
(105). Here again, however, it was the failure to inform that particularly 
upset the victims (106). 
What were the qualities exhibited by the police of which victim-
respondents either approved or disapproved? In the survey conducted by 
Knudten et al. (1976), 50% of the victims gave police officers an "excel­
lent" rating and 23% a "good" rating for effort, and 42% "excellent" and 
28% "good" for effectiveness. The lowest rating, "poor," was specified by 
fewer than 10% for both qualities. However, Goldsmith (1978) suggests 
that doubts about efficiency and technical competence may be a ground for 
dissatisfaction, and the reasons offered by large numbers of victims for 
their failure to report offenses committed against them lends strength to 
this hypothesis. 
The importance of the manner displayed by police officers was empha­
sized in Shapland's English study, in which female sexual assault victims 
attributed greater significance to this quality than to the officer's sex 
(Shapland et al., 1985:74) and generally commented upon it favorably. 
Knudten et al. (1976) found that 60% of the victims rated the police as 
"excellent" and 26% as "good" on courteousness. Police activities that 
were sometimes commented upon unfavorably in these studies included 
delay in response time (Shapland et al., 1985:48);8 failure to return the 
victim's property, taken by the police for evidentiary purposes, for several 
weeks after the final disposition (Davis, Russell, and Kunreuther, 1980:67); 
the failure to arrest the suspect (Smith, 1983:30); denial of the victim's 
request to see the statement to the police prior to his court appearance to 
give testimony (Shapland et al., 1985:88); and, above all, the failure to keep 
the victim informed about how the investigation was proceeding (Gold­
smith, 1978:3; Shapland et al., 1985:92-93). 
This last complaint seems to emerge as the critical factor in the relevant 
studies. As noted above, victims were less upset by results or decisions in 
the course of the investigation which might seem undesirable from the 
victim's point of view (nonapprehension, nonarrest, release on bail, reduc­
tion of charge, etc.) than by failure to inform them of these developments:9 
"This lack of information from the police caused considerable dissatisfac­
tion amongst victims and a feeling of being let down after they themselves 
had cooperated with the police in the early stages of the case" (Shapland et 
al., 1985:130). 
Owing to the probability that more and more of the sources of the 
dissatisfaction listed above are likely to emerge as the investigation and 
trial progress, it is perhaps not surprising that the degree of satisfaction felt 
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toward the police seems to decline over time. This was found by Shapland 
et al. (1985:239), who interviewed the victims at four stages of the proceed­
ings. While respondents observed that police officers were helpful and 
effective on the first contact (58), and the initial procedures generally were 
satisfactory (92-93), both degree of satisfaction and overall ratings of po­
lice subsequently declined (239).10 Knudten et al. (1976), on the other hand, 
found that victims who reached the felony trial stage "were the group most 
likely to indicate satisfaction with the police and district attorney"; and in 
Kelly's survey of rape victims, many indicated that their opinions of the 
police—unlike their opinions of prosecutors—improved as a result of their 
experiences (Kelly, 1982:20). This may be consistent with the findings of 
Poister and McDavid (1978) that victims of more serious offenses were 
more satisfied with the police. 
In conclusion, it appears that while levels of satisfaction with the police 
are generally high for both victims and nonvictims, there is some evidence 
that victims tend to be less satisfied than nonvictims. The absence of 
uniformity in the findings may be explained by many factors, including the 
lack of salience of the victimization experience for many respondents, the 
nature of the questions asked, geographical differences in police image and 
police practices, and so on. However, interviews with victim samples indi­
cate various grounds for dissatisfaction, in particular the lack of informa­
tion provided to the victim. Other grounds are evident from the review in 
chapter 2 of the evidence on police attitudes toward victim-related issues, 
including the relevance, or lack of relevance, of victim harm in police 
decision making, the context of police conversations with victims, and the 
degree of attention paid to the victim's views. It will be recalled that while 
some researchers claimed to have found that victim-related factors— 
including the victim's views—were regarded as important, ultimately the 
police assumed the role of protectors of the public rather than of the par­
ticular victim. 
This, in turn, raises wider issues regarding police-community relations 
and the role of the police in society. While the police, indeed, are part of the 
state's law enforcement system, they also function on a community level 
and maintain a general interest in a favorable rapport with the public. More­
over, since they are virtually the only public agency to which citizens can 
turn at all times, they fulfill a wider and more flexible function than law 
enforcement alone (cf. Kalogeropoulos and Riviere, 1983). Insofar as they 
fulfill a service or public assistance function as well, they will not have 
discharged their perceived obligations to the complaining victim merely by 
processing the complaint according to accepted bureaucratic procedures. 
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Attitudes toward Prosecutors 
As compared with the other main components of the criminal justice 
system, the police and the courts, the prosecutorial function is the least 
visible of the criminal justice agencies. Neither are the prosecutors physi­
cally in the public eye like the police,11 nor are their decisions routinely 
reported in the media like those of the courts. For this reason there is little 
evidence available regarding the public's perceptions of the prosecutor. 
However, some of the studies focusing on victims' perceptions (Cannavale 
and Falcon, 1976; Knudten et al., 1976; Ziegenhagen, 1976; Connick and 
Davis, 1981; Kelly, 1982; Smith, 1983; Shapland et alv 1985) have consid­
ered their attitudes toward prosecutors. 
Knudten et al. (1976) reported that 75% of the victims in their Milwau­
kee sample indicated "overall satisfaction" with district attorneys.12 How­
ever, this was lower than the corresponding figure for their satisfaction 
with the police (81%). Moreover, only 27% were "very satisfied" with the 
district attorneys as compared with 41% for the police. Furthermore, when 
asked for specific ratings for effort, effectiveness, and courteousness, the 
district attorneys received fewer "excellent" ratings than the police on all 
three items (37%, 29%, and 55%, respectively, for the district attorneys, as 
compared with 50%, 42%, and 60%, respectively, for the police).13 
In three respects there are striking similarities between the above find­
ings and those of the smaller study of rape victims in Washington, D.C., 
conducted by Kelly (1982). First, Kelly, too, found that satisfaction ex­
pressed with regard to prosecutors, although fairly high (68.8%), was lower 
than that expressed toward police, as reported in the previous section. 
Second, here, too, specific ratings as to how the victims were treated (a 
measure that seems close to the "courteousness" rating in the Knudten 
study) indicated poorer evaluations of prosecutors, whom 59.4% of the 
victims perceived as having "treated them with understanding," as com­
pared with the police, for whom the equivalent figures were 64.1% for 
patrol officers and 74.5% for detectives. Third, in both studies the specific 
ratings with regard to these specific qualities, for both police and prosecu­
tors, were consistently lower than the overall satisfaction rates with these 
agencies. Kelly's explanation of the last phenomena is that "victims rated 
police and prosecutors highly because they expected to be treated so 
poorly." 
The main criticisms of the prosecutors in the Kelly study seem to have 
been not so much a lack of courteousness as a lack of consideration for the 
victim's role in the proceedings: "Victims primarily objected to being ex­
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eluded from their case" (1982:12). They were neither consulted about plea 
bargains nor informed of the outcome of the case (cf. above, chap. 2; see 
also Ziegenhagen, 1976:267). "The more frequently victims heard from the 
prosecutor and were consulted about the case, the more satisfied they were 
with services" (Kelly, 1982:18-19).14 This neglect resulted in the related 
complaint that the prosecutor was not representing them; indeed nobody 
was. Thus, for example, victims, unlike defendants, were unable to obtain 
postponements of the hearings to suit their convenience. Similarly, in 
Cannavale and Falcon's (1976) study of witnesses in the D.C. Supreme 
Court, 36% of the respondents [N = 880) agreed that "prosecutors do not 
care about the victim in a case" (63, fig. 5-6). Moreover, for those of the 
witnesses who were victims, this percentage was even higher. 
On the other hand, the victims in Kelly's sample who testified at trial 
"were more likely to be treated with understanding by the prosecutor, 
probably because the prosecutors were likely to spend more time preparing 
those individuals to testify" (Kelly, 1982:18). This is consistent with the 
findings of Knudten et al. (1976) that victims who reached the felony-trial 
stage tended to be more satisfied with both police (as noted above) and 
district attorneys. Apparently, disadvantages inherent in the additional 
"administrative runaround" involved, generally associated with increased 
dissatisfaction, were outweighed by the satisfaction of greater involve­
ment in the criminal process (Knudten et al., 1976:119-21). 
A related criticism directed at prosecutors in these studies relates to 
their perceived excessive sympathy for or leniency toward the defendant. 
Thus, in the Cannavale and Falcon witness study, while 56% of the sample 
apparently believed that the prosecutor did care about the victim15—the 
figure being slightly lower for witnesses who were victims—69% agreed 
with the statement that "prosecutors are interested in securing an honest 
and fair hearing for the accused" (1976:63, fig. 5-6); this figure was higher 
for witnesses who were victims (60). Similarly, victims in Shapland's Brit­
ish study complained that prosecutors did not protest defense tactics de­
signed to cast doubt on the victim's testimony (1985:143).16 
As a result of their negative experiences, 34% of Kelly's sample declared 
that their opinion of prosecutors had deteriorated, more than twice the 
percentage whose opinions had improved (1982:20)—the reverse of her 
findings with regard to police officers. Ziegenhagen, who conducted inter­
views with a small number of New York victims of personal crimes, also 
reported "a striking decline of satisfaction with the prosecutor's office and 
judges after victims had been exposed to criminal justice personnel" 
(1976:268). 
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Thus, in spite of the evidence presented in chapter 2 that some victim-
related factors—and sometimes even the victim's views—were already be­
ing taken into account by prosecutors when the studies surveyed here were 
conducted, prosecutors nevertheless appear to evoke a somewhat negative 
image on the part of victims, more negative than that of the police. This may 
be partly because the prosecution lacks a tradition of community relations 
and is identified with an organizational structure of professionals for whom 
the individual citizen's interests appear remote. It is also probable that the 
negative aspects of court procedures and outcomes, to be considered in the 
following sections, "rub off" onto the prosecutors. 
Formal norms adopted recently in many jurisdictions, such as those 
referred to in the introduction to this volume, are intended to enhance the 
victim's role, inter alia at the prosecution stage. The research reviewed 
above will require replication as these norms are implemented. 
Attitudes toward the Courts 
Direct contacts with the criminal courts on the part of the general public— 
indeed, even on the part of victims—are doubtless considerably fewer than 
their contacts with the police, and this may partly explain the paucity of 
academic literature on attitudes toward the courts.17 With the exception of 
isolated questions in public opinion surveys relating to "harshness" (see 
below), the data available on attitudes toward the courts seem to be some­
what limited. This is surprising, not only because there is presumably 
somewhat greater exposure on the part of the public to the courts, which 
have a civil as well as a criminal function, than to prosecutors, but mainly 
because the courts are by democratic tradition the ultimate decision-
making body in the justice system. 
One of the few detailed analyses that I have found on the issue of public 
perception of the courts was the study of Turpen and Champagne (1978), 
based upon "approximately 4,300 interviews which were taken in ten ma­
jor cities in the United States" (262). In this study, 6.5% of respondents 
held the view that the courts were always fair, 57.6% usually fair, 26.3% 
sometimes unfair, and 9.6% often unfair. The authors raised two method­
ological problems regarding their observations. First, the cities from which 
the respondents were selected were not necessarily representative, and 
thus they warn against "over-interpretation or over-generalization" (262). 
Second, it does not logically follow that "sometimes unfair" implies a 
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lower rating than "usually fair/' although this was the view considered 
more likely by the authors (after interviewing some students on this issue). 
A more fundamental question, however, not dealt with adequately in 
the Turpen-Champagne study, relates to the meaning of "fairness." This is 
a highly subjective concept, which will depend on the social and penal 
philosophy of the individual respondent. The treatment of this issue in 
this study seems unsatisfactory. On the one hand, the authors state that 
"justice and fairness are not terms which lend themselves to precise defini­
tion, but most of us have some generalized notion of what they mean" 
(261-62). On the other hand, respondents were also asked to specify "the 
ways in which courts are unfair." These were grouped by the authors into 
"Procedures" (nine categories, including "unfair sentences", selected by 
4.5% of those responding to this question), "Problems of Harshness and 
Leniency towards Some" (14.6% "too harsh," and 31.0% "too lenient"), 
"General Unfair" (14.7%), and "Other" (3.4%). This categorization blurs 
what seems to be the most fundamental differentiation in the context of 
perceived unfairness on the part of the courts, namely, whether the courts 
are seen to be at fault in some uniform or generalized way or whether they 
are thought to discriminate against certain classes of individuals. Some 
light is cast on this issue in another table presented by Turpen and Cham­
pagne (263, table 2) in which respondents were asked to specify the "group 
to whom courts are unfair." The authors were somewhat bewildered by the 
response "everyone" on the part of more than half of those responding 
(55.2% ),18 which seemed to them to "make little sense" except on the 
emotional level. However, if this table were cross-tabulated with the "per­
ceptions of the ways in which courts were unfair" it might emerge that 
this response reflected the view that the courts were uniformly and consis­
tently at fault in their level of sentencing, rather than guilty of any particu­
lar bias. Thus, if sentences are seen to be generally too lenient, this may be 
seen as a form of "unfairness" with regard to victims, although it is not 
clear whether victims were ever specifically alluded to in the study, but 
would not be discriminatory in the usual sense.19 
Most of the surveys dealing with attitudes of the general public toward 
the courts lay emphasis on the generalized level of overall harshness versus 
overall leniency.20 Stinchcombe et al. (1980) reviewed the responses to the 
question whether local courts dealt harshly enough with criminals, as re­
flected in the findings of various Gallup polls and the General Social Survey 
of the National Opinion Research Center during the years 1965 through 
1978. (The findings of 12 polls were reviewed.) These indicated an almost 
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perfectly monotonic increase in the proportion of respondents who ex­
pressed the view that the courts were "not harsh enough," rising from 
48.9% in 1965 to 84.9% in 1978. By 1982 this figure had reached 86% 
(Flanagan et al., 1985), although subsequently there was a moderate decline: 
in 1989 83% were of this opinion (Flanagan and Maguire, 1992:203). This 
represents a very substantial increase over the years and hardly seems expli­
cable in terms of the hypothesis suggested in Stinchcombe et al. (1980) of "a 
desire for the courts to return to their earlier level of punitiveness" (34).21 
Indeed, public support for harsher penalties by the courts in response to this 
type of question appears to be a universal phenomenon. "In fact, the ques­
tion concerning sentencing severity generates a more consensual response 
than any other in criminal justice" (Roberts, 1992:147), even if the intensity 
of the response may be more moderate in other countries (cf. Pitsela, 
1991:748). 
At the same time, these findings should not necessarily be interpreted 
as an absolute measure of punitiveness, a topic that will be further dis­
cussed later in this chapter. One reason for this (others will be considered 
below) is that the supposedly punitive response may actually be a camou­
flage for other types of criticism, such as dissatisfaction with the degree of 
protection granted to defendants or with plea-bargaining practices. Thus, a 
series of studies by the Michigan Commission on Criminal Justice (1977) 
showed that the proportion of people who agreed that "courts have gone 
too far protecting people in trouble with the law" increased from 58% in 
1973 to 78% in 1977; and a recent review of the literature suggests that 
this view continues to prevail (Roberts, 1992:140). 
As to the perception of discrimination on the part of the courts toward 
different populations, the Turpen- Champagne study examined this issue 
too. As noted above, when asked to specify to whom the courts were 
unfair, more than half the respondents answered "everyone," indicating a 
reluctance to identify any form of discrimination. Social-class discrimina­
tion was specified by 22.8% of persons responding to this question, but 
this represented only about 6% of the total sample. The numbers specify­
ing racial groups were smaller still. Perceptions on this may of course be 
culture bound: a British survey found that 82% of the public believed that 
"some groups were treated differently," mainly on the basis of socioeco­
nomic factors (Shaw, 1982). 
Further clarification of this issue may be derived by analyzing the rela­
tionship between respondent characteristics and their perception of the 
courts as fair or unfair. While race, age, and one of the social-class variables 
were statistically significant in the predicted direction, the contribution of 
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these factors to the total variance was very small, the highest contribution 
being 1.2% for race (Turpen and Champagne, 1978:266-71). The authors 
concluded that "perceptions of judicial unfairness seem to represent a 
broad-based attitude in the population which is largely unrelated to those 
variables which are generally thought to explain alienation from the legal 
system" (267).22 Again, the recent review of the literature by Roberts (1992) 
supports the view that "the perception of systemic inequity is most clearly 
associated with the courts" (141). 
As noted, there is indeed evidence that the public feels greater dissatis­
faction with the courts than with other components of the criminal justice 
system (Reynolds and Blyth, 1976). In a survey of 10,000 residents in Joliet 
and Peoria, respondents were asked to rank the various criminal justice 
agencies on a scale from 1 to 9, where 1 indicated "much too lenient" and 9 
"much too harsh." "Local judges" received a median score of 2 in Joliet and 
3 in Peoria, as compared with median scores of 3 for the "corrections 
system," 4 for the "local criminal justice system," and 5 for the "local 
police" (Ku, 1977:29; and cf. Roberts, 1992:139). These findings will be 
considered below. 
How far do victims differ from the general public with respect to their 
attitudes to the courts? Fagan (1981: tables 2 and 3), who hypothesized that 
the experiences of victimization would reduce support for the courts, 
found no evidence to support this. The Turpen-Champagne study, too, 
included the experience of victimization among the variables for which 
the effect on perception of court unfairness was examined. As with other 
variables referred to above, the victimization experience was significantly 
associated with the perception of unfairness (p < 0.001) in this study, but 
here, too, the contribution to the variance was very slight [r2 = 0.005). A 
study based upon an ABC News poll of 2,464 adult respondents also found 
a low correlation between "victimization experience" and negative percep­
tion of the criminal courts (Flanagan et al., 1985). These findings suggest 
that attitudes of victims may be substantially similar but slightly more 
critical than those of the general public, the difference deriving either from 
the failure of the criminal justice system to prevent the victimization or 
from the victim's personal experiences with the system. However, the 
account of the system's handling of victims presented in chapter 2 would 
lead one to anticipate substantially more critical attitudes on their part.23 It 
should also be noted that in the matter of punitiveness, to be considered in 
greater detail below, victims do not in general seem to hold stronger views 
than nonvictims (Cullen et al., 1985; Brillon, 1988). 
A somewhat more precise impression of the specific attitudes of victims 
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can be obtained from the studies that focus exclusively on victims, and the 
remainder of this section will be concerned with the findings of these 
studies. It should be noted, however, that insofar as victim-related reforms 
might be expected to have changed victims' perceptions of the courts, such 
changes would not yet be evident in the studies reviewed here. Indeed, the 
purpose here is primarily to consider the victim's justice needs emerging 
from prereform evaluations of the system. 
The degree of support expressed for the courts in the victim-oriented 
surveys has mostly been only moderate. For while Knudten et al. (1976) 
found that only 14% of their Milwaukee sample indicated dissatisfaction 
with the courts, in the study by Davis, Russell, and Kunreuther (1980) of 
complaining witnesses in the Brooklyn Criminal Court, only 72% of the 
sample had a favorable opinion of the judge. Further, only 65% of Hagan's 
(1980) Canadian sample ranked the judge's performance as good or very 
good, and only 63% of the sample interviewed by Smith (1983) expressed 
satisfaction with the judge, which represented only 53% of responding vic-
tims.24 In the British sample (Shapland et al., 1985) 53% were satisfied, 
including 6% "very satisfied," with the way the courts had dealt with then-
case. Among 872 victims interviewed in the Portland, Oregon, area in 1974, 
only 45% expressed a favorable attitude toward the courts (Schneider et al., 
1976:101). Other surveys of victims and witnesses reporting negative atti­
tudes include Cook and Fischer (1976), Ashworth and Feldman-Summers 
(1978), Rentmeister (1979),25 Hunter and Frey (1980), and Ziegenhagen 
(1976), who concluded, on the basis of a New York study, that "there appear 
to be few features of the victim-witness role that are satisfactory from the 
victims' viewpoint" (266). 
Such generalizations may be of limited usefulness, however. A more 
informative picture may be obtained by attempting to locate specific areas 
of dissatisfaction. For this purpose, differentiation will be made between 
(a) attitudes toward court procedures, (b) perceptions of judges' character 
and attitudes, and (c) attitudes toward the court's decisions, in particular 
its final disposition. Finally, perceptions of the courts will be compared 
with those of the other criminal justice agencies considered hitherto. 
Court Procedures 
Holmstrom and Burgess (1978), who conducted a follow-up study of rape 
victims in the Boston area, observed, "Overwhelmingly, both adult and 
young victims found court an extremely stressful experience" (222). Par­
ticularly stressful were cross-examination by the defense lawyer, confronta­
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tion with the accused, and the public setting of the trial. In other studies, 
not confined to rape victims, the findings were somewhat less negative. 
Smith (1983), who interviewed victims of nonstranger violence in New 
York, found that "for a sizable minority of victims there clearly is room for 
improvement," yet she found it reassuring that "at least one half of the 
victims were satisfied with the system's response." Shapland, too, con­
cluded that in spite of the considerable inconvenience and unpleasantness 
involved (see below), "the problems that being a witness does bring are not 
sufficient to outweigh the benefits of participation" (Shapland et al., 
1985:159).M 
What were the grounds of victims' dissatisfaction with court proce­
dures? Smith (1983) noted that "court victims typically reported that they 
had little opportunity to participate in the process" (90). Heavy caseloads 
appeared to be a factor in preventing due consideration for the victim, 
particularly in large cities.27 However, the reduced caseload of a higher 
court did not appear to guarantee a higher level of satisfaction. More specifi­
cally, victims in Smith's study complained about "long waiting periods, 
unnecessary trips, lack of interaction with officials, general neglect, and 
lack of consideration for their feelings" (1983:94). Shapland et al. (1985), 
whose monograph included a detailed account of the victim's role in court 
as a witness, made the following observations: "In general one has the 
impression of victims being isolated and confused at court, not knowing 
what they may be required to do or what they may do. They do not realise 
what is happening around them and in few cases is the trouble taken to 
explain it to them" (113).28 
In the study by Cannavale and Falcon (1976), the witnesses were asked to 
specify their complaints. The main areas in which improvement was advo­
cated were better protection (28%), better attitude toward witnesses (20%), 
speedier trials (20%), better pay for witnesses (15%), and better facilities 
(12%) (57). There was generally little difference between the figures for 
witnesses who were victims and for witnesses who were not victims, the 
greatest difference being on the "better attitude" item, specified by 22% of 
victims as compared with only 16% of nonvictims. This difference may 
perhaps be explained in terms of a greater sensitivity or greater expectations 
from the court on the part of witnesses who were also victims. 
Perceptions of Judges 
The perceptions of the personality and character of the judge were often 
less negative than those of the court process, but the findings nevertheless 
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give ground for concern.29 While 83% of the witnesses in the study by 
Cannavale and Falcon (1976) agreed with the statement that "judges are 
very intelligent/' and 78% agreed that "judges are sincerely interested in 
the rights of citizens/' a sizable minority (27%) agreed with the statement 
that "judges think they know everything and don't listen to what anyone 
else has to say" (64). It is thus perhaps surprising, in view of the question­
able status of the victim in the criminal court, that three-fifths of the 
victims in Smith's small study "thought that the judge was concerned 
with their interests and were satisfied with the judge" (1983:90). However, 
this sample may be unrepresentative, since it comprised nonstranger 
cases, some of which were dealt with in a special domestic relations court, 
in which judges "specifically volunteered for this assignment" and were 
"especially careful, professional and courteous in their treatment of vic­
tims and their cases" (91). Finally, 75% of the victims in the Milwaukee 
sample studied by Knudten et al. (1976) rated the judges "excellent" or 
"good" in terms of courteousness, although this was lower than their 
ratings of police and district attorneys on this attribute. 
Perhaps a more serious matter than the judges' perceived courteousness 
and consideration is the degree of fairness and impartiality attributed to 
them. The qualified enthusiasm for the judiciary in these respects on the 
part of the general population was noted above. The evidence from the 
special victim and victim/witness studies reviewed here is hardly more 
encouraging. In Ziegenhagen's (1976) New York City sample of victims of 
personal crime, "judges were more often described as impartial, while 
about equal numbers of victims perceived the judges' behavior as friendly 
or hostile" (267). However, Reynolds and Blyth (1976), who found in their 
Twin Cities study that courts were rated "low to average," reported that 
"respondents were clearly upset by what they considered to be biased, 
inconsistent decisions in the legal system" (339). Moreover, in the witness 
study by Cannavale and Falcon (1976), it was found that only 72% agreed 
with the statement that "judges try to be fair in all their court decisions" 
(emphasis added), while 20% were prepared to agree to the statement that 
"most judges will accept bribes." Finally, Shapland et al. (1985), in their 
English study noted that "the impression that most victims have is that 
both magistrates and judges are very inconsistent" (236). 
Attitudes toward Court Decisions 
Victims' attitudes toward court decisions have been measured primarily 
by their views on the appropriateness of dispositions in terms of severity. 
 107 Perceiwed Justice Needs
Such views may either be ascertained generally, that is, in relation to 
"punishments meted out by the courts," or specifically, in relation to the 
specific case in which the victim was involved. The latter are of particular 
importance, since there may be a discrepancy between generalized atti­
tudes to the sentencing of offenders and the solutions perceived as appropri­
ate in individual cases. Thus, in Shapland's English study, 28.7% and 
26.1% of the respective samples30 expressed the view that sentences in 
general should be greater, while a further 25.5% and 39.8% specified that 
violent offenders should receive heavier sentences (1985:238); yet when 
respondents were asked which sentence they considered to be appropriate 
to the defendant in their particular case, and their answers compared with 
the sentences imposed, it emerged that "the wishes of victims were very 
similar to how sentencers actually view such cases" (153; cf. Hough and 
Moxon, 1985; and below). At the same time, when victims were subse­
quently notified of the sentence actually imposed, 38% disapproved, 
mostly because they found it too lenient (155).31 
Knudten et al. (1976) invited their Milwaukee victim respondents to 
rate the penalty imposed by the court as lenient, fair, or harsh. The number 
of respondents designating the penalty as "lenient" was generally greater 
than the combined figures of those who considered it "harsh" and those 
who perceived it as "fair" (tables 21-25). In Hagan's Canadian sample, too, 
53% of the sample viewed the sentence imposed as "too easy" (Hagan, 
1980:118). Davis, Russell, and Kunreuther (1980) found that 43% of their 
sample were dissatisfied with the outcome, 53% of them because of the 
leniency of the disposition. 
Satisfaction with the disposition is not necessarily a function of the 
severity of the sentence alone. Smith (1983) noted that satisfaction on the 
part of her interviewees depended not only on the defendant receiving an 
"appropriate" or sufficiently severe sentence but also on the court's fol­
lowing their wishes. In this connection note should be taken of the find­
ing of Davis, Russell, and Kunreuther (1980) that "most complainants 
upon entering the court had fairly specific ideas about what they wanted 
the court to do in their case" (23).32 However, when Shapland et al. (1985) 
asked the victims in their British study "Who do you think should have a 
say in what the sentence should be?" very few proposed such a role for 
the victim, while "others said that they would not like to see victims 
having any say because they would be biased" (236). The discrepancy 
between this view and the one expressed in Smith's study may be due to 
a less developed consciousness of the victim role—or its inadequacy—in 
England; but it may also be a function of the sample in Smith's study, 
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which was concerned mainly with nonstranger violence. Indeed, this may 
also partly explain the third factor found by Smith to affect the victim's 
satisfaction with the outcome, namely, whether he or she continued to be 
bothered by the defendant. Even apart from the victim's ability actually 
to influence the disposition, the fact of his or her being consulted by the 
prosecutor or judge has been found to be associated with satisfaction at 
the outcome (Davis, Russell, and Kunreuther, 1980:67). 
The frustration of seeing the court impose an excessively lenient sen­
tence (in the victim's perception), coupled with his or her apparent inability 
to have any meaningful say in the decision-making process, while leading to 
a low evaluation of the case outcome, does not necessarily "rub off" onto the 
judge (cf. the earlier observations on perceptions of court procedures as 
compared with judges' standing). Thus, Connick and Davis (1981) cited data 
collected in a small sample in the Brooklyn Criminal Court in which only 
20% of the victims in the "stranger" subsample were satisfied with the case 
outcome, while 75% rated the judge fair and 76% were satisfied with the 
judge's handling of the case; the figures in prior-relationship cases were 
24%, 64%, and 72%, respectively—a substantially similar pattern. In the 
Milwaukee sample, too, the prevailing view on the part of the victims that 
penalties were too light did not seem to have prevented their holding a 
generally favorable opinion of the courts. 
Finally, there are other outcome variables that may affect victim satis­
faction with the court, unrelated to the severity of sentence. Shapland et 
al. (1985:158) found that victims were significantly less satisfied where the 
charge was reduced during the passage through the courts or, not surpris­
ingly, where the defendant was acquitted. On the other hand, in her 
nonstranger study Smith (1983:43) found identical satisfaction rates for 
convictions and acquittals. 
Comparison with Other Agencies 
Yet another measure of the degree of satisfaction with the courts is ob­
tained by comparing victims' perceptions of the courts with their percep­
tions of other criminal justice agencies. Here, too, the picture that emerges 
is somewhat unfavorable to the courts. In the study by Davis, Russell, and 
Kunreuther (1980, table 5.1), the 72% of the sample who expressed a favor­
able opinion of the judge was lower than the corresponding figure for the 
arresting officer (86%) and the prosecutor (81%). In the study by Smith 
(1983), the 63% expressing satisfaction with the judge compares unfavor­
ably with the 74% who were satisfied with the police, although the figure 
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for the prosecutor in this study was lower (56%) than that for the judge. 
Knudten et al. (1976), who, as noted, found only 14% of the victims express­
ing dissatisfaction with the judges, also found that the percentages of "very 
satisfied" respondents (24%) or of "very satisfied" and "satisfied" com­
bined (66%) were lower than the equivalent percentages for police (27% 
and 75%, respectively). Moreover, respondents' ratings of judges in terms 
of effort, effectiveness, and courteousness were lower than their ratings of 
the police on these items, and somewhat similar to those for prosecutors 
(but somewhat lower in terms of courteousness, and fractionally lower in 
terms of effort). Hagan (1980), in his Canadian study, also found that the 
percentage who ranked the judge's performance "good" or "very good" 
(65%) was substantially lower than for the police (85%) and slightly lower 
than for the prosecutor (68%). 
These findings in relation to victims are consistent with attitudes ex­
pressed by the general public. Thus Roberts (1992:139) refers to a recent 
poll conducted in Colorado in which two-thirds of respondents gave posi­
tive ratings to the police but only one-third to judges, with prosecutors and 
public defenders somewhere in between. He comments that "it is clear 
that the public have more positive attitudes towards front-end compo­
nents" of the criminal justice system. Data provided by a recent survey 
conducted by the National Victim Center would appear to confirm this 
hypothesis. Respondents were asked to rate various criminal justice agen­
cies "in accomplishing their part of the criminal justice mission." Ratings 
of "excellent" or "good" amounted to 64% for the police, 48% for prosecu­
tors, 45% for judges, 32% for prisons, and 22% for parole boards (Flanagan 
andMaguire, 1992:178). 
The above findings are naturally a cause for concern. It may be that the 
unfavorable comparisons between perceptions of the courts and the police 
can be partly explained in terms of the greater personal contact the latter 
agency has with the public. Nevertheless, as noted earlier, the courts repre­
sent the pinnacle of the legal system, and have, since the English Bill of 
Rights and the writings of Montesquieu, if not earlier, been attributed a 
critical role in the preservation of democratic values. Thus, negative views 
expressed by the general public, such as "a strong tendency for the respon­
dents to believe that courts tended to be unfair" (Turpen and Champagne, 
1978:262), as well as the more specific criticisms on the part of persons 
experiencing the justice system, clearly present a serious problem. 
However, certain issues that may contribute to the negative image of the 
courts may have to be better differentiated, at least insofar as the implica­
tions for victims are concerned. First, the perceptions of the functioning of 
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the courts and their procedures must be distinguished both from percep­
tions of the ultimate dispositions ordered by the court and from the per­
ceived functioning of the judge. Dissatisfaction may not prevail to the same 
extent with these different elements.33 hi particular, it should be noted that 
the functioning of the court as a whole reflects not only on the judge but also 
on the other parties concerned; thus Fagan (1981), in constructing his "sup­
port for the courts scale" included one item relating to charge reduction by 
prosecuting attorneys, and another item relating to delaying tactics by de­
fense attorneys. 
Another issue in need of clarification is the degree to which victims' 
unfavorable perceptions of the courts as compared with other criminal 
justice agencies may be attributable to the location of the courts in the 
victims' experience timewise. For it has sometimes been observed that the 
victim becomes increasingly dissatisfied as he or she becomes "enmeshed" 
in the system (cf. Knudten et al., 1976). On this hypothesis the victims' 
dissatisfaction would accumulate by virtue of his or her expectations being 
disappointed by all the agencies,- and a more negative image of prosecutors 
as compared with police, and of courts as compared with police and prose­
cutors, would not necessarily redound to the discredit of the courts them­
selves. Some indication of this is found in Hagan's study, in which victims 
were interviewed both before and after the court hearing, and a slight 
improvement was noted in the rating of the judges (Hagan, 1980:113).34 
The identical finding was reported by Shapland et al. (1985:248). 
However, the victim's apparent decline in confidence in the system as it 
progresses may not be entirely connected to his or her direct personal 
experience with that system for, as noted, a similar pattern was observed in 
respect of the general public, who also appear to favor "front-end" agencies 
(Roberts, 1992:139). 
Noncooperation with the Criminal Justice System 
One of the best indicators of attitudes toward the criminal justice system 
may be the degree to which the public in general, and victims in particular, 
are willing to cooperate with this system, particularly in terms of reporting 
crimes and providing testimony. From the system's point of view, it is of 
course critical to its functioning that members of the public will be ac­
tively willing to perform these tasks.35 Moreover, one might surmise that 
such cooperation would be perceived by members of the public to be obliga­
tory, both in order to seek justice where they themselves have been victim­
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ized and by way of civic duty, in order to maintain the "rule of law" and to 
ensure that the criminal justice system can continue to function (see, e.g., 
Stuebing, 1984). 
Although these principles may have been accepted dogma until re­
cently, the victimization surveys conducted over the last few years have 
shown that the reality is very different. These surveys, which are consid­
ered to have a high level of validity, almost invariably indicate that most 
victimizations are not reported (Sparks, 1982). In 1990 only 37.7% of vic­
timizations in the United States were reported by the victims, and only 
34.7% of personal (as distinct from "household") crimes (U.S. Dept. of 
Justice, 1992); and the British figures for 1988 are almost identical, having 
been lower still some years earlier (Mayhew et al., 1989:16). Moreover, 
while less is known about this topic, observers of acts of victimization 
(bystanders) may also be reluctant to intervene and invoke law enforce­
ment procedures (Shotland and Goodstein, 1984). Finally, apart from initial 
reporting, concern has been expressed by criminal justice agencies that, 
even where offenses are investigated or prosecuted, citizens are often un­
willing to cooperate with the authorities. The key question that arises in 
the present context is the following: insofar as the above description of the 
"inhibitions" of the public with regard to activation of or cooperation with 
the criminal justice system is correct, do these inhibitions derive from 
negative attitudes toward and experiences of this system or from other 
causes? 
There seem to be four types of data that can be helpful in determining 
whether such noncooperation with the criminal justice system derives 
from negative attitudes or experiences: (1) data on the grounds specified by 
victim/witnesses for not reporting an offense, (2) data on the correlates of 
nonreporting, (3) data on the degree of association between nonreporting 
and negative attitudes to the criminal justice system, and (4) data on the 
views expressed by victim/witnesses regarding their intention to cooperate 
with the criminal justice system in the future. The evidence on these four 
issues will be examined briefly. 
Grounds for Nonreporting. In the course of victimization surveys, re­
spondents are asked to specify the reasons why they have refrained from 
reporting offenses. Categories of response used by the National Crime 
Survey included "nothing could be done," "victimization not important 
enough," "police wouldn't want to be bothered," "it was a private matter," 
"fear of reprisal," and "victimization was reported to someone else." Most 
of these categories do not reflect upon the respondents' attitudes to the 
criminal justice system, but the categories "nothing could be done" and 
112 Chapter 5 
"police wouldn't want to be bothered," for all their ambiguity (Gottfredson 
and Gottfredson, 1988:23), do seem to suggest a degree of reservation re­
garding law enforcement agencies. Mayhew et al. (1989:24-25) note that 
"previous research has shown that what victims feel about the police has 
relatively limited significance in non-reporting" but found that the percent­
age of cases in which police-related factors were specified rose from 23% in 
the 1984 British Crime Survey to 32% in 1988 (table 4).36 
The Correlates of Nonreporting. While there is strong evidence that the 
seriousness of the crime may be the main factor associated with the deci­
sion to report (Sparks, 1982:99; Mayhew et al., 1989:24; Van Dijk et al., 
1990:68), there is also some indication that reporting patterns are lower for 
those groups who are known to hold more negative perceptions of the 
police. Thus, younger victims are less likely to report victimization, and to 
some extent this is true of African Americans (U.S. Dept. of Justice, 1992). 
Moreover, one study found that various categories among the more vulnera­
ble sections of the public—female heads of households, persons lacking 
social support systems,37 and persons with financial and other problems— 
were less likely to report victimizations (Biblarz et al., 1984); and the 
Canadian Urban Victimization Survey found that among crimes of vio­
lence, "many serious victimizations . .  . went unreported... because the 
perceived danger or costs of reporting outweighed the advantages" (Solici­
tor General Canada, 1984:116). Analysis of the British Crime Survey data 
also indicated that "many incidents at the trivial end of the range are 
reported, and many regarded as serious by their victims are not" (Mayhew 
et al., 1989:29; emphasis added). 
Nonreporting and Negative Attitudes. In addition to the above indirect 
evidence on the association between attitudes toward law enforcement 
authorities and nonreporting, there is also some direct evidence on this 
topic. Garofalo (1977), using National Crime Sample data, found that vic­
tims rating the police more highly were only marginally more likely to 
report a victimization; the reporting rate declined from 51%, for those 
giving the police the most positive rating, to 47% for those giving the 
police the most negative rating. The relationship became much more evi­
dent when seriousness of offense was controlled for, using the Sellin-
Wolfgang scale: positive ratings of police were associated with reporting of 
offenses with low seriousness scores, but not for offenses with moderate or 
high seriousness scores. This is consistent with findings noted in the previ­
ous paragraph and indicates that attitudes to the authorities, while less 
important than the seriousness of the offense, may be a meaningful factor 
in reporting behavior. 
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This topic was examined in considerable detail in a study conducted by 
Schneider et al. (1976), who studied the association between attitudes to 
the criminal justice system and reporting trends, for a sample of approxi­
mately 900 victims of the Portland, Oregon, area. The results of multi­
variate analysis showed that for property offenses the seriousness of the 
crime and participation in the local antiburglary program were the strong­
est predictors, but trust in the police and the perceived quality of police-
community relations also contributed to the probability of reporting.38 For 
personal crimes, "understanding local issues" and seriousness were the 
best predictors, but "belief the police would catch the person/' "belief that 
the police would recover property/' and "belief that the courts would pun­
ish the offender" added further explanatory power, while "trust in police" 
was an alternative predicting variable. The authors further concluded that 
the attitudinal variables were more important for crimes against the per­
son and for the less serious property crimes. 
Insofar as a relationship has been established between nonreporting and 
negative attitudes toward the police, it would be anticipated that respon­
dents with negative attitudes would lay greater emphasis on reasons con­
nected with these attitudes when specifying why they did not report the 
offense. The analysis conducted by Garofalo indicates that such a pattern 
was barely perceptible in respect to the response that "police would not 
want to be bothered" (put forward by 13% of the cases in which reasons 
were given for nonreporting where respondents held a negative rating of 
the police, but by only 7% of respondents with a positive rating). However, 
the "nothing could be done" category of reason was unrelated to respon­
dents' rating of police. Finally, it should be noted that while Garofalo's 
figures suggested a slight tendency for persons with high evaluations of the 
police to report victimizations with greater frequency than persons with 
low evaluations, the same figures also showed that persons failing to report 
had the same distribution of ratings as persons reporting. Garofalo con­
cluded that the reporting experience did not have a negative effect on 
subsequent ratings of the police. This would suggest that, in contrast with 
the view expressed above, insofar as negative attitudes to the police are 
associated with prior victimization experience, these attitudes derive 
rather from the failure of the police to protect the victim by preventing the 
victimization than from negative experiences with the criminal justice 
system. 
Declared Future Intentions. Some surveys have elicited views of vic­
tims or witnesses as to the likelihood of their cooperation with the crimi­
nal justice system in the event of a future victimization. This, too, may be 
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regarded as a measure of the satisfaction felt by such persons with the 
treatment received in the current case. 
Cannavale and Falcon (1976), in their review of the somewhat sparse 
literature on noncooperation with prosecutors, referred to a Milwaukee 
survey in which 40% of a sample of 240 witnesses indicated that they 
would be less cooperative in the future. The main reasons for noncoopera­
tion with prosecutors cited by witnesses were, according to this review, 
trial delay, loss of income, inappropriate physical accommodations, and 
witness intimidation (12-13). The picture emerging from the study con­
ducted by the authors themselves was somewhat less pessimistic. In their 
own sample, based on 7,849 cases opened in Washington, D.C., in the first 
half of 1973, 81.2% of respondents stated that they "would be willing to 
serve as a witness in another case in the future" (140). This compared with 
91.2% of the sample who stated that they agreed to serve as a witness in 
the case in which they were then involved (138),39 indicating that for some 
their recent experience had been discouraging. Of the 9.9% who stated 
explicitly that they would not be willing to serve as a witness in the 
future—the remainder being unsure or giving conditional responses—the 
main category of reason offered was "waste of time, no justice" (149). 
In the British study conducted by Shapland et al. (1985), the victim 
sample was asked during both their first and their final interviews whether 
they would be willing to report offenses in the future. The question was 
asked in relation to four hypothetical offenses, in both the two main re­
search locations. Responses for three out of the four offenses varied from 
75.7% to 100%,40 and there was a tendency for positive responses to be 
lower on the second interview, although some individuals changed their 
minds in a positive direction. Among reasons specified for a negative 
change of mind were the trouble involved in reporting, lack of information 
received, retaliation, the sentence, the negative attitude of the police, and 
the probable failure to apprehend the offender. The authors' general conclu­
sion was that "problems with the police are the main reason for victims 
deciding that they will not report a further offense" (253), although atti­
tudes to the police were also the main consideration among those who 
changed in a positive direction. 
Evidence of victims' general outlook, elicited by the New York study of 
"victims and helpers" (Friedman et al., 1982), may be indirectly relevant 
here. In that study there appeared to be a tendency for respondents to have 
a greater faith in other people where they perceived the police as having 
gone out of their way in reaction to the crime.41 Ultimately, it seems that 
negative experiences with the criminal justice system as such may contrib­
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ute only marginally to the level of noncooperation. Much nonreporting is 
based upon utilitarian considerations of efficacy while some believe there 
is a moral duty to report (Smith and Maness, 1976; National Crime Victim­
ization Survey, 1992: table 111). Among a group of rape victims, "even 
those who were dissatisfied with services and poorly treated, for the most 
part, were willing to cooperate and advise others to cooperate with law 
enforcement in the future. They too recognized the judicial process as the 
'only game in town.' Not to play is to allow criminals to go free" (Kelly, 
1982:29). 
The fact that most victims are willing to cooperate in the future may be 
an indication that negative experiences with the criminal justice system are 
not of catastrophic dimensions. Yet, even if only a small minority develop 
an antagonism toward the system, this could have serious implications— 
first, because the addition of such "rebels" in a situation where already most 
offenses are not reported could lead to noncooperation on a large scale, and 
second, and more pertinent to the present topic, because it suggests that for 
some victims the experience is indeed a very negative one. 
Punitiveness 
The studies of the attitudes both of victims and of nonvictims reviewed 
above seem to indicate a general dissatisfaction with various aspects of the 
criminal justice system. One such aspect frequently mentioned is the per­
ceived leniency of sentences meted out by the courts, which, as noted 
above, has been an almost universal finding on the part of public opinion 
polls. Should these findings be taken as conclusive proof of a high level of 
punitiveness per se, or do they merely reflect a degree of dissatisfaction 
with the functioning of the courts? Put another way, is other evidence 
available on the degree of punitiveness of the attitudes of the public and of 
victims, independent of their perceptions of the criminal justice system as 
it operates today? 
Recent studies which have endeavored to elicit the public's views as to 
the appropriate penalties for particular offenses present a very different 
picture from that indicated by the opinion surveys referred to above. Thus, 
for example, the jurors in a study conducted by Diamond (1989) did not 
select harsher penalties than those selected by the judges, even though 
they shared the common view that "courts are too lenient." British Crime 
Survey data also indicated "a fair degree of congruence between the courts 
and the public." Roberts (1992), who reviewed a number of studies in this 
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area, concluded that "the preponderance of evidence supports the view 
that the public are not harsher than the courts, or at least are not consis­
tently harsher as the poll findings would suggest" (149). 
Roberts (1992:150) refers to two studies in which contrary findings were 
noted. Blumstein and Cohen (1980), who recorded the views held by a 
sample of 603 Pennsylvania residents (out of 2,500 approached), found that 
the prison terms selected were longer than those normally served. Zimmer­
man et al. (1988), who used a national sample of 1,920 randomly selected 
American adults, found that prison sentences were both more likely to be 
selected and of longer duration than the prevailing practice in the state of 
New York, perceived by the authors to be "middle range" in relation to 
national variations. The findings of Blumstein and Cohen indicated, how­
ever, that while the sentences selected by respondents were longer than 
those actually served in practice, they did correspond to the sentences 
imposed by the courts (i.e., not allowing for early release). This suggests 
that the views expressed may in fact have reflected respondents' views of 
the prevailing norm indicated by court policy. Some speculation of this 
nature was also expressed by Zimmerman et al. (1988:131-32). 
Even if the findings of these two studies cannot be entirely "explained 
away" in this manner, there is clearly a substantial discrepancy between 
the findings based on sentence selection and those of the polls referred to 
earlier. It seems that the ostensible dissatisfaction with the leniency of 
courts' sentencing cannot really be interpreted as an expression of punitive­
ness and a desire for harsh sentencing in specific cases. This dissatisfaction 
may reflect in part a general sense of frustration with the perceived in­
crease in crime42 and the apparent failure of law enforcement agencies to 
control it. It may also be based in part on ignorance of the realities of 
courts' sentencing practice (Roberts, 1992:112). There is also a gap be­
tween the policies supported by the public in general and the penalties 
preferred in individual cases. "Once the human details of an offense and 
offender are described, the average offender appears far less deviant, power­
ful and dangerous,- severe punishment appears less justified" (Diamond, 
1989:249; see also Thomson and Ragona, 1987:339-43). 
Further, there is some evidence to the effect that victims of crime, in 
spite of the data presented in the preceding section regarding their dissatis­
faction with the perceived leniency of the courts, are also not excessively 
punitive. Blumstein and Cohen (1980), in the study referred to above, com­
pared the penalties assigned by different categories of respondent. While 
they noted a degree of association between sociodemographic characteris­
tics and the degree of punitiveness of responses,43 when they compared 
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respondents who reported victimization experiences with nonvictims, 
they concluded, "Surprisingly, victimization experience has no effect on 
the sentences respondents assign" (243). The British Crime Surveys have 
also explored attitudes to punishment, and there, too, it emerged that 
victims were no more punitive than nonvictims (Hough and Moxon, 1985; 
see also Brillon, 1988).44 A German study found that only 17.4% of victims 
favored harsh sentences, and even among victims of violent crime the 
figure was only 20.9% (Baurmann and Schadler, 1991:15). 
Nor do the data emerging from the in-depth victim studies indicate a 
high level of punitiveness. Among a sample of felony victims in Ohio, 60% 
of those submitting a victim-impact statement suggested that the offender 
be incarcerated, but "these 'punitive' victims constitute^].. . only 33% of 
the total number of victims in the sample" (Erez and Tontodonato, 
1990:456). Shapland et al. (1985), in their English study, asked victims 
during their initial interviews what sentences they would like to see im­
posed upon the offender. Although the sample related to offenses of vio­
lence, only 40% favored a custodial sentence: "Victims did not seem to be 
very punitive even at the early stage in the case." Moreover, these victims 
were not simply predicting what they anticipated the courts would do: 
"What they expected the courts to give was often very much lower" (151). 
Nonpunitive reactions were also recorded in some of the plea-bargaining 
and sentencing involvement experiments described in chapter 8 below. 
Finally, in a Dutch study that will be described in greater detail below, 
more than two-thirds of the sample considered the sentence imposed too 
lenient, but less than one-third would have sentenced the offender to more 
than one year's imprisonment (Smale and Spickenheuer, 1979:78-79). 
Data of a somewhat different nature are found in the study of witnesses 
by Cannavale and Falcon (1976). In their sample, 42% agreed with the 
statement that "punishment for breaking the law is often too severe/' 
while 70% agreed that "some acts are legally defined as crimes when they 
really should not be." This sample seemed more critical of injustices in the 
criminal justice system and the social structure generally than of the con­
duct of offenders and the need to be punitive.45 This might be partly ex­
plained in terms of the similarity and overlap between victim/witnesses 
and offender populations, as noted in chapter 3. 
Another reason for the apparently low emphasis on punishment on the 
part of both victims and the general public may be that the dependent 
variable being measured in these studies is often less related to the 
"punitiveness-versus-leniency" dichotomy (the "severity axis") consid­
ered hitherto and closer to the second meaning of punitiveness discussed 
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in the introduction to this chapter, that is, punitiveness versus other sen­
tencing objectives (the "penal philosophy axis"). Thus, recent studies 
(Thomson and Ragona, 1987; Cullen et al., 1988) show that the public 
maintains substantial support for rehabilitation and other utilitarian objec­
tives of sentencing, although not necessarily to the exclusion of punitive­
ness in the first sense (cf. Penley, n.d.). 
Support for utilitarian objectives, including rehabilitation, is found 
among victims too. Van Dijk and Steinmetz (1988) found that the vic­
timization experience led to a greater emphasis on preventive rather than 
repressive sanctions. Victims interviewed in Shapland's study favored such 
sanctions as probation, community service, or some form of "treatment" 
(Shapland et al., 1985:151). Similarly, Chandler and Kassebaum (1979), in 
their Hawaii survey, found that victims placed considerable emphasis on 
rehabilitation of the offender. In the sample studied by Davis, Russell, and 
Kunreuther (1980), only 28% of the complainants clearly opted for punish­
ment of the defendant as the principle outcome sought from the court, 
many others being more concerned with restitution or protection for them-
selves.46 In Hagan's (1980) Canadian study, "punishment" was given a lower 
rating than other sentencing priorities both before and after the court experi­
ence, with "individual deterrence" and "reformation" being the most com­
monly cited objectives (109). Vennard (1976), on the basis of a small English 
survey, found that property crime victims were primarily concerned with 
compensation (restitution), although assault victims placed greater empha­
sis on retribution. Indeed, several researchers have found that the public is 
more inclined than the courts to opt for restitution (Roberts, 1992). A wide-
ranging study conducted in Hamburg found that a majority of the public, 
unlike professional criminal justice personnel, favors alternative measures 
such as restitution, mediation, or private settlement for all but the most 
serious offenses (Boers and Sessar, 1991). Holmstrom and Burgess (1978), in 
their comprehensive study of rape victims in Boston, found that the major­
ity of victims felt ambivalent about their assailant's conviction.47 "Two 
themes emerged. One was that the victim felt sorry or bad about what 
happened. . .  . A second theme was that the defendant really needed help, 
not the prison sentence that he received" (256). 
Another question that arises in this context is the salience of the puni­
tiveness instinct, insofar as it exists. Thus Kelly (1982), on the basis of 
interviews with 100 rape victims in the Washington, D.C., area, found that 
victims were interested in having their assailants convicted, but that the 
verdict explained only a small part of the victims' satisfaction. "These 
findings suggest that how victims are treated is more important than if 
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offenders are punished" (19). Similarly, in the INSLAW study (Hernon and 
Forst, 1983), victims expressed somewhat punitive views, but they felt less 
strongly about the need for punitiveness than about the need to keep the 
victims informed. "In short, retribution is not the sole concern of victims" 
(Kelly, 1982:19). 
Some other dimensions of punitiveness have been studied in two Euro­
pean studies that will be briefly referred to here. Smale and Spickenheuer 
(1979), in a small Dutch study of 100 victims, examined the relationship 
between the victim's need for retaliation (of which punitiveness was one of 
the indicators), his or her feeling of guilt at not having prevented the 
commission of the offense, and various offense-related and sociodemo­
graphic variables. The general lack of punitiveness found was referred to 
above. The need for retaliation among victims of violence was found to be 
associated with the seriousness of the injury and with the infliction of 
lasting physical effects. Surprisingly, however, property crime victims 
were more retaliative than violence victims. Other surprising results were 
the nonsignificant effects of acquaintance with the offender, knowledge of 
the sentence, and the payment of compensation. These negative findings 
may have resulted from the limited size of the sample. Note must also be 
taken of the lapse of time before the interview, "a good two years after their 
victimization had taken place" (76). Indeed, this study is notable primarily 
for its conceptualization and objectives, which are worthy of replication 
elsewhere. 
The study conducted in Hamburg, which was referred to above, was 
much more comprehensive. Views were elicited from a large sample regard­
ing the appropriateness of different types of sanction or informal methods 
of social control for a variety of offenses, modified experimentally in terms 
of the degree of injury inflicted and the harm intended. In addition to the 
general support for nonpunitive measures, respondents were specifically 
asked about the "needs and interests of victims" (Beurskens and Boers, 
1985); here only 13.3% of 1,484 respondents specified "punishment," the 
preferred responses being restitution (32.9%), community service (26.3%), 
and apology! 16.5% j .  4  8 
Since the views of the victims did not differ very substantially from 
those of the nonvictims, the result is an apparent discrepancy between the 
relative nonpunitiveness expressed here as compared with the sanctions 
selected in vacuo, that is, unrelated to victim needs. This suggests that the 
low degree of punitiveness expressed here may reflect justice needs of the 
victim, as perceived by victims and nonvictims alike, rather than express­
ing society's perceived coping needs, such as social protection. 
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Defendants' Attitudes 
Considering the vast literature that exists in the field of corrections gener­
ally, it is surprising how little of this deals specifically with offenders7 
perceptions of the system. Lawyers have traditionally been concerned with 
due process and penologists with the rehabilitation of the offender. It may 
be surmised that the attainment of both these objectives would be contin­
gent upon the defendants' perceiving the procedures with which they were 
involved and the outcome as having been basically fair, even given that the 
ultimate purpose of these procedures is to explore the possibility of inflict­
ing pain upon him or her. 
The few studies available suggest that defendants' perceptions are not 
wholly negative. Casper (1978) reported on interviews conducted with 628 
defendants charged with felonies in Phoenix, Baltimore, and Detroit after 
their court cases were concluded; 70% perceived the judge as being "unbi­
ased and fair to both sides," 60% thought that the treatment generally was 
fair, and 53% even considered the sentence received "about right." Their 
perceptions of the prosecutors, on the other hand, were less favorable. 
Similarly, Krohn and Stratton (1980), on the basis of 153 interviews with 
prison inmates, found that 74% reported being fairly treated by the judge, 
although only 42% felt the sentence was fair. Nearly two-thirds thought 
they were fairly treated by the police (64%) and the prosecutor (62%). In 
both studies perceptions of public defenders were rather negative, while 
private attorneys were regarded somewhat more favorably in the second 
study and substantially more so in the first. 
While no direct comparison can be made with the perceptions of vic­
tims described earlier, owing to differences in sampling and methodology, 
the general impression is that victims do not have substantially more 
favorable views of law enforcement personnel than defendants, in spite of 
the fact that law enforcement processes are supposedly designed, as noted, 
to inflict pain upon defendants (if found guilty) and to protect victims, or 
the community they represent. A further irony is that defendants are often 
least satisfied with the one agency purporting to assist them—the public 
defender. There may be, of course, a common explanation here: each party 
has high expectations from the agents who purport to be protecting their 
interests and are disappointed if their performance, as perceived by these 
parties, does not comply with these expectations. 
A further point conveyed by some of the literature in this area, as well as 
in other areas considered in this study, is that perceptions of fairness may 
depend less upon the outcome of the proceedings than upon the procedures 
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followed (Casper, 1978:11; Tyler, 1984). In a reanalysis of the data collected 
in the study by Casper referred to above, Casper et al. (1988) examined the 
correlates of defendant satisfaction, as measured by evaluation of the sever­
ity of the sentence, whether defendants felt they were treated fairly, and 
whether they had regrets as to how they handled their cases. These were 
correlated with three independent variables: (1) severity of sentence; (2) 
perceived "distributive justice," measured by the defendant's view of his 
or her sentence as compared with what others receive for the same offense; 
and (3) "procedural justice," as measured primarily by the defendant's 
views of the personnel involved (judge, prosecutor, defense attorney). 
While most of the correlations were significant, only procedural justice 
was correlated with all outcome-satisfaction measures at the 0.1% level. 
Moreover, since just over one-half of the defendants received custodial 
sentences, the authors felt that they had successfully refuted the view 
expressed by some earlier writers to the effect that procedural factors are 
only of significance to defendants in relatively trivial cases. 
Equity 
Equity theory, as explained briefly in the appendix, purports to explain the 
reactions of individuals confronted with a situation in which they "find 
themselves participating in inequitable relationships" (cf. Austin et al., 
1976; Walster et al., 1976). Since the paradigm case of the creation of such a 
relationship, as evidenced by the terminology of equity theorists, is an 
injurious act involving a "harmdoer" and a "victim" (also referred to as 
"exploiter" and "exploited"), it is evident that this theory is highly perti­
nent to the topic of this chapter. 
The inequitable relationship is alleged by equity theorists to give rise to 
two forms of distress: "retaliation distress" and "self-concept distress." 
Such distress is alleviated by "restoring equity." As noted in chapter 2, this 
may be achieved either by restoration of "actual equity," by means of such 
practical measures as retaliation or compensation, or by "psychological 
equity," whereby the new situation is rationalized to explain away the 
inequity. These reactions are attributed both to the participants in the 
inequitable relationships and to impartial observers. 
The selection of the appropriate reaction to an inequity is generally 
perceived by equity theorists to be based upon a cost-benefit analysis (Aus­
tin et al., 1976:168, 172). Thus, for a victim, compensation is the most 
beneficial reaction: "If the victim secures compensation, he has restored 
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the relationship to equity" (Walster et al., 1976:24). If this is not feasible, 
retaliation may be sought as an alternative. This, too, "will cause the 
harmdoer (as well as the victim] to perceive that the relationship is again 
an equitable one" (ibid., 25). Only if neither of these methods of "restora­
tion of actual equity" is practicable will resort be had to psychological 
equity, and the inequity will be rationalized. This may be achieved in 
various ways.49 "Victims sometimes console themselves by imagining that 
their exploitation has brought compensating benefits. . . . Victims may 
also convince themselves that their exploiter actually deserves the enor­
mous benefits he receives," much to the chagrin of reformers pursuing 
social justice (ibid.). 
Equity theorists, and in particular those few who have concerned them­
selves with crime victims, tend to regard the present criminal justice sys­
tem as insensitive to the implications of their theory (but cf. Longshore, 
1979). While informal pressures are sometimes exerted upon defendants by 
law enforcement personnel to compensate the victim (Macaulay and 
Walster, 1971), restitution has not in modern times been a primary func­
tion of the criminal justice system. Moreover, retaliation on the part of the 
victim has hardly been encouraged, except insofar as it is implicit in re­
tributive measures of justice imposed by courts in the name of the state. 
However, the prevalence of psychological equity, in which the victim is 
compelled to rationalize his suffering, emerges in much of the critical 
literature on the victim's predicament. Thus, whether explicitly or implic­
itly, equity theorists advocate reform of the system, and support is derived 
from their theories for some of the proposals to be considered subse­
quently. First, however, it will be necessary to examine more closely some 
of the assumptions and criticisms of the theory, in order to determine how 
far it should be recognized as a valid basis for the formulation of policy. 
One assumption of equity theory which has been criticized is its pur­
ported universality. As noted earlier, it has been presented as a general 
theory of social behavior (Berkovitz and Walster, 1976:vi). It purports to 
apply in particular to the following areas: business relationships, exploit­
ative relationships, helping relationships, and intimate relationships (Wal­
ster et al., 1976:7). It may be questioned whether a single theory may 
adequately explain these diverse situations. However, it seems plausible 
that inequity might be perceived as the focal issue in the second category, 
exploitative relationships, with which the present study is concerned; it 
is also partly concerned with helping relationships, in which as the result 
of the exploitative relationship a third party may be called upon to help 
the victim. 
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A related criticism questions the exclusivity of the theory. Can human 
behavior in any of these areas be explained solely by equity theory? This 
unidimensionality has been criticized: "Man does not live by equity alone" 
(Homans, 1976, citing Karl Weick). Kidd and Utne (1978), too, have criti­
cized this unidimensionality and the assumption that other distinct norms 
of justice, such as equality and need, are encompassed by the equity norm 
(see also Folger, 1984:5; Umbreit, 1989:137). They have argued further that 
equity theory is too simplistic an explanation for human reactions unless it 
also takes account of attribution theory: "Variations in the perceived cause 
of inequity are crucially important in determining whether one is aware of 
an inequity at all, the means parties may choose to reduce inequity and 
restore justice, and the amount of distress generated by an acknowledged 
inequity" (Kidd and Utne, 1978:305). The variables (or "additional informa­
tion") that Kidd and Utne perceive as being relevant to the degree of dis­
tress and the consequent mode of reaction to inequities are (a) locus of 
causation of the inequity; (b) the "stability" (i.e., duration and frequency) 
of the inequity; (c) the degree of intentionality—an intentional inequity 
being more distressful than an unintentional one; (d) the extent to which 
the inequitable behavior can be controlled; and (e) the sense of personal 
responsibility for the inequity (306-7). Another commentator, Homans 
(1976), has argued that equity theory has taken insufficient account of the 
power relationship between the parties. Some of these criticisms seem 
pertinent. In particular, it seems doubtful whether the selection of the 
mode of reaction—compensation, retaliation, or rationalization—would 
depend entirely on a cost-benefit analysis, irrespective of personality and 
social-structural considerations (cf. Brickman, 1977). 
Another problematic aspect of equity theory is its attempt to apply 
identical principles to all parties to the inequitable situation. Not only 
does the theory posit that both harmdoer and victim will suffer distress 
from the inequitable relationship, but the forms of distress are subjected to 
the same classification—retaliation distress and self-concept distress—as 
are the modes of reaction adopted for the restoration of equity. While this 
makes for a neat and balanced theory, it seems doubtful whether the percep­
tion of an inequity invariably gives rise to distress or motivates an attempt 
to reduce the injustice (Greenberg, 1984; and see the discussion of of-
fender's perceptions below). This somewhat simplistic approach is further 
aggravated by the application of a similar model to observers of the ineq­
uity, who are stated to undergo substantially the same reactions.50 
While all these criticisms have a certain validity and derogate from the 
universal acceptability of equity theory as a guide to social relationships, 
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the theory nevertheless appears to have substantial persuasiveness, in par­
ticular in relation to the focal area of the present study—crime victims. 
That a victim suffers distress, whether or not it can be dichotomized pre­
cisely in the above way, seems incontrovertible, and the availability of 
three main options by way of reaction—compensation, retaliation, or 
rationalization—also seems to ring true. There is, too, an element of plausi­
bility in the order of priorities attributed by equity theorists to harmdoers 
and victims alike, namely, a preference for compensation, failing this, retal­
iation, and failing this, rationalization ("psychological equity"). However, 
is there any hard evidence that this is in practice how victims react? The 
question of evidence is critical. In the absence of such evidence it would 
hardly be justified to develop a policy of criminal justice that relies upon a 
theory that had yet to be validated. Moreover, the primacy of equity and 
compensation as the basis for justice in social relations has been ques­
tioned in the psychological literature itself. 
Thus, Hogan and Emler (1981), who, with other writers, regard equity 
theory as "closely tied to the notion of distributive justice" (134), have 
argued that distributive justice is "an inappropriate analytical focus for 
understanding how the concept of justice functions at the level of the 
individual" (128). Among their criticisms of distributive justice are its 
emphasis on material goods and the assumption of familiarity, on the part 
of the decision maker or reacting individual, with all the relevant inputs 
and outputs. They question whether most people in fact believe in equity 
or in the existence of a relationship between merit and reward as hypothe­
sized by the just-world theory described in chapter 2. On the other hand, 
the authors argue that a retributive concept of justice suffers from none of 
these weaknesses, and is "older, more primitive, more universal, and so­
cially more significant" (131).51 Does the empirical evidence lend support 
to this view that retribution is the preferred reaction to inequity? 
In the previous section the available survey evidence and research on 
punitiveness was reviewed. However, the findings described were not di­
rectly related to the equity hypothesis, since no direct choice was pre­
sented between a compensatory solution and a retaliative, or retributive,52 
reaction. Nor does the equity theory literature abound in documentation of 
research that would test these alternative hypotheses. Moreover, this litera­
ture has tended to focus more on the harmdoer than on the victim. Finally, 
it has been more concerned with the primary dichotomy inherent in this 
theory—namely, the choice between restoring actual equity and restoring 
psychological equity—than with the secondary issue of whether the 
chosen form of actual equity is retaliation or compensation. 
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A notable exception, in spite of its limitations, is the research con­
ducted by de Carufel (1981) in Canada. De Carufel examined two questions 
of direct relevance to the present study: (1) whether, given the creation of 
an inequity, victims placed priority on punishment for the harmdoer or on 
compensation for themselves, and (2) if compensation were important, 
whether it mattered if such compensation issued from the harmdoer or 
from a third party. The research involved an experiment in which, follow­
ing an inequitable distribution of pay, four alternative solutions were 
adopted: (1) the harmdoer was compelled to compensate the victims (vic­
tim compensated, harmdoer "suffers"), (2) the harmdoer was fined an 
amount equivalent to his unfair gain (victim not compensated, harmdoer 
suffers), (3) the government compensated the victim (victim compensated, 
harmdoer does not suffer), and (4) the government censured the harmdoer, 
without ordering any material steps to rectify the inequity ("moral sup­
port," victim not compensated, harmdoer does not suffer). The degree of 
"satisfaction" and "fairness" of the outcome as perceived by the victims 
was measured on a nine-point scale. 
The general validity of the findings of this study may be questioned, 
since not only was it experimental, but it was conducted with university 
students, and with small samples. Moreover, in spite of the terminology 
employed ("harmdoer" and "victim") there was no indication that any 
criminal conduct was involved, although the inequity created was appar­
ently willful.53 Nevertheless, the seeming uniqueness of the experiment 
and the plausibility of the findings warrant that careful note be paid to the 
results of this study. These results indicated that while both victim com­
pensation and harmdoer's payment (termed in the research "suffering") 
significantly affected both outcome measures (the degree of victims' satis­
faction and the perceived fairness of the solution), compensation was the 
more important, the differences between the mean satisfaction and fair­
ness scores for victim compensated or not compensated being greater than 
those for payment or no payment by the harmdoer. Specifically, mean 
scores on the satisfaction scale followed this order: harmdoer paid compen­
sation (7.7) > compensation by third party (4.4) > harmdoer fined (2.2) > 
moral support (1.7) (de Carufel, 1981:451). 
The main finding, however, was that "subjects were very satisfied when 
the harmdoer suffered in order to provide the compensation." This finding 
suggests that victims may not be interested in retaliation or retribution as 
such but rather in compensation. Nevertheless, the compensation must be 
retributive, in the sense that it must issue from the wrongdoer. Receiving 
compensation from a third party "produced only moderate satisfaction." 
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The reduced level of satisfaction experienced by recipients of compensa­
tion from a third party is explained not only by the lack of any punishment 
being inflicted upon the harmdoer, and the inequity resulting from this 
gain, but also by a new inequity created by the third-party compensation. 
Thus while government compensation may have "eliminated to some ex­
tent the disadvantageous inequity" that arose initially, it "may have also 
created a simultaneous advantageous inequity with respect to the govern-
ment's intervention on their (the victims') behalf." Thus, "subjects may 
have felt 'two inequities' pulling in opposite directions" (452-53). 
In support of this last hypothesis, the author cited research indicating 
that recipients of aid generally54 experience inequity in such circum­
stances, which is reduced if they have an opportunity to reciprocate. The 
hypothesis is further supported by a second experiment reported in the 
same article (de Carufel, 1981), where victims indicated higher levels of 
satisfaction and perceived fairness on being offered gratuitous compensa­
tion for a disadvantage suffered when they were granted an opportunity to 
reciprocate than if no such opportunity were offered.55 De Carufel's studies 
appear to lend some credence to equity theory and to indicate its potential 
relevance to the issues under discussion. 
In this context, mention should be made of two other studies (both 
doctoral dissertations) with a bearing on equity theory, which have the 
advantage of having been conducted with actual crime victims rather than 
experimentally. Hammer (1989), whose explicit objective was to test the 
validity of equity theory, examined the relationships among stress, per­
ceived equity, and outcome of case for a sample of robbery victims. The 
author hypothesized that a more punitive response on the part of the 
criminal justice system would give rise to a greater perception of equity 
and to greater satisfaction on the part of the victim, as well as contributing 
to the victim's recovery. The findings produced a number of correlations in 
the expected direction and thus lend some support to the view that 
"harsher punishment of criminal offenders may help to restore a sense of 
equity to victims, and thus promote recovery" (95); but there were also 
some contrary findings, in particular in respect to female respondents. The 
author concluded that "the determinants of a victim's sense of equity and 
recovery from victimization appear to be more complex than a simple 
application of equity theory can explain, and further investigations are 
needed" (95-96). Hammer does not appear to have envisaged the possibil­
ity of the restoration of actual equity by the "primary" mechanism of a 
compensatory process; nor, indeed, were the alternative mechanisms of 
"psychological equity" examined. 
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The second study, by Umbreit (1988), focuses on the meaning of fairness 
in the perceptions of a sample of victims of juvenile burglars referred to a 
victim-offender mediation program. One of the research questions raised 
by the author was the validity of equity theory as compared with the more 
encompassing approach of Deutsch based upon the values of equality and 
need as well as equity (18; and cf. chap. 6 below|. Content analysis revealed 
that while compensation for the victim—as posited by equity theory— 
played an important role in the victims' responses, the offenders' rehabilita­
tion needs were perceived as being of even greater concern. These studies, 
together with de Carufel's, suggest that more research in this area would 
be fruitful both in the laboratory and in direct application to the criminal 
justice system. 
Before concluding the discussion of the relevance of equity theory to the 
victims of crime, one further aspect of this topic must be mentioned. The 
literature considered above relates almost exclusively to outcomes, that is, 
to substantive aspects of the justice system. However, much of the research 
on the criminal justice system reviewed in the preceding sections has indi­
cated that victims may be more concerned with the fairness of procedures 
than of outcomes. Some social psychologists have criticized the equity lit­
erature for ignoring this aspect of justice (see Folger, 1984; Tyler, 1984), and a 
body of research has developed on the perceived fairness and on the prefer­
ences of the parties in relation to different procedures of justice (Lind and 
Tyler, 1988). This has resulted in a debate over the relative significance of 
procedures as compared with outcomes in determining perceived fairness 
(Landis and Goodstein, 1986; Casper et al., 1988). This literature, too, sup­
ports the view that for victims in particular procedures are important in 
determining perceptions of fairness (Heinz, 1985; Umbreit, 1988:109). It 
will therefore be particularly relevant in the context of the discussions of 
procedural issues in chapters 8 and 11. 
Since it was established in chapter 3 of this study that victims' needs 
could not be considered without taking into account the needs of defen­
dants and the public, a brief discussion will follow regarding the applicabil­
ity of equity theory to these categories. 
Offenders ("Harmdoers") 
Equity theory, as noted, is said to apply to the participants in an inequita­
ble relationship. This includes not only the victim but also the harmdoer. 
Indeed, as noted, more attention has been devoted in the equity literature 
to the reactions of the harmdoer than to those of the victim. Harmdoers, 
128 Chapter 5 
too, are said to suffer both retaliative distress and self-concept distress and 
to react by restoration of actual equity, or, as an alternative, psychological 
equity (see, e.g., Walster et al., 1976; Utne and Hatfield, 1978). How far the 
two forms of distress are universally experienced by criminal offenders 
may be questionable. Adherents to subcultural theories of crime may 
doubt this, although the "shared-values" approach of Sykes and Matza 
(1957) would support it. It may also be doubted whether the psychopath 
experiences such distress. 
More relevant to the present discussion is the question whether the 
harmdoer favors the relief of distress through the actual restoration of equity 
by the payment of compensation,- the alternate method of actual equity, the 
equivalent of retaliation by the victim, would be to seek self-inflicted pun­
ishment (Walster et alv 1976:10), a theory supported by some adherents to 
the psychoanalytical approach. While "studies verify the fact that harm-
doers do commonly compensate their victims" (ibid.), such experimental 
findings may not be valid for real-life offenders. Techniques for restoring 
psychological equity, for example, by derogation of the victim, have been 
documented both in the experimental and the criminological literature (see 
Walster et al., 1976:10-11; Sykes and Matza, 1957; and Landau, 1977). The 
proposition that this type of solution is adopted only because the offender 
lacks any appropriate avenue for the restoration of actual equity seems 
doubtful but is worthy of empirical verification. The extent to which offend­
ers are disposed to compensate their victims is of course critical in the 
context of the development of restitutionary remedies in criminal justice, to 
which further attention will be devoted subsequently. 
Nonparticipants 
Equity theorists hold that "impartial observers should react to injustice in 
much the same way that participants do, with one qualification: observers 
should react less passionately than do participants" (Utne and Hatfield, 
1978:77). While it seems plausible that observers may be upset by a mani­
festation of inequity, the mechanisms involved are less clear. Do they, too, 
share the retaliation distress and self-concept distress attributed to the 
participants? This aspect of the theory seems to be less well documented 
in the literature. However, there is said to be "strong evidence that partici­
pants and impartial observers react to injustice in much the same way" 
(ibid.). 
It seems doubtful whether the dynamics involved in the selection of the 
mode of restoration of equity are identical for participants and for nonpar­
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ticipants. In most cases nonparticipants do not have the same facility for 
restoration of actual equity as do participants. It is perhaps for this reason 
that the emphasis in the literature dealing with nonparticipants has been 
on restoration of psychological equity. This literature has tended to merge 
with that dealing with attribution theory and, more especially, the just-
world theory. Thus the bystander reacts to an apparent inequity by attribut­
ing to the victim characteristics that would justify the inequity. This type 
of analysis is also applied to law enforcement personnel such as jurors, 
when they attribute blame to the victim and acquit the defendant; al­
though here they apparently possess the alternative option of restoring 
actual equity by convicting the defendant. 
Yet another category of nonparticipant in the inequitable act is the 
general public. Accounts of crimes presented in the media or conveyed 
informally may give rise to distress from which may follow either a desire 
for actual equity or a rationalization. Of greater interest here are the reac­
tions that follow accounts of criminal proceedings and their outcome. In 
some cases, the legal reaction may be perceived as being either too lenient 
or too harsh, and an inequity may be perceived. As noted earlier in this 
study, the criminal justice system has to seek solutions that are acceptable 
to society at large, as well as to the parties involved. 
Conclusion 
Equity theory, if valid, provides overwhelming arguments for the adoption 
of an equity model in the criminal justice system. First, it suggests that the 
parties, including nonparticipants, in fact prefer that the wrongdoer pay 
compensation to the victim rather than that the former should be pun­
ished, compensation being the optimal mode of restoring actual equity. 
Second, it suggests that the victim suffers from the failure to have equity 
restored to a greater extent than was otherwise evident on the basis of the 
literature reviewed earlier. The view that the trauma of victimization is 
further aggravated by secondary victimization by the criminal justice sys­
tem has already been noted. Equity theory, however, suggests that non­
compensation in itself may lead to a derogation of the victim by others. 
Lerner et al. (1976) report a study by Lincoln and Levinger that indicates 
that "innocent and uncompensated suffering often produces lower evalua­
tion of the victim" (140); the popular concept of a "loser" seems to illus­
trate this. The end result is thus tertiary victimization. 
It is therefore not surprising that some adherents to equity theory have 
advocated that its tenets be adopted by the criminal justice system. This 
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view is found primarily in the literature on restitution, which will be consid­
ered below. A more comprehensive approach has been put forward by 
Brickman (1977). He has argued that the principal aim of the criminal justice 
system should be to compensate the victim for his or her loss and suffering 
and (in addition) to compensate society for the costs involved in the adminis­
tration of criminal justice. Since the amount of compensation paid by offend­
ers would thus exceed their gains, a deterrent effect would also be present. 
This view may conflict with the principle insisted upon elsewhere in the 
equity literature that adequate compensation must precisely balance the 
harm done. Excessive compensation would merely create a new inequity 
(Walster et alv 1976:14), just as insufficient compensation would not fulfill 
the requirements of actual equity and thus be unattractive to the harmdoer. 
Brickman further argues that by paying compensation, the offender's self-
image—and the community's perception of him or her—would be en­
hanced, thus contributing to the offender's rehabilitation. 
The desirability of adopting a restitutionary model of justice follows 
from equity theory only so far as this theory has been shown to be valid. As 
noted, many aspects of the theory are still inadequately researched, and the 
relevant experimental findings derived from selected samples are not neces­
sarily applicable to "real-life" offenders and victims. Indeed, in view of the 
obvious relevance of the theory for criminal justice, it is surprising how 
underresearched this topic is. The study referred to in the previous section 
by Smale and Spickenheuer and the dissertations by Umbreit and Hammer 
are significant in endeavoring to explore some of these issues with a rele­
vant population. 
A model of justice based on equity theory, if the theory were valid, 
would take account of the psychological needs of the parties. However, 
such a model may not necessarily be consistent with certain principles 
regarded by legal philosophers as fundamental. Such principles will be 
discussed in the next chapter. 
Fundamental Principles 
of Justice 
The two preceding chapters considered the coping needs of victims and 
their perceived justice needs, on the basis of the empirical evidence avail­
able on these topics. In order to develop the optimal justice system, is it 
sufficient to take account only of these coping and justice needs of the 
victim—as well as those of the other relevant parties (offender and 
society)—or are there some overriding principles with which a justice 
system must comply in order to be worthy of the name? Such principles, if 
they exist, would not be derived from empirical observation but would 
rather be deduced on the basis of philosophical or jurisprudential analysis. 
It is with the question of the existence and identification of such principles 
that this chapter is concerned. 
The topic may be divided into three distinct questions. First, does the 
philosophical-jurisprudential literature suggest that recognition should be 
given to certain fundamental principles of justice which will be applicable 
to the criminal justice system in general and to the role of the victim in par­
ticular? Second, do prevailing systems of law, including the U.S. Constitu­
tion and international law conventions relating to human rights, subscribe 
to any such principles? This question is independent of the preceding one: 
on the one hand, accepted principles of jurisprudence may have been ignored 
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by the policy makers responsible for drafting constitutional documents; on 
the other hand, such documents may have adopted principles not necessar­
ily supported by the jurisprudential literature as universal or fundamental.1 
Third, irrespective of the degree to which jurisprudential analysis or consti­
tutional documents have hitherto recognized as fundamental certain princi­
ples that may have a bearing on the justice system and the victim, does it 
seem appropriate to adopt such principles today? The review of victims' 
needs in the preceding chapters did appear to indicate that victims have 
basic needs which have not been adequately taken into account by the 
traditional legal system. However, the degree to which these needs can be 
translated into definable rights or principles will partly depend upon the 
evaluation of current victim-oriented reforms to be considered below, while 
the merits of the recognition of constitutional rights for victims will be 
discussed in chapter 10. The present chapter will therefore focus on the first 
two questions specified above. 
Fundamental Principles of Justice in Jurisprudential Theory 
Jurisprudential literature is familiar with the historic controversy between 
the "natural" and the "positivist" theories of law. The former represents 
the view that the legal system must reflect certain accepted fundamental 
principles of morality generally seen to derive from divine or supernatural 
sources. The development of this view is associated in particular with the 
ancient Greek philosophers and St. Thomas Aquinas (Lloyd and Freeman, 
1985: chap. 3), and in modern times it has been associated primarily with 
Catholic scholars. The positivist school of jurisprudence, the origins of 
which are identified with Bentham and Austin, holds that the law has no 
necessary content, being the product of autonomous and secular forces of 
legislation. 
While the concept of "natural law" as such has tended to hold a limited 
appeal in modern jurisprudential writing,2 many philosophers have taken 
the view that the law must necessarily reflect certain moral or political 
ideals—what has been somewhat disparagingly termed "metaphysical ab­
solutes" (McDougal et al., 1980:68), or, more sympathetically, a "deonto­
logical" approach. Emphasis on moral content is found in particular in the 
German "idealist" school of the nineteenth century, associated with Kant, 
with his concept of the "categorical imperative." Moreover, while positiv­
ist thinking has generally dominated modem Anglo-American jurispru­
dence, nonpositivist approaches have increasingly come to the fore in the 
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last decades. One factor here may have been the phenomenon of the moral 
excesses perpetrated within the framework of the legal system under the 
Nazi regime, which led jurists—in particular Lon Fuller and H. L. A. 
Hart—to debate whether such pernicious norms could properly be termed 
"law." Even Hart himself, who in the context of the aforementioned contro­
versy fell firmly in the positivist camp, took the view that the law had a 
"minimum content" (see Lloyd and Freeman, 1985: chaps. 6, 3). 
Another contemporary legal philosopher has endeavored to present a 
more comprehensive reformulation of natural law theory in secular terms. 
In his Natural Law and Natural Rights J. Finnis (1980) sought to identify 
the "basic forms of human good"3 and the "basic requirements of practical 
reasonableness" which enable us to differentiate between "ways of acting 
that are morally right or morally wrong," thus arriving at "a set of general 
moral standards."4 
A greater threat to positivist thinking, however, has come from social 
contract theories. Historically associated with Hobbes, Locke, and Rous­
seau, such theories resemble the natural law approach in that they hy­
pothesize that the nature of social institutions and social relationships is 
predetermined. This approach has been criticized not only because its 
historical basis is doubtful, but also because "however the contract was 
envisaged, anyone could write his own ideas into its terms" (Heath, 
1963:6). Nevertheless, it is in the social contract tradition that there has 
emerged one of the most articulate and stimulating theories of modern 
idealist jurisprudential literature, that of John Rawls (1971). In his Theory 
of Justice Rawls (1971) deduces two fundamental postulates of justice 
which rational persons "in the original position"—that is, when deter­
mining the future institutions of the society they were creating, and in 
ignorance of the role in society which they themselves were destined to 
fulfill—would adopt in order to ensure the fairness of the principles to be 
evolved (12). These principles are concerned with the distribution of liber­
ties and of social and economic inequalities in society.5 This theory will 
be relevant to some of the topics to be considered in this study, such as 
the justice of adopting a public compensation scheme for victims. 
Apart from the mainstream natural law and social contract theories, 
innumerable idealist political ideologies of all colors—extremes ranging 
from individualism to totalitarianism—have been held by different schools 
and writers to provide the necessary basis for the legal system (Friedman, 
1967). Notable among them is Marxist analysis, which, although positivist 
in some respects (see McDougal et al., 1980:78; but cf. 76), and in spite of the 
ambivalence among Marxist thinkers regarding the role of law—destined 
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ultimately to "wither away" with the state itself6—has had specific implica­
tions for the content of the legal system. "By reiterating the crucial role of 
the sharing of material values (especially wealth, well-being and skill), 
Marxists have defined an indispensable agenda for the enlargement of hu­
man rights everywhere" (ibid., 77). 
Reference may also be made here to the "Republican Theory of Crimi­
nal Justice" recently developed by Braithwaite and Pettit (1990). While 
initially rejecting deontological approaches in favor of a pragmatic ap­
proach to criminal justice, the authors are led to adhere to a concept of 
social philosophy7 that they trace historically from ancient Rome through 
Montesquieu. The basis of the republican idea is "negative liberty," or the 
"minimization or elimination of interference by others" (57); this is 
closely linked to a concept called "dominion," which is conditioned upon 
three premises, resembling in the style of their formulation the postulates 
of John Rawls.8 This theory, according to the authors' analysis, has wide-
ranging implications for the criminal justice system and gives rise to four 
presumptions in this area (chap. 6): (1) parsimony in the use of resources, 
(2) checking of power by means of the recognition of rights, (3) reprobation 
or disapproval as the primary reaction of the community to criminality, 
but also (4) reintegiation "for those citizens who have had their dominion 
invaded by crime or punishment" (91). The relevance of this for the victim 
is emphasized. 
There thus emerges a dichotomy not specifically between legal positiv­
ism and natural law but between legal positivism and the various idealist 
approaches, including natural law, all of which perceive the character of 
the legal system to be predetermined by some "higher-order" characteris­
tic attaching to human society as a whole. In principle, legal positivism9 
imposes no such constraints. 
However, the above dichotomy, too, is insufficient for the purposes of 
the present analysis. So-called positivists, while in principle repudiating a 
priori theories of the character of human society,10 have frequently had 
strongly held views as to the proper objectives of social action. The most 
notable example is Jeremy Bentham, who evaluated all public measures in 
terms of their "utility" or their "tendency to augment the happiness of the 
community" (Bentham, 1948:3). Other positivist approaches that have ad­
vocated specific agendas for social action are the social engineering school 
of Roscoe Pound, which posited the need for legal reforms based upon 
empirical study of the facts, and the social defense school in criminology, 
which gave priority to the need to rehabilitate and control the offender. 
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Similarly, the political scientists McDougal, Lasswell, and Chen (1980), 
while rejecting a priori theories of human rights, have developed a complex 
agenda for social and political action in this area. 
It will therefore be more useful for present purposes to consider the 
applicability of such "fundamental principles of justice" not according to 
their a priori or theoretical foundations, the analysis of which would be 
beyond our scope here, but according to the nature of the principles and the 
area of their applicability. Thus classifications that differentiate between 
civil and criminal law, between retributive and distributive justice, and 
between substantive and adjective law are relevant in the present context, 
insofar as they involve various principles governing the relationships be­
tween offender and victim, offender and society, and society and victim. 
While there seems to be no classification in which the categories do not 
overlap to some extent, it seems that the fundamental principles to be 
considered here can be conveniently classified according to their focus 
upon (1) reaction to wrongdoing, (2) reaction to victimization, or (3) struc­
ture and procedure. 
Reaction to Wrongdoing. This label would apply to the retributive ap­
proach, which advocates a reaction to wrongdoing based on the deserts of 
the offender. It also applies to the school of social defense, which holds to a 
more crime-preventive philosophy. These approaches are concerned with 
determining the proper societal reaction to the offender under criminal 
law. Since, however, wrongdoing also raises legal issues between the wrong­
doer and the person wronged, traditionally an area governed by the civil 
law, tort philosophy will also be relevant, in particular the controversy 
regarding the corrective function of tort law. Moreover, considerations of 
distributive justice have also been perceived as directly relevant to penal 
philosophy (Sadurski, 1985, 1991). 
Reaction to Victimization. This heading is concerned with philoso­
phies that may be applied in developing remedies designed to assist vic­
tims. Naturally, there is some overlap with the previous heading, since 
victims may be assisted by corrective policies applied to the wrongdoer, at 
least in the framework of tort law, and possibly even by retributive policies 
(see below). However, the emphasis under "reaction to victimization" is 
instead upon how society as a whole should use the assets at its disposal— 
that is, questions of distributive justice. Here the jurispnidential hterature 
dealing with social contract merges with the broader literature of social 
philosophy in which discussion is devoted to the identification and elabora­
tion of the fundamental guiding principles for the distribution of goods— 
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principles such as equality, right, desert, and need. As noted, such princi­
ples clearly have relevance for society's treatment of the victim (cf. 
Mawby, 1988). 
Structure and Procedure. The literature both of political science and of 
jurisprudence has raised some norms of political or legal organization to 
the level of fundamental principles. This applies, for example, to the princi­
ple of legality, the separation of powers, and "due process of law"; indeed, 
the U.S. Constitution is sometimes said to be concerned mainly with 
processes. Some of the principles involved govern the structures and the 
interrelationships of political institutions, while others determine the way 
the laws will be applied in individual cases. Such principles, too, will be 
relevant in determining optimal solutions for administering justice among 
victims, offenders, and society. 
All the ideologies referred to may be criticized either on the basis of 
some alternative ideology or on pragmatic or utilitarian grounds. A utilitar­
ian approach would argue that each specific issue must be examined on its 
merits, and the optimal solution determined on the basis of the calculus of 
happiness thereby achieved or on some other "cosequentialist" criterion 
(cf. Primoratz, 1989:9). As noted above, utilitarian principles may also be 
employed to test various policies or principles in the justice area. However, 
in the present study, utilitarian criteria will tend to coincide with the other 
criteria to be applied to these policies, namely, those which have been 
adopted in the two preceding chapters, "coping needs" and "perceived 
justice needs." Insofar as these needs are met to an optimal degree, utilitar­
ian criteria will be substantially satisfied, and there will thus be no need to 
invoke utilitarianism as the basis for independent "fundamental princi­
ples" of justice. 
The above-mentioned principles will serve as a backdrop in the course 
of the analysis of the innovative victim-oriented programs in subsequent 
chapters, where some of the underlying issues, and in particular their appli­
cation, will be further pursued. However, a brief discussion of some of the 
concepts referred to may be appropriate here, in particular retribution and 
social defense, and the main alternative guiding principles of distributive 
justice. 
Retributivism 
The principle of talionic retributivism ("an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a 
tooth"), common to the Bible and other early codes such as Hammurabi's 
Babylonian Code and the Roman XII Tables, has often been regarded as part 
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of the natural order of mankind, that is, as part of "natural law." It is, for 
example, often cited as an argument for the death penalty. However, schol­
ars have interpreted the above-mentioned provisions in different ways (cf. 
Kaufmann, 1977). Thus Maimonides regarded the talion not as a manda­
tory sanction but as a maximum penalty for the offense, designed to pre­
vent extreme and disproportionate measures of vengeance on the part of 
the victim. Moreover, at the time these codes prevailed it seems that 
financial accommodation between the parties was in fact the dominant 
method for the resolution of legal disputes.11 In the Kantian version of 
retributivism, on the other hand, there was no doubt about its mandatory 
character as society's proper reaction to the commission of a crime.12 This 
doctrine is significant in the present context not so much for what it 
ordains in terms of society's punishment of the offender but rather in that 
it seems to preclude other, and especially more conciliatory, approaches to 
sanctioning which might have significant implications for the role of the 
victim. 
Support for retributivist doctrines fell into decline with the rise of 
utilitarianism and the adoption of "forward-looking" objectives of punish­
ment such as rehabilitation and incapacitation, as well as the more "clas­
sical" objective of deterrence. However, these objectives have in turn 
been criticized as insufficient justifications for punishment. Empirical 
research has cast doubt on the efficacy of both deterrence and rehabilita­
tion (Blumstein et al., 1978; Martinson, 1974), while the individualized 
decision-making processes associated with the latter have been criticized 
for their arbitrariness (American Friends' Service Committee, 1971). The 
efficacy of long-term imprisonment as a means of incapacitation has also 
been doubted by some researchers (Van Dine et al., 1977), and selective 
incapacitation is regarded by many criminologists as both unjust and 
difficult to implement (see, e.g., Monahan, 1981). Thus one of the strongest 
motivations for the revival of retribution as the objective of punishment 
has been "the really insuperable difficulties that attend any alternative to 
it" (Hospers, 1977:195). This type of argument also forms the basis of the 
contemporary just-deserts position, as formulated in the report of the 
Committee for the Study of Incarceration "Doing Justice" (von Hirsch, 
1976); although it is arguable that this somewhat negative reasoning can­
not be considered to have raised retribution to the level of a "fundamen­
tal principle." 
At the same time, adherence to retributivism on the basis of its puta­
tively superior merits continues. In a well-known exposition of this view, 
Mabbott argues that "it is manifestly unjust to deprive a person of his 
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liberty as a consequence of committing a criminal act for any reason other 
than the fact that he committed the crime—in short, that he 'deserved' the 
punishment" (Wilson, 1977:111). Finnis (1980) quotes a line of argument 
reminiscent of Kant when arguing that the offender by his act "gains a 
certain sort of advantage over those who have restrained themselves," and 
that "punishment rectifies the disturbed pattern of distribution of advan­
tages and disadvantages throughout a community by depriving the con­
victed criminal of his freedom of choice, proportionately to the degree with 
which he had exercised his freedom, his personality, in the unlawful act" 
(263). Even the Hegelian idea of the "right to be punished" has been echoed 
in recent times by Morris and Gardiner (1981). 
Other writers, including Hart and Rawls, have favored a "mixed" philoso­
phy of punishment, incorporating both retributivist and nonretributivist 
elements (cf. Primoratz, 1989: chap. 6). In Punishment and Responsibility, 
Hart (1968: chaps. 1, 9) differentiated the "general justifying aim" of punish­
ment and the "principles of distribution," according to which the responsi­
bility and punishment of the individual would be determined. He placed 
greater importance on retribution in distribution, which he saw as guaran­
teeing that only a guilty person will be punished. Similarly, in "Two Con­
cepts of Rules," Rawls suggested that the legislature might base criminal 
law legislation on utilitarian ideas, while the courts would apply retribu­
tivist criteria (see Cederblom, 1977).13 
Retributive theories posit that the offender should be punished to a 
degree considered equivalent to the harm inflicted on society as a result of 
the offense.14 Although the harm is generally inflicted upon a specific vic­
tim, this aspect is not generally emphasized in the theoretical literature, as 
distinct from the "applied" literature to be discussed in the next chapter. 
Similarly, such theories have generally failed to incorporate any role to be 
played by the victim. Vengeance on the part of the victim is perceived by 
classical retribution theory to be the antithesis of legal punishment (cf. 
Primoratz, 1989:70-71). The positive analysis of victim hate articulated by 
Murphy (1990), albeit as a subsidiary factor in retributive punishment, is 
cited as something of an anomaly in this literature; and the possibility of a 
role for the victim, if considered, is generally rejected (Cederblom, 1977). 
This rejection by retributivists of a role for the victim is somewhat 
paradoxical, since, as noted, the societies from which the retributive ap­
proach was derived appear to have placed the main emphasis in their 
sanctioning system on compensation for the victim. Thus, biblical laws 
enjoined the thief or trespasser to repay the owner a multiple value of the 
property stolen. Further, etymologically the word retributive means "to 
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pay back/' and it is by no means clear that the original connotation was 
paying one's debt to society rather than to the victim. 
Be that as it may, tentative consideration has been given in recent years 
to the restoration to the victim of a role in the retributive scheme of things, 
whether on a purely conceptual level or in terms of practical policies 
(Sebba, 1982). One form this reorientation has taken is the so-called restitu­
tionary theory of justice. Thus, Barnett (1977, 1980) has argued that crime 
is an offense by one individual against another, and "justice consists in the 
culpable offender making good the loss he has caused" (Barnett, 1977:287). 
In a similar vein, Barnett and Hagel (1977), adopting a concept of individual 
rights from Dworkin,15 attribute to the criminal justice system the func­
tion of enforcing the victim's moral rights and enabling the victim "to 
rectify the ambivalence created by the criminal act" (17). It seems that the 
Barnett and Hagel scheme of justice (cf. also Rothbard, 1977; Gittler, 1984) 
does not preclude various characteristics of a retributive system as gener­
ally understood, including the imposition of penal sanctions on the de­
fendant, but in this case, too, the victim would play a more active role. 
However, Barnett and Hagel unequivocally assert that one generally ac­
cepted characteristic of a retributive system of justice—the exemption 
from or mitigation of accountability where the perpetrator's mental health 
is in question—has no place under their concept, for it would have the 
effect of depriving the victim of his or her rights. Perhaps the restitutionary 
theory, to be considered further in the next chapter, might appropriately be 
described as "quasi-retributivist."16 
Social Defense 
Social defense is a twentieth-century school of penal philosophy (and penal 
policy) that lays emphasis on the treatment and control of offenders. The 
treatment orientation points to the roots of this movement in the positiv­
ist school of criminology, of which it is an offshoot.17 While its correctional 
objectives bestowed upon this school a utilitarian character, social defense 
adopted the value-laden objective of ameliorating the situation of "both 
society and the citizens" (Ancel, 1985:18). 
The variety of meanings attributed to the term are described in Marc 
Ancel's account of this movement. Ancel argued that the identification of 
social defense with mere repression, and the charge that individual rights 
were sacrificed by this approach, were unfounded or were true only of 
some of the earlier advocates of social defense, such as Adolph Prins 
(ibid., 52). Nevertheless, even if adherents of this movement are correct in 
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perceiving treatment of the offender as serving the offender's interests, a 
view that has been questioned by liberal and radical critics in recent 
years, a greater emphasis is clearly placed by this school on the main 
objective, the protection of society. One of the key concepts of the social 
defense school is the "safety measure/' which must be applied to indi­
viduals "in proportion to their individual capacity for doing harm" 
(Ancel, 1965:15). This leads to the other key concept, the notion of "dan­
gerousness," and the need to focus safety measures on (a) habitual, and 
(b) abnormal offenders (ibid.). Moreover, social protection should be 
sought, according to this approach, not only by treatment but also by 
prevention (17-18). While the limits of state intervention in order to 
further these objectives may be imprecise,18 social defense is clearly a 
doctrine that gives priority to what are seen to be societal needs and 
interests. Insofar as the individual offender's interests are taken into con­
sideration, they are evaluated somewhat paternalistically: the experts 
will determine the offender's treatment needs. 
This emphasis on societal interests in dealing with offenders has impli­
cations for the present study. The espousal of social defense doctrines 
might tend to inhibit an orientation of the criminal justice system toward 
the victim. 
Distributive Justice 
Classification of the alternative criteria upon which distributive justice 
may be based varies somewhat in the literature. The main dichotomy is 
sometimes seen to be between justice according to desert and justice on 
the basis of equality, a dichotomy that dates to Aristotle (see Walster and 
Walster, 1975). Sometimes need—a concept close to but distinct from 
equality (Miller, 1976:147)—is seen to be the main alternative to desert. To 
need and desert, Miller, in a leading text on social justice (1976), adds a 
third category, justice based on rights.19 This seems to be the least satisfac­
tory of Miller's terms, since "right" is not so much a criterion or parameter 
of justice but a tool to describe the legal situation after a particular crite­
rion or normative standard has been adopted or is seen to be inherent. Thus 
if "desert" or "need" be adopted as the appropriate criterion for justice, 
they, too, would give rise to rights. Miller's rights category would thus be 
better described as "tradition" or "status" as the basis of rights. However, 
it may also be useful to adopt such a term to describe any residual theory 
that rejects a priori principles for the distribution of goods in society, such 
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as need or desert (see also Galston, 1980). Thus, for example, defense of 
rights could describe Nozick's rejection of various normative principles for 
the distribution of property (see Nozick, 1974). 
Another writer often cited in the social psychology literature is Deutsch 
(1975), who proposed the following three criteria for social justice: equity, 
need, and equality. Equity is related to the concept of desert, both of which 
are seen to predominate in societies whose primary concern is economic 
productivity.20 
These alternative criteria for social justice are not viewed by their propo­
nents as competing values in all societies at all times. Rather, a particular 
culture with a particular economic orientation will be dominated by a 
particular conception of social justice. Thus Miller's rights criterion 
(which he associates with the philosophy of David Hume) is identified 
with conservative hierarchical societies—such as feudalism—in which 
the respect for traditional rights is the dominant motif. His desert criterion 
(illustrated by reference to the writings of Herbert Spencer) is identified 
with the competitive market economy—such as Western industrialized 
states—in which individualism and merit are rewarded. His need criterion 
(associated with the views of Peter Kropotkin) is identified with commu­
nalism and "social solidarity" as the guiding principle. Similarly, Deutsch 
(1975), as noted, identifies equity with an emphasis on economic productiv­
ity, equality with an emphasis on "enjoyable social relations/' and need 
with an emphasis on "the fostering of personal development and personal 
welfare" (143). In view of the relativity of the criteria to their socioeco­
nomic setting, it may be argued that these are not objective or "fundamen­
tal" principles of justice but rather a description of the subjective views of 
the members of the particular group, and therefore pertain to the analysis 
of perceived justice needs, the topic of the previous chapter. However, the 
classifications and the analyses referred to are not, even in the case of the 
social psychologist, based upon empirical research but are instead induc­
tive. Moreover, the values are thought to be "fundamental" to the societies 
concerned. 
Fundamental Principles of Justice under the Constitution 
A constitution is the mechanism whereby rights and principles that are 
perceived to be fundamental in the society in question are granted superior 
legal status in that society and are thereby ostensibly rendered both 
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normatively binding upon its lawmakers as well as its citizens and immune 
from routine and casual revision.21 How far does the U.S. Constitution incor­
porate any of the principles considered above, or any other rights affecting 
crime victims? 
The U.S. Constitution does not relate directly to crime victims. How­
ever, it concerns itself extensively with the criminal justice system. The 
Bill of Rights, ratified in 1791, perpetuated a number of characteristics of 
the common-law system of criminal justice which were thought to protect 
the citizen from arbitrary incrimination on the part of the government. 
Thus, the right to silence, the right to a jury trial, the right to counsel, the 
right to the confrontation of witness, and the right to "due process" are 
incorporated in these provisions, which applied originally only to the fed­
eral government but were subsequently extended to the individual states 
by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, as interpreted by the Supreme 
Court. In effect, these provisions guaranteed a perpetuation of the so-called 
adversary system, apparently foreclosing the possibility of alternate and 
possibly less formal procedures, in particular in criminal cases.22 The proce­
dural characteristics of the system were thus elevated to the status of 
fundamental rights. Further, the reference to "excessive fines" and to 
"cruel and unusual punishments" in the Eighth Amendment seems to 
imply, perhaps somewhat paradoxically, that the prevailing system of 
criminal sanctions is retributive—or at least punitive—in character. For if 
this were not the case, there would be no need for the imposition of such 
limitations on the severity of the sanction. 
It has been suggested, however, that another amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution has direct relevance to the victim. In an article written at the 
behest of the American Bar Association's Criminal Justice Section, Rich­
ard Aynes (1984) argued that the Fourteenth Amendment, which mandates 
the "equal protection of laws," should in effect be interpreted as a charter 
guaranteeing a number of rights to crime victims. He argued that "protec­
tion of laws" implied a "positive duty to supply protection," and that it 
"seems that there is a consensus that there is an affirmative duty upon 
government to protect those under its jurisdiction" (55). Aynes also sees 
the government's duty to protect its citizens as the corollary of the citi­
zens' duty not to violate the law (66), and as consistent with the purposes 
of government as laid down in the Declaration of Independence (79J.23 
Aynes notes historical precedents whereby public authorities—the sheriff, 
or the municipality—were held to be absolutely liable for the misconduct 
of their charges or inhabitants, in effect rendering them "insurers" against 
damage inflicted upon those to whom a duty is owed (1 lOff.). However, he 
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balks at insisting that the contemporary government's duty to protect its 
citizens should result in such "insurance" but rather seeks recognition for 
two more modest rights: (1) for the citizen's right to compel the law en­
forcement authorities to perform their duty (cf. also Willing, 1982), and (2) 
for the recognition of tortious liability for damages for failure in the perfor­
mance of this duty. Thus the government would be liable to the victim if it 
failed to take into account the victim's interests at one of the decision-
making stages. It would follow that two of the major obstacles to such 
suits under contemporary law—lack of "standing"24 for the victim in the 
criminal justice process and sovereign immunity of the state for suits by 
its citizens—would be implicitly removed.25 Finally, Aynes sees the recog­
nition of these rights as stepping-stones toward the ultimate recognition of 
a more comprehensive right, the "right not to be a victim" (116). 
While Aynes's thesis is in many ways persuasive, its basic premises are 
legally questionable. First, as pointed out by O'Neill (1984), both the fed­
eral and the state constitutions are more concerned with imposing re­
straints upon governmental activity than with imposing obligations: 
"They rarely require that government promote goals" (368). Moreover, the 
issue under discussion here was specifically addressed by Judge Posner in a 
federal case (cited in O'Neill, 1984:368-69): 
There is no constitutional right to be protected by the state against being 
murdered by criminals or madmen. It is monstrous if the state fails to 
protect its residents against such predators but it does not violate the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or, we suppose, any other 
provision of the Constitution. The Constitution is a charter of negative 
liberties; it tells the state to let people alone; it does not require the 
federal government or the state to provide services, even so elementary a 
service as maintaining law and order. 
Further, the Fourteenth Amendment refers to equal protection, not abso­
lute protection. It was essentially a provision enacted to contend with dis­
crimination. Its history, as Aynes himself recounts, is closely identified 
with the aftermath of the Civil War and the desire to compel the erstwhile 
rebellious states to grant equal civil rights to their black citizens. Moreover, 
while other types of legislative classification (i.e., those unconnected with 
racial categories) have also been subjected to the test of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, they have generally been held not to be discriminatory if the 
purposes of the classification were shown to be "rational" (Mason et al., 
1983:612). 
The applicability of the equal protection clause was expanded consider­
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ably in the 1960s, when the Supreme Court began to identify certain "fun­
damental rights," such as the right to travel, or "suspect categories/' such 
as race or nationality, to which restrictions could not be applied other than 
for "compelling state interest" (Mason et al., 1983; Feeley and Krislov, 
1990). Thus, designation of crime victims as a category from whom rights 
were to be excluded might give rise to judicial intervention under the 
Fourteenth Amendment,26 but this is a far cry from the absolute duty of 
protection suggested by Aynes. The emphasis in the Fourteenth Amend­
ment is on equality of consideration rather than on the extent of the 
protection itself. 
However, Aynes may be on stronger ground in his operative conclu­
sions, where, as noted, he refrains from insisting upon absolute protection 
but merely argues that law enforcement personnel should have a universal 
duty to investigate and be liable in tort for the failure to exercise reason­
able judgment in making decisions in which victims may have an interest. 
For if it can be shown that law enforcement personnel in practice investi­
gate most cases, and take some account of victims7 interests, then the 
failure to follow this practice in certain individual cases might amount to 
discrimination. While most cases referred to in the literature in which the 
courts have been asked to invoke the equal protection clause involve dis­
crimination by legislation against classes of citizens, the wording of the 
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the states from denying to "any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws" (emphasis added). 
This would clearly cover the discriminatory exercise of administrative 
discretion under law, and not just the enactment of discriminatory law. 
Thus, while it may be problematic to invoke the Fourteenth Amend­
ment in favor of a governmental duty of absolute enforcement of the 
law, there are stronger grounds for arguing that this provision prohibits 
discriminatory enforcement of the criminal law. This view has recently 
received support—unrelated to claims based on the U.S. Constitution— 
from the republican theory of justice of Braithwaite and Pettit (1990), 
which recognizes "the right of a victim to have the authorities apply the 
same criteria as with other victims in determining how far to investigate 
the offence, whether to prosecute, whether to convict and how to sen­
tence" [77). 
As a matter of practice, the courts have, as noted, shown great reluc­
tance to interfere with the discretion of law enforcement authorities, 
whether for fear of the infringement of the separation-of-powers doctrine, 
out of reluctance to interfere with discretionary powers, or because of a 
lack of standing on the part of petitioners (Welling, 1987:94-105; Green, 
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1988:492-93).27 Welling, Green, and other writers have, accordingly, pro­
posed new modes for enhancing the victim's status vis-a-vis law enforce­
ment authorities, which will be considered in subsequent chapters. 
However, insofar as one seeks to base the remedies on "equal protec­
tion/' a larger and more fundamental issue not directly considered by 
Aynes must be dealt with. This is the question whether the prevailing 
criminal law and criminal processes are in fact designed to protect victims, 
such that the conclusion may be reached that it is indeed the victim who 
has the right to the "equal protection" of these laws and processes. This 
question may be subdivided into two further questions. First, is the crimi­
nal law concerned with protection? The social defense school would in­
deed attribute considerable importance to this objective. On the other 
hand, under a retributivist view, whether Kantian or following the just-
deserts school, punishment is not essentially concerned with protection, 
or indeed any other forward-looking function, but is exclusively backward 
looking. Without entering here into an exhaustive discussion on the phi­
losophy of punishment, it seems that the protection of society is accepted 
as at least one of the purposes of punishment. Moreover, there are certain 
stages of the criminal process, notably bail and parole hearings, where 
protection of the public is one of the main considerations. 
The second and more problematical question is whether the protective 
purpose of the criminal law is directed at the victim rather than at society 
in general. The problem here is that even if the victim has some recognized 
special interest in the criminal process (as to which, as we have seen, there 
is considerable ambivalence), this seems to be primarily a retributive inter­
est. The protective interest—that is, the prevention of future criminality 
by the same offender—is not the interest exclusively of the victim but of 
prospective future victims, the public as a whole.28 It could then of course 
be argued that any citizen, including the victim, had a Fourteenth Amend­
ment interest in protection from the offender. In this case, however, it 
cannot be said that there is any inequality in the way law may be applied in 
a particular case in which the government refrains from taking action, 
since the victim is (in theory) being placed at risk from the offender 
"equally" with other members of the public.29 
Similar problems arise with the ultimate goals that Aynes would strive 
to achieve, namely, recognition of "the right not to be a victim/' This 
slogan is fraught with ambiguity. If it means that every citizen has an 
enforceable right to prevent his or her own victimization, it is mere 
casuistry, for by definition offenders do not recognize this right and its 
implementation is impracticable. If it means that it should be recognized 
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that acts of victimization are not protected by law, it is simply a truism. 
Criminal victimization is, by definition, prohibited by law. Moreover, a 
potential victim is even permitted to take what would otherwise be unlaw­
ful measures to counteract such victimization (the right to self-defense). If, 
however, bearing in mind that rights have correlative duties, the question 
being addressed is whose right is the corollary of the potential offender's 
duty not to victimize, this is of focal importance for this study. Are viola­
tions of prohibitions under the criminal code in fact offenses against the 
victim? While practically this is so—the injury is inflicted upon the vic-
tim's person or property—legal convention appears to regard the offense as 
committed against the state, as evidenced by the mechanisms of law en­
forcement, including the Bill of Rights, and by the tort-crime dichotomy.30 
On this analysis, it is not the citizen who has a right not to be a victim,- it is 
the state that has a right not to have its citizens victimized. However, as 
indicated earlier, it is this approach—one that places all the emphasis in 
criminal justice on the state, to the exclusion of the victim—that has been 
the cause of much disaffection with the present system. Recognition of the 
"right not to be a victim" in this sense would require a radical rethinking 
of the criminal process, which again may not be consistent with the pres­
ent Constitution.31 This theme will be resumed in chapter 12. 
The President's Task Force on Victims of Crime (1982), while making 
no far-reaching claims regarding the constitutional rights of the victim 
under the present law, suggested that a radical change be brought about by 
means of constitutional amendment (114-15); and other proposals have 
been made of a similar hue (Lamborn, 1987). These proposed amendments 
deal primarily with the status of the victim from the procedural point of 
view, and their implications will be considered in chapter 8, which deals 
with procedural reforms. 
Welfare Rights. The discussion of need as a basis of distributive justice 
(cf. Sadurski, 1985: chap. 6) might lead to recognition of a general right to 
welfare. Included in this right might be the entitlement of victims to 
compensation or services from the state (although there might be a prob­
lem in justifying a preference for victims over other needy categories; see 
below, chap. 9). While there is an extensive literature dealing with the 
philosophical arguments in favor of or against the recognition of such a 
legal right (see, e.g., Plant et al., 1980; Mawby, 1988), and support for such 
recognition has been based upon the interpretation of Rawls's principles of 
fairness (Michelman, [1975?)), attempts to argue that such a right currently 
exists under the U.S. Constitution by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment 
(Michelman, 1969), or that it is a "fundamental right" and therefore deserv­
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ing of special scrutiny (Feeley and Krislov, 1990:813), do not seem to have 
gained much support from the Supreme Court (Rice, 1979:39). 
Fundamental Principles of Justice in International Law 
The development of international law has been concerned primarily with 
the relationships among states. Developments in the twentieth century 
have increasingly focused attention on the rights of (minority) groups, 
while since World War II there has also developed a body of human rights 
law whereby certain basic rights appertaining to individuals are recognized 
in international law (see, e.g., Shaw, 1991: chap. 6). These rights impose 
obligations upon individual states regarding the treatment meted out to 
their citizens, in some cases granting remedies to the individuals 
concerned—again, an innovation from the point of view of international 
law. Obligations of this nature are specified, inter alia, in the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights; the International Covenants on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights and on Civil and Political Rights; the American 
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man; and the European Convention 
on Human Rights. Not all these documents impose binding obligations on 
the signatory states (Brownlee, 1971:106), and even when so binding, the 
norms outwardly adhered to are not necessarily incorporated into the do­
mestic law of these states. Nevertheless, the adoption of such documents 
on the international plane does point to the existence of certain fundamen­
tal principles, which have been agreed to in substance among a majority of 
the states in the United Nations or in the region concerned. 
What rights of crime victims can be inferred from these documents? 
Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the 
General Assembly of the United Nations in 1948, declares, "Everyone has 
the right to life, liberty, and security of the person." This is echoed in 
article 1 of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. 
This clearly indicates that the Utopian-sounding principle specified by 
Aynes as the ultimate objective of victim sympathizers—recognition of 
"the right not to be a victim"—has in fact already gained recognition.32 
Here too, however, the question arises as to the practical ramifications of 
the recognition of this right. 
It may be that affirmation of the right to life, liberty, and the security 
of the person—property being generally dealt with under separate provi-
sions—implies an obligation on the part of the state to protect its citizens 
from infringements of such violations. The reason this is notv explicit is 
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that the primary intention of such provisions is to protect individuals not 
from abuses perpetuated by other citizens but rather from abuses emanat­
ing from the state itself. This is further borne out by other provisions of 
these documents specifying a right to the protection of the law. The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights specifies the right to such protec­
tion against "arbitrary interference with .. . privacy, family, home or cor­
respondence" and "attacks upon . . . honor and reputation."33 Here, again, 
the emphasis is upon the prevention of governmental abuses of citizens 
rather than acts of victimization by other citizens. Naturally, the same 
applies to the extensive body of international law prohibiting torture 
(Rodley, 1987). 
Further, as in the case of the U.S. Constitution, the extensive references 
to criminal processes in these charters of human rights focus upon the 
rights of offenders and suspected offenders, rather than those of victims. 
Such provisions, insofar as they impinge upon victims, may be considered 
as limiting rather than enhancing their protection. Even the prohibition on 
torture, as implied by the name of the leading international document— 
"Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment"—belongs analytically to the struggle for the 
protection of the rights of offenders, or of persons so perceived by the state, 
even though it also takes the significant step of rendering torture a crimi­
nal offense (art. 4) and designating the recipient a victim (art. 5). 
It may also be noted that some international legal documents, such as the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights of 1966 
and the European Social Charter of 1961 have recognized general rights to 
medical and—in the second case—welfare services, which are in principle 
applicable to crime victims; but no such category is specifically alluded to in 
these documents. Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms specifies theright to "respect for 
private life," and this provision was held by the European Court of Human 
Rights, in the Case of X and Y versus the Netherlands, in 1983, to obligate 
the state to provide protection under the criminal law against sexual abuse 
(Berger, 1992:282). Under a Dutch law considered by the court, only the 
victim could file a complaint, so that in the case of an assault committed 
against a handicapped girl, no prosecution took place. Her father was thus 
successful in his claim for compensation. This case seems to be a landmark 
in its recognition of victims' rights but seems to have attracted little atten­
tion in this literature. 
Another major breakthrough in this area occurred in 1985, when, after 
intensive activity on the part of victim advocates, the Seventh United 
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Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders 
adopted the "Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime 
and Abuse of Power," which was in turn adopted by the UN General 
Assembly. The declaration deals with two focal areas: (a) "Victims of 
Crime" and (b) "Victims of Abuse of Power." The first category relates to 
the conventional definition of crime victims, and the declaration lays 
down norms providing for (1) access to justice and fair treatment, (2) restitu­
tion, (3) compensation, and (4) assistance. These were the areas on which 
victim advocates, hailing mainly from Western democracies, had been fo­
cusing and continue to do so. The standards incorporated in the declaration 
in these areas will be relevant when considering the mainstream victim-
oriented remedies. 
However, "some States, primarily from the developing world, indicated 
strong concern about abuse of political power exemplified by the conduct 
of some transnational corporations, matters not effectively regulated by 
national criminal law" (Lamborn, 1988:108). With this in mind, part B of 
the declaration was added to cover "Victims of Abuse of Power." The 
definition of victims here, as noted in chapter 3, is wide and includes 
individuals and collectivities who have suffered harm "through acts or 
omissions that do not yet constitute violations of national criminal laws 
but of internationally recognised norms relating to human rights" (sec. 18). 
Although the operational sections of the declaration dealing with this 
category of victim are somewhat inconsistent in their terminology (cf. 
Lamborn, 1988:112-13), the main purport of the declaration in respect of 
this category of victim is to encourage the enactment of legislation crimi­
nalizing the conduct involved, the provision of material and other reme­
dies (sees. 19, 21), and the negotiation of international treaties (sec. 20). 
As might indeed be anticipated in the light of its title, the declaration is 
concerned almost exclusively with victims. Being aware that victim-
related principles are liable to have implications for offenders too, the 
General Assembly resolution adopting the declaration specified that mea­
sures taken to promote the interest of victims should be "without preju­
dice to the rights of suspects and offenders" (sec. 2). However, one of the 
policies that states are encouraged to adopt under the resolution is "to 
establish and strengthen the means of detecting, prosecuting and sentenc­
ing those guilty of crime" (sec. 4(d)); but the emphasis here is perhaps on 
comprehensiveness, rather than on toughness, in law enforcement, and is 
doubtless intended to reflect the secondary objective specified in this sec­
tion, namely, "to curtail victimization." At the same time, another policy 
encouraged by the same section is "to prohibit practices and procedures 
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conducive to abuse, such as secret places of detention and incommunicado 
detention" (sec. 4(g)). This clause does not seem to be intended to improve 
the lot of persons suspected of "traditional" offenses but is presumably 
aimed at the victims of abuse of power covered by the second part of the 
declaration. However, a committee charged with the task of considering 
modes of implementing the declaration, which listed a number of interna­
tional standards the violations of which should be considered to be covered 
by the heading "victims of abuse of power," included the Standard Mini­
mum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (see Bassiouni, 1988:78). Thus 
under this part of the declaration, the borderline between victims and 
offenders is necessarily blurred. Finally it should be noted that while decla­
rations of this nature are not generally considered under international law 
to be of legally binding force,34 "a declaration which may appear hortatory 
may, as practice develops, come to embody the law" (Asamoah, 1966:245). 
Conclusions 
In this chapter the question was raised whether there are fundamental prin­
ciples of justice that need to be taken into account when formulating a 
policy toward victims. Such principles were sought both in the juris-
prudential-philosophical literature and in constitutional documents. While 
certain concepts and expressions such as "fairness" and "equality" appear 
to be widely regarded as basic to the idea of justice, attempts to find a 
universally acceptable principle or standard by which any legal system can 
be tested, while often stimulating fruitful debate, have proved problemati­
cal. There appear to be a number of reasons for this. First, most theories are 
based upon inadequate premises. Either they have some metaphysical or 
speculative foundation—such as divine inspiration or social contract— 
whose concept and content are inevitably open to speculation, or they are 
based on the writer's sometimes highly personal views on the characteris­
tics of mankind which a legal system must take into account. Second, the 
nature of any theory and the priority of values on which it is based will be 
related to the political, moral, social, or political philosophy of its author 
and will be culturally determined (cf. Miller, 1976; Diamond, 1981). Third, 
even within the framework of a given approach, there may be competing 
principles of justice, rather than a single formula against which all policies 
may be tested (Miller, 1976:361). Thus, while some of the principles ex­
pounded in the jurisprudential literature (such as Rawls's theory of justice, 
or utilitarianism) may have relevance to victim-oriented policies, and their 
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implications will be considered in the ensuing discussion, they should not 
be regarded as absolute. 
Principles incorporated in constitutional and international charters do 
ex hypothesi have the status of fundamental legal principles. But existing 
provisions of the U.S. Constitution do not appear to have direct bearing on 
the status of the victim in the justice system in spite of the valiant attempt 
of Professor Aynes to show the relevance of the Fourteenth Amendment in 
this respect. Note should be taken, however, of the proposals to amend the 
U.S. Constitution, as well as some amendments effected in state constitu­
tions (see below, chap. 10). Moreover, an exhortation to respect victim 
rights is now enshrined in an international document that imposes, upon 
UN members, at least a moral obligation. Additional documents may ap­
ply on the basis of regional affiliation, notably to members of the Council 
of Europe (cf. Tsitsoura, 1984). 
It may also be appropriate to recognize new fundamental principles, 
which will address themselves to the role of the victim, and to incorporate 
such principles into the Constitution. Such proposals might be based on 
the analysis of victim-related problems in the current literature. However, 
the failure of abstract thinkers to develop universally acceptable theories 
from which to derive these principles leaves open the possibility that they 
might alternatively derive from empirical studies such as those surveyed 
in the two preceding chapters. If a particular view as to the requirements of 
justice for victims were both widely and strongly (i.e., saliently) held by 
relevant sectors of the public, this might be a consideration for adopting 
these views at the level of a fundamental or constitutional principle.35 

Part III

Evaluation of Victim-

Oriented Reforms 

Reforming the Objectives 
of Sanctioning Policy: 
The Desert Model of Sentencing 
and Restitution 
In this part of the study the main reforms described briefly in chapter 1 will 
be considered in the light of the requirements of the system as reviewed in 
chapters 4 through 6. Attention will thus be paid to the degree to which the 
reforms and proposals appear to be calculated to address (a) the coping 
needs and (b) the perceived justice needs of the relevant parties (and in 
particular of the victim), and to take account of (c) fundamental principles 
of justice adhered to by some of the dominant theories. As far as possible, 
differentiation will be made between the a priori merits of the proposals in 
question, that is, the degree to which they appear to have a potential for 
meeting the needs described, and the actual effectiveness of the measures 
specified, where such proposals have already been adopted and insofar as 
evaluative data are available. 
In this and the chapters that follow in this section, the discussion will 
relate primarily to questions of principle and matters giving rise to contro­
versy. No attempt will be made to consider in detail the innumerable 
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practical and administrative problems that arise at the implementation 
stage of such detailed proposals as those of the Proposed Model Legislation 
(NAAG/ABA, 1986). Further, the report of the President's Task Force (1982) 
deals with such matters as police training and procedures for the speedy 
return of victims' property held by the police for evidentiary purposes. 
These issues are of the utmost importance, but their analysis in detail goes 
beyond the scope of this study. In a general way, however, such issues may 
be clarified by the analysis of the victim's role in the criminal process, and 
of victim-assistance programs. 
This chapter will focus on substantive reforms in the criminal justice 
system which have a direct bearing on the victim's situation. The main 
reforms addressed will be desert sentencing and restitution. While the 
importance of the last topic in the present context is obvious, desert sen­
tencing, while not ostensibly concerned with victims, also appears to be of 
the greatest relevance. 
The Desert Model of Sentencing 
How far are recent developments in sentencing philosophy calculated to 
affect the way in which the victim is considered at the sentencing stage? As 
noted in chapter 2, victim-related factors have traditionally been reflected in 
sentencing practice, in which victim harm has generally constituted one of 
the main components—if not the exclusive determinant—of the serious­
ness of the offense and the punishment therefor. This has applied both to the 
formal legislative norms and to court practices as revealed by empirical 
studies. However, the weight given to the seriousness of the offense in the 
sentencing decision was diminished under the influence of the principle of 
individualization of punishment, whereby factors relating to the personal­
ity and circumstances of the offender, rather than the seriousness of the 
offense, were to determine the outcome. The sentencing "tariff" could be 
modified or rejected in favor of an individualized sentence (Thomas, 1967). 
Similarly, under the system of indeterminate sentencing, individual circum­
stances might determine the release decision of the parole board. 
The principle of individualization, which was mainly a reflection of the 
rehabilitationist philosophy, has been eroded in recent years in favor of the 
neoretributivist just-deserts philosophy, which posits that the seriousness 
of the crime and the culpability of the offender should be the exclusive 
measures for determining the severity of the sanctions (von Hirsch, 1976). 
Partly under the influence of these views, both Congress and many state 
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legislatures have enacted laws that would reduce or even eliminate the 
discretionary powers of both the courts and parole boards to individualize 
sentences (see, e.g., the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984), nota­
bly by making provision for the publication of sentencing guidelines and 
other modes of structured sentencing (Ashworth, 1992a). It is true that 
these laws often purport to take into account a variety of sentencing objec-
tives,1 including general deterrence and incapacitation, and that their enact­
ment was influenced by a number of the ideological-political forces referred 
to in the introductory chapter to this book, and in particular by the "law-
and-order" ideology. However, it seems that the just-deserts philosophy 
constituted the main intellectual force behind this revolution. Moreover, 
the principle of proportionality, which appears to reflect primarily a desert 
philosophy, has recently been adopted as the basis of sentencing policy in 
Britain and other countries (von Hirsch and Ashworth, 1992:83; see also 
U.S. Sentencing Commission, 1987:1.2). 
While the standard criminological literature and some specialist mono­
graphs (e.g., Cullen and Gilbert, 1982) deal extensively with the demise of 
the rehabilitationist philosophy and the rise of the justice or desert model, 
almost no consideration has been given to the victimological implications 
of this revolution. The development of the victim and the just-deserts 
movements have been coincident in time, and in one significant respect at 
least share a common goal, namely, the deemphasis of the personality of 
the offender as the focus of the criminal justice system. There has neverthe­
less been scant analysis of the relationship between the theoretical under­
pinnings of the two movements. More particularly, little attention has 
been paid, until recently (cf. Cavadino and Dignan, 1993), to the implica­
tions of the development of a desert model of justice for the status of the 
victim, whether in symbolic or in practical terms. 
The replacement of an individualization or rehabilitationist mode of 
justice by a deserts model will now be considered in terms of the three levels 
of analysis adopted in this study: coping needs, perceived justice needs, and 
fundamental principles of justice. Since the just-deserts model has been 
advocated on ideological rather than pragmatic or empirical grounds, it will 
be appropriate in the first place to consider this model from the point of view 
of the principles of justice involved, with special reference to the victim. 
Fundamental Principles of Justice 
It would be beyond the scope of this study to engage in a detailed critique 
of the desert model of justice in the light of various theories of retributive 
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and distributive justice. The reader is referred to the general literature on 
this topic, and in particular to the extensive writings of Andrew von 
Hirsch in defense of the theory, and, among its critics, to Cullen and 
Gilbert (1982) and Braithwaite and Pettit (1990; see also Pettit and Braith­
waite, 1993). The present analysis will focus instead on aspects of the 
theory and its implementation that lay emphasis on victim-related factors 
in determining the penalty to be imposed upon the offender. 
On a retributivist or desert view, the severity of the sanction is in princi­
ple to be determined by the seriousness of the offense and should be propor­
tional to it. What are the components of offense seriousness, and how is 
their relative magnitude to be determined? While desert theorists have yet 
to adopt an agreed answer to this last question (von Hirsch, 1985; Ash-
worth, 1992a), the proposed solutions are inevitably related to victim 
harm. Thus Sellin and Wolfgang (1978) suggested that the seriousness of 
delinquent acts could be assessed in terms of the amount of injury, theft, or 
damage inflicted upon the victim, and that the relative seriousness of 
specific types and degrees of harm could be measured empirically on the 
basis of respondent perceptions. Such measures could, it was suggested, be 
incorporated in a sanctioning scheme (Wolfgang, 1976; Nevarez-Muniz, 
1984) which would result in a retributive sentencing tariff based exclu­
sively upon the degree of harm inflicted upon the victim. 
Another view, referred to by von Hirsch (1985:65-66), holds that since 
the public may have insufficient knowledge of the harm actually inflicted 
by various types of offense, data deriving from victimization studies 
should be used. Von Hirsch himself expressed a preference for developing a 
scale of "interests" adapted from Feinberg (1984), whereby personal safety 
and livelihood interests were the most serious, various other interests 
being graded lower on the scale. More recently, von Hirsch and Jareborg 
(1991) have developed a scale based on the degree to which the offense 
constitutes an invasion of what they call the "living standard." 
While all these scales tend to focus on the injury to the victim as the 
point of departure for determining the appropriate sentence,2 the leading 
statement of the just-deserts position asserted that the seriousness of 
crime be measured by two components: harm and culpability (von 
Hirsch, 1976). The degree of culpability was to be measured by such 
characteristics as the type of mens rea and the degree of moral turpitude 
involved in the commission of the offense. The addition of this compo­
nent of seriousness would tend to dilute the victim-oriented component 
of offense seriousness;3 it would also accommodate with greater facility 
the punishment of attempts and of victimless crimes. Conversely, it 
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might result in reducing the seriousness level where the victim's conduct 
was perceived to have contributed to the commission of the offense. 
The principle of culpability may have a limiting or negating effect on the 
harms for which punishment is due. In particular, harmful results of the 
crime that were unforeseen by the offender seem in principle to be excluded 
from the ambit of the calculation of offense seriousness—certainly harms 
that were unforeseeable (cf. Sebba, 1994). The Federal Sentencing Guide­
lines (sec. IB 1.3) originally defined the injury that is to be taken into account 
in sentencing as "harm which is caused intentionally, recklessly or by crimi­
nal negligence" (U.S. Sentencing Commission, 1987:1.15), but this provi­
sion was subsequently amended so that relevant conduct now includes "all 
harm that resulted from the acts and omissions specified" (U.S. Sentencing 
Commission, 1994:16). This topic, which has been somewhat neglected in 
the just-deserts literature (but see Singer, 1979:26-27), has become of focal 
interest in the light of recent Supreme Court cases to be discussed below. 
Culpability may, perhaps more frequently, be an aggravating circum­
stance, as in cases where the offense is committed with "deliberate cruelty" 
or "callousness," illustrations of what Singer (1979) terms "unnecessary 
injury" (85, emphasis added). In some cases, such as the sentence increase 
for "vulnerable victims" (Federal Sentencing Guidelines, sec. 3A1.1), the 
rationale could arguably be based on either aggravated harm or aggravated 
culpability.4 
Other victim-related characteristics may be more difficult to classify 
under the headings of either harm or culpability in the context of desert 
sentencing, and their relevance to desert sentencing is therefore in ques­
tion. How far should the sentence be affected by the attributes or "moral 
worth" of the individual victim?5 This was one of the issues raised in the 
recent Supreme Court cases Booth v. Maryland (1987 55 LW 4836), South 
Carolinav. Gathers (1989 490 US 805 ), and Payne v. Tennessee (1991 115L 
Ed 2d 720), all of which involved the admissibility of victim-related evi­
dence at the sentencing stage of capital murder trials. (These will be consid­
ered again in the framework of the discussion of victim-impact statements.) 
In the first of these cases it was held that evidence of the personal character­
istics of the victims was inadmissible. Justice Powell was "troubled by the 
implication that defendants whose victims were assets to their commu­
nity are more deserving of punishment than those whose victims are per­
ceived to be less worthy" (4838 n. 8). The inadmissibility of such evidence 
was affirmed in Gathers, but in Payne a differently constituted court over­
ruled the earlier cases and held evidence of the victim's attributes to be 
admissible. However, Chief Justice Rehnquist denied that the purpose was 
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to differentiate the sentence according to the "worthiness" of the victim, 
but rather "to show instead each victim's 'uniqueness as a human being7 " 
(734). Not only is the potential here for differential sentencing in conflict 
with democratic values, but it also leads away from the declared objectives 
of desert-based and structured sentencing—that is, uniformity (see, e.g., 
U.S. Sentencing Commission, 1987:1.2). 
Another issue that arose in these cases was related to the admissibility 
of evidence of the emotional impact of the crime on victims and their 
families. In Booth, a majority of the Court "rejectfed] the contention that 
the presence or absence of emotional distress of the victim's family . . . are 
proper sentencing considerations in a capital case." In Payne the majority 
overruled the earlier cases on this point too, and held that evidence of the 
impact of the crime on the family was admissible. Moreover, it imposed no 
clear limitations on this principle in terms of the type of harm that would 
be relevant, its remoteness, or the culpability of the offender with regard to 
that harm. In his dissenting opinion in Booth, Justice White took the 
extreme view that an offender could be held "accountable . . . for the full 
extent of the harm he caused." Chief Justice Rehnquist, in delivering the 
majority opinion in Payne, was less specific, but Justice Souter seemed to 
favor a broad concept of accountability based upon the principle that "ev­
ery defendant knows . . . that the person to be killed probably has close 
associates, survivors, who will suffer harms and deprivations from the 
victim's death." These formulations appear to go beyond the principles 
generally adhered to by desert theorists. 
The issues raised above are concerned with the effect on the sentence of 
victim-related factors connected with the commission of the offense. 
Some of the recent legislation or guidelines specify as mitigating factors 
benefits conveyed to the victim by the offender after the commission of 
the offense (e.g., restoration of property, payment of compensation, etc.). 
To a just-deserts purist, "these factors are highly incompatible with a des­
erts concept—that the focus on sentencing must be exclusively, or virtu­
ally exclusively, upon the crime, not upon the criminal's later reaction to 
the crime" (Singer, 1979:90). A fortiori, the amelioration of the victim's 
situation by outside parties, for example, by an award under a state com­
pensation plan, would not be relevant as a mitigating circumstance. 
It will be recalled that desert-based sentencing was advocated in large 
measure to counter the disparities that prevailed under the previous sys­
tem, in which one of the main objectives was to achieve individualization 
of the sentence based on the needs of the offender. It is something of a 
paradox that, to echo a visionary paper delivered by Marvin Wolfgang 
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(1982) at the Third International Symposium of Victimology in 1979, the 
developments described above appear to be leading to the "individualiza­
tion of the victim." This must surely be the probable effect of taking 
account of the victim's personal and moral attributes, or the emotional 
impact of the offense on the victim's family, in determining offense serious­
ness. Wolfgang argued: "This victim individualization not only does not 
violate the model of just deserts, it may indeed enhance it, enrich it by 
providing greater precision in the proportionality of the severity of sanc­
tions to the gravity of victimizations" (57). Von Hirsch (1985:79), too, 
appears to tread this path when he engages in discussion as to whether the 
seriousness of a broken finger inflicted in the course of a crime would be 
affected by the fact that the victim was a concert pianist.6 Elsewhere, von 
Hirsch and Jareborg (1991:5 n. 14) suggest a differentiation between "cases 
of special harm resulting from vulnerabilities shared by significant num­
bers of persons" and "cases of special harm that are more idiosyncratic to 
particular individuals"; presumably their intention is to exclude the sec­
ond category from the sentencing equation, or to modify its significance. 
Moreover, they would presumably only take into account "culpable" 
harm, that is, harm that was foreseen, or at least foreseeable. Even so, the 
very analysis is strongly suggestive of Wolfgang's thesis. 
Desert theory purports to relate the punishment to the wrong inflicted 
by the offender upon the community. Yet the developments in "proportion­
ate" sentencing described above, which are in a large measure consistent 
with desert theory, clearly allocate a very central role, at least on the 
symbolic level, to the victim. 
Coping Needs 
Neither the traditional rehabilitation-individualization model nor the jus­
tice model of sentencing speaks directly to the issue of the victim's coping 
needs. Under the rehabilitation model, the victim would not normally 
benefit materially except in those cases in which the offender was placed 
on probation with a condition of the payment of restitution. Sentencing 
under the deserts model also does not purport to bring any benefit to the 
victim, except under the restitutionary justice version, where restitu­
tionary payment rather than imprisonment is perceived as the measure of 
desert. However, many advocates of restitution, following the pioneering 
writings of Eglash (1958) and Schafer (1976), specifically base their advo­
cacy of this approach upon rehabilitationist goals rather than desert (see 
below). 
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Recent legislation enacted to encourage the payment of restitution by 
offenders remains ambiguous in respect of its underlying philosophy. On 
the one hand, restitution is advocated as a general policy to be considered 
by the court in all cases, thereby implying that it is not a rehabilitative 
measure to be applied according to individualized considerations. On the 
other hand, such provisions are not to be enforced universally, as a desert 
philosophy might imply. At most, an obligation is imposed upon the courts 
to consider a restitution order. Moreover, such legislation has not generally 
been incorporated in desert-oriented sentencing reforms but has been en­
acted independently. Thus the deserts model as such does not appear to 
contribute directly to the resolution of the victim's coping needs. 
Perceived Justice Needs 
The replacement of the rehabilitation model by the desert or justice model 
in current academic and political thinking has taken the form of a sort of 
"moral crusade."7 It seems to have been assumed, especially by the law-
and-order lobby, that the public in general, and victims in particular, would 
ardently support the move toward determinate and proportionate sentenc­
ing. Moreover, both liberals and radicals emphasized the unfairness of 
indeterminate sentences, which gave rise to apparently arbitrary decisions 
regarding the term of imprisonment to be served by an offender under the 
rehabilitationist system. Yet firm data regarding the views and perceptions 
of the relevant parties in this respect are somewhat rudimentary,- more­
over, while they do provide some support for the prevailing ideology, this 
support is not unequivocal. 
Much of the evidence and related discussion of these topics derives from 
the scaling literature that was inspired by the seminal work of Sellin and 
Wolfgang (1978) referred to above on the "measurement of delinquency." 
Their original study, conducted with selected samples, showed that respon­
dents to a questionnaire were able to make meaningful quantitative differ­
entiations between the relative seriousness of different types and degrees 
of victimization. This approach enables a precise calculation of the weight­
ings attributed by respondents to the various physical components of the 
offense and its outcome, such as the seriousness of the injury inflicted, the 
use of intimidation, the commission of a sexual assault, the breaking into 
of premises, and the monetary value of the loss inflicted. 
This psychophysical scaling approach to offense seriousness was subse­
quently replicated on general populations, notably in a survey conducted 
in the Baltimore area (Rossi et al., 1975) and in a cross-national study 
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linked to the National Crime Survey (Klaus and Kalish, 1984; Wolfgang et 
al.; 1985). The original study emphasized only physical harm and took no 
account of the offender's culpability as determined by the mental element. 
This, too, was shown to affect perceived offense seriousness (Sebba, 1980) 
and was partially taken into account in the subsequent studies referred to. 
As noted earlier, these two elements, the harm inflicted on the victim 
and the culpability of the offender, are the components of offense serious­
ness to have gained recognition under the just-deserts philosophy. There is 
thus a general consistency between this philosophy and public perceptions 
of criminal responsibility and punishment as measured by the psycho­
physical studies, although the degree to which the two dimensions are 
integrated in the public perception may vary (Warr, 1989), and there is 
considerable evidence (Shachar, 1987) that the public includes in its seri­
ousness evaluation "fortuitous" harms, unforeseen by the perpetrator, the 
relevance of which to desert is, as noted above, problematical. The nation­
wide replication study referred to also found that victim vulnerability 
affected perceived-seriousness scores;8 as noted above, this, too, is gener­
ally accepted as a legitimate element for consideration under the just-
deserts doctrine. Further, one study (Riedel, 1975) concluded that the 
surrounding circumstances and background of the offender were not per­
ceived as relevant to respondents' estimation of offense seriousness— 
again, a finding generally seen as consistent with the just-deserts approach. 
However, both Riedel's findings and the exclusion of personal circum­
stances from desert sentencing principles have been disputed (see Parton et 
al., 1991:75; Ashworth, 1992b: 116-17). 
Further, most of these studies have noted a general consistency among 
different population groups in estimating the seriousness of offenses, thus 
providing support for the "consensus," as opposed to the "conflict," view 
of legal norms.9 Such consistency is a precondition of the adaptation of a 
just-deserts model, for the fixed tariff of punishment, the adoption of 
which is implicit in the model, would have to be acceptable to society as a 
whole. 
A unique study in this respect was conducted by Hamilton and Rytina 
(1980), who asked respondents (a quota sample of 391 residents of the 
Boston area) (a) to assess the seriousness of a number of offenses, (b) to 
assess the severity of various penalties, and (c) to select an appropriate 
punishment for particular offenses. This enabled the researchers to ascer­
tain how far the penalty selected for an offense was proportional to the 
seriousness of that offense, thereby providing a test of whether individuals 
applied standards of proportionality in selecting sanctions, as dictated by 
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just-deserts philosophy. A strong correlation was found between the two 
measures. "The general theoretical question—whether the norm of just 
deserts is used by individual respondents in organizing their cognitions 
and associated judgements—appears to have been answered with a re­
sounding, if monotonic 'yes' " (1130). Moreover, when between-individual 
correlations were examined, the data suggested "a high level of consensus 
on the norm of just deserts." However, lower-income and black respon­
dents were found to adhere less strongly to the just-deserts principle and to 
deviate from the group norms, thereby lending support to the conflict 
hypothesis. 
Some support for the main findings of the above study is found in the 
research conducted by Blumstein and Cohen (1980) referred to in chapter 5. 
A sample of residents in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, were asked to 
select the appropriate sanctions for 23 different offenses.10 Various mea­
sures of severity (selection of prison sentence, mean sentence length) were 
correlated with the results of the two best-known scales of offense serious­
ness, those of Sellin and Wolfgang (1978) and of Rossi et al. (1975). Correla­
tions varied from 0.73 to 0.97. The authors concluded that "the sentences 
of our survey respondents are largely consistent with the principle of just 
deserts as it relates sentence severity to offense seriousness" (Blumstein 
and Cohen, 1980:236). 
The implications of the psychophysical studies are mostly rather indi­
rect. With the notable exception of Hamilton and Rytina, most of the 
psychophysical research has been concerned exclusively with the determi­
nants of offense seriousness, without express application to the sanction­
ing system.11 Thus, respondents might have been considering measures of 
seriousness for a different purpose, such as the measure of harm caused to 
society;12 indeed, the scales were originally devised by Sellin and Wolfgang 
as a basis for criminal statistics rather than punishment. By the same 
token, respondents might, even if oriented toward a sanctioning system, 
take cognizance of other factors, such as the offender's background, even 
though they perceive such factors as irrelevant to offense seriousness as 
such. Moreover, some of the conclusions derived from the analysis of psy­
chophysical data may be partly a function of the formulation of the hy­
potheses selected and the methods adopted for testing them (Sebba, 
1980:126). 
There are indeed some research findings that raise doubts about the 
degree to which the public favors the deserts model, at least in its pure 
form. One of the psychophysical replications found that respondents attrib­
uted seriousness weighting to harm inflicted even if such harm were unin­
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tended and unforeseen by the perpetrator of the injurious act (Sebba, 1980). 
This, of course, is in conflict with the "culpability" element in the desert 
paradigm. Further, a review of the findings of the psychological literature 
(Miller and Vidmar, 1981) noted the importance of the motivation attrib­
uted to the perpetrator, as well as his or her conduct before and after the 
offense, factors that are considered irrelevant to desert sentencing. There 
seems to be a discrepancy here between moral culpability, to which these 
factors would be relevant, and legal culpability, to which they are not. The 
appropriate response or remedy for perceived injustices as posited by eq­
uity theory may correspond rather to moral criteria of culpability than to 
the legal criteria specified by the desert model. In principle, the need to 
restore equity, with its implication of balance and equivalence—whether 
this restoration is achieved by a compensatory or a retaliatory process— 
has much in common with the concept of just deserts.13 However, the 
solutions to various dilemmas raised in these two areas of literature (cf. 
Utne and Hatfield, 1978) may differ—equity solutions being determined 
empirically, just-deserts solutions inductively. Thus, equity theorists have 
noted, on the basis of survey and observational data, that where the 
harmdoer has also suffered, this suffering reduces the inequity and would 
thus result in a mitigation of the punishment (Austin et al., 1976:189).14 
This is in conflict with pure just-deserts theory (Singer, 1979). 
A corollary of hanndoer's suffering is the reduction of the victim's suffer­
ings. It was noted earlier that post factum restitution by the offender is not 
regarded as a mitigating factor by pure desert theory. Under equity theory 
such payment would constitute a contribution to the restoration of equity. 
A reduction in victim suffering brought about by an outside body, such as a 
state welfare service, would a fortiori not be considered a mitigating factor 
under desert principles. Indeed, even equity theory seems equivocal on this 
point. Yet a small study conducted by Cohn (1974) showed that the provi­
sion of such a service to the victim had the effect of mitigating the need to 
punish the offender in the perception of the respondents. 
A more serious challenge to the view that the public unequivocally 
adopts a deserts view of sanctioning is found in surveys in which respon­
dents were asked to identify with alternative sentencing philosophies. In a 
survey of 1,248 members of the general public, Forst and Wellford 
(1981:806) found that while just deserts ("to punish the offender in direct 
proportion to the seriousness of his crime") was seen to be "extremely 
important" or "very important" by the majority of the respondents, an 
almost identical proportion (72%) placed rehabilitation ("to reform the 
offender through treatment and correction measures to convert him into a 
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useful and productive citizen") in the same categories. In another survey in 
which 1,121 responses were elicited from Washington State residents 
(Riley and Rose, 1980), 97.8% thought rehabilitation should be the goal of 
the correction system, and 73.4% took the view that this goal had a high, or 
the highest, priority. This compared with the corresponding figures of 
91.4% and 45% for the goal of punishment (350). However, while punitive­
ness here referred to a fixed sentencing system and rehabilitation indicated 
indeterminate sentencing, the former appears to have had negative connota­
tions (e.g., "the use of traditional prisons") not emphasized by most just-
deserts advocates and was associated by the researchers with conservatism. 
Moreover, in a third survey reported by Cullen and Gilbert (1982:259)— 
themselves severe critics of the deserts approach and advocates of 
rehabilitation—a larger proportion of the public appears to have supported 
deserts rather than rehabilitation as a sentencing philosophy. More re­
cently, however, Cullen et al. (1988) reported findings indicating continued 
support for rehabilitation, while support for punishment reflected its utili­
tarian rather than its desert aspects. 
Thus it may be premature to conclude unequivocally that the public 
favor a desert model of justice. While the principle of proportionality 
seems generally acceptable, the available findings "do not tell us about the 
relative strengths of just deserts as a norm or about people's willingness to 
use alternative principles of justice" (Hamilton and Rytina, 1980:1141 ).15 
Further, the support expressed in many of the studies for both punishment-
desert and rehabilitation raises questions as to how these terms are inter­
preted by the public (cf. Penley, n.d.; and see above, chap. 5). 
The preceding discussion relates to the degree to which public attitudes 
appear to favor a desert model of justice. As to victims, there seems to be no 
specific evidence in the literature; we do not know, for example, how far 
victims would regard unforeseen or "subjective" harm as justifying punish­
ment. It has been noted in chapter 5, however, that victims do not seem to be 
more punitive than other citizens and frequently cite other priorities rather 
than punishment. The extent of the victim's preference for restitution and 
other "victim-oriented" measures will be considered subsequently. 
A number of studies have been conducted with criminal justice person-
nel,16 who, it appears, lay considerable emphasis on rehabilitation. Forst 
and Wellford (1981) found that, unlike the general public, all categories of 
criminal justice personnel included in their study—judges, prosecutors, 
defense counsel, and probation officers—were more likely to attribute im­
portance to rehabilitation than to just deserts (see also Berk and Rossi, 
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1977). This may, as noted, reflect an institutional interest on the part of the 
respondents who participated in the study. 
Last, but by no means least, it is essential to ascertain the views of 
defendants in this matter. While it has often been assumed that offenders 
are profoundly distressed by the apparent inequities and arbitrariness re­
flected by discretionary and indeterminate prison sentences, there has been 
little systematic study of offender perceptions, and such evidence as is avail­
able does not seem to support this assumption. Thus, in the study conducted 
by Forst and Wellford (1981), only 37% of the 550 federal prisoners inter­
viewed regarded just deserts as a "very important" or "extremely impor­
tant" goal of sentencing, as compared with 65% who favored rehabilitation. 
In another study conducted by Shelly and Sparks (1980) employing psycho­
physical techniques, in which mean scores for offense seriousness were 
plotted against the penalties allocated for these offenses, the results did not 
reflect support for proportionality. Moreover, some respondents advocated 
greater individualization in sentencing as well as greater consistency. 
The literature reviewed above suggests that the public may share some 
general perceptions of offense seriousness and culpability upon which a 
proportional sentencing system as envisaged by the just-deserts model 
may be based. However, a number of special populations may be less in­
clined to accept this model, including ethnic minorities (Hamilton and 
Rytina, 1980), criminal justice personnel (Forst and Wellford, 1981), and 
prisoners (Shelly and Sparks, 1980; Forst and Wellford, 1981). Further, gen­
eral attitudes at the macro level may be replaced by a different approach 
when specific applications are called for (Cohn, 1974). Finally, as regards 
the attitudes of victims on this question, little is known. 
Conclusion 
In view of the close connection between the development of the just-
deserts and the victim movements, in terms of both temporal proximity 
and, to some extent, common politico-ideological antecedents, it is surpris­
ing how little attention has been paid to examining the merits and demer­
its of the desert model in relation to the victims of crime. It emerges from 
the preceding survey that the fundamental concepts of justice underlying 
the desert model are to a degree victim oriented, in that they tend to lay 
emphasis on victim harm; but inasmuch as the element of culpability 
plays a prominent role, this may reduce the victim orientation, since it 
removes the emphasis from the suffering of the victim to the moral 
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turpitude of the offender. Moreover, the coping needs of the victim are 
largely ignored under this model, except by the small school of advocates 
of the restitutionary theory. 
It also emerges that while the desert model may be consistent with the 
sense of justice felt by the public in general and victims in particular, this 
topic has hardly been explored. Since both the just-deserts and the victim 
movements seem to have developed to a considerable extent as the result 
of what was thought to be dissatisfaction by the public and by victims with 
the former system, it is surprising that there has been little attempt to 
determine the extent to which this supposed dissatisfaction has been re­
duced by the new sentencing models. 
Restitution 
The history of restitution in the criminal courts is in effect the history of 
the role of the victim. The larger role played by the victim in early justice 
systems reflected the main function of such systems—to arrange for the 
resolution of the conflict between the two adversaries. Similarly, the de­
cline of the role of the victim referred to in the opening chapters of this 
book reflects the decline in the use of restitution as the main disposition in 
the criminal trial, insofar as trials could be labeled "criminal" under early 
systems, the criminal-civil dichotomy being then less developed (Schafer, 
1968). The function of the criminal trial became more punitive. Monetary 
remedies for the victim became the objective of civil legal processes, to be 
used only rarely in criminal cases.17 Similarly, views expressed by such 
pioneers as Tallack and Garofalo to the effect that the criminal justice 
system should pay greater attention to the victim's needs usually included 
a proposal to require offenders to make restitution to the victim (Schafer, 
1968:23-24; Garofalo, 1975; and see Smith, 1975), at least until the rela­
tively recent development of the concept of state compensation.18 
At the same time, it is clear that the advocacy of restitution has had a 
broader base than this concern for the welfare of the victim, and that its 
popularity in the literature cannot be attributed exclusively to this move­
ment. Part of the attractiveness of the idea of offender restitution derives 
from its multifaceted appeal, or, less charitably, its "chameleon" quality 
(Shapiro, 1990). As pointed out by Hudson and Galaway (1978), restitution 
may be supported as being consistent with most of the generally accepted 
objectives of criminal justice. Indeed, restitution programs have mostly 
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laid greater emphasis upon the benefits to be derived by the offender than 
those to be bestowed upon the victim (Hudson et al., 1980). Theoretical 
writers, too, have often emphasized this aspect (Eglash, 1958). 
Restitution may therefore be regarded in part as an offshoot of the reha­
bilitation movement; indeed, it was advocated by some of the pioneers of 
the positivist school of criminology (Weitekamp, 1991), in which this 
movement has its roots. It may also have derived support from labeling 
theory, for restitution may advance the labeling objective of a minimal 
form of intervention with the offender, thus, in the labeling view, causing a 
minimum of harm (see, e.g., Schur, 1973). Rehabilitation and labeling were 
popular approaches in the 1960s and 1970s; and restitution, as well as 
diversion and community service, may be regarded as a product of these 
philosophies, subsequently interacting with the victim movement. Addi­
tionally, as noted in chapter 6, there are conceptual links between restitu­
tion and retribution or desert, while some writers have found support for 
restitution in other aims of criminal justice, including deterrence (Tittle, 
1978).19 
Restitution programs were common even before the contemporary vic­
tim movement took root. The Minnesota Restitution Center, one of the 
most active institutions in this area, was founded in 1972. Restitution 
programming "mushroomed in the VOs" (Hudson et al., 1980:16), and 
most states passed or amended legislation during this period to facilitate or 
encourage its use (ABA, 1981; Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1984). By the 
mid-1980s there were several hundred restitution programs (Smith et al., 
1989). These developments were accompanied by a massive literature on 
this topic,-20 by 1980, Hudson et al. (1980) identified 336 related publica­
tions, most having appeared in the preceding decade. 
Restitution has received further impetus in recent years from federal 
governmental and legislative activity. The Victim and Witness Protection 
Act of 1982 amended title 18 of the U.S. Code to grant federal courts a 
general power to order restitution, rather than solely as a condition of 
probation (Slavin and Sorin, 1984:508). Moreover, a court refraining from 
making such an order, or even ordering only partial restitution, was obliged 
under this legislation "to state on the record the reasons therefor" (sec. 
3579(a)(2); now sec. 3663). The expansion of court-ordered restitution was 
recommended by the President's Task Force on Victims of Crime (1982) 
and by the American Bar Association's Guidelines for the Fair Treatment 
of Crime Victims and Witnesses in 1983. By 1988, restitution laws had 
been adopted by all 50 states (NOVA, 1989), and in some cases entrenched 
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in their constitutions (Hillenbrand, 1990:194), while model restitution pro­
visions have been incorporated in the Uniform Victims of Crime Act, 
1992. Provision for restitution is also laid down in the UN Declaration of 
Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power. Fi­
nally, a right to restitution is listed among the victim's rights recognized 
by Congress under the Victims' Rights and Restitution Act of 1990 (sec. 
502), while another section (sec. 506) advocates that states adopt the same 
goal in their victims of crime bills of rights. 
It would seem from this review that the principle of restitution has 
today won universal acceptance, its earlier support on the part of certain 
offender rehabilitationists now being supplemented by a broad front of 
victim advocates. However, in spite of—or perhaps because of—the fact 
that restitution to the victim has been advocated from so many quarters,21 
and despite the explosion of programs and literary activity in this area, a 
large number of major issues, both conceptual and empirical, remain 
unclarified. 
The uncertainties regarding restitution derive partly from confusion in 
the terminology and in defining the subject matter, in at least three areas. 
First, some of the literature deals simultaneously with restitution on the 
part of the offender and compensation schemes administered by the state 
(see, e.g., Newton, 1976). Moreover, this differentiated terminology is not 
universally accepted; in England the term compensation may refer to resti­
tution by the offender (see, e.g., Vennard, 1978; Harland, 1980). 
Second, while the term restitution generally refers only to monetary 
payments by the offender to the victim, it is sometimes taken to include 
other forms of reparation, such as service to the victim and, more com­
monly, service to the community (Hudson et al., 1980.) Third, a restitution 
order may take the simple form of a sanction imposed by the court at the 
sentencing stage in lieu of or in addition to any other sanction (see, e.g., the 
Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982), or it may be part of an elabo­
rate program or "project" involving special personnel, negotiations be­
tween the parties, a formal contractual agreement, and the supervision of 
its implementation. Such programs may be adopted at various stages of the 
criminal process. As indicated below, in these programs the emphasis 
tends to be placed on the rehabilitation of the offender, whereas a simple 
restitution order seems to be oriented primarily to meeting the victim's 
needs, whether material (coping) or justice needs. 
It is doubtless partly owing to these areas of confusion that much of the 
research in this area is methodologically faulted, and that such an expan­
sive literature has produced so few firm data about the effects and implica­
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tions of restitution. This literature will nevertheless be analyzed here for 
the light it can cast on the issues being examined in this study. 
Coping Needs 
Determining the ability of restitution programs to achieve their objectives 
is highly problematical. Hudson et al. (1980:168), in their National Assess­
ment of Adult Restitution Programs, noted that restitution programs were 
assumed to bring various benefits to victims (financial redress, involve­
ment in the process, satisfaction), to offenders (rehabilitation, reduced in­
trusiveness into their lifestyle), and to the criminal justice system or the 
public (reduction of costs, increased credibility of the system). They were 
attributed a large number of outputs or outcomes; the authors listed no 
less than 68 (52), employing at least nine measures of benefit (175). These 
objectives inevitably conflict. Moreover, "rationales linking restitution ac­
tivities to victim, offender or system benefits . . . tend to be implicit, and 
poorly developed" (173). 
The lack of clear formulation of goals (see also Weitekamp, 1991) is 
only one of the obstacles in the evaluation of the achievements of the use 
of restitution. Another is the great variety of situations in which restitu­
tion is used: as a form of pretrial diversion, as a condition of probation, as 
an independent sentencing sanction, as a sentencing sanction in combina­
tion with other sanctions, and as a condition of parole. McGillis, on the 
basis of a national survey, differentiated between four main program mod­
els: (1) those organized by prosecutors as part of victim/witness programs, 
(2) restitution within victim-offender reconciliation programs,22 (3) resti-
tution-employment programs, and (4) routine probation supervision (Kar­
men, 1990:284). Similarly, a juridical analysis conducted in Germany 
(Mueller-Dietz, 1991:201-4) differentiated procedural, enforcement, and 
substantive orientations to restitution. These variations complicate the 
evaluation of the effects of various program components and the gen­
eralizability of any conclusions. The problem is further compounded by 
the need to differentiate between adult and juvenile restitution programs, 
between financial and "service" restitution, and between restitution to 
the victim and restitution to the community. 
What is even more critical, while a number of reports on restitution 
programs purport to be evaluative, the employment of rigorous evalua­
tion methodology has been almost nonexistent. Of 31 evaluations of resti­
tution "projects" or "programs"23 reviewed by Hudson and his colleagues 
(1990), only four employed experimental design, while the large majority 
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used no controls of any kind (53; see also Hudson and Galaway, 1980). 
Even in 1989 the same writers took the view that "shortcomings in the 
evaluations done, along with the weak research designs used, means that 
we have learned only a modest amount about restitution programs, in 
spite of millions of dollars having been spent" (Hudson and Galaway, 
1989:5). Smith et al. (1989), in reporting in the same year on their study of 
restitution enforcement, also noted "the paucity of empirical research on 
these issues" (see also Harland and Rosen, 1990). Moreover, while a num­
ber of publications have purported to evaluate restitution programs, no 
American studies seem to be available of the routine use by courts of the 
power to order restitution, or of the implementation and efficacy of such 
orders in these cases, although some British findings will be referred to 
below. 
The main question under the present heading in the context of this study 
is how much the victim stands to gain materially from restitution orders— 
if used systematically and implemented effectively. Harland (1981) ana­
lyzed the potential for restitution on the basis of the National Crime Survey 
data for 1974 and concluded that "relatively few victimizations are so 
costly, even in terms of gross loss, as to negate the possibility of a restitutive 
disposition." 
Ongoing data from the same source would seem to confirm this conclu­
sion. In 1990, 50.2% of personal crimes, of which there were 14 million, 
involved losses of under $100, 68.6% under $250; since 9.5% involved no 
or unknown losses, only 21.9% involved losses known to be $250 or more, 
of which nearly half were under $500. For household crimes, of which 
there were over 14 million in 1990, values were somewhat higher: 37.9% 
of the losses were under $100, 32.5% were of $250 or more; moreover 36% 
of completed burglaries had a value of $500 or more, as did, not surpris­
ingly, 90.3% of completed car thefts. Naturally, the figures now are higher 
than in 1974, but the general pattern has remained constant {National 
Crime Victimization Survey Report, 1992:94-95). 
Even assuming this conclusion to be correct,24 there remain a number of 
obstacles to the feasibility of restitution by the offender. These obstacles 
possess varying degrees of surmountability. The most insurmountable re­
lates to the fact that only a minority of offenders are apprehended and 
brought to justice—the well-known "funneling" or "shrinkage" effect (see 
Karmen, 1990:288)—whereby there is a fallout of cases at various points in 
the criminal process. Even if restitution were to be introduced at an early 
stage of the proceedings, this would be of no avail in the majority of 
property victimizations in which the offender is never apprehended. Of­
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fenders processed through "alternative systems/' such as mental health, 
would also be exempted (Harland, 1982). 
Further, even among apprehended offenders, not all would be able to 
afford restitution. The figures presented by Harland (1981) included some 
victimizations where the losses were relatively large, and this problem 
would be considerably aggravated if offenses against the person were in­
cluded. Moreover, while little is known about the distribution of income 
among offenders generally, Harland attempted to explore this issue by 
reference to the findings of a survey of the income of jail inmates during 
the 12 months prior to their incarceration (in 1972), where it was found 
that "more than half had incomes of less than $3,000" (19); in 1978 the 
median income was $3,714 (Slavin and Sorin, 1984:569). Even assuming 
that offenders' incomes have substantially increased since then, they 
might find restitution payments problematical. This problem could of 
course be resolved in the case of offenders sentenced to imprisonment by 
ensuring that they earn a minimum wage and that a proportion of this be 
earmarked for the victim. Indeed, Kathleen Smith (1975) proposed that the 
very duration of the prison term be determined by the payment of restitu­
tion to the victim. Currently, however, "restitution and a term of imprison­
ment are irreconcilable because prison wages are very low" (Slavin and 
Sorin, 1984:570). The alternative possibility of some form of service to the 
victim might be even more problematic. Restitution has been said to be 
particularly appropriate for white-collar crime, especially where commit­
ted by corporations, whose ability to pay is evident (Goldstein, 1982); but 
its selective usage, while other offenders received more punitive sentences, 
would be perceived as discriminatory. 
Problems also arise in respect to the method adopted for determining 
the amount of loss. Since restitution assessments are not the main concern 
of criminal—as opposed to civil—proceedings, the method of estimating 
the loss may be somewhat haphazard.25 Victims often claim that the 
amount of restitution awarded does not cover their actual losses, let alone 
compensate for pain and suffering (Hudson and Chesney, 1978:135; Bonta 
et al., 1983; Vennard, 1976; Smith et al., 1989:113), although discrepancies 
tend to emerge between the assessments made by victims, offenders, and 
courts (Hudson and Chesney, 1978). This problem will have been aggra­
vated by the 1990 Supreme Court case of Hughey v. U.S. (109 L Ed 2d 408), 
to be considered below, which held that an award of restitution must be 
limited to the loss caused by the specific conduct that was the basis of the 
crime for which the offender was convicted. 
The reluctance of criminal justice personnel, such as prosecutors and 
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judges, to concern themselves with the assessment of restitution (see be­
low) is also a limiting factor. This has probably been the main reason for 
the restricted use of restitution orders in the past, and their confinement to 
property cases involving liquidated damages. Indeed, the difficulties in­
volved in grafting a civil or quasi-civil remedy onto current procedures in 
the criminal courts (cf. Klein, 1978), are seen as one of the main obstacles 
to the integration of the restitutive remedy into the contemporary system. 
Such problems led, according to Molumby (1984), to the "demise of restitu­
tion" in the state of Iowa, one of the pioneering states in the recent history 
of restitution legislation (Hudson et al., 1980:15). 
This unwillingness on the part of criminal courts to become involved 
with financial assessments of harm should have been overcome by two 
types of measure introduced as part of the reforming legislation: first, by the 
introduction of victim-impact statements—introduced at the federal level 
together with the restitution legislation, under the Victim and Witness 
Protection Act of 1982—which were designed to ensure that the court 
would have the relevant information regarding the extent of the harm in­
flicted upon the victim; and second, by the mandatory or quasi-mandatory 
formulation of the restitution provisions themselves. 
However, provisions such as the federal ones, although mandatory in 
spirit, leave room for maneuver (Roy, 1990). The revised section 3579 (d) to 
title 18 of the U.S. Code specifies that "the court shall impose an order of 
restitution to the extent that such order is as fair as possible to the victim 
and the imposition of such order will not unduly complicate or prolong the 
sentencing process" (emphasis added). Qualifications of this nature may 
appeal to the traditional judicial reluctance to enter into restitution calcula­
tions. Similarly, on the equivalent quasi-mandatory provision adopted in 
England in 1988, whereby magistrates must give reasons for not making an 
award, Marshall (1990) comments that "it may have little effect because 
most magistrates have quite plausible reasons for not doing so (not enough 
information, poor defendant, victim implicated in precipitating crime, size 
of loss disputed, etc.)" (86). Nevertheless, some increase in the use of com­
pensation orders has been observed since the new legislation came into 
force (Moxon et al., 1992; Ashworth, 1992b:251). 
Information relating to the success of the reforms in this respect in the 
United States is only partial (see Harland and Rosen, 1990). A survey of 
judges conducted by Smith and Hillenbrand (1989) found that "all respon­
dents said they usually order the defendants to make restitution to the 
victim when the crime results in financial losses which the defendant is in 
the position to pay" (66). There are two qualifications here: "usually," and 
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the evaluation of the defendant's means. Moreover, the respondents repre­
sented those 36 states in which victims' legislation was perceived to be 
more developed (6). Karmen (1990), on the other hand, concluded that, in 
spite of the wave of legislation, "the implementation of restitution re­
mained the exception rather than the rule in most jurisdictions" (282). 
Figures for the U.S. Sentencing Commission guideline cases—to which the 
above-cited provisions apply—show that in 1992 restitution was ordered 
in only 17.1% of the cases (Maguire et al., 1993:525); and while in the 
Brooklyn criminal court the use of restitution orders increased tenfold in 
the 1980s (Davis et al., 1992:748), Weitekamp (1991:429) has produced 
some evidence indicating that the use of restitution may have been more 
extensive, at least in certain jurisdictions, before the rise of the victim 
movement and its accompanying legislative reforms. 
A related problem is that of enforcement of the orders. Some researchers 
have found that restitution orders are not always implemented. Hudson 
and Galaway (1980:191) reported two studies, one conducted in Minnesota 
and one in England, which found that "one fourth of those ordered to pay 
restitution failed to satisfy the order"; moreover "the larger the amount 
ordered, the less frequently it was completed." Another study by Brown 
(1983), based upon a sample of 448 offenders ordered to pay restitution, 
found that only 44% had made all the payments due according to the 
schedule determined in the restitution order, while 18% had made no 
payment whatsoever (Brown, 1983:148-49). A more recent study by the 
American Bar Association (Smith et al., 1989) is not much more encourag­
ing. At the four sites selected for in-depth study, the rates of "full pay­
ment" varied from 61% in New York City, where the program operated 
under the auspices of the Victim Services Agency, to 25% in Montgomery, 
Alabama. Conversely, the rates for "paid none" varied from 22% (Salt Lake 
City) to 62% (Montgomery), while the average amount collected varied 
from 67% to 10% (86). 
The above study included an in-depth analysis of the factors associated 
with successful compliance, such as the avoidance of excessively high 
awards, community ties on the part of the offender, and continuing efforts 
on the part of the program administrators to secure compliance (Smith et 
al., 1989: chap. 5). Some practical implications may be drawn, as also from 
the study by Lurigio and Davis (1990) indicating the positive results follow­
ing the use of "threatening" letters sent to liable defendants, clarifying 
their obligations. It does not appear, however, that any simple remedy has 
emerged from these studies which could radically improve the situation. 
One of the traditional weaknesses of the compensation order was that 
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enforcement was generally left to the victim, who was not always even 
aware that the order had been made (Hudson and Chesney, 1978:137); 
moreover, probation officers, when charged with this task, did not place a 
high priority on enforcement of restitution orders (Shapiro, 1990). The 
Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 did not entirely overcome this 
problem. For while it provided that the order could be enforced either by 
the state or by the victim, the mode of enforcement was to be "in the same 
manner as a judgement in civil action" (sec. 3579(h), now 3663 of the U.S. 
Code). A similar policy was adopted in the Uniform Victims of Crime Act, 
1992 (sec. 403), and by NOVA (1989:13). It was partly for this reason that 
Slavin and Sorin (1984:573), following an exhaustive analysis of the provi­
sions of the act, concluded that restitution "may be an illusion." This 
pessimistic conclusion seems to be confirmed on the state level by the 
research of Smith et al. (1989), who concluded that "the victim gets short 
shrift in the restitution process" (113). 
Consideration should be given to granting "equal status" to compensa­
tion orders for the benefit of victims and the state's equivalent sanction, 
the fine. In Britain compensation orders are enforced in a similar way to 
fines (Newburn, 1988: chap. 7), and compliance rates appear to be higher. 
In Israel, not only are compensation orders enforceable as fines, but any 
sum collected is regarded in the first instance as compensation.26 For cases 
in which restitution orders are combined with terms of imprisonment, the 
garnishment of prisoner earnings has been considered both in the United 
States27 and elsewhere (Joutsen, 1987:237). Finally, in Britain the possibil­
ity has been raised that restitution that the offender has been ordered to 
pay should, in the first instance, be available from public funds (Newburn, 
1988:47; Moxon et al., 1992:31). 
In principle, the use of restitution as a sanction is thought to bring some 
objective gains not only to the victim but also to the offender. It will be 
recalled that restitution programs were developed with an emphasis on the 
offender, and it is to the offender that most of the variables used in evaluat­
ing these programs relate: "Offender measures far outnumber measures 
used for victims" (Hudson et al., 1980:49; see also 50-51). Since those 
words were written, restitution provisions have been expanded, generally 
as part of explicitly victim -oriented legislation; yet even recently Smith et 
al. (1989) observed: "Restitution has been motivated by offender-oriented 
concerns for rehabilitation or punishment, and that seems to remain the 
case today" (113). This particular "offender-gain," namely, rehabilitation, 
can perhaps be regarded above all as a societal gain, and will be considered 
below. 
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However, insofar as restitution is designed to replace other sanctions— 
and in particular, imprisonment—this may be regarded unequivocally as a 
gain for the offender, in that it will be less punitive and will involve a lesser 
degree of intervention with his or her freedom. The evidence available so 
far, however, suggests that restitution is not widely used as a replacement 
for imprisonment, but rather for minor offenders for whom a custodial 
sentence would not in any case be anticipated: 
One of the most consistently reported findings in the body of evaluation 
work is that restitution projects and programs established for the purpose 
of diverting offenders from custodial confinement generally do not fulfil 
this mission. The study done on Tasmania by Barnes; the most recent 
evaluation of the British Community Service Program; the Georgia Resti­
tution Shelter Study; and studies done on the project in Alberta, British 
Columbia, all present information showing that only a relatively small 
proportion of persons admitted would have been incarcerated in the ab­
sence of the program. This apparent inability of diversion projects to 
substantially divert from more severe penalties and to actually increase 
the degree of social control exercised over offenders raises disturbing 
questions. What about the case of an offender who, in the absence of the 
program, would not have been imprisoned, fails to complete the restitu­
tion order, and is subsequently imprisoned? Instead of helping to reduce 
rates of imprisonment as intended, the project is likely to increase the 
number under custodial confinement. (Hudson and Galaway, 1980:190) 
We have here an illustration of the well-documented phenomenon of "net­
widening" (see, e.g., Austin and Krisberg, 1981). Weitekamp (1991), who 
confirms this pattern, suggests, on the basis of the experience of a Philadel­
phia court, that restitution could in fact be used, with favorable results, for 
hard-core offenders. However, in view of the prevailing views of criminal 
justice personnel to be considered below, it seems that only a radical revi­
sion of the system, such as the abolition of imprisonment as a sanction for 
many crimes of at least middle-range seriousness, could ensure that the 
desired effect would be achieved. 
Another problem for the offender is the possibility of discrimination 
against the poor defendant. Reference is made in the literature to the possi­
ble "servitude" of the poor offender enslaved for life in order to pay off his 
debt. Indeed, it has been suggested (Klein, 1978) that it was just such 
inhumanity that accompanied the early restitutionary phase of legal his­
tory and that led to the evolution of the modern retributive system. The 
issue is not so clear-cut, however. If, for example, offenders were all obliged 
to pay restitution out of prison earnings, there would be no discrimination 
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in favor of the wealthy. This, however, would only be applicable where a 
prison sentence was justified in the first place. 
Finally, consideration must be given to the objective gains and losses to 
society as a whole which would accompany the more extensive adoption 
of restitution. Theoretically, there would be a large financial saving. The 
costs of administering a restitution program are considerably less than 
those of running a prison; it has been argued that even a residential resti­
tution program is cheaper than incarceration (Lawrence, 1990). Further, 
restitution by the offender theoretically obviates the state's need to com­
pensate the victim. 
However, these benefits are, for the present at least, more apparent than 
real. As noted, there is no evidence that the use of restitution has resulted 
in a reduction in incarceration rates; and while some progress may have 
been made regarding its function in compensating the victim, it is by no 
means clear that this burden would otherwise have been borne by the 
state. It should be noted in this context that while restitution orders tend 
to be used more for property offenses (Newburn, 1988:18)—although there 
is considerable variation by location (Smith et al., 1989:78)—state compen­
sation, to be considered in chapter 9, is generally reserved for offenses of 
violence; thus public funds, as distinct from insurance, are not generally 
saved by the use of restitution orders as currently practiced. 
The other potential form of societal benefit might be a reduction in 
recidivism, if restitution orders were either to have an absolutely rehabilita­
tive effect, or to be more beneficial—or less harmful—in this respect than 
the sanction they replaced.28 Since the publication of the research review 
conducted by Martinson et al. (1975), criminologists do not generally an­
ticipate that any one type of intervention will achieve uniformly better 
results in terms of recidivism than other types. A particular form of inter­
vention may be beneficial for some offenders and detrimental to others 
(VanVoorhis, 1983). 
Data regarding the effectiveness of restitution in this respect are lim­
ited. As noted above, the overwhelming majority of "evaluations" of such 
programs have lacked the necessary design and controls for any conclu­
sions to be drawn. Moreover, such evidence as is available is somewhat 
inconclusive. In a quasi-experimental study in a western metropolitan area 
in the United States in which probationers who were obligated to pay 
restitution were compared with a second group who were not so obligated, 
it was concluded that no rehabilitative consequence could be observed 
(Miller, 1981). An evaluation conducted at the Minnesota Restitution Cen­
ter found that more controls than experimentals were returned to prison 
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for new offenses, but more experimentals than controls were returned for 
parole violations. The explanation of closer parole supervision of the ex­
perimentals was offered for this phenomenon. The overall outcome was 
that more experimentals than controls were returned to prison (Hudson 
and Chesney, 1978:139-41). More recently, Lawrence (1990:215) reported a 
similar finding with regard to a residential restitution program in Texas. 
Failure rates were higher than for parolees, again attributed to more inten­
sive supervision of the former. Weitekamp (1991:436, 443), too, found that 
failure rates in his Philadelphia sample were high owing to the difficulties 
in meeting restitution requirements but that recidivism rates were lower 
than for prisoners,- however, the samples do not appear to have been 
matched (433). As noted, however, inconclusive findings may conceal an 
interaction between type of offender and type of intervention: Van Voorhis 
(1985) has indicated that the ability to comply with a restitution order 
depends primarily upon the offender's ability to assume responsibility and 
thus upon his or her moral development. This implies that the use of 
restitution orders for offenders selected according to the appropriate crite­
ria would be more successful. However, this would involve the need to 
employ diagnostic techniques in sentencing and would raise issues of 
equality of justice. 
More systematically positive findings have been recorded for juvenile 
restitution programs. Both Schneider (1986) and Rowley (1990) found that 
juvenile restitution diversion programs were generally more successful 
than control groups adjudicated by traditional processes. Ervin and 
Schneider (1990) explored various hypotheses that might explain the rela­
tive success of a number of restitution programs as compared with control 
dispositions; their tentative conclusion was that the success of restitution 
was attributable to the opportunity it provided to participants to be re­
warded by successful completion of the program. The apparent success of 
certain juvenile restitution programs can hardly be generalized with re­
gard to the indiscriminate use of restitution as a sanction for adults, in 
particular in view of the rather limited findings of the adult-related evalua­
tions. At the same time, insofar as the use of restitution may be desirable 
on the basis of other criteria, equivalence of outcome in this respect may 
be a consideration in its favor. 
Perceived Justice Needs 
Equity theory would seem to suggest that if the offender is ordered to pay 
full restitution to the victim, this should be perceived by the observers of 
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the inequity—including the parties themselves—as the most favored 
mechanism for the restoration of equity. Is information available on the 
attitudes of the parties to restitution proceedings, so that the validity of 
the equity hypothesis in this respect can be tested? 
Victim Attitudes. In the course of their National Assessment of Adult 
Restitution Programs, Hudson and his colleagues conducted an attitude 
survey among samples involved in 19 of the projects in the National Assess­
ment. The results were reported by Hudson et al. (1980, chap. 9) and 
Novack et al. (1980). Questionnaires were mailed to offenders and victims, 
of whom 194 offenders and 152 victims responded, representing response 
rates of 30%-34% for offenders and 43%-46% for victims.29 Conclusions 
based on the overall results of this study must be treated with caution, not 
only because of the modest response rate, but also because a number of 
projects were involved, having varied characteristics, and decisions regard­
ing restitution were taken at different stages. Further, some projects in­
volved community service rather than monetary restitution, while others 
involved both in combination—although some of the detailed presenta­
tions of findings differentiated between these types of programs. 
In cases where monetary restitution was awarded, only 44% of the 
victims expressed satisfaction with the "overall treatment of the of­
fender," while 56% were dissatisfied (Hudson et al., 1980:184). However, 
where restitution was combined with community service, 84% of victims 
were satisfied. The location of the decision in the criminal process seems 
also to have been a critical factor here.30 Where the decision was part of a 
pretrial diversion scheme, 82% of the victims expressed satisfaction, as 
compared with only 43% where the restitution order was made as a condi­
tion of probation or at the incarceration stage—generally linked to a parole 
release (185). This may be partly explained by the contacts between vic­
tims and program staff which took place in the diversion programs (184). 
Other possible explanations might be an increase in expectations as the 
case proceeded through the system, or more effective implementation of 
the payments in the diversion programs.31 
Similarly, while 60% of the victims (overall) thought that the offender's 
monetary restitution requirements were fair, this increased to 79% where 
restitution was determined at the pretrial phase, as opposed to 47% and 56% 
at the probation and incarceration phases, respectively (185). In almost all 
the other cases the victim thought that the requirements were too lenient. 
Somewhat more favorable among the earlier surveys was that con­
ducted by Davis et al. (1980), who reported that 67% of a New York sample, 
based on two courts, considered the amount to be fair,- also favorable was 
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that conducted by Kigin and Novack (1980), who reported that 78% of the 
victims in a Minnesota juvenile restitution program said the type of restitu­
tion was fair, 74% said that the amount was fair, and 76% were satisfied 
with the restitution outcome. 
However, the more recent and comprehensive study conducted by Smith 
et al. (1989) indicates the persistence of problems affecting victim satisfac­
tion. In particular, there appears to be a gap between the perceptions of the 
program administrators in this respect and the victims themselves. For 
while 73% of the program directors interviewed [N = 75) believed that 
victims were either "very satisfied" or "somewhat satisfied" (35), among 
the (approx. 200) victims interviewed at the four selected sites (see above), 
only 56% were satisfied with the amount awarded and 33% with the 
amount received, while 78% "believed that the restitution program or the 
court could have done more to collect their restitution" (105-7). 
The researchers developed a satisfaction scale based on three measures of 
satisfaction—with the size of the award, the speed of payment, and the 
amount of money received. Using a regression model, which explained 
more than half the variance, they found that the main predictors of victim 
satisfaction were (a) the proportion of the award paid by the offender, (b) 
whether the award covered their losses, and (c) whether they were kept 
informed during the process. The last factor appears to be the most meaning­
ful in the context of the model, being independent of the input measures. 
These findings, and especially the last, may be linked to those of a small 
survey conducted a few years ago in a British magistrates' court. There, too, 
the findings were mixed, and victims were dissatisfied especially when the 
amounts were not paid in full or did not cover the losses, or where payment 
was delayed. As to the last category, however, "What they were most upset 
about was the lack of communication or information from the court about 
the delay" (Newburn, 1988:38). These studies may illustrate the phenome­
non noted by Shapiro (1990:76) whereby restitution—and other provisions 
designed to assist victims—may raise victim expectations while exacerbat­
ing their sense of powerlessness within the criminal justice system. 
However, in order to assess the potential for the expansion of restitu­
tionary sanctions, it is important to separate questions relating to victims' 
satisfaction with these sanctions, based on their own experiences, from the 
question of their acceptance of restitution as a sanction in principle, and in 
particular their perceptions of the relative merit of restitution as compared 
with other sanctions. 
Respondents in the National Assessment survey were asked to identify 
the fairest sanctions for the crime victimization in which they were 
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involved (Hudson et al., 1980:186-87); 61% of the victims selected mone­
tary restitution, 10% selected other forms of restitution, 6% selected proba­
tion, and 23% selected incarceration. While this seems to indicate that 
restitution is indeed the sanction most favored by victims, two qualifica­
tions must be added: the sanction selected here may have been influenced 
by the experience of the victim in the instance cited; and a supplementary 
question, in which victims were invited to select a combination of sanc­
tions, revealed that only 12% of victims favored restitution as the sole 
sanction,32 others favoring its combination with some other sanction. 
Similarly, few victims interviewed in the British Crime Survey selected 
compensation (i.e., restitution) as the sole sanction—only 7% of burglary 
victims, and 4% of car theft victims, while "a further third of victims of 
both burglary and car theft wanted compensation and some other punish­
ment" (Hough and Moxon, 1985:168-69). These results are consistent 
with the finding noted above regarding the higher level of satisfaction 
where restitution was combined with community service. A German sur­
vey, however, based on a large sample of the citizens of Hamburg, found 
that restitution was acceptable by most respondents, for most offenses, as 
the sole sanction, and that having had a victimization experience was not 
significant in this respect (Boers and Sessar, 1991); but for i8 of the 38 
offenses included in the study, a majority favored some combination of 
punishment and restitution (130-31).33 
Offender Attitudes. Hudson et al. (1980:184-85) reported that approxi­
mately one-half of the offenders indicated that they were either "very 
satisfied" (16%) or "satisfied" (33%) with their overall treatment in the 
restitution programs surveyed. Again, the satisfaction rate was consider­
ably higher (35% + 52% = 87%) where restitution was combined with 
community service;34 and for offenders, too, the satisfaction was higher 
when restitution was part of a pretrial diversion program (82% satisfied) 
than when it was coupled with probation or incarceration or parole—in 
both those cases only 43% of offenders were satisfied. 
The percentage of offenders in the above survey who thought the mone­
tary payments were fair was almost identical for offenders as for victims: 
79% when restitution took place at the pretrial stage, 48% when it was a 
condition of probation, and 60% when coupled with incarceration or pa­
role. However, unlike the victims, the offenders in almost all the other 
cases, that is, those who did not view the restitution requirements as fair, 
were of the opinion that they were too harsh, rather than too lenient (see 
Hudson et al., 1980:185; Novack et al., 1980:67). Moreover, in contrast to 
the above findings, in the New York City program (Davis et al., 1980:45), in 
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which restitution was ordered at the sentencing stage, "only 38% felt that 
the amount was fair/' approximately half the satisfaction rate of the vic­
tims. Regrettably, the more recent evaluations of restitution referred to 
above appear to have neglected to study the offenders' perceptions. 
Equity theory would hypothesize maximal offender satisfaction where 
the offender was ordered to pay restitution to the victim, conditional on 
the restitution being accurately assessed and the offender being able to pay. 
It should be recalled that both equity theory and restitution programs were 
developed with a focus on the offender (or "harmdoer") rather than on the 
victim. In this respect the findings reported above are not altogether en­
couraging, and it seems that either equity theory itself or its applicability 
in the present context and in the present circumstances has less than 
complete validity. In particular, it has been suggested by Harland (1981) 
that an offender may not be satisfied that an inequity is being remedied by 
the payment of restitution if his or her income is appreciably lower than 
that of the offender, as the available data suggest might often be the case:35 
"Notwithstanding the crime loss, the victim is still the more prosperous. 
Restitution could then become, in the offender's eyes, simply another 
source of unjust enrichment of the wealthy at the expense of the poor" (20). 
Moreover, the ability to take responsibility for the harm inflicted and its 
repair may require a level of maturity or moral development that may not 
be possessed by all offenders (Heide, 1983; Van Voorhis, 1983). 
These doubts are apparently confirmed by the question asked by Hud­
son et al. (1980:187) regarding offenders' preferred sanctions. Only 29% 
selected monetary restitution, while 37% preferred community service, 
and 28% selected probation. One can only speculate as to the preference 
for community service over monetary restitution. Perhaps, in spite of the 
apparently greater intrusion of privacy involved, the requirements of com­
munity service were seen to be less onerous. Of more interest in the con­
text of the present study is the possibility that the offender feels that his or 
her debt is owed to the community at large rather than to the individual 
victim. A clear-cut option to test this hypothesis would have been to 
provide the option of a fine payable to the state as an alternative to restitu­
tion payable to the victim. 
Societal Attitudes. Data on the acceptability of restitution as a sanction 
on the part of the general community are relatively sparse. Two studies 
conducted by Gandy and colleagues related to this topic. The first (Gandy, 
1978) focused on groups holding some special relationship to criminal or 
welfare proceedings: police, social work students, members of a women's 
community service organization, and probation and parole officers.36 
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Gandy compared support for what Eglash (1958) conceived as "creative 
restitution" with that for other penal objectives. Creative restitution was 
defined as "a process in which an offender, under supervision, is helped to 
find some way to make amends to those he has hurt by his offense" (119). 
Three forms of creative restitution were specified: monetary payments to 
the victim, service to the victim, and service to the general community. 
On an 11-point Likert scale ranging from "strongly agree" to "strongly 
disagree," creative restitution scored overall much higher than all other 
objectives of the penal system.37 This was true for each category of respon­
dent (122). Creative restitution was found to be positively correlated with a 
rehabilitation philosophy, and negatively correlated with other sanction­
ing objectives (124). It was, however, viewed as inappropriate for offenses 
against the person. Among the three forms of restitution specified, "mone­
tary payments and service to the general community were considered to 
have somewhat greater potential than service to the victim." The author 
concluded that "the vast majority of the respondents were interested in the 
concept of restitution" (124). The second study related to a wider popula­
tion in a southern city in the United States; this, too, found that "there 
was considerable support for the use of restitution sanctions" (Gandy and 
Galaway, 1980:98). Evidence for this deriving from more recent studies is 
reviewed in Galaway (1988). 
Two studies conducted outside the United States have the advantage of 
having elicited views from wider samples and having offered respondents 
more clear-cut alternatives.38 Galaway (1984, 1988) conducted a survey in 
New Zealand to determine how far the public would agree to the use of 
restitution as an alternative to imprisonment, in the wake of a recommen­
dation of the New Zealand Penal Policy Review Committee. A question­
naire with descriptions of six property offenses was distributed to two 
population samples, inviting them to select the appropriate sanction.39 The 
choice of sanction varied between the two samples. While both samples 
were offered the choice between imprisonment and a list of noncustodial 
sanctions—fine, probation, community service, and nonresidential peri­
odic detention—the experimental version included the option of restitu­
tion while the control version did not. The analysis showed that fewer 
respondents in the experimental group selected imprisonment, and the 
differences were statistically significant for five out of the six offenses. The 
author concluded that restitution was an acceptable alternative to impris­
onment for a substantial number of cases. The strength of this study is in 
the size and randomness of the samples,40 and its application to the use of 
restitution orders in general, rather than to a particular type of program, as 
reported in much of the United States-based research. 
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The study conducted in Hamburg by Sessar and his colleagues has al­
ready been referred to. This survey was based on a random sample of 4,400 
residents (the response rate was 44%), with additional subsamples repre­
senting various special population groups. This survey adopted a more 
victim-focused orientation. Respondents were asked to designate the most 
important need or interest of the victim after the commission of a theft or 
an assault. The distribution of the responses [N = 572) for the six options 
offered was as follows: restitution 33.7%, community service with pay­
ment being passed on to the victim 27.8%, an apology 15.9%, punishment 
13.5%, victim assistance 10.0%, and personal service by the offenders 
0.3% (Sessar, 1984:16). When theft victimization was differentiated from 
assault victimization, nearly one-half of the respondents (48.3%) selected 
restitution as the first priority for theft victims, and nearly one in five 
(19.2%) for assault victims. Further, when asked to choose, following con­
viction for theft, between payment of a fine to the state, payment of restitu­
tion to the victim, or one-half to each, 75% of respondents favored full 
restitution, 9.5% the fine, and 15.4% the compromise (19). 
In the main part of the study, respondents were presented with 38 of­
fense descriptions and invited to choose between five different approaches 
to social control. These were (1) private agreement on restitution or recon­
ciliation outside the criminal justice system, (2) restitution or reconcilia­
tion achieved through an official mediator, (3) restitution as part of the 
criminal justice system, (4) punishment that would be waived or reduced if 
restitution were paid, and (5) punishment that would not be waived even if 
restitution were paid to the victim (Boers and Sessar, 1991:130). 
The results are extraordinary. Restitution instead of punishment is ac­
cepted for most of the hypothetical criminal incidents, not merely in 
addition to the criminal process but also instead of it, that is, within the 
framework of private settlement and reconciliation. Taken over 38 cases, 
the frequency of the responses to the five proposals is as follows: 23.9% 
for private agreement; 18.5% for private agreement with the help of a 
mediator; 17.4% for private agreement initiated by the criminal justice 
system; 18.8% for punishment to be mitigated or abolished in the event 
of successful restitution; 21.4% for punishment without consideration of 
restitution, (ibid.) 
A detailed analysis reveals that for 18 of the 38 offenses a majority favored 
responses (4) or (5), that is, punishment, at least in the first instance (ibid., 
fig. 7.1). Nevertheless, the findings do indicate a high level of acceptance of 
restitution as a penal sanction. Thus, while restitution is not generally 
advocated as a universal remedy, it seems to be perceived by some as 
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preferable to punishment even for the most serious offenses.41 However, 
when research on the lines of the Hamburg study was replicated in Hun­
gary (Arnold and Korinek, 1991), support for restitution was found to be 
less general. It is hoped that such research will also be replicated in 
common-law countries. 
In view of some of the difficulties encountered by victims in the course 
of restitution proceedings, it may also be pertinent to study the attitudes of 
criminal justice personnel and related professions. The favorable attitudes 
on the part of various correctional personnel and related groups described 
in Gandy's study have already been noted. Gandy (1978) also reported a 
study in which attitudes to restitution were elicited from 250 members of 
the legal community in South Carolina.42 Over 80% expressed support for 
the concept of restitution, indicating that "the legal community would 
help implement and support a program of creative restitution if it existed 
in South Carolina" (126). Monetary restitution was the favored form, while 
"creative restitution" generally was substantially more highly preferred 
than state compensation. Similarly, Hudson and Galaway (1978), who re­
viewed the restitution and community-service-related research, concluded 
that "the nonevaluative studies dealing with attitudes toward the use of 
financial restitution or community service show quite clearly that such 
sanctions are endorsed by criminal justice officials and lay citizens" (191). 
However, Klein (1978) has pointed to the complications facing the crimi­
nal court in administering restitution orders. Indeed, as noted above, it has 
been suggested that difficulties of this nature resulted in the demise of 
restitution in the state of Iowa (Molumby, 1984). Similarly, an INSLAW 
study (Hernon andForst, 1983:81 n. 11) found that because of the practical 
problems involved in the composition and enforcement of restitution or­
ders, criminal justice personnel preferred the use of state compensation 
schemes—the reverse of the findings reported by Gandy. Canadian prosecu­
tors were also found to consider restitution inappropriate for the criminal 
courts (Stuebing, 1984). A more recent study by Bae in Minnesota also 
reported that criminal justice officials "were much less likely to accept 
restitution as an alternative punishment to imprisonment for property 
offenders than was the public" (Roberts, 1992:152). The Hamburg study 
found that prosecutors were consistently and substantially less in favor of 
the restitution-based responses than the public, while the judges fell be­
tween the two (Boers and Sessar, 1991: table 7.1). 
One explanation for these apparently conflicting findings may lie in the 
dichotomy between the two concepts of restitution alluded to above. Gandy 
and Hudson and his colleagues were considering restitution programs ere­
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ated primarily in order to rehabilitate the offender and involving a con­
tractual agreement between the parties, with supervision by designated 
members of the program. These programs—whether for pretrial diversion, 
whether linked to probation orders, or whether postincarceration—func-
tion in effect as alternatives to regular criminal justice processes and tend to 
reduce the load on these processes. Such programs are in principle likely to 
appeal to criminal justice personnel, particularly if they concentrate upon 
the relatively minor cases, thus posing no threat to the prevailing system. 
On the other hand, the widespread use of restitution orders by the criminal 
courts, whether instead of or in addition to conventional sanctions, imposes 
a heavy burden of investigation and administration, particularly if the 
courts assume the burden of enforcement of these orders. Such a develop­
ment is consequently less welcome and, as indicated earlier, may be encoun­
tering some implicit resistance. However, this is not to argue against a 
development that appears to have considerable support among the commu­
nity at large and—in spite of reservations—among the parties to the offense. 
Fundamental Principles of Justice 
Most of the arguments raised in favor of restitution have a utilitarian 
character. Indeed, this must potentially be the optimal sanction in terms of 
Benthamite utilitarianism, maximizing the benefit of the victim, while 
minimizing the suffering of the offender and the cost to the state. It has 
also been found by Braithwaite and Pettit (1990:127) to be consistent with 
their "republican theory" of justice, in that it complies with their criteria 
of reprobation and reintegration and, it would seem, with their criterion of 
parsimony. 
It would also be difficult to fault this objective on the grounds of incon­
sistency with "fundamental principles of justice" as elaborated in the previ­
ous chapter. Can there be anything offensive in the two basic components 
of the restitutive idea: that the offender will make some kind of practical 
repayment for the wrong committed, proportional to the extent of the 
damage inflicted; and that this payment should redound to the benefit of 
the victim of the harm inflicted? Objections to such an approach would 
seem to have to rely on somewhat extreme attitudes. Thus, a Marxist or 
radical might place full responsibility for the harm inflicted on the socio­
economic structure and exempt the offender from any personal obligation 
to make amends.43 From a very different standpoint, a Kantian might argue 
that punishment must be perceived to be such, and must therefore possess 
purely negative and repressive attributes (cf. also von Hirsch, 1976:121). 
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However, retributivists have expressed other reservations with regard to 
the restitutive approach. Ashworth (1986:95-96) points to the emphasis in 
restitution on the loss inflicted and the exclusion of the mental element, 
that is, culpability, in determining its quantum. Moreover, retributivists 
have tended to deemphasize victim-related aspects of retribution and 
hence to be somewhat ambivalent regarding the role of restitution. Thus 
Sadurski (1985), in "Giving Desert Its Due" says, "Punishment is distinct 
and independent of restitution; restitution is a matter of the losses of the 
victim, punishment is a matter of illegitimate benefits of the offender. 
Hence, punishment restores the equilibrium of benefits and burdens by 
imposing an additional burden upon the criminal without necessarily 
bringing any benefits to the victim" (243). Inclusion of the word "necessar­
ily," however, appears to leave the door slightly ajar for the possibility of 
restitution in Sadurski's concept of retribution. Thus Duff (1986) observes 
that "it is true that the idea of compensation is quite distinct from that of 
punishment. . . but the same activity—making a financial payment, or 
providing material assistance—could serve both purposes" (284). Con­
versely, a recent analysis of Zedner (1994) found reparation—of which, as 
noted, restitution is a form—to be not inconsistent with retribution, al­
though she concludes that reparative remedies could be more effectively 
developed if pursued as an independent goal. 
Bamett (1977, 1980), in his "restitutionary" theory of justice, differenti­
ated this from retribution. On the other hand, McAnany (1978) has com­
pared the restitutive and retributive approaches and noted the similarity in 
conceptual underpinnings: emphasis on justice, blame and responsibility, a 
backward-looking orientation, and the equalization of offenders.44 More­
over, there is nothing sacred in the measure of retribution being calculated 
in terms of the duration of prison sentences. In an earlier day, retribution 
was achieved by a variety of other sanctions, both corporal and financial 
(Schafer, 1970). Retributive or "punitive" restitution might operate on prin­
ciples distinct from those on which civil compensation was based (Shap­
land, 1984; Thorvaldson, 1990). 
For example, the level of payment might in certain circumstances be 
higher than the loss inflicted.45 Alternatively, an additional punitive com­
ponent might be payable to the victim to compensate for the indignity and 
the injustice (cf. Thorvaldson, 1990:27), or to the state to cover costs and in 
consideration of the infringement of norms designed to protect the public 
as a whole, or in consideration of the "symbolic gravity" of the crime 
(Shapland, 1984:146). In some instances, however, a penal orientation may 
have a limiting effect, as illustrated by the reluctance of the English courts 
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to order the paying of compensation from family assets unrelated to the 
offense (Ashworth, 1992b:251); or by the 1990 decision of the U.S. Supreme 
Court in Hughey (109 L Ed 2d 408) to limit restitution to the offense of 
conviction. Paradoxically, the application of an offender orientation may 
result in greater flexibility; restitution ordered under the Federal Probation 
Act is unrestricted by the offense of conviction, for in the interests of 
rehabilitation it is considered desirable that the offender should take full 
responsibility for his or her acts (Hillenbrand, 1990:199). 
A more serious problem of justice and desert is raised by the differential 
ability of offenders to pay restitution. This may result in variations in the 
level of the burden inflicted being determined not by the seriousness of the 
offense but by the personal circumstances of the offender. In extreme 
cases, such circumstances might lead to the offender's incarceration in 
default of payment. The same problem, of course, applies today to the fine 
as a penal sanction. In the case of the fine, however, the problem can be 
resolved by such techniques as the Swedish "day-fine" system (see New­
ton, 1976; Morris and Tonry, 1990:143ff.). This is problematical in the 
context of restitution {pace Wright, 1982:253), since in the case of restitu­
tion it is insufficient that justice be done to the offender in terms of equal 
suffering. Justice must also be done to the victims in terms of equal bene­
fits, that is, proportional to the loss inflicted. 
Some type of solution to this problem could be developed if restitution 
were indeed to have an unequivocally punitive character. If the restitution 
payments could be made only from earnings from prison labor or commu­
nity service, the punishment would then be standardized for offenders of 
differing income groups. This would be inappropriate, however, for minor 
offenses where no prison term were contemplated or in a system where 
restitution were to substitute for imprisonment, as is widely advocated by 
reformers. At the same time, even if restitution in certain cases proved to 
place a heavier burden on less affluent offenders, this would be at worst no 
different from the current situation regarding the civil liability of wrongdo­
ers. However, it should not result in their incarceration: this principle has 
been recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court (see below). 
The preceding discussion has focused on the reservations, or potential 
reservations, of retributivists in relation to the restitutive orientation. Men­
tion should be made here of two recent approaches, both very favorable to a 
restitutive or, more broadly, "restorative" orientation, based upon a mixture 
of retributivism and utilitarianism.46 Cavadino and Dignan (1993) propose 
an individualized restorative sanction, which would provide for alternative 
sanctions and would lay emphasis on negotiated settlements, but would 
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operate within the limits set by a proportionate or desert sentencing. Wright 
(1982: chap. 10) advocates that an assessment of the appropriate sanction 
level be determined—possibly in terms of a numerical score—for each of­
fender, according to his or her due, but the offender's individual "package," 
whereby he or she "makes amends" to the victim and society, would vary 
with the circumstances. These proposals provide enterprising and humane 
solutions, combining individualized justice with desert. They are not likely, 
of course, to satisfy "pure" desert advocates. Moreover, in addition to the 
problems of their implementation, they do not necessarily ensure full resti­
tution to the victims—this being merely one of a number of alternative 
sanctions in both approaches. 
Finally, objection in principle to a restitutionary policy may be voiced 
by social defense advocates. This philosophy, it will be recalled, places 
emphasis on the protection of society, preferably by means of rehabilitat­
ing the offender. While restitution is seen by many of its supporters to have 
rehabilitative potential, it is often advocated as a substitute for institu­
tional treatment. Societal control would thus be reduced, and "career 
criminals" and "dangerous" offenders might be free to repeat their acts. A 
policy of "punitive restitution" would operate to some degree as a con­
straint on such offenders, for example, if they were obliged to pay restitu­
tion through prison earnings; but the restraint would be limited according 
to the dictates of the desert principle—that is, commensurate with the 
harm inflicted rather than the harm predicted. Ironically, however, restitu­
tion as practiced today is, as noted earlier, more closely linked to the 
rehabiUtationist ethos than to the victim movement (see, e.g., Hillen­
brand, 1990) and may even reflect social defense philosophy more than it 
reflects the "restitutionary" theory of punishment. 
Constitutional Issues 
Restitution proposals and practices raise a number of constitutional issues 
(Edelhertz et al., 1975; Note, 1984; Upson, 1987). For instance, restitution 
programs have been criticized for lack of due process. Where damages are 
sought in a civil action, the defendant is entitled to a jury trial, the right to 
cross-examine witnesses, and the protection of the rules of evidence. 
These rights are absent where restitution is awarded at the sentencing 
stage of a criminal trial (Slavin and Sorin, 1984:534). However, in the 1984 
Welden and Satterfleld cases (see Upson, 1987), the appeal court upheld the 
validity of the federal restitution provisions, emphasizing that a criminal, 
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not a civil, sanction was involved. On the other hand, as noted above, in 
the case of Hughey in 1990 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the restitu­
tion order was limited to the offense of conviction. This ruling might in 
fact redound against the interests of defendants, since the prosecution— 
and certainly the victim—would have an interest in all charges being 
pursued, in order not to prejudice restitution rights. 
Also, where the indigence of the defendant results in imprisonment for 
defaulting on restitution payments, there is the possibility of attack under 
the equal protection and due process provisions of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, or the cruel and unusual punishment provision under the 
Eighth Amendment (Upson, 1987). In Beaiden v. Georgia (1983 461 U.S. 
660), the court indeed held it to be "fundamentally unfair" to punish a 
person for lack of financial resources. 
Another constitutional argument that might be invoked in this context 
would be the possibility that a relationship of servitude be created. This 
could presumably be defended under the exception to the Thirteenth Amend­
ment, which exempts the prohibition on slavery in the case of "punishment 
for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted." But if incarcera­
tion or some other form of service were extended beyond a period that could 
reasonably be justified as punishment, this provision might be invoked. 
However, the right of the victim to restitution is now guaranteed under 
the constitutions of certain states (Hillenbrand, 1990:194). Further, the 
procedural right of the victim to be heard, as enshrined in certain state 
constitutions (NOVA, 1989:9) and proposed on the federal level (Presi-
dent's Task Force, 1982), might also indirectly enhance the victim's sub­
stantive rights. Finally, as noted earlier, the victim's right to restitution has 
been recognized on the international plane under the UN Declaration of 
Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power. Insofar 
as the victim's "right to redress" (Gittler, 1984:139) is implemented, care­
ful attention should be given to the question whether such implementa­
tion can be consistent with the exhortation of the Federal Guidelines for 
the Treatment of Crime Victims and Witnesses to the effect that restitu­
tion should not be awarded in derogation of defendants' rights. 
Subject to this proviso, there would seem to be a strong argument for the 
proposition that, in cases where the state is successful in investigating a 
crime and chooses to take action against the offender, the victim should be 
granted a recognized substantive interest in this proceeding. Recognition 
of such a right would seem to be generally consistent with coping needs, 
perceived justice needs, and fundamental principles of justice. 
8

Reforming Trial Procedures: 
Victim Participation 
Philosophers of law have observed that procedural reform frequently gives 
rise to the more significant changes in substantive law.1 In the present 
context, too, it is possible that enhancing the victim's role might affect the 
outcome of the criminal justice process, for example, by giving rise to an 
increase in the use of restitution. Procedural reforms, however, may be a 
worthy objective in their own right. As was shown in chapter 5, one of the 
main complaints on the part of victims was the lack of information and the 
fact that they were not encouraged to feel a part of the proceedings. Particu­
lar reference may be made in the present context to Umbreit's small study 
of burglary victims (1989), where he found that "nearly all victims ex­
pressed the need to be involved in the criminal justice system," whether 
actively or passively (110), and to the large German survey reported by 
Kilchling (1991:53-54), in which a majority of both victims and nonvic­
tims believed that the victim's role at both the investigation and trial 
stages should go beyond that of mere witness. Thus, irrespective of any 
effect on case outcomes, there may be some value in reforming procedures 
for their own sake, in the anticipation that this may lead to greater satisfac­
tion on the part of the parties concerned. 
In chapters 1 and 2, the criminal justice process was reviewed on a stage­
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by-stage basis (arrest, bail, plea bargain, trial, sentence, parole), and it 
would be possible to adopt a similar perspective for the purpose of consider­
ing procedural reform. However, a more useful approach seems to be to 
classify the topics to be discussed by considering the victim's role in the 
criminal justice system as envisaged by the reform in question. The critical 
variable in this respect seems to be the degree of victim participation in 
the criminal process. 
Victim participation could be treated as a continuous variable,2 but it 
can more conveniently be dealt with as a categorical one. Three main types 
of victim participation will be analyzed here: (1) indirect participation, (2) 
vicarious participation, and (3) personal participation. A fourth category, (4) 
personal confrontation, will be considered only briefly in the present chap­
ter, since it pertains less to the reform of the present criminal justice 
system than to the creation of alternatives (see below, chap. 11). These 
terms will be clarified in the course of the analysis. 
Since the discussion here will focus on issues of principle relating to the 
victim's role in the criminal process, emphasis will be placed on the more 
formal stages of the proceedings, that is, those of a judicial or quasi-judicial 
nature, rather than on the more administrative aspects, such as the appre­
hension and investigation functions of the police. These are also areas in 
which some of the more interesting experimentation and evaluation have 
been conducted in recent years. However, much of the following analysis 
will also have implications for the less visible decision-making processes. 
Indirect Participation 
Indirect participation refers to techniques whereby criminal justice person­
nel are supplied with information concerning the victim which they may 
be expected to take into account in the decision-making process. Thus, the 
victim's "participation" is mediated by the traditional role players in the 
criminal justice system. The victim has access in some way to one of these 
role players but does not participate directly in the decision-making pro­
cess. Another, purely passive, form of participation takes place when crimi­
nal justice agencies inform the victim of the developments taking place in 
the wake of their complaint. 
Chapter 2 examined how far the various agencies took into account 
victim-related information under traditional practices, differentiating in 
particular between the attention that was paid, on the one hand, to objec­
tive information regarding the victim's circumstances and the extent of 
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the victimization and, on the other hand, to the views expressed by the 
victim regarding his or her expectations from the system. The police in 
deciding whether to make an arrest or pursue an investigation, the prosecu­
tion in deciding whether to prosecute, the court in making a bail determi­
nation and when imposing sentence might all be expected to take into 
account at least the objective information relating to the victim. However, 
opportunities for conveying both factual and attitudinal information have 
in the past been somewhat limited. One of the main purposes of the re­
forms has been to increase the flow of such information, as well as to 
require that information be conveyed by criminal justice personnel to vic­
tims regarding the decision-making processes. 
The President's Task Force (1982) emphasized the importance of con­
veying attitudinal information relating to the victim and placed the main 
responsibility for this task upon the prosecutor: "Prosecutors have an 
obligation to bring to the attention of the court the view of victims of 
violent crimes on bail decisions, continuancies, plea bargains, dismissals, 
sentencing and restitution. They should establish procedures to make 
sure that such victims are given the opportunity to make their views of 
these matters known" (65). The duty placed upon the police in this re­
spect was more limited and focused mainly on the need to investigate 
reports of intimidation (57). 
The prosecutor's duty under the President's Task Force recommenda­
tion was limited to bringing information to the attention of the court. 
The American Bar Association's guidelines, on the other hand, obligate 
the prosecutors themselves to take note of the victim's views before the 
prosecutors' own decision making: "Victims or their representatives in 
serious cases should have the opportunity to consult with the prosecutor 
prior to dismissal of the case or filing of a proposed plea negotiation with 
the court, and should be advised of this opportunity as soon as feasible" 
(ABA, 1983:16). The federal Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 
directed the attorney general to issue guidelines for the treatment of 
victims by prosecutors in cases of serious crime which would mandate 
consulting with the victim or family about their views before decisions 
relating to the dismissal of the case, pretrial release, plea negotiations, 
and pretrial diversion. The guidelines that were issued mandated con­
sultation at five additional stages, namely, the decision not to seek an 
indictment, continuancies, proceeding against the accused as a juvenile, 
restitution, and sentencing in general (cf. Goldstein, 1984:230-32). More­
over, the federal Victims' Rights and Restitution Act of 1990 bestows 
upon the victim "the right to confer with attorney for the Government in 
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the case" (sec. 502(b)(5)). The right to confer with the prosecution has 
now been incorporated in the constitutions of Michigan and certain other 
states (NOVA, 1989:9; National Victim Center, 1994). 
Some legislation makes specific reference to the prosecution decision 
making to which the victim's views may be thought to be relevant. Thus 
the Victims' Rights and Restitution Act, while nonspecific as to the right 
granted at the federal level, is more explicit in relation to the goals the 
states are encouraged to adopt: "Victims of crime should have a statutorily 
designated advisory role in decisions involving prosecutorial discretion, 
such as the decision to plea-bargain" (sec. 506(3); see also the ABA Guide­
lines for the Fair Treatment of Crime Victims and Witnesses, 1983:16). 
By 1988, 24 states had granted victims some status with regard to plea-
bargaining decisions (NOVA, 1989:12). Such provisions take a variety of 
forms (Polito, 1990:251-53), including physical presence at the hearing, 
to be considered below under "direct participation." These procedural 
rights are not accompanied by substantive rights to control the outcome 
of prosecutors' decisions. However, the possibilities of challenging prose­
cution inaction through judicial review have been explored by Green 
(1988), while Wainstein (1988) has argued in favor of court-ordered prose­
cution at the instigation of a victim threatened with further victimiza­
tion. Finally, Kennard (1989) would grant the victim a veto over any 
proposed plea bargain. 
An even more popular institution developed in recent years for the 
purpose of increasing victim input into the criminal justice system has 
been the victim-impact statement. This is a statement that is made avail­
able to the sentencing judge and incorporates information regarding the 
nature of the harm inflicted upon the victim. This would include, under 
section 3 of the federal Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, "infor­
mation concerning any harm, including financial, social, psychological 
and physical harm, done to or loss suffered by any victim of the offense."3 
The emphasis here is on the first of the two elements referred to earlier, 
that is, objective information; presentation of the victim's views may be 
included, but for this purpose an alternative vehicle may be available, 
namely, a Victim Statement of Opinion (NOVA, 1989:10). 
The main techniques for implementing such provisions, as reviewed in 
a national survey conducted by McCleod (n.d.), are (1) incorporation in the 
probation officer's presentence report, (2) submission of a separate report 
by a probation officer or prosecutor, and (3) an oral presentation by the 
victim at the sentencing hearing, which for the purposes of the present 
analysis may be better classified as "personal participation." Two further 
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categories mentioned by McCleod relate to parole proceedings. Hillen­
brand and Smith (1989:45), in their survey of the impact of victims' rights 
legislation, differentiated further between statements submitted by vic­
tims, which were in narrative style, and the use of standard forms; clearly 
the former has a greater potential for psychological impact. By 1988 legisla­
tion providing for victim-impact statements had been enacted in nearly all 
states (NOVA, 1989:10), as well as in Canada (Giliberti, 1991) and Australia 
(Sumner, 1987, 1994; Ashworth, 1993). 
Finally, in addition to the above provisions for increasing victim input 
into criminal justice decision making, most guidelines and legislation 
place heavy emphasis on "passive" participation, namely, the duty to in­
form the victim of developments in the case (see, e.g., ABA, 1983; NOVA, 
1989:13-15; Victims' Rights and Restitution Act of 1990, sec. 502(b)(3) 
and (7); Uniform Victims of Crime Act, 1992). 
What are the implications of the reforms outlined above in terms of the 
parameters of justice as designated by the present study? Law journal arti­
cles have appeared in support of (Eikenberry, 1987; Polito, 1990) or in 
opposition to (Henderson, 1985; Dolliver, 1987) the recognition of en­
hanced procedural rights for victims, while a plethora of comments have 
appeared in the wake of the leading Supreme Court cases Booth v. Mary­
land (1987) and Payne v. Tennessee (1991), referred to in the preceding 
chapter. Empirical evaluations have been sparser, but particular note 
should be taken of studies of the implementation (McCleod, n.d.) and the 
effects (Davis et al., 1990; Davis and Smith, 1994a, 1994b; Erez et al., 1994) 
of victim-impact statements, and of the work of Erez and her colleagues, 
incorporating both empirical evaluations (Erez and Tontodonato, 1990, 
1992) and integrated overviews of the issues (Erez, 1990, 1991, 1994). The 
evidence emerging from these and other sources will now be considered. 
Coping Needs 
The practical needs of the victim are not affected by procedural changes 
as such. However, the availability of victim-related information to the 
decision-making bodies may influence the substantive outcome of the 
case. Indeed, one of the declared objectives of victim-impact statements 
has been to increase the probability that the court will make a restitution 
order.4 This does indeed seem a possible outcome. The courts in the past 
have been reluctant to order restitution partly because of the need to 
enter into precise assessments of the losses incurred. The additional infor­
mation on this matter which might be available in a victim-impact state­
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ment, or as a result of victim-prosecutor contacts, might provide an incen­
tive to make such an order. Further, a cumulative or interactive effect 
might be produced by the combination of these procedures and the provi­
sions discussed in the preceding chapter mandating the consideration of 
restitution orders on the part of the courts. Moreover, the exemption 
granted to the federal courts under the Victim and Witness Protection Act 
of 1982 from the obligation to make a restitution order where such an 
order is liable unduly to "complicate or prolong the sentencing process" 
may be more difficult to invoke where a comprehensive assessment of 
the amount of damage inflicted upon the victim is filed with the court. 
Finally, the complaint that the amount designated in the restitution order 
generally falls short of the victim's true losses—and in particular of the 
victim's assessment of those losses—should also be partly met by the 
new procedures. 
Empirical evidence regarding the effect of victim-impact statements on 
restitution is mixed. The nationwide survey conducted by Hillenbrand and 
Smith (1989:123, 125) found that financial information in the victim-
impact statements was thought by criminal justice officials to be "most 
useful" and to affect both the likelihood and the amount of a restitution 
award. However, their New York-based survey of victims found that 54% 
were of the opinion that these statements had no effect on restitution 
awards. 
One precondition for the effectiveness of these procedures is that they 
will be implemented. In Hillenbrand and Smith's survey only 27% of the 
victims reported having made victim-impact statements, and similarly 
low rates are described in most of the surveys reported,-5 but compare the 
studies by Erez and Tontodonato (1990) and Walsh (1992), both conducted 
in Ohio, where participation rates were considerably higher. The generally 
low rates may be explained in part by the fact that prosecutors may per­
ceive these statements as superfluous, inappropriate, burdensome to the 
victim, or adding to their burden of discovery to the defense (Henley et al., 
1994). Kennard (1989) claims that "since over ninety per cent of all crimi­
nal cases end in a negotiated plea, most victims never have the opportunity 
to present a statement" (430). While it may not be true that there is no 
opportunity for a statement in these cases (cf. Erez and Tontodonato, 1990), 
the effect of the statements may be substantially reduced (Villmoare and 
Neto, 1987:62). 
Offenders are not directly involved in these procedures. However, the 
fact that the disposition of the case is modified as a result of such procedural 
reforms will of course be of direct concern to the offender. An additional 
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input of victim-related information may result in the refusal of bail or its 
being set at a higher level, a custodial sentence instead of probation, a longer 
term of imprisonment than would otherwise have been imposed, a restitu­
tion order, or the refusal of parole or clemency. 
Even if these outcomes were to cause additional hardship to the of­
fender, the availability of more—and more accurate—information to the 
decision-making agencies could hardly be faulted on this ground, unless 
the offender were denied the opportunity to dispute the accuracy of such 
information. Thus, if a victim-impact statement were filed with the court 
as a confidential document, whether as part of the probation officer's 
presentence report or otherwise, this may result in denying the defendant 
an opportunity to contest the accuracy of the information, since constitu­
tionally protected adversary rights have not been held to apply to such 
documents.6 Moreover, although the majority opinion of the Supreme 
Court in Booth v. Maryland found that the admission of evidence of this 
nature could have an inflammatory effect on the jury, this decision was 
effectively overturned in Payne v. Tennessee (see chap. 7 above; Sebba, 
1994). 
It is not altogether clear, however, that additional victim input will 
necessarily redound to the offender's disadvantage (cf. Rubel, 1986:236, 
249; Erez, 1990:25). A study by Erez and Tontodonato (1990) of 500 felony 
cases processed in Ohio found that, employing multivariate analysis, the 
submission of a victim-impact statement influenced the likelihood of in­
carceration (p < 10%), but not the length of the prison term. However, the 
apparently positive effect on type of disposition should be treated with 
caution, both because of the significance level and because there may have 
been differences not controlled for between cases in which victim-impact 
statements were submitted and those in which they were not. Thus Davis 
et al. (1990), in a New York City study using an experimental design, found 
"no evidence that using victim-impact statements puts defendants in jeop­
ardy and/or results in harsher sentences" (6; see also Davis and Smith, 
1994b). Similarly, a detailed analysis of the effects of the introduction of 
the victim-impact statement in South Australia also found no indication 
that sentences became more severe (Erez et al., 1994). (In a study of parole 
proceedings, however, victim testimony was found to be the main predic­
tor of parole refusal; see Bernat et al., 1994.) 
Four types of explanation are offered in the course of these studies as to 
why the statements appear to have had almost no effect on sentencing 
severity: (1) Implementation problems—for example, statements are often 
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not taken or may be perfunctory. (2) Criminal justice officials have this 
type of information even without the statements. (3) "Officials have estab­
lished ways of making decisions which do not call for explicit information 
about the impact of crime on victims" (Davis and Smith, 1994a: 467-68). 
That is to say, the "established ways" are resistant to innovations. (4) The 
effects of victim-impact statements may indeed exist but they are con­
cealed. As a result of victim-impact statements, sentence severity more 
closely reflects the harm inflicted by the offense, that is, they increase 
proportionately in sentencing (ibid., 457, referring also to Erez and Tonto­
donato, 1990). However, since in cases where the harm is serious this will 
result in enhanced severity, but in cases where harm is moderate the result 
will be less severity, the overall results appear to indicate an absence of any 
effect. This hypothesis, however, has yet to be substantiated. 
The study by Walsh (1992:301) focusing on the effects of victims' sen­
tence recommendations in sexual assault cases in Ohio found that this 
variable did not significantly affect the sentence outcome. Moreover, of­
fenders for whom the victims recommended imprisonment (the majority) 
were almost as likely to receive probation as imprisonment (299). How­
ever, when nonrecommendation cases were included in the analysis, it 
emerged that these cases attracted harsher sentences than those in which 
recommendations were submitted. Walsh concluded that it was "likely 
that some of the sex offenders granted probation would have been impris­
oned were it not for the probation recommendations they received from 
their victims" (304). Moreover, while Walsh's sexual assault victims 
tended to be punitive in their orientation, Henderson and Gitchoff (1981) 
reported that communication with victims by a private agency preparing 
presentence reports on behalf of the defense resulted in an almost total 
abandonment of retributive views. Other studies indicating the nonpuni­
tiveness of victims were alluded to in chapter 5. 
Finally, some additional cost to the public must inevitably be incurred 
by providing that extra information be collected by the criminal justice 
agencies. A system whereby the probation officer has to obtain infor­
mation from the victim in a sense doubles his or her clientele: data must 
be gathered from or about the victim as well as the offender. Even where 
victim-impact statements are filed directly by the victim, some adminis­
trative costs will be involved. However, the costs of such measures have 
generally been estimated to be slight (ABA, 1981:47). Naturally, if the 
reformed procedures result in changes in the ultimate disposition, this 
could produce indirect costs such as those of detention or incarceration. 
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Again, however, this surely cannot be an argument against increasing the 
information made available to criminal justice agencies. 
Perceived Justice Needs 
The analysis of available data on victims' attitudes to the justice system 
presented in chapter 5 indicated that procedural reform might, in the vic-
tim's perception, be more important than substantive legal change. Vic­
tims seemed more distressed by prevailing procedures, including the lack 
of information conveyed to them by the criminal justice agencies and their 
lack of recognition as a party to the process, than by the dispositional 
outcomes. The indicators were that a greater involvement with the system 
may lead to a reduction in the level of discontent. 
Some evidence of victim satisfaction in the "post-reform" era is begin­
ning to emerge. A recent Dutch study (Wemmers, 1995:338) attributed 
generally positive results to the passive involvement of victims in the 
system, insofar as this took place. Among the 359 victims interviewed by 
Hillenbrand and Smith (1989) in the United States, nearly two-thirds said 
they were kept informed of the police investigation (129). "Good informa­
tion about case status" was the second most satisfying factor about the 
way the case was handled, but "lack of information re case progress" was 
the second least satisfying factor (146-47)! When asked specifically about 
various categories of information, "very satisfied" responses varied from 
21% to 34%, while "not satisfied" varied from 33% to 43% (142). 
When, on the other hand, the victims were asked to relate to the oppor­
tunity they had had to "have a say" in the charging and sentencing deci­
sions, dissatisfaction levels were higher still—49% and 54%, respectively 
(ibid.). Further, Erez and Tontodonato in Ohio (1992), Davis and Smith in 
New York (1994b), and Erez et al. in South Australia (1994) all found that 
the submission of victim-impact statements (VIS) did not increase the 
level of victims' satisfaction. The first of these studies found that "those 
who had completed a VIS with the expectation that it would have an 
impact but who felt that it had no true effect on the outcome were more 
likely to believe the sentence was too lenient" (403). The failure to meet 
expectations was also observed in the South Australian study and in a 
Canadian evaluation (Giliberti, 1991:713). It should be noted that in the 
New York City study (Davis and Smith, 1994b) a special effort was made to 
ensure that the victim understood the purpose of the victim-impact state­
ment, but that this failed to enhance their feelings of involvement. (Indeed, 
many remained unaware that such a statement had been prepared.) 
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While further research is clearly required on all aspects of victim partici­
pation, two are particularly worthy of attention. The first is the mode of 
submission of the statement. Is more satisfaction obtained when the state­
ment is prepared by the victim in person rather than through an intermedi­
ary, and is the "narrative" style (McCleod, n.d.) more satisfying than the 
completion of a standard form? Second, is it more satisfying to liaise with 
probation officers or with prosecutors for this purpose? On the one hand, 
probation officers may be more skilled in dealing with human problems (cf. 
Villmoare and Neto, 1987:63). On the other hand, probation officers are 
traditionally identified with the offender's interests, while the prosecutor, 
it would seem, can more easily be perceived as being on "the victim's 
side." 
Such research may help to identify sources of satisfaction or dissatisfac­
tion related to victim participation in criminal justice procedures. Mean­
while, various hypotheses on this topic emerge from the above data. As 
noted, one reason for the apparently low level of victim satisfaction, as 
indicated by Erez and Tontodonato, may be unwarrantedly high expecta­
tions. Another explanation may be problems relating to implementation, 
some of which were alluded to earlier. Thus Polito (1990) supports a consti­
tutional amendment on the subject of victims' procedural rights in order to 
ensure that adequate remedies will be available for their enforcement. 
A third possibility is that, in spite of the impression deriving from the 
research surveyed in chapter 5, the enhancement of the victim's procedural 
status may not be sufficient, unless the outcome, too, is perceived as 
satisfactory. In the survey conducted by Hillenbrand and Smith (1989), 
while many procedural matters were alluded to by victim respondents, 
"treatment of defendant" was nevertheless the main factor specified in the 
determination of both the victim's satisfaction and his or her dissatisfac­
tion (146-47; cf. Giliberti, 1991:703; Erez et al., 1994:58). 
Finally, satisfaction may be limited owing to the fact that the victim's 
participation in the procedures considered in this section has generally 
been indirect. The emphasis in these procedures is on activities conducted 
by criminal justice personnel rather than by the victim. Considerations of 
bureaucratic convenience may further derogate from victim involvement. 
For example, it has been suggested that the probation officer might obtain 
the information necessary for the victim-impact statement from the police 
file (ABA, 1981:47). This would relieve the probation officer of the need to 
locate the victim, and thus abort any possible result in terms of enhancing 
the latter's personal involvement. A reform of this type in Australia, 
whereby courts rely on police summaries for victim information, has given 
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rise to the phenomenon of "victims of efficiency" (Douglas et al., 1994). 
There may rather be a need for procedures involving a more active role for 
the victim, and these will be considered below. 
The defendant's perception of the procedural reforms considered here 
are somewhat speculative. The positive effects attributed by some writers 
to outcomes—notably restitution—that emphasize the offender's responsi­
bility toward the victim have already been noted. The same should apply 
to procedures in which this responsibility is emphasized. However, insofar 
as the victim-related material is considered in confidential presentence 
documents, this could encourage resentment toward the victim rather 
than contribute to an enhanced sense of responsibility. 
A delicate topic to which little thought or attention seems to have been 
devoted—at least in the academic literature—is the effect of the dual role 
of the probation officer. As noted above, the probation officer, whose pre­
sentence report has hitherto focused upon the offender, has generally been 
perceived as being sympathetic to the offender's interests; for the proba­
tion officer's institutional role has been to draw attention to the individual 
offender's needs and circumstances. This role of the probation officer at the 
presentence stage may have been important, too, as the background to his 
or her additional role in some cases: the supervision of those offenders who 
were subsequently placed on probation. To confer on the probation officer 
the novel task of providing the court with information regarding the nature 
of the harm inflicted upon the victim—and sometimes also the latter's 
views on the disposition—is surely to revolutionize this role. This change 
might radically alter the offender's perspective of the balance of power in 
the sentencing court, as well as of the nature of probation as a correctional 
outcome. 
The issue of public perceptions seems not to be a major issue in the 
present context. The public is not generally a witness to the criminal 
justice proceedings. It may become acquainted with the outcome of the 
case, generally on a sporadic basis, through the media and personal con­
tacts; but it is less concerned with procedures. However, the issue of 
whether the public believes that criminal justice personnel should be 
equipped with more information regarding victim harm and victim atti­
tudes is a researchable one. It may be surmised that the public would be 
sympathetic to procedural changes directed to that objective, except for 
sections of the public identifying with offenders rather than with victims. 
It is not clear that the professional public, however, is entirely sympa­
thetic to such reforms (cf. Goldstein, 1984:242ff.). It is true that some of the 
documents cited above have been produced by professional representative 
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bodies of judges and lawyers, and that justice-related and legally qualified 
personnel undoubtedly have had a dominant input in creating the legisla­
tion so far enacted. However, a study conducted by INSLAW (Hernon and 
Forst, 1983) found that only 56% of the judges interviewed favored victim-
impact statements. On the other hand, they were favored by 71% of the 
prosecutors and 66% of the police and were viewed as effective by most of 
the criminal justice officials whose responses were recorded by Hillenbrand 
and Smith (1989). 
Fundamental Principles of Justice 
By most criteria the availability of more information related to victim 
harm, measured objectively, is calculated to improve the level of justice 
meted out by the courts. This applies particularly if sentencing policy is 
related to desert, but it may also be compatible with other sentencing 
objectives. However, if the sentence, or the decision to charge, to refuse 
bail, to deny parole, and so on, were to be based upon the suffering and 
deprivations of the individual victim and his or her family—and evidence 
of this type was held in the recent Supreme Court case of Payne v. Tennes­
see to be admissible in sentencing—this might be problematic even in the 
context of desert theory. As noted in chapter 7, von Hirsch's concept of just 
desert, following that of most traditional retributivists, is based upon harm 
and culpability, and the latter implies that the offender should only be 
punished for harms that were foreseen, or at least foreseeable. This would 
not necessarily include the full range of victim suffering (cf. Sebba, 1994). 
Some support for this harm-oriented approach is found in Murphy 
(1988) and in Talbert (1988), who designates it ''social retribution"—as 
compared with "moral retribution," which lays emphasis on the personal 
responsibility of the perpetrator. Moreover, a degree of support may also be 
derived from public perceptions, which, as noted earlier, attribute serious­
ness even to unforeseen harm. However, it seems doubtful whether such a 
sentencing policy can be justified in terms of classical retributivism. Nor is 
it necessarily consistent with social defense, since the infliction of greater 
harm, and in particular unintended harm, in an individual case, is not 
necessarily an indication of future dangerousness. It is equally doubtful 
whether this type of victim contribution to sentencing can further other 
sentencing aims, such as rehabilitation, as suggested by Talbert (1988). 
Moreover, the Court in Payne has gone further, and declared that the 
attributes—that is, moral character—of the victim may also be taken into 
account, thereby recalling the concept of "individualization of the victim" 
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envisaged by Wolfgang (1982) and aggravating the aforementioned problem 
of justification in the context of sentencing policy. Further, the question of 
the admissibility of the victim's opinion of the offender and of the appropri­
ate sentence, which may be conveyed either through a victim-impact state­
ment or a "victim statement of opinion," whether written or oral, was left 
open. These issues raise, in increasing order of magnitude, the questions of 
fairness, due process, and equality in sentencing. 
It may be observed in this context that the UN Declaration of Basic 
Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power specifies 
the following: "6. The responsiveness of judicial and administrative pro­
cesses to the needs of victims should be facilitated by. ... (b) Allowing 
the views and concerns of victims to be presented and considered at 
appropriate stages of the proceedings where their personal interests are 
affected, without prejudice to the accused and consistent with the rele­
vant national criminal justice system." It is questionable whether victim 
views and concerns can be presented at the sentencing stage, either di­
rectly or indirectly, "without prejudice to the accused." The Supreme 
Court cases considered in the present and the preceding chapters, in 
which "victim concerns" were voiced before the jury and the defendants 
were sentenced to death, would not seem to conform to this formula. The 
phraseology of the Florida and Kansas constitutional amendments, pur­
porting to balance enhanced victim involvement in the process by a pro­
viso that would negate interference with the rights of the accused, may 
also be problematic. These issues arise even more acutely in the context 
of direct victim participation, which will be considered below. 
Vicarious Participation: Victim Advocacy 
The preceding section dealt with the degree to which various criminal 
justice agencies or personnel succeed in taking account of victims' needs 
and desires. Under the present heading a more radical alternative will be 
considered, that specially appointed persons be charged with promoting 
these needs and desires. This in theory would mean that the victim's own 
representative would assume a role in the criminal justice system on his or 
her behalf,7 a vicarious mode of participation by the victim.8 Such represen­
tatives are sometimes referred to as "victim advocates." However, care 
must be taken to distinguish victim advocacy in this sense from the 
broader usage sometimes adopted, which includes almost any activity con­
ducted to improve the welfare of victims (cf. Elias, 1986: chap. 7). 
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Even in the narrower sense, the term "victim advocacy" has not yet 
developed a very specific connotation, which in turn reflects the relative 
infancy of the concept. Certain dichotomies may be usefully invoked to 
elucidate the different possibilities. The victim advocate (a) may or may 
not be an advocate in the sense of a legally qualified attorney; (b) may or 
may not possess legally recognized status in the criminal justice system; 
(c) may be concerned with a particular stage of the process, such as the 
sentencing decision, or may be invested with a more generalized role; (d) 
may be concerned exclusively with the victim's interests as they are af­
fected by the criminal proceedings, or may have wider concerns on the 
victim's behalf. As to the last point, the present analysis will focus on 
victim advocacy in the course of the criminal process, rather than broaden 
the discussion to other aspects of victim assistance which will be consid­
ered in chapter 10. 
As a result of recent reforms, traditional criminal justice personnel, such 
as prosecutors and probation officers, may have responsibility for the presen­
tation of the victim's views before the court; but this does not render them 
"victim advocates." However, these agencies may appoint special persons 
to fulfill victim-related functions. Thus McCleod (n.d.:23-24) notes that 
many prosecutors' offices have victim-service units, which play an active 
role in assisting victims to submit victim-impact statements. In this con­
text she employs the term "victim advocates." The federal Victims' Rights 
and Restitution Act also requires criminal justice agencies to designate 
officials who will be responsible for "identifying the victims of crime and 
performing . . . services" (sec. 503(b)), but the emphasis here is on the provi­
sion of information to victims rather than on active promotion of their in-
terests.9 However, the constitutional amendment adopted by the state of 
Washington specifies that where "the victim is deceased, incompetent, a 
minor, or otherwise unavailable, the prosecuting attorney may identify a rep­
resentative to appear to exercise the victim's rights" (Eikenberry, 1989:31). 
Since the concept of victim advocacy in the above sense is still in its in­
fancy, few data are available to evaluate the potential contribution of this in­
stitution to the criminal justice system. Dubow and Becker (1976) described 
two "grassroots" attempts by communities in the Chicago area to pursue 
victims' interests in the criminal justice system. In one case, the citizens 
themselves (the Early Ardmore Group) monitored the measures taken in the 
courts against a neighborhood gang that was causing considerable anxiety 
on the part of local residents. In the other case (the Hyde Park Project), 
lawyers were appointed for a similar purpose, and the program involved 
"reaching out" to victims to enable them to have their interests protected. 
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Davis, Tichane, and Connick (1980) issued a detailed account of the first 
year's experience of the Victim Involvement Project in the Brooklyn Crimi­
nal Court. This was a project in which paralegal workers, with previous 
experience in a victim/witness-assistance scheme, were attached to the 
court in order to represent the interests of victims. It was hypothesized 
that such a scheme would be successful in promoting victim interests for 
the following reasons: (a) the staff were paraprofessionals and thus "under­
stood the concerns of court officials"; (b) they were permanently located in 
the courtroom and would thus develop a rapport with these officials, par­
ticularly prosecutors; and (c) they would be in the possession of informa­
tion on the victim which would be useful to prosecutors and would thus 
have something "to offer in exchange" for their own petitions on the 
victim's behalf (20-21). 
Another project of relevance to the present topic is the Victim Impact 
Demonstration Project administered at the Brooklyn Supreme Court and 
evaluated by the Victim Services Agency (Fisher, 1984). One special charac­
teristic of this project was the fact that the task of preparation of the 
victim-impact statements was neither imposed upon existing criminal jus­
tice personnel nor left to the victim but was requested from specially 
appointed professional counselors. The other special characteristic was 
that the statement was prepared close to the initiation of the complaint 
rather than before the sentencing decision. It was hypothesized that this 
would encourage the establishment of a closer link between the victim and 
the prosecutor, providing information that might affect prosecutorial deci­
sion making as well as judicial dispositions. 
The most obvious form of victim advocacy, however, seems to have 
been almost totally neglected in the empirical literature and barely men­
tioned in the Anglo-American legal literature (but cf. Fleming, 1978; Hil­
lenbrand, 1989). This is the possibility that the victim will be represented 
by an attorney during the course of the criminal process. The literature 
bewailing the "disappearance" of the victim as a party to the penal process 
has generally overlooked the provisions retained in a number of states for 
the participation in this process by the victim's attorney, whether for the 
purpose of conducting a private prosecution or in order to assist the public 
prosecutor (see Note, 1955; McDonald, 1976a; Goldstein, 1982; Gittler, 
1984; Davis, 1989). 
While the concept of the private prosecutor has wider implications, 
both for the criminal process as a whole and for the victim's role in that 
process, and will consequently be discussed in chapter 12, more pertinent 
in the present context is the second alternative, the appointment of an 
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attorney who has not assumed the prosecution role. Such an attorney has 
no direct control over the course of the proceedings; his or her sole func­
tion is that of victim advocate, to ensure that the victim's interests are 
made known and taken into account by those invested with decision-
making powers. This role is recognized under German law in the person of 
the Nebenklage, the "auxiliary" or "subsidiary" prosecutor. This term 
refers to the victim but in practice generally means the victim's attorney; 
indeed, legal aid may be available for this purpose (Bohlander, 1992:413-
14). This institution has been comprehensively evaluated (Schulz, 1982), 
and its scope has recently been extended by legislation (Kaiser, 1991). 
In spite of the historical and comparative materials on this institution on 
the one hand, and its intrinsic interest on the other, scant consideration has 
been devoted to this concept in the recent victim-oriented proposals. The 
main compendia of reform descriptions and proposals (e.g., NAAG/ABA, 
1986; NOVA, 1989) seem to ignore this possibility. However, the American 
Bar Association legislative review (ABA, 1981) devoted a chapter—albeit 
very short—to the topic "Counsel for the Victim." The legislative proposals 
reviewed there limited the idea of appointing counsel to cases in which the 
victim's reputation, whether moral or legal, was likely to come into ques­
tion during the course of the proceedings; thus the objective of these propos­
als seems to be the protection of the victim rather than the pursuance of the 
victim's rights and remedies. Nevertheless, the procedural implications of 
such a narrow role can be generalized; and indeed the discussion of the 
merits of such a proposal in the ABA publication suggests the possibility of a 
wider application of the concept of victim's counsel (44). 
The same concept seems to be hinted at, although not explicitly advo­
cated, by the "Findings and Purposes" section of the federal Victim and 
Witness Protection Act of 1982, which in sec. 2(a)(5) states: "While the 
defendant is provided with counsel who can explain both the criminal 
justice process and the rights of the defendant, the victim or witness has no 
counterpart." A lack of balance and the existence of an injustice are indi­
cated here, the apposite remedy for which may seem obvious, although, in 
retrospect, it does not appear to have been in the minds of the policy 
makers.10 
Nevertheless, there is one area in which victim advocacy by private 
attorneys does appear to have developed within the framework of the re­
cent reforms. In many jurisdictions, victims today have the right of 
"allocution," that is, to present their views in person at the sentencing 
hearing. This institution will be discussed under the heading of "direct 
participation." In most of these jurisdictions, if the victim does not wish to 
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exercise this right in person, another person may appear on his or her 
behalf. "Survey research has shown that attorneys, followed by family 
members, are the most frequently authorized persons to speak for victims" 
(McCleod, n.d.:25). This development is surely worthy of further investiga­
tion and evaluation. Finally, a more modest right to the presence in court 
of "an advocate or other support person of the victim's choice" has been 
provided by the recent constitutional amendment in Illinois (see art. 1, sec. 
8.1 of the constitution). In spite of the limited scope of this provision, its 
constitutional status is worthy of note. 
There follows a discussion of the merits and demerits of the victim 
advocacy proposals according to the criteria adopted in this study, insofar 
as this is possible in the light of the limited material available. 
Coping Needs 
The potential for victim advocacy to contribute to the victim's coping 
needs depends upon the advocate's ability to influence the decision-
making processes of the criminal justice system. However, the advocate's 
role may also require that he or she advise the victim about remedies that 
are not an integral part of these processes, such as the filing of applications 
to state compensation schemes and the instigation of civil suits against the 
defendant or third parties. 
Relatively little information is available on the contribution of the advo­
cacy role (as defined above) as distinct from the more diffuse "victim­
assistance" role (which will be discussed in chap. 10). Evaluations of some of 
the modest schemes referred to above point to marginal but not unequivocal 
achievements. With regard to the Chicago experiments described by Dubow 
and Becker, no evaluative research is referred to. However, the authors men­
tion limitations on the ability of the citizens in the Early Ardmore Group 
and the lawyer in the Hyde Park Project to pursue their desires in the court­
room, owing to lack of legal standing. Generally, the Hyde Park lawyer 
seems to have actively pressured criminal justice personnel, so that some 
results might have been anticipated. At the same time it appears that since 
he was appointed by a community organization—the South East Chicago 
Commission—he felt he had a community responsibility that might not 
always accord with the interests of individual victims. 
The Victim Involvement Project in the Brooklyn Criminal Court was 
accompanied by a comprehensive attempt at evaluation. Since evaluation 
was undertaken of a variety of outcome variables, both objective and sub­
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jective, a number of samples were studied, thereby somewhat complicat­
ing the research design (Davis, Tichane, and Connick, 1980: chap. 2). One 
of the limitations on the advocate's role here was, again, a lack of legal 
standing before the court and the need to communicate through the prose­
cutor (20-21). Thus, the Victim Involvement Project "faced the same obsta­
cles that victims themselves faced in trying to be heard" (18). However, the 
program staff were also only moderately successful in securing the atten­
dance of the victim in court, which they regarded as important for the 
pursuance of their claims (21). Nevertheless, they were apparently instru­
mental in alleviating the problems associated with court appearance, such 
as obtaining court excusals (ibid., chap. 3). Finally, some outcome differ­
ences were found by the researchers, apparently as a result of the activities 
of the Victim Involvement Project staff. Thus, the use of restitution orders 
by the court, although disappointingly small, was significantly greater for 
the experimental sample than for the controls (ibid., 50, table 4.1a). 
In the other New York City project referred to here, in which counselors 
prepared victim-impact statements for use by prosecutors and judges, a 
complication arose with the design when it emerged that the prosecutors 
did not in fact refer all of the experimental sample to counselors so that 
statements could be prepared (Fisher, 1984:7). Consequently, in the analy­
sis the experimental group was divided into two according to whether such 
statements had indeed been filed. The preliminary analysis revealed a po­
tential for coping benefits among the experimental group who met with 
the counselors to file victim-impact statements, in that 53% of this group 
reported having been informed of special services for victims, as compared 
with only 19%-20% of the other groups (ibid., 8-9, table 3). However, the 
size of the first group was rather small [N = 39). Moreover, it emerged that 
no greater use was made of this information in terms of referral to these 
services on the part of the victims. 
The potential advantage of a legally qualified attorney as compared with 
the personnel involved in the above-mentioned experiments lies both in 
his or her forensic and advocacy skills and in the greater probability that 
permission would be granted to address the court as occasion arises. No 
systematic data are available on the functioning of the victim's attorney in 
the U.S. jurisdictions where this practice is followed.11 However, Mc­
Donald (1976a), on the basis of informal investigations, concluded that 
these advocates—where they were not actually prosecuting—had two 
types of roles: a "kibbitzing" role, whereby they attempted to provoke the 
decision-making authorities into rulings that would satisfy their clients; 
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and a reconnoitering role, whereby they assessed the evidence in order to 
determine whether it would justify the initiation of a civil suit against the 
defendant for the recovery of damages. Naturally, this role is calculated to 
improve the victim's material position. However, it is doubtful whether 
there are many cases in which a victim could afford legal representation at 
both a criminal and a civil trial, and in which the defendant would have 
sufficient means to render such litigation profitable. 
Somewhat more systematic information is available regarding the Ger­
man Nebenklage or auxiliary prosecutor. Data for 1979 showed a varied 
use of this institution in different types of courts, amounting to between 
3.7% and 10.2% of the cases (Schulz, 1982, appendix A). Moreover, its use 
may have increased following the adoption of liberalizing amendments to 
the law in 1986 (cf. Kaiser 1991); it seems that Kaiser's 1989 survey found 
that auxiliary prosecutors participated in approximately 23% of the cases 
(fig. 16) and that it had become popular with attorneys as a result of the 
relatively high fees (561). A recent Polish survey (Bienkowska and Erez, 
1991) found that 36% of victims participated as private prosecutors, but 
since many of these acted on their own behalf, without legal representa­
tion, the findings of this study will be dealt with under the next heading. 
Anticipated benefits to the victim from this system include, apart from 
exercising a degree of control over the proceedings and thus presumably 
enhancing satisfaction (see below), a higher probability of a restitution 
award from the criminal court and of obtaining information that will be of 
assistance in a subsequent civil suit (Schulz, 1982:172ff.). The introduction 
of any form of victim advocacy must also take cost into account. The type 
of programs described in the American literature require the appointment 
of full-time professional personnel, while the appointment of privately 
appointed attorneys would presumably involve even greater cost, whether 
to the state or to the individual victim. In the latter case, victim advocacy 
would become a remedy exclusively for the socioeconomic elite.12 
As for the defendant's coping needs, in addition to the factors referred 
to under the previous heading, representation of the victim in criminal 
proceedings by an attorney increases the importance of competent repre­
sentation on behalf of the defense and is likely to hamper negotiations 
regarding verdict and disposition (cf. Davis, Tichane, and Connick, 1980: 
68). In the context of the Nebenklage proceeding, it has been claimed that 
this is burdensome for the defendant, both in the way it affects the 
chances of rehabilitation and in the risk of a higher burden of costs 
(Roxin, 1983:393). In terms of the practical effects on the public, the main 
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consideration is likely to be the cost involved—mainly of the legal repre­
sentation, if this were at the public expense, but also of possibly more 
protracted proceedings. 
Perceived Justice Needs 
The evaluation of the Victim Involvement Project (VIP) found that "two­
thirds of those who reported talking to a VIP representative believed that 
the VIP person was looking out for their interests" (Davis, Tichane, and 
Connick, 1980:60). This indicates that the staff was relatively, but not 
completely, successful in conveying the image of victim advocates. More­
over, it appears that these victims were no more likely than others to feel 
that they had any influence on the disposition of the case, probably be­
cause they "did not perceive VIP as a central element in the decision-
making process" (61). Satisfaction was associated with type of disposition, 
and they appeared to regard contacts with prosecutors as more important 
for this purpose (63-64). On the other hand, victims who received an 
explanation of the proceedings in court were more likely to state that they 
had been well treated, and such explanations were more frequent where 
there had been contact with the VIP staff, although in some cases the 
explanation had been forthcoming from the prosecutor. 
In the Victim Impact experiment it was anticipated that "giving victims 
a chance to express the effect of the crime on them would increase their 
feeling of involvement in the court process and their sense of fair treat­
ment by court officials" (Fisher, 1984:11). There was no evidence, how­
ever, that this was achieved. There were only small differences between 
the experimental group for whom the impact statements were prepared 
and the control sample in respect to how well they felt they were treated, 
how well they were informed, and whether they had had a chance to 
express their views "to people in court" (ibid., table 5).13 
This last finding is particularly disappointing: only 33% of those who 
met with program staff felt that they had "very much" had a chance to 
express their views to "people in court," although a further 43% responded 
"to some extent." This may be because the staff were not fully identified 
by the victims as court personnel. It may also be that where no victim-
impact statements were prepared by the staff, prosecutors took more care 
to elicit the victims' views; for among the "experimental group" who had 
not been involved in victim-impact statements (see above), a higher propor­
tion selected the "very much" response. 
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However, there is some evidence that indicates that representation by 
an attorney is perceived as being beneficial to victims in the course of 
criminal proceedings. Villmoare and Neto (1987:50), in a study of victim 
participation in sentencing, which will be considered below, found that 
legal representation increased the victim's involvement in the process. 
Kaiser (1991, fig. 9) found that 64.3% of his victim sample designated 
attorneys as the preferred choice to be responsible for their interests. 
Fundamental Principles of Justice 
Programs in which victims are assisted in conveying information about 
their views to criminal justice personnel cannot be considered a threat to 
prevailing concepts of justice, except insofar as the use of such information 
infringes upon due process or other concepts as discussed under the preced­
ing subheading. On the other hand, the introduction of an advocate with 
an active role in the judicial proceedings on the Nebenklage model raises a 
question of the balance of forces in adversary proceedings and the possible 
creation of a third party to these proceedings. This will be further consid­
ered below. 
Conclusions 
The existence of a victim advocate, whose exclusive function is to further 
victim interests, seems in principle to have a greater potential than placing 
reliance upon existing criminal justice personnel, who inevitably have 
other tasks or different priorities. The limited research available suggests 
that such a role might produce at least some practical and perceptual 
benefits. 
There are two interrelated dangers in such a system, however. The first 
danger is that, if a new agency is involved, it may become institutional­
ized as part of the criminal justice system with resulting negative reper­
cussions. A new program "may become used by the system in pursuit of 
the system's objectives, and in the process the program may lose sight of 
its original goals" (Dill, cited in Davis, Tichane, and Connick, 1980:85). 
Indications of this phenomenon emerged both in the Chicago Hyde Park 
experiment (Dubow and Becker, 1976), where the advocate felt he was 
representing the interests of victims as a class, and in the Victim Involve­
ment Project, where for the staff to maintain their role in court entailed 
their "acceptance of existing norms concerning appropriate dispositions 
in different types of cases and traditional methods of operation" (Davis, 
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Tichane, and Connick, 1980:77). The authors recalled Eisenstein and Ja-
cob's account of the functioning of the criminal justice system, in which 
judge, prosecutor, and defense counsel share common goals of maintain­
ing group cohesion and reducing uncertainty (23-24). The victim advo­
cate may also be coopted into this system.14 
The second danger is that such personnel may in some respects consti­
tute a barrier to contact with the criminal justice system rather than a link 
with that system. The staff of the Victim Involvement Project were not 
seen as an integral part of the court process (ibid., 81-82). Thus, the "vic-
tim's sense of involvement was related to the extent and quality of interac­
tion with judges and prosecutors (whom victims correctly recognized as 
the big decision-makers) but not with VIP staff" (ibid.). The authors con­
cluded that "direct contact between victims and prosecutors seems neces­
sary for victims to feel part of the process" (ibid.). This apparently was also 
the feeling of some of the prosecutors interviewed in the study (ibid., 67), 
in spite of the advantage for them in terms of convenience in dealing with 
program professionals. 
These problems would probably be mitigated if the victim advocate 
were a qualified attorney, such as under the German Nebenklage system, 
rather than a paraprofessional, and if such an attorney had legal standing 
before the court to argue on the victim's behalf. The problems would be 
mitigated even further if the victim were represented by his or her own 
personal attorney rather than a public official (see Weigend 1986:13-15). 
However, apart from the cost involved in such a system, whether to the 
victim or to the state, and the possible implications of creating a "third 
party" in the system, it is not clear that such representation would neces­
sarily be preferable to the victim's own personal participation. Thibaut and 
Walker (1975) conducted experiments indicating that persons involved in a 
conflict prefer procedures that maximize their power of control. They cite 
evidence consistent with this theme which shows that persons experi­
enced greater satisfaction in the role of spokesperson as compared with the 
role of "constituent" or client.15 This, of course, may be counterbalanced 
by a lower level of efficacy and articulation on the part of the client who 
pleads his or her own case. Thus the research does not serve to suggest, in 
the authors' view, that "in a legal setting a client may wish to exchange 
roles with his attorney but rather to illustrate again an apparent need on 
the part of individuals to have as much involvement as possible in deci­
sions affecting their outcomes."16 The possibility that the victim will per­
sonally be an active participant in the criminal justice process is the topic 
of the next subsection. 
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Personal Participation 
For some supporters of victim rights, the appointment of an agency to 
represent the victim's interests is insufficient. They insist on granting the 
victim a personal role in the criminal process. Moreover, such advocates of 
active victim participation can invoke both the psychological theories re­
ferred to in the previous section and research indicating the frustration felt 
by victims with their limited traditional role in the criminal justice pro­
cess (e.g., Shapland et al., 1985). In response to such demands, many states 
now allow victims to present an oral statement at the sentencing hearing 
or "allocution" (NOVA, 1989:10). As argued in the President's Task Force 
report: "When the court hears, as it may, from the defendant, his lawyer, 
his family and friends, his minister, and others, simple fairness dictates 
that the person who has borne the brunt of the defendant's crime be al­
lowed to speak" (1982:77). Although this argument was put forward in 
support of allocution, the report went much further in supporting the 
victim's right to participate in the criminal process. It proposed an addition 
to the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution to the effect that "the 
victim, in every criminal prosecution shall have the right to be present and 
to be heard at all critical stages of judicial proceedings" (114). 
A constitutional amendment in this vein was adopted by Florida in 
1988, specifying as follows: "Victims of crime or their lawful representa­
tives, including the next of kin in homicide cases, are entitled to the right 
to be informed, to be present, and to be heard, when relevant, at all crucial 
stages of criminal proceedings, to the extent that these rights do not inter­
fere with the constitutional rights of the accused" (NOVA, 1989:9). This 
provision is wider than the Task Force recommendation in that it applies 
not just to "judicial proceedings" but to "all crucial stages of criminal 
proceedings." However, it is narrower in that it has two provisos: (a) rele­
vance, and (b) noninterference with the rights of the accused (cf. the clause 
in the UN Declaration cited above). 
Other states have also provided for direct victim participation, whether 
by statute or by constitutional amendment. One objective of these reforms 
is to guarantee the victim the right to attend the trial, from which the 
victim, as a witness, was traditionally excluded under the "rule of sequestra­
tion," a source of considerable frustration among victims (Kelly, 1980:180). 
Other provisions allowed for a more active contribution, whether at sentenc­
ing, as noted above, at plea-bargaining proceedings, or at parole hearings 
(NOVA, 1989:9-12, 18-19). 
One commentator has suggested, in the course of an analysis of the plea­
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bargaining provisions, that such "rights" may be of dubious value without 
enforcement provisions (Welling, 1987:340-45), although the courts may 
be more inclined to intervene in individual cases following the incorpora­
tion of such rights in constitutional provisions—as reflected in the recent 
Arizona parole case referred to below in chapters 10 and 12. As yet there 
seems to have been relatively little empirical evaluation of most of these 
provisions. An empirical study of the allocution rights granted under the 
Victims' Bill of Rights adopted in California in 1982 was conducted by 
Villmoare and Neto (1987), while some general data are included in the 
surveys already referred to by McCleod (n.d.) and Hillenbrand and Smith 
(1989). Further, evidence of the effect of direct victim participation in 
informal proceedings is available from the studies of mediation and restitu­
tion programs to be discussed in chapter 11. Finally, detailed findings are 
available from some earlier pioneering experimentation with the participa­
tion of victims in plea-bargaining negotiations. 
The experiments on victim participation in plea-bargaining followed a 
proposal put forward several years ago by Norval Morris (1974) in recogni­
tion of the fact that the character of criminal justice was in effect being 
determined in secret deals between prosecutors and defense counsel, in the 
absence of some of the key parties to the criminal proceedings—for offend­
ers, victims, and generally also judges were not included. Moreover, it has 
been argued that recent sentencing developments have rendered the vic-
tim's interest in the plea-bargaining process even more acute, both because 
sentencing guidelines have reduced the judge's discretion and enhanced 
the importance of the charging decision, and, more particularly, because 
the 1990 Supreme Court decision in Hughey has limited the measure of 
restitution which may be ordered to the harm inflicted by the offense of 
conviction (Starkweather, 1992:861). 
One advantage of the experiments conducted to explore Morris's pro­
posal was that the expansion of the negotiation proceedings to include 
these parties resulted in an increased similarity to the trial itself, at least 
in terms of dramatis personae. Another advantage was that the experi­
ments were accompanied by comprehensive evaluation programs. The 
first experiment with the "pretrial settlement conference" was conducted 
in Dade County, Florida, in 1977 and was evaluated by the University of 
Chicago (see Kerstetter and Heinz, 1979; Heinz and Kerstetter, 1979; 
Heinz and Kerstetter, 1980). For the second experiment, this time called a 
"structured plea negotiation," three sites possessing different characteris­
tics were selected (Wayne County, Michigan; Jefferson County, Kentucky; 
and Pinellas County, Florida) in order to increase the generalizability of 
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the findings. The evaluation of this experiment was conducted by 
INSLAW (Buchner et al., 1983). The following discussion of the coping 
and perceived-justice effects of victim participation will rely heavily upon 
these research evaluations. 
Coping Needs 
A precondition for the amelioration of the victim's situation as a result of 
the introduction of a novel procedure is that the procedure be complied 
with, at least in substance. In the case of the plea-bargaining experiments, 
no gains could be anticipated unless the victim's participation in the 
process—at the very least his or her physical presence—were actually 
achieved. Thus there was some disappointment in the first experiment, 
where of the 378 cases included in the experimental group only about one-
third actually participated in the conference. In the second experiment the 
participation rates were lower still, varying between 17% and 26% over 
the three sites (Buchner et al., 1983:3:17). However, the researchers estab­
lished that this apparently lower participation rate derived partly from 
communication failures and partly from uncertainty as to the identity of 
the victim. They concluded that of those notified some 50% actually at­
tended the conference. Moreover, in this second experiment the main vari­
able associated with the decision to participate was the seriousness of the 
offense.17 Thus there seemed to be no ground for the concern that victim 
participation would fail for extraneous reasons such as fear of the offender 
or the alienation of minority groups. However, economic factors seemed 
also to play a part, and difficulty in taking time off work was a frequently 
cited ground for nonparticipation. Problems of communicating with the 
victim in order to secure his or her presence at court also seemed likely to 
prove to be an endemic problem. 
In cases where the victim was in attendance, the potential for an effect 
on the outcome of the case derived either from his or her interventions or 
from the mere presence at the conference of the victim or the other parties 
invited as part of the experiment.18 Both of the researches indicated that 
the contributions of the victim and the defendant to the proceedings were 
modest in quantitative terms; they left most of the speaking to the profes­
sional personnel. Nevertheless, most victims made some contribution.19 
Moreover, a content analysis in one of the studies suggested a shift in focus 
of the exchanges in the experimental proceedings, in that relatively more 
time was devoted to issues of concern to the "lay" parties, such as the facts 
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of the case, than to the legal issues, which were of more concern to the 
professionals (Kerstetter and Heinz, 1979:49; Buchner et al., 1983:2:34). 
As to the outcome of the proceedings, generally speaking this was not 
radically affected by the experimental situation, whether in terms of the 
nature of the disposition or its severity. Thus the evaluation of the first 
project concluded that "the conference process . . . did not result in any 
major changes in the kinds of decisions that were reached" (Kerstetter and 
Heinz, 1979:108).w There was evidence that in one courtroom less use was 
made of incarceration (106), while in another there was an increase in 
restitution orders (104); but the authors took the view that "the trend in 
the findings that the conference may have resulted in more lenient sentenc­
ing is too fragmentary to be conclusive" (108). Similarly, in the second 
experiment, while "it was feared that victim presence would inhibit prose­
cutors from negotiating," it was found that "in none of the three sites was 
victim presence related to the type of agreement reached at the confer­
ence" (Buchner et al., 1983:2:15). 
There are both methodological and substantive reasons for not regard­
ing "outcome effects" as the determining criteria for the present purpose. 
Methodologically, since many of the conferences to which the victims 
were invited were in fact held without the victim, comparison with con­
trol groups cannot be considered decisive in measuring the effect of the 
victim's presence. Moreover, the earlier experiment was further compli­
cated by the fact that although allocation of cases to the experimental 
"conference" procedure was conducted on a random basis, in a number of 
these cases no conferences were held for a variety of reasons (Kerstetter 
and Heinz, 1979:19, 32-33). 
Substantively, while it might be expected that the presence of the 
victim would lead to a greater inclination to consider restitution orders, 
aggregate case outcomes cannot be considered the main criterion for deter­
mining the value to the victim of participation in the proceedings. There 
are two reasons for this. First, victims' wishes are not monolithic: some 
may be more punitive than the prosecutor, and some less so. Thus, the 
expression of victim wishes, even if taken into consideration in the indi­
vidual decision-making process, will not necessarily be reflected in aggre­
gate distributions of outcome. Second, the main product anticipated is 
not to be sought so much in the practical results of the case as in the 
victim's perceptions that they have a role to play in the system. Thus the 
real test of the success of these experiments is to be found in the attitudi­
nal data to be considered below. 
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The findings of the victim allocution study conducted by Villmoare and 
Neto (1987) were at least as negative in terms of the variables considered 
above, and perhaps more so. The authors estimated that no more than 3% 
of eligible victims exercised their right to allocution (52). This may be 
explained partly by lack of information: out of a sample of 171 victims 
interviewed, 56% were not aware of their right to allocution. Both lack of 
knowledge and failure to exercise their rights may have been partly attrib­
utable to the lack of significance attributed to the right by criminal justice 
officials, and particularly judges, many of whom reported that the victims' 
views were already known through the victim-impact statement. On the 
other hand, the prosecutors surveyed by Hillenbrand and Smith (1989:45) 
viewed oral victim statements as more effective than other types, although 
judges did not share this perception (69). Many of the victims in the 
allocution study seem to have shared the judges' view that their appear­
ance would not have much effect on the outcome, while others were de­
terred by emotional or practical problems (42-43). 
As to the defendant's coping effects, it is possible that the participation 
of additional parties could result in the exercise of coercive pressure at a 
plea-bargaining negotiation, giving rise to a less favorable outcome. How­
ever, it is generally felt that plea bargains as such are likely to result in 
lighter sentences (see Buchner et al., 1983: chap. 6); while, as noted, the 
effect of victim participation in the experiments described here did not 
appear to render sentences harsher (see also Welling, 1987:311). In this 
respect the findings are generally consistent with those relating to indirect 
victim participation. 
Finally, Buchner et al. found that the program they evaluated had the 
effect of increasing the judge's involvement in the negotiations and conse­
quently the judge's acceptance of the idea of the "sentence differential" 
(i.e., the guilty plea as a mitigating factor). 
As to costs to society, the conferences did not seem to be unduly burden­
some. The mean time spent on each conference was 10 minutes in the first 
experiment (Kerstetter and Heinz, 1979:62) and 7 to 9 minutes in the 
second (Buchner et al., 1983:32). The latter study noted that the disposal 
time was faster for the experimental group, while the former assessed the 
costs involved as being no different from those of the regular procedures. 
As to California's system of allocution, "the effect of the workload on the 
system has been minimal" (Villmoare and Neto, 1987:59). 
Moreover, the plea-bargaining experiments were accepted by the judges— 
enthusiastically by some (Buchner et al., 1983:3:43). The reservations ex­
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pressed by other legal practitioners, both prosecutors and defense (3:46), may 
be explained in terms of institutional interests; but fears of disruption of the 
proceedings or intransigence on the part of victims proved unfounded. 
Perceived Justice Needs 
The first of the plea-bargaining studies adopted four criteria for determining 
whether the experimental procedures affected attitudes. The first criterion 
was whether the victim felt that he or she had knowledge of the disposition. 
It was found that "the victims in the test group were somewhat more likely 
to feel they knew the disposition than the control victims" (Kerstetter and 
Heinz, 1979:111), but the difference was not significant. The authors con­
cluded that knowledge of the disposition was a function of whether the 
victim or the police officer attended the proceedings, but it could not be 
concluded that the nature of the proceeding was a factor determining the 
degree of cognitive involvement. 
The second criterion was satisfaction with the disposition. A combined 
measure was constructed based upon satisfaction with the process and its 
perceived fairness. It was found that in all groups victims, defendants, and 
police were all relatively satisfied with the process. Insofar as there was 
variance, this was not attributable to the experimental procedure. There 
was greater variance among the controls than between the controls and the 
experimentals. Moreover, variation in satisfaction could not even be attrib­
uted to attendance at the conference (this applied to defendants also) but 
rather to individual courtroom differences (115-16). 
The third criterion was satisfaction with the process. Here again the 
ratings were generally positive. For the victims, however, there was "some 
evidence that the conference procedure contributed to the overall positive 
evaluation of the way the courts processed cases" (117). This seemed to 
indicate the importance of the experimental procedure. However, not only 
were there some courtroom variations here but, surprisingly, the difference 
between victims who attended the conference and those who did not was 
not significant, although "those who attended were generally more posi­
tive than those who did not" (119). The authors commented: "One explana­
tion for this anomaly, assuming more than statistical noise is operating, 
may be that the increased satisfaction comes not from participation in the 
conference, but in the consultative process which included notifying vic­
tims of the conference opportunity. Thus receiving information about the 
availability of the conference may be the key to the test effects" (119). 
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The fourth criterion was general attitude to the criminal justice sys­
tem. Here, neither the experimental procedures nor the decision to attend 
had a significant effect on either victim or defendant views (120-21 ).21 
Similar, although not identical, questions were asked of the victims in 
the second experiment. In two of the three sites, victims participating in 
the experiment were more likely to know the outcome of the case than the 
controls (Buchner et al., 1983:3:29, table 3.12). In the third site almost all 
knew the outcome irrespective of the program, since they were routinely 
informed by the prosecutor. Substantial percentages were dissatisfied with 
the outcome in all sites; in one site the percentage was 63%, in the others 
29% and 28%. However, while both experimentals and controls were gen­
erally satisfied when the defendant was sentenced to imprisonment, the 
experimentals were more satisfied when the outcome was probation [p < 
.06). This suggests that victim involvement might result in greater under­
standing for a seemingly lenient sentence. 
The responses regarding satisfaction with the experimental procedure 
were somewhat disappointing in this study. While many were satisfied with 
the experimental procedure immediately after the conference took place 
(57%-80%), the numbers declined (53%-63%) at the second interview six 
to eight weeks later, by which time appreciable minorities (28%-40%) ex­
pressed dissatisfaction (ibid., table 3.10). Regrettably, no comparative fig­
ures are available on this point. Moreover, only a minority felt that their 
view of the court system had improved as a result of the conference,- and 
while 60%-64% thought that the conference was a better method than a 
trial for handling a criminal case, and a large majority thought that it was 
either important or very important to attend the conference (73%-94%), 
these last figures declined after six to eight weeks. More significantly, sub­
stantial proportions (22% -50%) felt that the victim had no influence during 
the conference (ibid., tables 3.10, 3.15). 
General views on the criminal justice system were elicited from victims 
subjected to the experimental and regular procedures regarding such issues 
as the punitiveness of the courts and the fairness of judges. Generally, only 
minorities agreed that "the court system cares about the victim's needs," 
but the minorities were somewhat larger among the experimental groups 
(ibid., table 3.16). Similarly, the proportions of experimentals who ex­
pressed a willingness to cooperate with the system in the future tended to 
be higher, but not significantly so (table 3.14). However, experimentals 
were appreciably more favorably disposed toward plea-bargaining (table 
3.37). 
The defendants' views of the plea-bargaining process bore some resem­
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blance to those of the victims. Large majorities took the view immediately 
after the conference that attendance was very important and that the bar­
gain was very fair and were satisfied with the procedure; again, the propor­
tions declined after six to eight weeks (ibid., table 3.21). Defendants were 
generally satisfied with the conference when an agreement was reached 
(table 3.22). Satisfaction levels were also related to the final sentence im­
posed (table 3.23). Defendants in the experimental group were more likely 
to agree with the statement that "the court system cares about victim's 
needs," although only a minority of defendants agreed with this statement. 
The evaluators concluded that "greater respect for victims among defen­
dants could be a by-product of the SPN [structured plea negotiation) experi­
ence" (ibid., 3:62). 
In the California allocution study, 54% of the victims who exercised 
this right felt different after making their statement to the judge, mostly in 
a positive sense, but a substantial minority felt angry or helpless. More­
over, less than half felt that their involvement affected the sentence 
(Villmoare and Neto, 1987:44). This was not their dominant consideration 
in exercising their allocution right, however (43). 
The researchers developed a satisfaction index, based on the victim's 
satisfaction with law enforcement and with the district attorney and on 
his or her opinion of the judge (ibid., 49). Satisfaction on this scale did not 
correlate with victim participation, but this was explained partly by the 
fact that the offenses in such cases were often of a more traumatic nature; 
it was also noted that victims sometimes elected to participate at sentenc­
ing because they were dissatisfied with the other criminal justice agencies 
(49-50). Moreover, the satisfaction index was positively correlated with 
the researchers' criminal justice involvement index, which reflected the 
victims' (a) interaction with the district attorney, (b) court activity, and (c) 
knowledge of allocution rights. The results should be treated with caution, 
as the number of respondents who actually participated was rather small. 
Finally, reference may be made here to the Polish study, based on a 
sample of 1,496 returned questionnaires, conducted by Bienkowska and 
Erez (1991). Under the Polish criminal justice system, "victims who partici­
pate as subsidiary or private prosecutors can make statements concerning 
the penalty for the accused" (221). As noted earlier, 36% participated as 
subsidiary or auxiliary prosecutors, while another 22% were private prose­
cutors. Only 12% of these, however, exercised the above right. Moreover, 
"only 15% of the victims who made a statement about the sentence felt 
satisfied after making it," while "72% stated they did not think in reality 
their statement had any effect on the penalty" (222). 
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Psychological research and surveys of victims gave rise to rather high 
expectations from the direct participation of the victim in the system, at 
least in terms of victim satisfaction. The evaluations discussed above indi­
cate that these expectations have not been met. This seems to have been 
due mainly to the perceptions of the participant victims that their presence 
was largely symbolic and that they were able to make no meaningful 
contribution to the outcome, given the entrenched interests of traditional 
criminal justice personnel. In this respect the potential for meaningful 
participation and consequent satisfaction may be greater in the context of 
informal modes of dispute resolution to be discussed in chapter 11. 
However, it may also be observed that ability to play an active role in 
the forensic drama may in part be a function of personality, and that, in 
spite of the greater anticipated benefits from direct participation, some 
victims obtain greater satisfaction in an indirect role. To cite Villmoare 
and Neto (1987): "An informal or face-to-face interview or conversation 
with a generally sympathetic probation officer appears to be, for many 
victims, a more comfortable and emotionally satisfying experience than a 
recitation in open court" (63). 
Fundamental Principles of Justice 
In principle there is considerable appeal in the idea that the victim should 
have the right to appear in person at all the relevant stages of the criminal 
process, a process initiated as a consequence of his or her victimization. 
There is also some appeal in raising this right to the level of a constitu­
tional amendment, as has occurred in Florida and been proposed on the 
federal level and by NOVA (Lamborn, 1987), as well as being incorporated 
in the UN Declaration. This might have the effect of enhancing both its 
symbolic and its practical significance (Polito, 1990) in spite of objections 
in principle to this type of constitutional amendment (Dolliver, 1987). 
Proposals of this nature raise fundamental issues relating to the nature of 
the prevailing criminal justice system, and the possibilities of creating an 
additional party to the proceedings. These issues will be considered in 
chapter 12. 
Perhaps even more challenging are the questions raised by proposals of 
this nature regarding the relationship between procedural and substantive 
reforms. It may be that procedural reforms of this nature—as indeed indi­
cated by most of the empirical evaluations—do little to change substantive 
outcomes, whether owing to the inflexibility of criminal justice personnel, 
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to the inhibitions of victims, or to normative structural limitations, in 
particular fixed sentencing provisions (Hall, 1991:262). Insofar as this is 
the case, the evidence suggests that victims will remain dissatisfied. 
If, on the other hand, victim participation were to influence offender 
dispositions, or even bail and charging decisions, additional issues would 
be involved, in particular the equality of treatment required both by desert 
philosophy and by constitutional principles. Deviance from the norm may 
occur in a mitigating direction, since victim participation may result in 
lighter sentences, and in particular in an emphasis on restitution. This 
seems to be acceptable in terms of the constitutional protection of the 
defendant but is of course rejected by desert theorists. 
Clearly, deviance in the opposite direction is a cause for greater concern. 
As indicated in the context of indirect participation, evidence of victim 
attributes or the impact of a murder on survivors, held to be constitution­
ally admissible in the 1991 Supreme Court case Payne v. Tennessee, dis­
cussed above, must inevitably have a potential to give rise to harsher 
sentences, this surely being the main reason prosecutors invoke such evi­
dence. The admission of direct testimony, as occurred in Payne, in which a 
grandmother testified as to the impact on the surviving child of the murder 
of his mother and baby sister, probably has an even greater potential for 
emotional arousal of the decision makers—in this case the jury. This poten­
tial may be further aggravated where the oral testimony includes an expres­
sion of the victim's sentiments regarding the offender and a recommended 
sentence. Although the Supreme Court in Payne refrained from ruling on 
the admissibility of such statements, they are recognized under many legis­
lative provisions, some of which have been considered above. 
Since the principle of victim participation in the proceedings is neverthe­
less a positive one, the formulations of the UN Declaration and the Florida 
and Kansas Constitutions, to the effect that the victim's right to be heard 
is guaranteed only insofar as it does not "prejudice" or "interfere with" the 
rights of the defendant, has a strong attraction. On a broad interpretation of 
defendant prejudice, however, the proviso might tend to negate the vic-
tim's participatory rights altogether. While an appropriate "balance" is 
often called for (e.g., Polito, 1990:269), it is difficult to predict where the 
point of gravity will lie in the case of a constitutional amendment; develop­
ments in Florida and Kansas should be followed carefully. However, in 
view of the apparent difficulties in integrating victim and offender rights 
within the prevailing adversary model, consideration should be given to 
alternatives. This will be the subject of chapter 12. 
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Personal Confrontation 
In the context of some of the procedures described in this and the preced­
ing chapter, references are occasionally made in the literature to direct 
contacts between the victim and the offender. Such contacts occurred, 
albeit only rarely, in some of the restitution programs reviewed by Hud­
son et al. (1980:79), in the plea-bargaining experiments (Heinz and Ker­
stetter, 1979:172), and particularly in the victim-offender reconciliation 
programs (Galaway, 1985). 
A notable aspect of the literature on this topic is the account presented of 
attitudes toward such encounters. While the potential for victim-offender 
communication is still largely an unknown quantity, and reservations have 
been expressed by criminal justice personnel (Hofrichter, 1980:108), both 
offenders and victims seem to be favorably disposed. Thus Novack et al. 
(1980:64-65) reported that 57% of the victims and 90% of the offenders in 
their study stated that they would have liked to have met with the other 
party to determine restitution agreements (see also Bussman, 1985). More­
over, while victims may have strong initial reservations regarding such 
encounters (Smale and Spickenhauer, 1979; Hofrichter, 1980:113-14), 
those who have actually experienced them seem more enthusiastic. In one 
study reported by Hudson and Galaway (1980:188), all twelve victim partici­
pants, as well as 85% of the offender participants, expressed the view that 
they would want to meet the other party if they were in the same situation 
again (cf. also Bonta et al., 1983). 
"Confrontation" in the present context refers to a moderately struc­
tured proceeding in which justice personnel are involved. Since the pro­
ceeding is designed to produce a specific result, such as a plea, or a restitu­
tion arrangement, what takes place is in fact a form of negotiation. At the 
same time, such proceedings are clearly less structured than a conven­
tional formal judicial proceeding. Hofrichter (1980:111), in considering vic­
tim involvement in restitution, defined negotiation as a "non-judicial but 
judicially approved system"; this seems to apply also to victim-offender 
reconciliation projects (Galaway, 1985). Thus while restitution programs 
and plea-bargain conferences may be adjuncts to the criminal justice sys­
tem proper, it does not follow that procedures followed in these frame­
works are appropriate for the criminal trial. Confrontation or negotiation 
between offender and victim must rather be regarded as supplements or 
alternatives to the criminal justice system, and will consequently be dealt 
with more extensively in chapter 11 below. 
Following an impressionistic survey of a cross-section of restitution 
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programs, generally confined to property offenses, Hofrichter (1980) drew a 
conclusion, partially supported by the foregoing analysis in this chapter, 
that "it is good for the victim, good for the system and good for justice if 
victims are restored to a participatory role in the adjudication of criminal 
offenses." Victims appear to derive some satisfaction from participation in 
the process, and offenders also seem to accept victim participation. More­
over, it is thought that "the more knowledge the offender has of the victim 
and the effects of the offense, the less the offender will be able to use 
'justification techniques' " (Hudson and Galaway, 1980). Hence there is an 
assumed gain in terms of rehabilitation. However, justice, if based on 
desert or social defense, may be threatened by negotiated criminal justice. 
This theme will be resumed in chapters 11 and 12. 
Remedies Unrelated to the 
Criminal Process: 
State Compensation and Escrow 
State Compensation 
This chapter will consider remedies designed to ameliorate the victim's 
predicament that do not directly impinge upon the criminal justice proce­
dures. The attraction of such remedies is that they can exist alongside the 
present system and do not involve "rocking the boat," with all the prob­
lems following therefrom as described in the preceding chapter. On the 
other hand, they raise other problematic issues. Further, in some instances 
they, too, may ultimately have indirect implications for traditional crimi­
nal justice procedures. The main remedy to be considered under the pres­
ent heading is the state-administered victim compensation scheme. 
Criminal Injury Compensation Schemes 
Since the possibilities of recourse against the offender are generally viewed 
as being limited, in particular because of low apprehension rates and lack 
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of resources at the offender's disposal, public compensation schemes are 
frequently cited as the chief remedy for victim losses. The state compensa­
tion scheme is an institution that has developed with an astonishing rapid­
ity, with some of the characteristics of a moral crusade.1 While the concept 
has ancient roots, and was advocated in the nineteenth century by both 
utilitarians and criminologists of the positivist school (Joutsen, 1987:253), 
its revival in recent times seems to date from an article published in 1957 
by the British penal reformer Margery Fry. 
The first modem scheme was introduced in New Zealand in 1963 and 
1964, followed by Great Britain in 1964 and California in 1965. Other 
jurisdictions followed with something of a snowball effect (see the graphs 
of the adoption of this remedy in U.S. jurisdictions in Ramker and 
Meagher, 1982:68) and McGillis and Smith (1983:8). By 1982 over 60 juris­
dictions in the world had such programs, while the United States had 33 
(McGillis and Smith, 1983:2, 7). 
The President's Task Force on Victims of Crime (1982) affirmed the 
importance of such schemes and proposed that federal legislation—which 
had been considered by Congress in every session since 19652—should be 
adopted in order to subsidize the states in this matter. In 1984 such legisla­
tion was finally enacted in the form of the Victims of Crime Act, or VOCA, 
and funding began in 1986. VOCA funding provided further impetus to 
state legislators, and by the end of 1991 all states with the exception of 
Maine, as well as the District of Columbia and the Virgin Islands, had 
adopted state compensation programs. Maine was considering—and subse­
quently adopted—such legislation (Parent et al.; 1992:iv, 1). 
On the international level, provisions relating to state compensation 
were incorporated into the UN Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice 
for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, while in 1983 the Council of 
Europe adopted the European Convention on the Compensation of Victims 
of Violent Crimes (Tsitsoura, 1984; Willis, 1984; Bassiouni, 1988). This 
topic has also been popular in the professional literature. During the years 
of rapid development, academic writers focused on legal issues regarding 
the scope and implementation of such schemes and philosophical discus­
sions as to their justification.3 Subsequently, there were a number of at­
tempts to conduct comprehensive reviews of such programs.4 
Empirical studies of this institution have been relatively few. As the 
programs developed, some macrostudies were conducted to examine the 
question of the costs to society of such programs (Garofalo and Sutton, 
1977; Garofalo and McDermott, 1979; Jones, 1979). Relatively little atten­
tion has been devoted to studying the impact of compensation programs, 
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beyond some macrostudies by Doerner et al. (1976) and the study of the 
implementation and impact of the New York and New Jersey programs 
conducted by Elias (1983b).5 
In view of the large public expenditure involved in the administering of 
these programs, it is surprising that these issues have not been more exten­
sively researched. This point was noted by McGillis and Smith (1983), 
whose research was commissioned following a recommendation of the At­
torney General's Task Force on Violent Crime (1981) that "a relatively inex­
pensive study" be conducted on this topic: "In a critical area of public policy, 
ignorance can potentially be far more expensive than research" (25-26). 
There follows an analysis of the available data regarding victim compen­
sation from the point of view of the parameters adopted in this study. 
Coping Needs 
Victims. The early years of victim compensation programs presented 
an excellent illustration of the gap between the rhetoric and the reality of 
social reforms. For while establishment of such programs was accompa­
nied by considerable polemics concerning the plight of victims and the 
need to assist them, the available information regarding their outcome 
suggests that their actual contribution to victims' welfare was paltry. The 
proportion of crime victims who actually received compensation under 
such schemes was estimated at less than 1 %. There are indications, how­
ever, that some improvement may subsequently have taken place. 
The very limited benefits of the programs seem to have been related to 
three underlying factors: (1) the desire to expend only limited public funds, 
(2) the legislators' image of the "deserving" victim, and (3) a lack of realism 
in the formulation of legislative policy, that is, the gap between norms and 
actuality. 
As the figures presented below will indicate, compensating victims of 
crime at the public expense is potentially costly. Federal subsidies only 
became available in 1986, in the wake of VOCA. Yet even in 1989 "almost 
half the program directors said that existing funding for program adminis­
tration was inadequate" (Parent et al., 1992:14). In order to save public 
funds, and thus establish a program that will appear beneficial without 
excessive demands on the taxpayer, benefits under the compensation 
scheme have been limited in the scope of their coverage. This resulted, in 
the first instance, in the restriction of the programs to crimes of violence. 
Indeed, even property damage resulting from violence, such as broken 
locks or spectacles, is rarely included (McGillis and Smith, 1983:87; 
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NOVA, 1989:1; Parent et al.; 1989:5), and where it is included, it is subject 
to very low maximum awards (Parent et al., 1992:30). Compensation is 
provided mainly for medical treatment, including counseling, loss of in­
come, and funeral expenses (22). 
Few of the programs allow recovery for pain and suffering, which ac­
counts for 51% of the awards in a jurisdiction that does allow such claims, 
namely, Hawaii; and see the British scheme (Home Office, 1993:2-3). 
Some programs require that victims prove financial hardship before their 
claims will be considered (McGillis and Smith, 1983:70; Parent et al., 
1992:23). Finally, almost all programs incorporate a maximum limitation 
in the amount that may be awarded to the individual claimant (between 
$5,000 and $50,000, but most frequently $10,000), and many specify a 
minimum, generally $100 (Parent et al., 1992:29-30). It has been estimated 
that this last type of requirement has the effect of excluding large numbers 
of otherwise eligible victims, including many categories of the neediest 
victims, such as the elderly and the disabled (Garofalo and Sutton, 
1977:39, 77). 
Some limitations, however, were removed in most states in order to 
comply with VOCA funding conditions, which were tightened up further 
in 1988 (Parent et al., 1992:2-3). Thus, for example, VOCA required the 
removal of residency qualifications and inclusion of the victims of drunk 
driving offenses under the compensation program. 
Since the intention of the legislators was to assist "deserving" or "inno­
cent" victims, various provisions are included in the relevant legislation 
which are designed to exclude the "undeserving." Conversely, the pro­
grams generally cover losses suffered by "Good Samaritans" in the course 
of providing assistance to victims or in the pursuance of law enforcement. 
In this context, which victims are considered to be "undeserving"? 
"Contributory misconduct" to the commission of the offense causing the 
injury seems to be a universal ground for denying or reducing compensa­
tion both in the United States and in Europe (McGillis and Smith, 
1983:64, 71; Parent et al., 1992:23; Joutsen, 1987:265; Miers, 1990:82ff.; 
Greer, 1994:359ff.). A more problematic ground is the character, status, or 
lifestyle of the victim, for example, being a prisoner,6 having a criminal 
record, or being unemployed (!)—"presumably because they could not 
have suffered any loss of earnings" (McGillis and Smith, 1983:66). This 
ground for exclusion may tend to interact with the previous one, as illus­
trated by an extract from a policy statement issued by the British compen­
sation board, cited by Miers (1990): "In particular the Board will look 
critically at any provocative, annoying or loutish behaviour which can be 
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seen to be attributable to the applicant's own over-indulgence in alcohol 
or the misuse of drugs" (86). However, its policy in this respect seems 
subsequently to have been modified (Greer, 1994:363). In non-common-
law countries there is said to be less emphasis on lifestyle as a qualifying, 
or rather disqualifying, factor (Van Dijk, 1985:3; Joutsen, 1987:265); but 
Kirchhoff (1983-84) notes the rejection by the German Compensation 
Board of "twilight zone" cases involving, for example, violence in the 
context of beer drinking and homosexuality. 
Third, "un worthiness" or "innocence" may also derive from the vic-
tim's ongoing relationship with the offender: having a blood relationship, a 
sexual relationship, or belonging to the same household. These exceptions, 
which were also calculated to prevent fraudulent claims as well as to 
exclude the possibility that the offender might benefit from the compensa­
tion payment ("unjust enrichment"), were calculated to exclude large num­
bers of victims, since much crime, especially that of personal injury, is 
committed within "criminal" subcultures, among nonstrangers, or in sit­
uations of developing interpersonal conflict. These limitations, however, 
have been reduced in the United States as a result of the federal funding 
provisions, which now require compensation to be paid in domestic vio­
lence cases, which were excluded under the "household" and "family" 
rules. Similarly, there has been an attempt to narrow down the "unjust 
enrichment" exception (Parent et al., 1992:21-22). 
Finally, "unworthiness" may be related to the victim's conduct after the 
offense was committed, for example, whether the victim reported the of­
fense to the police and how speedily application was made for an award. 
This type of requirement is generally classified by the literature under the 
separate heading of "cooperation with the authorities" (Miers, 1990:72; 
Parent et al., 1992:25). 
A compensation scheme is of little value to victims who are unaware of 
its existence. A Louis Harris survey conducted in New York found that 
only 35% of the victims questioned knew of the existence of the scheme 
(Bucuvalas, 1984:36-39; cf. also Friedman et al., 1982:55). A general lack 
of awareness is thought to be true of other jurisdictions also (Ramker and 
Meagher, 1982:76; McCormack, 1991:334, 336), although program direc­
tors perceive some improvement in this area (Parent et al., 1992:12). 
One method adopted by some schemes to overcome this problem is to 
impose an obligation on law enforcement personnel to notify victims of 
their rights—including the possibility of applying for compensation. This 
came to be known as the "reverse Miranda" (McGillis and Smith, 1983:93; 
Doerner, 1977:108). However, a survey conducted by Rich and Stenzel 
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(1980) found that few of the schemes had endorsed the obligation to inform 
victims; moreover, such provisions had mixed results (McGillis and 
Smith, 1983:93). Further, even an informed victim may not have the know­
how or the resources for filing a claim, or even convenient geographical 
access, since most of the programs are centralized (cf. McCormack, 
1991:336—38). A decision to seek legal advice will not necessarily resolve 
the problem, since the compensation tribunals are ambivalent in their 
attitude to the participation of attorneys and the fee allowed—sometimes 
limited to between 2% and 15% of the award—may be insufficient to 
attract an attorney's services (Friedman et al., 1982:169; McGillis and 
Smith, 1983:84-85; Parent et al., 1992:32). 
These inhibiting factors, combined with lack of information on the one 
hand, and familiarity with program eligibility restrictions on the other, 
have undoubtedly contributed to low application rates on the part of vic­
tims. A survey conducted by Doerner (1977) indicated that the rate of 
claims filed in California, Maryland, Massachusetts, and New York during 
the years 1967 through 1975 varied from 0.25% to 2.97% of the violent 
crimes known to the police. The Louis Harris survey conducted in New 
York found that among the victims who had heard of the Compensation 
Board (35% of the sample) only 7% filed a claim—representing 2% of the 
sample. Of those suffering injuries, 10% filed a claim (Bucuvalas, 1984:37). 
Similarly, Elias (1984:110), on the basis of his study of compensation 
claims in Brooklyn, New York, and Newark, New Jersey, estimated that 
"less than 1 % of all violent crime victims (who constituted about 20% of 
all crime victims) applied for compensation" (cf. also Hudson, 1984:43). 
More recently, McCormack (1991:329) reported that 8.5% of recorded vic­
tims of violent crime in New Jersey in 1987 applied for compensation. In a 
national survey he found that application rates varied widely among the 
states "from a high of 31 percent (in Colorado) to a low of 1.2 percent (in 
Illinois and Louisiana)" and that the national average was 6% (330, 334). 
Further, the studies conducted by Elias and others found that compen­
sation boards only made awards in about one-third of the cases in which 
applications were made. However, McCormack (1991:330-36) reported a 
national average of 65.7%—again, with considerable variation by state, 
from 31% for New Jersey to 100% for Washington. The national figure 
was a slight improvement on the 60% noted by McGillis and Smith 
(1983:100-103). 
The cumulative effect of restrictive criteria for eligibility, poor dissemi­
nation of information, difficulties or inhibitions in the making of applica­
tions, and the rejection of claims results in the tiny proportion of victims 
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of violent crime who actually receive compensation from the boards. 
Where application rates did not exceed 2% and success rates were one in 
three, less than 1% of such victims were compensated. McCormack's 
more recent national survey estimated that nationwide 3.8% of victims of 
reported violent crime received compensation—a rate that would be re­
duced by half if unreported crime were to be taken into account (Mc­
Cormack, 1991:330, 333). Similarly, Parent et al. (1992) estimate that 
claims were filed in less than 2% of the estimated 5.7 million violent 
crime victimizations that occurred in the United States in 1987 and that 
70% of these were allowed (32, 16). Even allowing for some further im­
provement since the data for these studies were collected in the late 1980s, 
the outcome is not encouraging for victims. 
It seems probable that the overwhelming majority of the uncompen­
sated victims do not in fact qualify under current eligibility requirements. 
Some 90% of crimes of violence do not result in the need for medical 
treatment (Garofalo and McDermott, 1979:446); approximately one-half 
fail to report the offense (although proportionately few of these are in­
volved in serious offenses); many do not meet the minimum loss require­
ment; and some are not "innocent." Moreover, Parent et al. (1992:6, 16) 
estimate that a large proportion of the remainder are covered by private 
medical insurance, thereby rendering them ineligible for compensation. 
Parent et al. (1992) estimate that between 168,000 and 336,000 victims 
per year are eligible, depending upon the precise eligibility criteria applied. 
Since the programs surveyed reported making 65,000 awards in their last 
fiscal year, the authors concluded that the programs may be reaching be­
tween 20% and 50% of potentially eligible victims, and that "the propor­
tion of eligible crime victims served by compensation programs is higher 
than it is generally believed to be" (6). Even if this is true, most victims 
may still be ineligible because their losses are of the wrong type, their 
injuries are insufficient, or they are insufficiently "innocent" or coopera­
tive with the police, and so on. 
Studies conducted in other countries also indicate only a moderate level 
of success with compensation awards. Canadian studies (Statistics Divi­
sion, 1984; Stuebing, 1984) found that the vast majority of the public were 
unaware of the existence of a compensation board. Indeed, only 13% of 
victims who had received medical treatment and who were thus prima 
facie candidates for awards knew they could file claims. Moreover, fewer 
than one-third of those who had this knowledge—3.8% of all the treated 
victims—actually filed claims. 
The British Criminal Injuries Compensation Board cited a 19% applica­
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tion rate in its early years (Vennard, 1978). Sophisticated attempts in more 
recent years to assess the eligible population have produced estimates of 
the proportion applying as being between 26% (Newburn, 1989:13) to 
nearer two-thirds (Miers, 1990:34), of whom 65% are successful in obtain­
ing awards. In Germany, on the other hand, Villmow (1986:423, 428) found 
that only 6% of victims of violent acts made applications and that "bene­
fits were denied in 63% of the cases." These figures, based on data col­
lected in the late 1970s, strongly resemble those of the early American 
studies. Another German scholar found that "many victims apply, but the 
law gives almost nothing" (Kirchhoff, 1983-84:29), while a Dutch study 
concluded that "less than one per cent of all victims of violent crimes are 
reached by the fund" (Van Dijk, 1985:6). 
Apart from the low probability of receiving an award, the delay involved 
in applying to the compensation tribunal and in obtaining the award may 
also be a problem. In many cases, the victim may be in need of immediate 
funds to deal with the victimization trauma. Some schemes recognize this 
need and grant emergency awards. Delay may in itself be a cause of victim 
hardship, in addition to the bureaucratic complications of systems "plagued 
with red tape and huge backlogs" (Cronin and Borque, 1980:100). Most of 
the American schemes, however, now make provision for emergency 
awards. Finally, even those applicants who are successful may receive less 
than the sum requested, owing to maximum limits, financial need require­
ments, disputed evaluations, and so on. 
These findings hardly suggest that victim compensation schemes—at 
least as they function today—are a universal panacea for meeting the vic-
tim's material needs. Victim compensation "gives too little, too late, to too 
few of the crime victims" (Van Dijk, 1984:84). They lend credence to the 
view expressed by Elias (1983a) that victim compensation schemes are in 
fact symbolic gestures on the part of the political establishment. The exis­
tence of such schemes tends to conceal the fact that most victims still lack 
an adequate remedy. The legislation providing for federal subsidies in the 
United States has encouraged expansion of the schemes, as well as requir­
ing removal of some of the eligibility restrictions. Others, however, re­
main. VOCA (sec. 1403(a)(l)) specified that property damage would not be 
covered by the federal grant. Moreover, this grant only covers a maximum 
of 40% of the cost of the scheme, or rather of the state's expenditure on 
compensation payments two years earlier; the remaining 60% of the fund­
ing, as well as administrative costs, will still have to be raised by the state. 
Hence the reluctance of many program administrations to promote their 
services (Parent et al., 1992:14). 
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Offenders. Public compensation of the victim does not in itself directly 
involve the offender. Advocates of restitution, however, might argue that 
such provisions would have a negative effect on offender rehabilitation. 
The offender's belief that the state will compensate the victim would tend 
to negate his or her personal responsibility for the harm inflicted and to 
operate as a "neutralization technique." Moreover, this would result in 
encouraging crime, and therefore also be harmful to society as a whole. 
However, compensation programs may have more direct consequences 
for the offender. The state generally assumes a right of subrogation 
whereby the benefit of any civil suit or restitution claim brought against 
the offender becomes vested in the state or the compensation board (Teson, 
1982:562-63; Parent et al., 1992:30; and see sec. 317 of the Uniform Vic­
tims of Crime Act, 1992). Thus it may be argued that the function of state 
compensation is to ensure that financial assistance be available to the 
victim, but not to relieve the offender of his or her liability. 
There is thus a potential threat to the offender's resources similar to 
that discussed under the topic of restitution. However, this potential is 
limited by the fact that claims will relate exclusively to injury compensa­
tion and will arise only where a specified minimum loss has been incurred. 
Hence the liability of offenders to compensate may be limited, as indicated 
by the low amounts in fact recovered through subrogation.7 
Apart from the possibility of the offender's covering the cost of compen­
sating the victim on the individual level, an increasingly popular solution 
to the problem of cost is for offenders to carry the burden collectively, by 
means of the levying of an indemnity on all offenders—or on all offenders 
falling into particular categories—in addition to the penal sanction im­
posed by the court. Unlike the somewhat cumbersome, and in many cases 
probably fruitless, remedy of instigating civil suits against individual of­
fenders, the collective levy is a much more realistic approach in practical 
terms, as evidenced by the fact that the majority of the compensation 
programs currently obtain a large part of their funding in this way (Parent 
et al., 1992:38). The justice of this solution will be discussed below. In 
terms of offender resources, however, the strain is relatively marginal, 
since the burden is shared among offenders as a whole, rather than devolv­
ing on the individual perpetrator. The indemnity usually takes the form of 
a fixed fee or percentage of the fine imposed. 
Society. Before their instigation, there was considerable speculation re­
garding the cost of victim compensation programs. This speculation devel­
oped into more specific assessments during the late 1970s, when Congress 
was considering proposals whereby the federal government would pay 25% 
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or 50% of the cost of all state compensation. It is revealing to review these 
assessments with the hindsight of familiarity with the contemporary costs 
of the programs. 
Garofalo and Sutton (1977) used data from the 1974 National Crime 
Survey to estimate the numbers and extent of injuries for which claims 
could be filed under a compensation scheme. They concluded that the 
maximum cost of a program, if all those eligible applied and in the ab­
sence of minimum-loss criteria, would be approximately $261.1 million, 
while the incorporation of such criteria might reduce the cost to $174.3 
million or $143.6 million, depending upon the criterion adopted (37). In 
another study by Garofalo and McDermott (1979), using National Crime 
Survey data for 1974 through 1976, other eligibility criteria were added— 
exclusion of victims who were related to the offender, and the require­
ment that the crime must have been reported to the police. The costs of 
the various combinations were estimated to vary from $276.6 million (no 
eligibility criteria) to $194.7 million (all criteria apply). Jones (1979), using 
both FBI and National Crime Survey data, arrived at a maximum cost of 
$248.4 million. In spite of the methodological problems involved in mak­
ing such assessments, the similarity of these assessments indicates a high 
level of reliability, although Meiners (1978), an opponent of victim com­
pensation, estimated its cost as $400 million and predicted that this 
would rise to $1 billion.8 
By contrast, Jones (1979:138), on learning of the low utilization experi­
ence of the New York compensation board, "adjusted" his estimate to only 
$48 million; he therefore concluded that a federal bill under which a 25% 
subsidy was being proposed would cost the federal government consider­
ably less than the $30 million it was planned to allocate for this purpose. 
In retrospect it appears that Jones's revised estimate was probably the 
closest, if somewhat too conservative. This can be explained in terms of 
the particularly low utilization rates in New York when Jones obtained his 
data, as compared with prevailing practices nationwide. Data presented by 
McGillis and Smith (1983) regarding the operating costs of 28 state compen­
sation boards in 1981 indicated a total cost, that is, including overheads, of 
approximately $57 million. At the end of the 1980s, the 41 programs re­
sponding in the survey by Parent et al. (1992:36) paid out a total of $125.6 
million, over 30% in California.9 Given inflation, these figures may not be 
substantially higher than Jones's. The point is of importance, since his 
original estimate—as well as those of the other researchers—was five 
times higher, an indication of the extent to which victims' needs are un­
met, and to which costs to the public are being "saved." 
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hi addition to the costs of the compensation awards themselves, the 
administrative costs of the programs must be taken into account. These 
amount on average to 16.1% of the award totals but vary considerably by 
state, from 2.7% for Missouri, to 31.4% for Wyoming.10 The costs of these 
programs do not necessarily fall upon the general public. Data collected by 
Parent et al. (1992:38) at the end of the 1980s found that while a dozen 
states financed an average of 83% of the budget out of general revenue, a 
majority of the states covered most of the budget out of fines and penalties 
levied on offenders. On average, 15% of the budgets were at this time 
covered by federal subsidies under VOCA, a percentage that was expected 
to increase as more states complied with federal requirements. This federal 
budget—the Crime Victims Fund—is also paid for primarily from fines, as 
well as special assessments of between $25 and $50 per offense (2). 
It is difficult to draw conclusions about whether any public program is 
or is not "excessively costly." It has been observed that the cost of a 
compensation program is not unduly heavy as compared with other feder­
ally funded programs. The same is true if its costs are compared with other 
heads of criminal justice expenditure. Moreover, it seems somewhat bi­
zarre to save public funds by administering a program that will fail to reach 
most of the people for whom it is nominally intended, although, as noted 
above, perhaps this was the intention of the policy makers. Further, some 
expansion of the program may be relatively low in cost. It was once calcu­
lated that by removing the minimum award requirement, the number of 
potential beneficiaries could be nearly tripled with only a 12% increase in 
costs being incurred (Garofalo and McDermott, 1979:456-57). On the 
other hand, if the programs were to be rendered comprehensive and to be 
fully utilized, costs would—on the basis of the early estimates—rise con­
siderably. It was once estimated that extension of the programs to property 
offenses would cost 7% of the gross national product!11 
In addition to direct economic cost, other types of social costs and 
benefits are envisaged as the result of the implementation of compensation 
schemes. One anticipated benefit is a greater willingness to report crimes 
and to cooperate with the criminal justice system, thereby increasing the 
efficiency of law enforcement. However, a series of analyses conducted by 
Doerner and his colleagues in both the United States and Canada (see, e.g., 
Doerner et al., 1980) did not produce any conclusive evidence that the 
introduction of compensation programs gave rise to higher reporting rates. 
This is not surprising in the light of the lack of awareness of the programs 
and the low rate of successful claims. In such circumstances, any positive 
feedback would surely be slight. Nor do attitudinal surveys suggest that 
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victims having contact with compensation tribunals express any greater 
readiness to cooperate with law enforcement authorities in the future (see 
below). 
Meiners hypothesized that the availability of state compensation would 
act as an incentive to the commission of crime. This economic analysis is 
supported by the "neutralization technique" argument raised above, to the 
effect that offenders can rationalize that their conduct does not inflict a 
direct loss on their selected victims. However, while this attitude is com­
monly attributed to housebreakers, it seems less plausible in the context of 
crimes of violence. 
Perceived Justice Needs 
When the function of the New York State Crime Victims Compensation 
Board was explained to them, 93% of the victims interviewed in the Louis 
Harris survey expressed their approval (Bucuvalas, 1984:43, 45). The senti­
ment behind this statistic may simply have been that something should be 
done to help victims. Respondents did not have to choose between alterna­
tive remedies for the victim. Thus 94% favored "making convicted crimi­
nals help pay part of the cost of compensation and services for victims," 
and 95% favored offender restitution (47). 
By contrast, the specific attitudes of victims to the compensation boards 
were much more negative. First, a generally poor image seems to be indi­
cated by the fact that even among those who knew about the boards many 
did not bother to apply (37-38). Moreover, other studies have shown that 
those who have had experience with compensation claims express nega­
tive views. Elias (1984) found that "80% of those who did recover were not 
satisfied with their award. Three quarters of all applicants said they would 
not apply for compensation again. Almost one in five ruled out a future 
claim because, although they had received an award from their first applica­
tion, they considered it insufficient" (111). 
Satisfaction has thus been found to be related to the victim's experience 
with the compensation board, and in particular to the outcome of the 
claim. The study by Doerner and Lab (1980) found that claimants who 
received compensation from the Florida Crimes Compensation Commis­
sion in 1977 were more likely to be satisfied with the commission and to 
declare their intention to cooperate with it in the future than claimants 
whose claims were rejected. Elias, too, found that "some claimants (those 
receiving adequate rewards) had more positive awards than did non-
claimants generally" (111). However, "so overwhelmingly negative were 
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most claimants (those receiving an inadequate or no award) that the vic­
tims who did not encounter the compensation board at all (nonclaimants) 
actually had significantly more positive attitudes and a greater willingness 
to cooperate than did those who had such contact (claimants)—a result 
precisely opposite from that expected by compensation's proponents" 
(ibid.). For similar reasons a Dutch study also found that "the Fund on 
balance tends to generate more negative than positive feelings amongst its 
applicants" (Van Dijk, 1985:15). 
Thus, the effect of the encounter with the compensation boards on the 
part of the relatively few victims who do have contact with them is far 
from being wholly positive. Moreover, even for those victims who receive 
awards and develop favorable views of the board, this does not generate any 
"spin-off" benefit resulting in such victims having a better opinion of the 
criminal justice system generally than other victims, or in having a greater 
disposition to report offenses in the future (Doerner et al. 1976; Doerner 
and Lab, 1980; Shapland 1984:140; Van Dijk, 1985:15). 
Most of the victims in the Louis Harris survey cited above, who ex­
pressed support for the New York compensation board, had not had per­
sonal experience with the board. At the same time, most respondents 
supported expansion of the program, even if this meant extra cost to the 
state; indeed a majority even favored its extension to victims of property 
crime (Bucuvalas, 1984:47). The question arises whether liberalization of 
the programs would reduce the apparently high level of dissatisfaction 
expressed today on the part of the persons encountering the compensation 
boards, or whether it would have the opposite effect. This would depend 
partly on the extent to which claimants had accurate information and 
realistic assessments of the anticipated decisions of the boards. It would 
also depend on the nature of the liberalization of the board's policy. Elias 
(1984), for example, found that New Jersey claimants were more satisfied 
than New York claimants, and he attributed this to the fact that claims 
were recognized in New Jersey as of right, rather than ex gratia (112). 
Similarly, the effect of other program variables, including procedural 
variables, should be monitored to determine how each is related to victim 
satisfaction. Shapland et al. (1985) argue that the interest shown by the 
compensation board, and its recognition of the victimization—where this 
in fact occurs—may be more important to the victim than the award itself. 
Per contra it has been suggested that one source of negative reactions of 
victims to the compensation experience may be that the state representa­
tive appears in an adversary relationship vis-a-vis the victim (Grabovsky, 
1985). 
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This, in turn, leads to the final point: the true adversary, if there is to be 
one, is surely thought to be the offender. Hence it is from the offender that 
the victim expects payment. This is supported by the small survey con­
ducted by Van Dijk (1985:11). Payment deriving from another source (the 
state) may give rise to dissatisfaction. Such a hypothesis would be consis­
tent with equity theory, to be considered below. 
As to offenders, little information is available regarding their attitudes 
toward victim compensation. On one view they might be expected to 
approve of such programs, which, as suggested above, might even be seen 
as providing a rationalization for their continued offending. Equity theory, 
however, hypothesizes the contrary. Indeed, it hypothesizes that both 
participants and observers of the inequity created by the criminal offense 
should be dissatisfied. For not only has the initial inequity between 
harmdoer and victim not been remedied, but a new inequity has been 
created. The state, which was not the cause of the initial inequity, has 
undertaken to incur a loss in order to compensate the victim. This gives 
rise to a further inequity, and the distress created by the original 
inequity—to all parties concerned—is thereby compounded, or at least 
replaced by a new inequity. Some support for this hypothesis is found in 
the experimental research conducted by de Carufel (1981) described in 
chapter 5. 
The situation is further complicated in the context of the American 
compensation schemes by virtue of the fact that much of the compensa­
tion funds derives not from the collectivity of taxpayers but from offend­
ers, albeit not the specific offender who caused the particular inequity. 
This is clearly a topic worthy of further investigation. 
Similarly, the general public might also be expected to support victim 
compensation schemes, and some evidence has been found to this effect 
(St. Louis, 1976). On the one hand, the public is thought to identify with 
the victim. On the other, the schemes are relatively inexpensive, since 
most victims do not benefit from them. Indeed, these are the very reasons 
for which some writers believe victim compensation schemes to have been 
adopted so enthusiastically by politicians.12 The fact that most programs 
are at least partially funded by fees levied on offenders would be calculated 
to strengthen public support even further, as would provisions whereby the 
state could seek reimbursement of the payment from the offender.13 
Nevertheless, objections might be forthcoming from conservative mone­
tarists who object to any form of public expense or state interventionism 
that might be associated with welfare, and who might expect the victim to 
rely either on recourse to the offender or on private insurance. The majority 
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of a sample of jurists also objected to the principle of imposing a duty on the 
state to compensate victims and expressed a preference for offender restitu­
tion (Gandy, 1978). 
Finally, if equity theorists are correct, state compensation creates a 
problem of perceived inequity for all who "observe" it, because these 
payments, when forthcoming, are made by the wrong party—the state 
rather than the harmdoer. The inadequacy of the payments might be 
another source of perceived inequity, and this would be consistent with 
the findings referred to above; however, in accordance with equity theory 
it is also possible that victims who received less than full compensation 
might attribute this to their own "unworthiness," leading to restoration 
of psychological rather than actual equity (see above, chap. 5). Both exten­
sive surveys and in-depth research are required to explore these issues 
further. 
Fundamental Principles of Justice 
The literature on victim compensation, especially the earlier writings, has 
devoted considerable attention to the question of the rationale behind the 
concept.14 Does the state have a duty to compensate the crime victim? If 
so, what is the source of this duty? If not, why should crime victims 
receive preferential treatment over other categories of victims? Why 
should compensation be paid to victims of violent crimes but not to vic­
tims of property crimes? 
If a pragmatic or utilitarian response is given to these questions—for 
example, if victim compensation schemes are justified in terms of cost-
benefit analysis—the question of fundamental principles of justice does 
not arise. The value of the schemes must from this perspective be tested 
solely by empirical evaluation of their relative costs and benefits, which 
were considered above. Other "pragmatic" objectives that have been tested 
empirically are,crime reduction and the prevention of the alienation of 
victims (Carrow, 1980a:6-7). On another view, the search for an agreed 
rationale is likely to be fruitless, compensation schemes having been estab­
lished not as a result of the force of theoretical arguments for their adop­
tion, nor in the wake of scientific research, but simply to meet political 
needs (Miers, 1978; Greer, 1994:397). 
Nevertheless, a brief attempt will be made here to consider some of the 
arguments raised in support of victim compensation schemes, insofar as 
they raise issues of justice. The most frequently cited rationales are the 
state's duty to protect its citizens, the social welfare theory, and the 
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"shared risk" theory, whereby taxation is seen as a mechanism for social 
insurance against crime (Lamborn, 1973b:462-64; Carrow, 1980a:5-6; 
Merrill, 1981:268-69). Most of these arguments are derived, albeit not 
always explicitly, from the literature of social philosophy dealing with the 
relationship between the citizen and the state, and with the justificational 
bases for the distribution of goods among categories of citizens according 
to various criteria. These are very different issues from those that arose 
when justice-related criteria were discussed in previous chapters, where 
the focus was on the appropriateness of various sanctions from the perspec­
tive of the competing philosophies of punishment; indeed, insofar as juris­
prudential issues have been raised in the present context, they have been 
related instead to civil law. 
However, although this point has been generally ignored in the litera­
ture, victim compensation schemes may also raise certain criminal justice 
issues, as well as the social justice issues of which there has been a greater 
awareness. In other words, victim compensation may have a bearing not 
only on distributive justice but also on retributive justice. 
Distributive Justice. Various principles of distributive justice were con­
sidered earlier in chapter 6. The three alternatives posited by Miller 
(1976)—right, desert, and needs—appear to represent alternative principles 
upon which compensation schemes might be based. However, in view of 
the special role played by the state in criminal justice, it may be appropri­
ate first to consider the rationale for state compensation deriving from 
social contract theory. 
One frequently mentioned justification for state compensation schemes 
is the state's failure to fulfill its undertaking to enforce the law and prevent 
citizen victimization, an area in which the state has assumed a virtual 
monopoly (Lamborn, 1973b:462), perhaps by virtue of a social contract 
(Merrill, 1981:268). This monopoly is said to give rise to an implicit obliga­
tion on the part of the state to protect all citizens and to pay compensation 
if it fails in this obligation. This argument may have been weakened by the 
rapid development of private security in recent years, which seems to 
imply a perceived dilution of the state's duty to protect, and thus also to 
compensate on failure to do so! Historically, however, when the local 
parish was responsible for the maintenance of order, ratepayers would be 
liable for the compensation of victims, a tradition that survives in Ireland 
for certain property offenses (Greer and Mitchell, 1982: chap. 10). 
Most authors do not discuss the applicability of the social contract in 
depth—perhaps because of its clearly fictitious nature—but merely note 
that it has not been generally accepted, as indicated by the failure of most 
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states to recognize victim compensation as a right. Aynes, whose thesis 
regarding the right not to be a victim was discussed in chapter 6, did not 
insist upon the social contract theory in justification of his argument. 
Moreover, the social contract theory was invoked indirectly by Meiners 
(1978) as a basis for the case against victim compensation. Meiners applied 
the principles of justice posited by Rawls, which themselves derive from a 
variation of social contract theory, to the issue of victim compensation and 
concluded that the use of public funds for victim compensation was in 
conflict with these principles. Meiners argued as follows: "Random victim­
ization is similar to natural disasters that none could have been reasonably 
expected to foresee or prevent. . . . Most random disasters result in rela­
tively small costs which can be borne by the victim. Individuals can either 
bear the full costs of the misfortune at the time of occurrence or spread the 
cost over time by purchasing insurance" (68). Meiners therefore argued 
that citizens "in the original position/' that is, about to form a social 
contract or constitution, would not have opted for state responsibility for 
random disasters resulting in small costs, with which he classifies crimi­
nal victimization, but only for very costly tragedies which "few individu­
als can afford" (68). The ability of even the most unfortunate to afford some 
form of self-assistance follows in his view from the application of Rawls's 
difference principle of income distribution (69).15 
There are a number of difficulties with Meiners's analysis, such as deter­
mining what persons in the original position would see as a "small" and 
what as a "costly" tragedy. Since many victimizations are costly at least 
from the point of view of the individual victim, if not objectively so (see 
chap. 4), this might lead to precisely the opposite conclusion from that 
reached by Meiners—that citizens would see themselves as greatly benefit­
ing from a compensation scheme at relatively low public cost.16 
Another argument put forward by Meiners, apparently as a part of his 
Rawlsian analysis, is that victimization is not in fact entirely random but 
depends partly on personal preferences for risk taking, which affect the 
probability of victimization (68-69). The implication here is that parties to 
the social contract would not have anticipated paying compensation for 
injuries that could have been avoided. It is true that victimization is not 
random. However, its distribution is related to variables such as age, sex, 
ethnic group (Skogan and Maxfield, 1981), and lifestyle (Hindelang, 1982; 
Fattah, 1991: chap. 12), variables that are not, or are only partly (in the case 
of lifestyle), under the victims' or potential victims' control. Moreover, it 
is questionable how far citizens should be obligated to inhibit their daily 
activities in order to prevent victimization. It has also been argued that the 
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avoidance of locations perceived as dangerous in fact increases the probabil­
ity of crimes being committed in these areas (Wilson and Kelling, 1982), 
since the dilution of the population present renders those remaining even 
more vulnerable. 
Even if we accept the conclusion that Rawls's principles do not justify 
recognition of the victim's right to compensation from the state, the basis 
for this conclusion is not the social contract approach as such but the 
particular terms of this contract as envisaged by Rawls. While Rawls's 
second principle is concerned with reconciling equality and need as a basis 
of justice—neither of which would seem to exclude state compensation— 
his first principle is concerned with preserving a maximum amount of 
liberty. This may tend to operate as a conservative, limiting principle when 
applied to the distribution of goods in society. Perhaps this discussion on 
the applicability of the Rawlsian thesis to victim compensation merely 
illustrates the difficulties of basing particular rights on a social contract 
approach. 
More specific recognition of victims' rights was developed by Aynes 
(1984) based on the Fourteenth Amendment. Indeed, if a right to absolute 
state protection could be read into this provision, it would clearly follow 
that the state had a correlative duty to protect the citizen from victimiza­
tion, and if it failed in the performance of this duty, to pay compensation. 
As indicated in chapter 6, however, this interpretation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment is problematic. In practice, states are naturally reluctant to 
recognize the existence of such a duty "because if there were such a duty it 
would be impossible to confine it to personal injury as opposed to damage 
to property" (Greer and Mitchell, 1982:325). 
The rejection of the "rights" approach to victim compensation is re­
flected in the principle adopted in many jurisdictions having such schemes, 
that all payments are to be ex gratia, at the discretion of the tribunal empow­
ered to make the award. Indeed, in England the scheme has always been 
administered on a nonstatutory basis, and when a statute was finally en­
acted in 1988, it was not implemented (Miers, 1990:16-17; Home Office, 
1993:7). Moreover, even under those schemes in which the victim's claim is 
recognized as of right, many categories of victim are excluded from its 
benefits. Were the victims seen to have an absolute right to compensation, 
there would be no grounds for adopting eligibility criteria, except perhaps 
those which were intended to ensure the validity of the claim. 
The desert criterion of justice seems to be closest to that in fact adopted 
by compensation schemes. As noted above, compensation is paid only to 
victims who are seen to be "deserving" according to various moral or 
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ethical criteria. Thus victims may be excluded from the programs if they 
are thought to have contributed in some way to the commission of the 
offense, if they are morally or legally "tainted," or if they have failed to 
cooperate with law enforcement agencies. "Desert" is of course referred to 
here in a positive sense, as a basis for reward, as contrasted with the 
negative desert, which refers to the principle on the basis of which punish­
ment is due (cf. Miller, 1976:87). Operationally, the principles upon which 
the victim's (distributional) desert is established and measured are the 
inverse of those upon which the offender's (retributional) desert is deter­
mined under the justice model, namely, the seriousness of the injury in­
flicted, for which here, too, the application of psychophysical scales have 
been suggested (Wolfgang, 1975); and the "nonculpability" of the victim 
(cf. von Hirsch, 1976). 
Politicians and the promoters of victim-oriented programs hold to an 
image of the "ideal" victim whom they want to assist, and be perceived to 
be assisting. This image, however, is somewhat remote from the reality, 
especially where crimes of violence against the person are concerned. Vic­
tims are likely to belong to the same subculture as the offender (see above, 
chap. 3). The fact that ideal victims may account for only a relatively small 
part of the actual victim population is, of course, an advantage economi­
cally for the promoters of these programs, insofar as their funding has to be 
supported largely out of public resources (i.e., their constituents' taxes). As 
indicated earlier, because of the relatively small number of claimants, the 
programs are relatively inexpensive. 
However, serious doubts arise as to whether the desert approach can be 
justified. The starting point for all rationales of victim compensation is not 
that the victim is a worthy citizen,17 but that he or she has been the object 
of a criminal offense. Although the concept of distribution based upon 
principles of desert may be a dominant force in contemporary political 
thinking, there seems to be no logical justification in superimposing such a 
principle on compensation schemes in order to restrict their application, 
for the rationale for these schemes does not derive from this principle. One 
may also recall in this context the feminist complaint before the reform of 
rape laws that the rules of evidence applied to rape trials made it seem that 
it was the female victim who was on trial, since the proceedings focused 
on her alleged proclivity to consensual sexual intercourse, both in the 
instant case and on previous occasions (Berger, 1977). Thus, the "worthi­
ness" of the victim became the dominant issue in the criminal trial. A 
similar trend is evident in the present context. 
Need is in principle the most "progressive" criterion for social justice. It 
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is closely identified with the principles of the welfare state and the provi­
sion of benefits to the socially disadvantaged, principles that have gained 
support in both the legal and social work literature. The need criterion is 
indeed invoked by some compensation tribunals, but only in a negative 
sense. Some jurisdictions apply a "needs test," restricting compensation 
awards to the needy, although in the United States this requirement is 
becoming relatively less common (Parent et al., 1992:23). Such provisions 
have been criticized not only because of their limiting function but also 
because the means test is perceived as stigmatic. Moreover, as noted, the 
need principle has an exclusively negative function here, for it does not 
allow for an award to be made to a needy person not fulfilling the other 
requirements laid down by the scheme's provisions. 
Need as a positive criterion would be an attractive principle upon which 
to base a compensation scheme. According to such a criterion, all persons 
who had suffered loss as the result of victimization and who were in need 
of compensation could receive it. However, there would be many practical 
objections to such a scheme, in particular the breadth of its application 
(depending on the definition of need) and the administrative complications 
involved in the widespread application of means tests, as well as the objec­
tion to such tests referred to above. 
Moreover, the needs approach also raises a problem of principle. If the 
criterion for assistance to the disadvantaged is need, why should special 
privileges be granted to persons whose disadvantage stems from a criminal 
offense rather than from other causes (cf. Miers, 1978)? This is the problem 
of "horizontal equity," which arises whenever a particular category of vic­
tim is selected for favorable treatment (cf. Fleming, 1982, in the context of 
drug injury compensation plans). Harris et al. (1984), in the course of a 
comprehensive analysis of various compensation options available in Brit­
ain in the wake of different types of injury, concluded that "the future 
policy-maker should plan to phase out all existing compensation systems 
which favour accident victims (or any category of them) over illness vic­
tims" and "the abolition of every compensation scheme which is based on 
a particular category of causation" (327-28).18 Thus, not only is a needs or 
"consequence" approach entirely remote from the philosophy of the pre­
vailing system (cf. Miers, 1990:330), it may be inconsistent with the very 
existence of crime compensation schemes. 
Retributive Justice. Since victim compensation schemes are a mecha­
nism whereby public funds are allocated to a particular category of individu­
als, they are generally thought to raise questions primarily of distributive 
justice. Compensation programs may, however, also involve latent issues of 
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retributive justice. This possibility arises both on the basis of philosophical 
considerations and because of the practicalities of current compensation 
schemes. 
As to the philosophical considerations, it is suggested that the term retri­
bution may be concerned not only with the infliction of sanctions on the 
offender but also with the restitutio in integrum of the victim. The relation­
ship between court-ordered restitution orders and retributive theory has 
been discussed elsewhere in this volume. The connection between restitu­
tion and retribution was seen to rest in part upon an analysis of the early 
history of criminal justice, which was once essentially a mechanism for the 
payment of compensation by the offender to the victim, generally on the 
basis of a tariff. The suggestion that restitution could be seen as retributive 
was also based upon the idea that retribution means that while the offender 
must pay for his or her sins, such payment need not take the form of a 
corporal or other punishment enacted by the state, but could also be a 
monetary payment to the victim. 
This argument may be developed further. The term retribution derived 
from Latin literally means "paying back." This concept has two compo­
nents: the duty of the offender to repay, and the right of the victim to be 
paid. The development of the criminal justice system has been such that 
all the emphasis has been placed upon the first component. The state has 
assumed the victim's erstwhile role as prosecuting party in order to ensure 
that the offender indeed fulfills his or her obligation and repays his or her 
debt, albeit not to the originally designated beneficiary. There now appears 
to be an awareness that the second component—the victim's right to 
restitutio in integrum—has been unjustly forgotten. If, in recognition of 
this right the state, rather than forgoing its role as the agency that exacts 
justice from the offender, elects to continue in this role but also to pay the 
victim his or her due, could this not be construed as merely completing the 
retributive process? 
The adoption of this view would have implications for the determina­
tion of the conceptual basis upon which compensation programs rest. 
Clearly, the above analysis would lead to the adoption of the "rights" 
approach. If the state were seen as a kind of intermediary for the perfor­
mance of justice vis-a-vis the offender on the one hand and the victim on 
the other, there would be no ground for the incorporation of eligibility 
requirements based upon desert or need. 
This concept of the role of compensation programs leads directly to the 
second part of this analysis, based upon the structure of current compensa­
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tion schemes. As noted earlier, recognition of the principle that the state 
has some responsibility toward victims was not accompanied by a con­
comitant opening of the public coffers. The reverse was true: methods 
were sought for financing these schemes without draining public revenues. 
The most attractive solution, and one that has been widely adopted in the 
United States, was to transfer the financial burden to the offender. Indeed, 
this is undoubtedly seen to be a matter of ideology and justice rather than 
mere economy or administrative convenience. Offenders were the cause of 
victimization and should be made to pay. This approach undoubtedly lies 
behind the provision incorporated in many of the schemes for the subroga­
tion to the state of the victim's remedies against the offender; this type of 
provision is primarily a matter of ideology, since, as noted above, the poten­
tial for substantial revenue by this mechanism seems to be limited. Such 
provisions tend to place the compensation program within a retribution-
restitution framework. For if the state is to pay compensation to the victim 
and then to exact it from the offender, this is directly analogous to the 
restitution process of the criminal court. Rather than the judge ordering 
the offender to pay reparation to the victim, another state agency achieves 
the same result by a more circuitous route. On this analysis, compensation 
payments by the state possess the same degree of retributiveness as restitu­
tion orders (cf. chap. 7). 
The other type of funding provision is much more important in practice 
but much more problematical from the point of view of the current analy­
sis. As noted above, most state compensation schemes in the United States 
are funded, at least in part, by levies on certain categories of offenders. On 
the surface this, too, appears to be an expression of retributive principles: 
offenders are being made to pay for the harm inflicted upon victims. 
However, this extension of the retribution principle is objectionable in 
many ways.19 Offenders convicted of public order offenses or attempts, or 
of other charges involving no harm or almost no harm to a victim, are 
compelled to pay for the harm inflicted by other offenders. This may be 
seen as a form of collective punishment and may be criticized on a number 
of grounds of principle. 
First, criminal law generally confines vicarious responsibility, the ratio­
nale for which is difficult to identify (Fletcher, 1978), to certain limited 
categories. Second, to place all offenders in a single category for the pur­
pose of collective responsibility contradicts the trend of modern criminol­
ogy to regard criminality as a relative concept rather than a characteristic 
that dichotomizes the population into "them" and "us" (or in this case, 
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the liable and the exempt). Third, collective punishments that have been 
exacted in the past, whether in tribal society or in times of military occupa­
tion, have been condemned by international and human rights lawyers. 
Fourth, to adopt a Rawlsian analysis, it is doubtful whether persons "in the 
original position" would have wished to undertake responsibility for the 
harm inflicted as a result of offenses committed by others. If this is retribu­
tion, it is a far cry from the concept of desert as countenanced by advocates 
of the justice model of punishment. 
On the other hand, these objections do not in principle apply to the 
financing of compensation schemes out of payments of fines (but see 
Thorvaldson and Krasnick, 1980). On the contrary, it seems wrong that the 
state, through the mechanism of the fine, should assume the victim's role 
in exacting retribution and should pocket the proceeds. Fine money should 
be available first and foremost for the benefit of victims. Of course, this 
differentiation between fines and special levies could be circumvented 
simply by increasing fines, so that additional funds were made available to 
finance victim compensation without any loss to other public revenues. 
However, while it is true that the level of fines is arbitrary and does not 
usually purport to be based upon scientific measures of offense serious­
ness, to raise fines beyond the level that seemed otherwise appropriate 
expressly for the purpose of assisting victims in general seems wrong in 
principle. 
Conclusion 
It seems that victim compensation schemes are based primarily on a desert 
model of (distributive) justice, or at best a rights model with desert as a 
limiting principle. Programs operating on this model, because of their eligi­
bility criteria, their failure to disseminate information effectively, and 
other reasons considered above, benefit relatively few victims and have not 
been very favorably perceived. Moreover, their basic rationale is hard to 
defend. Both "rights" (unqualified by desert) and "need" are easier to de­
fend as criteria for awarding compensation, but both would be costly; the 
first because all crime victims would have to be compensated in full, and 
the second because, apart from administrative complexity and costliness, 
it raises the issue of equality with victims of other types of misfortune. 
Reimbursement of state expenditure by individual offenders is justifi­
able on the same general grounds as direct restitution payments. However, 
this does not apply to the imposition of a collective burden on entire 
categories of offenders. 
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Escrow 
Another remedy unrelated to the criminal justice system that has been 
introduced in recent years is the establishment of escrow funds, by virtue 
of "Son-of-Sam" laws. Such laws are designed to prevent offenders from 
capitalizing on their offenses by selling their story to the media, following 
the example of the perpetrator of the Son-of-Sam murders in New York. 
The laws provide that monies paid under such contracts may be attached 
by the state and held in escrow for the benefit of victims who may subse­
quently succeed in bringing civil suits against the offender. In the absence 
of such suits, the monies may be paid into a Crime Victim Fund, to finance 
victim assistance or state compensation schemes, or may be returned to 
the offender. Under some laws, a percentage of the money may be made 
available for defense counsels' fees. Such laws have now been passed by 
most states (NOVA, 1989:16), and by Congress under the Victims of Crime 
Act of 1984. 
On the face of it, such legislation—although it has encountered constitu­
tional obstacles—seems to be of a generally positive character from the 
point of view of the criteria of the present study. If assets accruing to the 
defendant are held in escrow to meet future claims by the victim, this is 
merely a technique for enhancing the victim's chance of a successful suit 
under prevailing civil-law provisions. No substantial change in the sanc­
tioning of defendants or the rights of victims is involved. In principle the 
justice of escrow provisions has thus to be measured according to the 
justice of allowing victims to bring a civil suit. Victim compensation by 
means of a civil suit, to be discussed in chapter 12, would appear to be a 
generally desirable objective from the point of view of the coping needs of 
the parties, perceptions of justice, and, with certain reservations, funda­
mental principles of justice. 
Nevertheless two observations may be made regarding such legislation 
that cast serious doubt on its value. The first criticism is the rareness of the 
phenomenon. While acts of victimization are recorded in millions per an­
num, and of serious victimization in at least hundreds of thousands, the 
number of cases giving rise to the establishment of escrow funds is counted 
in single digits. The coping benefit of such legislation from the point of view 
of crime victims is thus minute. The phenomenon described in relation to 
victim compensation—namely, the adoption of legislation for political ends 
rather than as a solution to real problems—appears to apply here in an even 
more extreme form. The wave of Son-of-Sam or "notoriety-for-profit" stat­
utes adopted in recent years may genuinely assuage the moral indignation of 
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some sections of the electorate that offenders are capitalizing on their 
crimes, but it will do little to assist crime victims. 
The second observation derives from the conceptual analysis employed 
in this study. Escrow is discussed in the present chapter as a remedy uncon­
nected with the criminal justice system. In this respect it resembles public 
compensation schemes, which indeed are often responsible for administer­
ing the relevant funds (NOVA, 1989:16). However, as will emerge from the 
subsequent analysis of alternative models of justice, the underlying ap­
proach of the two remedies is radically different. Compensation schemes 
place responsibility for assisting the victim on the state; escrow is essen­
tially an adjunct to a civil-law action instigated by the victim against the 
offender and is thus consistent with the approach that favors settlement of 
the conflict between the parties directly involved. Greater consideration 
should be devoted to the question of which of these two approaches is the 
more desirable. Further, if the facilitation of civil actions by victims 
against offenders is recognized as a desirable objective, why is such facilita­
tion limited to those extremely rare cases in which offenders benefit from 
media contracts? Why not undertake more comprehensive reforms that 
would facilitate civil suits in general? 
Not only have these laws been little used, they have now been dealt a 
further blow by the Supreme Court, which, in the 1991 case of Simon &) 
Schuster v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims Board (50 CrL 
2019) held that the New York Son-of-Sam law—which, it will be recalled, 
was the first such law to be enacted—was inconsistent with the First 
Amendment of the Constitution. While the objective of depriving offenders 
of the profits deriving from their offenses was deemed to be a worthy one, 
the law was too widely drafted, since (a) the reference to the crime commit­
ted might be relatively marginal to the work in question, and (b) there was 
no requirement that the "offender" should have been convicted of, or even 
charged with, the offense.20 This "remedy," therefore, is of more interest for 
the theoretical issues it raises than for its practical implications. 
10

"Catch-All" Remedies: Victim/ 
Witness Assistance and Victims' 
Bills of Rights 
The two remedies dealt with in this chapter, victim/witness-assistance 
programs and victims' bills of rights, are not in fact specific reforms but 
comprehensive terms that effectively include or overlap with the reforms 
and proposals considered in the preceding chapters. The main difference 
between these two topics is that the first concept, victim/witness assis­
tance, emphasizes services provided to victims from the point of view of 
the service provider, while the bill-of-rights concept focuses rather on the 
victim's perspective of the services to which he or she may be entitled, as 
well as on the victim's role in the criminal process vis-a-vis the offender. 
However, both terms are lacking in precision and may overlap. A publica­
tion of the Bureau of Justice Statistics (1983] classified "recognition of the 
rights of victims and witnesses" under the heading "Victim and Witness 
Assistance." Nevertheless, the difference in perspective referred to here, as 
well as differences of substance in the focal areas of concern, renders the 
separate treatment of each topic desirable. 
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Victim/Witness Assistance 
The victim/witness-assistance program is perhaps the most popular expres­
sion of the victim movement. It appears to have received its initial impetus 
when the LEAA funded eight such programs in 1974 (Finn and Lee, 
19831V),1 although according to Roberts (1990:44-45) the first such pro­
gram was established in 1969. The American Bar Association also devel­
oped a Victim/Witness Assistance Project (see Lynch, 1976; ABA, 1981:5), 
and other organizations such as NOVA and Aurora became active in this 
field. Growth of such programs was slowed by the decline of federal bud­
gets for this purpose at the end of the 1970s, but their support by local 
agencies ultimately provided them with greater security (Finn and Lee, 
1983). 
Moreover, there was a renewal of federal activity in this sphere. The 
Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 provided for the development 
of guidelines to be issued by the Department of Justice to ensure that law 
enforcement personnel became sensitized to the service needs of victims. 
Many specific proposals were incorporated in the President's Task Force on 
Victims of Crime of 1982, while the Victims of Crime Act of 1984 provided 
for federal funding to the chief executive of each state for the financial 
support of eligible crime victim assistance programs; thus "by 1986 the 
funding and stability of victim service and witness assistance programs 
had increased dramatically" (Roberts, 1990:46). In 1989 the Victims of 
Crime Act provided $43 million for distribution to local victim-service 
programs (NOVA, 1989:6). Moreover, states have devised numerous meth­
ods for raising revenue for this purpose, including penalties imposed on 
convicted offenders or fine surcharges, tax concessions, and alcohol taxes; 
and funds for programs assisting victims of domestic violence may be 
raised from charges on certificates of marriage, divorce, births, and deaths 
(ibid., 5-6). 
Roberts (1990:42) refers to "over 600" programs serving crime victims in 
1987. However, Davis and Henley (1990:157) and Young (1990:182) refer to 
between 5,000 and 6,000 programs! In Britain, too, victim-support programs 
increased rapidly during the 1980s (Maguire and Corbett, 1987:10), although 
state funding has been very limited, heavy reliance being laid on volunteer 
activity (Mawby and Gill, 1987; Rock, 1990). Some other European coun­
tries also have burgeoning victim-assistance movements (see Guidelines for 
Victim Support in Europe, 1989), and a number of the provisions of the UN 
Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of 
Power of 1985 relate to victim assistance (see sees. 14-17). 
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While victim/witness-assistance programs may differ considerably both 
in content and in priorities, a study conducted for the National Institute of 
Justice identified a "common set of assumptions" that was shared by 280 
projects identified by the authors (Cronin and Bourque, 1981:7). These 
were 
That victims and witnesses have been badly treated by the criminal 
justice system as well as by the criminal. 
That projects based in local agencies or organizations can help to 
ameliorate this situation. 
That the criminal justice system as well as individual victims and 
witnesses will benefit from the effort. 
The specific purposes of the projects were also threefold: 
To ameliorate the effects of criminal victimization by the offender or 
by the criminal justice system. 
To envisage and facilitate the participation of victim and witnesses in 
the criminal justice system. 
To improve the criminal justice process through more effective and 
efficient victim/witness utilization. 
The specific content of the programs, as noted, may vary; one review 
identified six main areas of victim/witness assistance: (1) emergency ser­
vices, (2) counseling, (3) advocacy and support services, (4) claims assis­
tance, (5) court-related services, (6) system-wide services (Finn and Lee, 
1983:8; within each area a number of specific services were listed, totaling 
31). NOVA adopted an eightfold classification based upon the chronologi­
cal order according to which the service would be provided: (1) emergency 
response, (2) victim stabilization, (3) resource mobilization, (4) representa­
tion of victim's views following arrest, (5) assisting victim prior to court 
appearance and (6) at court appearance, (7) presentence services, and (8) 
postsentence services (NOVA, n.d.; Young, 1982).2 
The President's Task Force on Victims identified sixteen services that 
a model victim/witness-assistance unit should provide.3 Other classifica­
tions appear in the earlier reviews by Rosenblum and Blew (1979) and in 
Dussich (1981), Schneider and Schneider (1981), Ziegenhagen and Benyi 
(1981), and Viano (1979:53ff.); some of these classifications focus on func­
tional categorization of the services, others on differences in the underly­
ing philosophies. The Victims of Crime Act of 1984 defined "services to 
victims of crime" as including the following four services: (1) crisis inter­
vention services (defined as "counselling to provide emotional support in 
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crises arising from the occurrence of crime"); (2) emergency services— 
transportation to court, short-term child care services, and temporary 
housing and security measures; (3) assistance in participating in criminal 
justice proceedings; and (4) payment of costs for a "forensic medical ex­
amination of a crime victim."4 
Roberts (1990:31) presented some survey data indicating the frequency 
with which various services were provided by different programs. He found 
that some 60%-70% of the programs (a) explained the court process, (b) 
made referrals to other agencies, (c) provided court escorts, (d) helped the 
victim file claims to the compensation board, (e) educated the public, (f) 
advocated with an employer on behalf of the victim, and (g) provided 
transportation to court. However, this list does not include crisis counsel­
ing, which according to Roberts is the focal activity of some programs. 
Since the various programs may provide any combination of these and 
other services, the development of a useful typology is problematical. One 
meaningful classification would be by the identity of the sponsoring 
agency, generally police, prosecution, or community-based organization 
(see Cronin and Bourque, 1980:14-15; Roberts, 1990:120-21). However, 
Cronin and Bourque (1980, 1981), who conducted a mail survey of 227 
programs, developed a useful classification of their own, which appeared to 
be applicable to the universe of programs, namely, a division into those 
focusing on the victim as victim (the "victim model"), those emphasizing 
the needs of witnesses (the "witness model"), and those which attempted 
to combine the functions (the "victim-witness model").5 The force of this 
classification was enhanced by an analysis (Weigend, 1982) of the ratio­
nales for, and implications of, the establishment of such programs, in 
which it was cogently argued that an orientation toward victims and an 
orientation toward witnesses are not merely different but actually inconsis­
tent and conflicting: "The victim-program must seek to implement the 
client's wishes. . .  . It should not be located in or have close ties to any law 
enforcement agency" (Weigend, 1982:8-9). 
In spite of the proliferation of victim/witness-assistance programs, the 
boundless energy and relatively generous funding that have been invested 
in their development and maintenance, and the current official federal 
policy of renewed encouragement to the programs, hard data on their effec­
tiveness have been relatively sparse (cf. Skogan et al., 1991:98). Some of the 
earlier publications provided useful summaries of the basic concepts of 
such programs (Viano, 1978; Young, 1982). There have also been at least 
five more comprehensive attempts to consider the way in which such 
programs actually function,6 and some of these have incorporated some 
 255 "Catch-All" Remedies
tentative evaluations. Only during the last few years have some more 
methodologically rigorous evaluations of the effectiveness of programs 
been undertaken, but on a selected and localized basis. 
The more comprehensive analyses take one of two forms: an in-depth 
study of a number of selected programs, or a more general survey of the 
field. Thus Rosenblum and Blew (1979) presented an overall review of four 
of the better-known pioneering programs (in Brooklyn, N.Y., Milwaukee 
County, Wis., Multnomah County, Oreg., and Pima County, Ariz.), each of 
which had been independently evaluated by a research institute. Cronin 
and Bourque (1980, 1981), on the other hand, contacted 227 programs, of 
which 20 were visited and studied in greater depth by the authors and their 
colleagues. Their evaluation of the programs was based upon the evidence 
of written records made available to them. Much of the evaluative material 
in these records was problematical, however, since it was not the fruit of 
methodologically rigorous research (Cronin and Bourque, 1980:89ff). Simi­
larly, Rosenblum and Blew (1979) differentiated between evaluation of (1) 
the program design, (2) delivery of services, and (3) the impact of the pro­
grams, and found the third level of evaluation the most problematic (59ff).7 
The third overview was conducted by Finn and Lee (1983). This survey 
reviewed the available literature, contacted a number of programs, and 
visited six. This analysis, however, was concerned with the operational 
rather than the evaluative aspects of victim/witness-assistance programs. 
In 1985 Roberts (1990) conducted a National Survey of Victim Service 
and Assistance Programs. Of 312 programs contacted, comprehensive infor­
mation on the functioning of the programs was supplied by 184. In addi­
tion to the descriptive aspects of the study, it incorporated self-evaluation 
by program staff of their "strengths, problems and needed changes" (ibid., 
chap. 5). However, there was no direct evaluation of the impact of the 
services on the clients. 
The last available overview was conducted in 1989 by Skogan et al. 
(1990, 1991). This involved an in-depth study of four programs (in Evans­
ton, 111., Rochester, N.Y., Pima County, Ariz., and Fayette County, Ky.). 
The emphasis here was on determining the needs of victims and assessing, 
on the basis of interviews with 470 victims, the extent to which these 
needs had been met by the programs. 
As noted, some more localized studies have been designed more specifi­
cally to evaluate program impact. The dearth of evaluative data noted by 
Cronin and Bourque resulted in the sponsoring of an evaluative study of 
one specific program—in Pima County, Arizona—undertaken by the Insti­
tute for Social Analysis (Smith et al., 1984; Smith and Cook, 1984; Cook et 
256 Chapter 10 
al., 1987). The focus of this study was on the effects of crisis intervention 
(see, e.g., the literature review in Smith et al., 1984: chap. 1); but in addi­
tion to the sample of victims receiving crisis intervention services, an 
additional sample provided with "delayed services"—including counsel­
ing, assistance in applying for protection orders, social service referrals, 
and court services (Smith et al., 1984:22-23)—was also studied. Both sam­
ples were compared with a control group. Regrettably, allocation to the 
three groups was not randomized, such that "differences in victim adjust­
ment which are detected among the comparison groups are not clearly 
attributable to the presence or absence of service" (10). 
Other evaluations have been conducted in recent years by Skogan and 
Wycoff (1987), of a program whereby police in Houston contacted victims 
to offer assistance; and by Davis (1987), of an experiment conducted by the 
New York Victim Services Agency, whereby groups of victims were as­
signed to three different types of intervention, two psychological ("crisis 
intervention with supportive counseling" and "crisis intervention with 
cognitive restructuring") and one material. In both studies, experimental 
procedures were adopted and comparisons were made with groups who did 
not benefit from the interventions. 
Mention should also be made here of the multilevel study of British 
victim-support schemes by Maguire and Corbett (1987). This study ana­
lyzed survey data received in relation to 177 of the 193 schemes listed in 
1984 (11), but also included questionnaire data from the British Crime 
Survey and in-depth interviews with victims in selected districts. An eval­
uation study has also been conducted in the Netherlands (Steinmetz, 
1988). 
In the following pages an attempt will be made to consider the potential 
contribution of the programs from the point of view of the parameters of the 
present analysis, relying primarily on data emerging from the above-
mentioned studies. Emphasis is placed here on programs involving the provi­
sion of material or therapeutic assistance, generally by specially appointed 
persons (including volunteers), rather than on guidelines or training courses 
directed at criminal justice personnel fulfilling their normal function (cf. 
Rosenbaum, 1987). Nor is the present analysis concerned with institutions 
specifically dealt with in other chapters, such as state compensation. 
Coping Needs 
The first precondition for an effective service is accessibility. However, 
Davis and Henley (1990) noted that, while little information is available on 
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this, "the scant evidence that does exist suggests that service programs 
reach only a small fraction of persons victimized by crime"; while Maguire 
(1989:129) has estimated that in Britain, with the most extensive victim-
support system in Europe, less than 5% of victims of reported crimes are 
reached, and probably no more than 1 % of all crime victims. This applies 
even where an "outreach" policy is adopted, although this may not always 
be possible for reasons of confidentiality (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 
1983). Where reliance is placed on victim initiative, the lack of knowledge 
regarding the existence of the programs (Friedman et al., 1982:12; Shapland 
et al., 1981:219) will be a barrier. On the other hand, there is evidence that 
victims who seek assistance, or those selected by the programs for this 
purpose, are likely to be among the more serious cases (Maguire and 
Corbett, 1987:215; Davis and Henley, 1990:167). Another limiting factor 
in this context may be a tendency for the schemes "to deal almost exclu­
sively with one-off, stranger-to-stranger offences" (Corbett and Maguire, 
1988:33). 
However, even for those who are exposed to the programs, the evidence 
of their usefulness is far from unequivocal. Cronin and Bourque (1980), in 
the course of their comprehensive analysis of the benefits of victim-
assistance programs, found that victims were generally favorably disposed 
toward the programs, but that it was difficult to find hard data that would 
identify specific benefits (see 93ff.; this part of their review related specifi­
cally to programs on the "victim model"). This conclusion has been largely 
supported by subsequent studies. Skogan et al. (1990) conducted a compre­
hensive study of the relationship between victim services and victim 
needs in four locations; the victims in their sample, half of whom had been 
in contact with a victim-assistance program, received some assistance 
with most of their problems—but generally not from the programs but 
from other sources (fig. 5). Of those requesting services in the survey by 
Hillenbrand and Smith (1989), of 359 victims, a majority reported receiving 
the service for most items (145). Again, the service was presumably not 
always arranged by victim-assistance personnel—for example, a relatively 
high proportion requested, and were granted, police protection. On the 
other hand, victim/witness staff based in prosecutors' offices are presum­
ably helpful in supplying information regarding the criminal proceedings 
(Hillenbrand and Smith, 1989:164). 
With respect to financial benefits to the victim, Cronin and Bourque 
found the evidence to be "sketchy." "It appears, for example, that projects 
can increase the quantity and quality of state victim compensation claims 
filed, but the claims review, approval, and disbursement process is out of 
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project hands" (Cronin and Bourque, 1980:100). One benefit, however, that 
these authors found to be clearly established was the saving of time for 
witnesses, whose contacts with the criminal justice system, and in particu­
lar the courts, were better coordinated (Cronin and Bourque, 1981:40). 
There is evidence in the literature that victims may take precautions to 
prevent further victimization, but there is no clear basis for attributing this 
to victim-assistance programs (ibid.,- Skogan and Wycoff, 1987); indeed, 
programs frequently do not cater to the security needs of victims (Skogan 
et al., 1990). Victims are also thought to have benefited in recent years 
from a greater sensitization that has developed on the part of the police to 
their needs, but this, too, cannot unequivocally be attributed to the exis­
tence of the programs (Cronin and Bourque, 1981:98; and cf. Rosenbaum, 
1987). 
As to the contribution of such programs to the victim's ability to over­
come emotional and behavioral problems, Salasin (1981:16) emphasized 
the lack of knowledge in this area and the inadequacy of traditional evalua­
tion techniques (cf. also Rich, 1981:141), while another author has noted 
"the difficulties involved in providing a clear conceptual definition of effec­
tual coping" (Wortman, 1983:215). Nevertheless, the evaluation projects 
have attempted to assess the programs in this respect. Thus Cronin and 
Bourque (1980) found that there was "almost no evidence about the suc­
cess of victim projects in reducing emotional trauma" (99). 
The Pima County evaluation studied this issue in considerable depth, 
adopting a number of output measures (anxiety, fear, stress, behavioral 
functioning, and nervousness). Fear levels remained constant for all three 
groups—those receiving crisis intervention, those provided with "delayed 
services," and controls—from the time of the critical interview until the 
follow-up interview some months later. The anxiety level, which dropped 
for all categories, dropped most steeply for the crisis-intervention sample 
[p < 0.001), while the mean stress levels dropped more for both treatment 
groups than for the controls (p < 0.001) (Smith et al., 1984:35-40). It 
cannot necessarily be concluded that the greater reduction in anxiety and 
stress was attributable to the treatment, since, as noted, allocation to the 
groups was not random but was probably related to the perceived needs of 
the victims. Nevertheless, the fact that the anxiety level for the crisis-
intervention group actually dropped below that of the other categories by 
the second interview (albeit very slightly) indicated the probability of a 
program contribution. 
The British study by Maguire and Corbett (1987) focused mainly on 
victims who had received assistance from victim-support personnel, but 
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they also matched a small subsample (N = 26) with victims who had not 
received such support. They concluded that "there are signs . . . that a visit 
from a VSS volunteer may have some effect in reducing anger and, in 
particular, in altering attitudes towards the offender" (170); respondents 
were less punitive and more likely to agree to mediation. 
The results of the quasi-experimental American studies referred to 
above were largely negative. In the study by Davis (1987), which compared 
the effects of two methods of crisis intervention with material assistance, 
as well as with a control group, no significant differences were found 
among the groups on various psychological measures applied over the first 
three months after victimization. Skogan and Wycoff (1987), who com­
pared a sample offered assistance by police officers with a control group, 
found differences on various measures, including fear of crime and satisfac­
tion with the police and the neighborhood, to be only minor, and mostly 
not in the expected direction. Similar types of experiments conducted in 
the Netherlands also produced largely negative results (Steinmetz, 1989). 
Many programs have been limited to particular types of victims, nota­
bly victims of rape. Coates and Winston (1983) conducted a review of rape 
crisis centers. Of 63 centers responding, "92.5% reported that the groups 
had been an overall success." However, they noted that evaluation 
studies—including their own—were methodologically inadequate (e.g., 
absence of comparison groups), so that while it was generally observed 
that "support groups do ease feelings of deviance for most of their mem­
bers, we still lack firm support for this conclusion" (183). 
Various explanations are offered for these rather negative results. First, 
even an experimental design may not fully control for higher levels of 
need or traumatization among the experimental group (Steinmetz, 1989). 
Second, it may be difficult to measure the contribution of a usually very 
limited counseling program (involving perhaps one or two meetings). 
Third, a much longer period of counseling may be required for the more 
traumatized cases (Davis, 1987); while in Britain, where visits generally 
take place the day after the incident, the support will be absent during the 
period of relapse (Maguire, 1989:137). Fourth, it has also been observed 
that while the emphasis in these programs is generally upon psychological 
counseling, the greater need may actually be for material assistance, 
which many of the programs fail to provide (Davis and Henley, 1990:165-
66). Skogan et al. (1990), in their study of the relationship between victim 
services and victim needs, found that many of the most frequently cited 
needs, particularly related to security and filing insurance, were not met 
by the programs and concluded that "there was not a very good match 
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between victims' needs and victim services" (45). In Britain the reverse 
problem has been noted (Maguire, 1989:137), that is, victim-support volun­
teers focus on practical assistance where emotional support is needed. 
Finally, victims receiving assistance may have more contacts with the 
criminal justice system, giving rise to negative effects as a result of "secon­
dary victimization" (Steinmetz, 1989). 
The largely negative findings noted here may be partially balanced by at 
least some positive data relating to expressed satisfaction, which will be 
considered below. Nevertheless, the findings must give rise to concern in 
view of the high expectations accompanying the establishment of the pro­
grams; they also indicate the need for further research. 
The coping needs of society may be considered here under the headings 
of (a) cost and (b) the contribution of the programs to the functioning of 
the criminal justice system. Much of the literature on victim/witness-
assistance programs is of a practical nature and is concerned with budget­
ing and funding (cf. Roberts, 1990). Precise cost-benefit analysis, however, 
is a different matter. Rosenblum and Blew (1979), after considering this 
issue, concluded that "it is impossible precisely to assess the savings, if 
any, which accrue from them" (65). But Cronin and Bourque (1980) re­
ported detailed calculations on the cost of various aspects of the programs, 
such as cost per client assisted, cost per contact, and cost per capita, per 
annum, for the population in the jurisdiction served. These varied accord­
ing to the nature of the program. While estimates per capita of population 
served varied only between 13 and 23 cents, the median cost per client (in 
the sites visited for which data were available) varied between $7 for the 
"witness model" and $48 for the "victim model" (Cronin and Bourque, 
1980:55, 77, 80). Smith et al. (1984:24) reported that the average cost per 
client for the Pima County program, which also handled disputes of a 
noncriminal nature, was $55; although for crisis intervention it was only 
about $34, since the crisis unit was manned mainly by volunteers. (The 
Victims of Crime Act of 1984 requires that volunteers be utilized as a 
condition of eligibility for federal funding.) 
The authors compared these figures with the costs of other components 
of the criminal justice system such as trial or mediation, estimated at $100 
to $200, and probation, estimated at between $450 and $1200. This is 
somewhat misleading, in that the cost of the programs is cumulative with 
these costs rather than alternative. Perhaps the point intended to be made, 
however, is that the cost of providing such assistance to the victim is 
relatively modest, particularly when compared with the amounts ex­
pended on the offender. On the other hand, Lowenburg (1981) reported on 
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an earlier evaluation of the same program conducted by the Stanford Re­
search Institute which concluded that there was a slight net saving: "Over­
all, the program produced $127,122 in annual measurable social benefits 
compared with an annual operation cost of $121,560" (409). 
But even if the costs are moderate, the financial benefits to the system 
may not be substantial. Saving results primarily from the fact that closer 
contacts with victims or witnesses may result in fewer continuances and 
less waste of police time. Moreover, victim/witness programs may be per­
forming tasks otherwise undertaken by the police. On this latter point, 
Cronin and Bourque (1980:116-17) concluded that police time was, in­
deed, saved, freeing police officers for other tasks. 
It has also been generally anticipated that enhanced cooperation would 
bring about not only financial savings but also an increased probability of 
securing a conviction in the current case (cf. Karmen, 1990:180-81) and a 
greater readiness to cooperate in the future—for example, by the reporting 
of offenses. Insofar as such cooperation is calculated to render law enforce­
ment more effective, this, too, would have implications for financial costs. 
Considerations of this type have been instrumental in the establishment 
and encouragement of witness-oriented programs by law enforcement au­
thorities. Analysis of the available evidence by Cronin and Bourque 
(1980:104-12, 120-21) showed that the programs did produce modest 
increments—about 10% to 15%—in witness appearance. However, these 
findings are not uniform (Karmen, 1990:181). Moreover, there was no evi­
dence of either an increase in conviction rates or a greater inclination on the 
part of clients to cooperate with the criminal justice system in the future 
(Cronin and Bourque, 1980:91-92; cf. Davis, 1983:240). These findings will 
be considered further in the ensuing discussion relating to measures of 
satisfaction with the programs. 
Perceived Justice Needs 
There does not appear to be much specific evidence regarding the effect of 
victim/witness schemes on perceptions of the justice system, although 
there is certainly some evidence of consumer satisfaction with individual 
services. Referring to the "victim model," Cronin and Bourque commented: 
"It appears that a majority of project clients do like the services offered and 
will report that they have been helpful. Thus if we take the client opinion at 
face value, the victim is helped by victim model projects" (1980:99). The 
same applied also to the "witness model" (115). Rosenblum and Blew (1979) 
referred to one program survey that reported that "99 percent indicated they 
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would contact the program again if they had similar problems" (54). Simi­
larly, in the Pima County study, 89% of victims in the crisis-intervention 
sample stated that the program helped, as did 86% of those receiving "de­
layed services'7 (Smith et al., 1984); and high rates of "consumer satisfac­
tion" were also noted by Maguire and Corbett (1987:154-55). 
Further, the INSLAW study referred to in chapter 2 reported that a victim 
program increased the probability that the victim would be familiar with 
the outcome of the case and less likely to report that he or she had not been 
kept informed (Hemon and Forst, 1983:33-35); these are issues that were 
described earlier as being critical factors in causing victim dissatisfaction. 
Not all the evidence is quite as unequivocal, however. The INSLAW 
study found that only 67% of the sample were satisfied with the victim-
service staff, which was no higher than the level of satisfaction with prose­
cutors and rather lower than the rate of satisfaction with police officers 
(Hernon and Forst, 1984:46). Moreover, in the Pima County evaluation, in 
spite of the positive results reported above, 49% of the sample receiving 
crisis intervention and 75% of those receiving "delayed services" felt that 
they were in need of more assistance, as compared with only 44% of those 
who had received no services, whose need should have been greatest 
(Smith et al., 1984:67).8 No more than 10%—11% of the samples inter­
viewed designated the program as being their most helpful source of sup­
port; family, friends, or even the police were named in this connection 
more frequently than the victim-assistance program (68-69). 
Further, Cronin and Bourque (1980), in spite of their specific findings 
relating to victims' reported reactions, commented that "the evidence for 
increases in victim or witness satisfaction associated with either project 
type also is relatively weak" (92). And while expressing general satisfac­
tion with services provided, "clients apparently are not markedly more 
satisfied with the system, more 'willing' to cooperate, or more likely to 
report crime" (Cronin and Bourque, 1981:30). Similar findings were also 
reported by Rosenblum and Blew (1979:62-63). Finally, some of the earlier 
surveys even raised doubts about the general degree of satisfaction with 
the programs (Britton et al., 1976; Hunter and Frey, 1980). 
It may be that the limited proven effectiveness of victim/witness-
assistance programs is simply due to the methodological difficulties of 
showing significant objective or even attitudinal changes. Davis and Hen­
ley (1990) cited the Pima County evaluation as follows: "The authors 
concluded that 'despite the victims' feelings that the program helped them 
considerably, the measures of emotional trauma did not indicate any sub­
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stantial effects' " (168). It seems from this citation that the authors of the 
evaluation did not attribute significance to "the victims' feelings that the 
program helped them considerably," in the light of the negative results of 
the psychological tests. Maguire (1989), however, explicitly regards victim 
satisfaction as insufficient as an objective for victim support: "VSS [Victim 
Support Schemes] should not be satisfied simply because their clients are 
satisfied" (138). 
It may also be that programs are in need of modification. Greater atten­
tion should perhaps be paid to Weigend's argument on the need to focus 
either on victim or on witness needs, to prevent conflicting objectives (cf. 
also Karmen, 1990:181). Similarly, a researcher associated with the Victim 
Services Agency in New York, which conducted some of the earlier sur­
veys, concluded that "victim/witness programs had little success in in­
creasing cooperation because they perpetuated the treatment of victims as 
nothing more than witnesses for the prosecution" (Davis, 1983:297). 
However, it is also possible that victim/witness-assistance programs 
are capable of providing a kind of "process" satisfaction at the time the 
service is provided, but not of influencing victims' long-term perceptions 
of the criminal justice system, or even of the programs themselves. It may 
be that the citizen has an operational dichotomy between, on the one 
hand, his or her expectations from "the system," represented in this case 
mainly by the police (Shapland et al., 1981:215), and, on the other hand, 
informal support networks that may be perceived as the mediating agency 
for eliciting justice from the offender (ibid., 213; Friedman et al., 1982:65). 
This dichotomy may leave no clear role for victim-assistance programs. 
Possible support for this view may be derived from the Hamburg survey, 
which found that relatively few respondents—and fewer victims than 
nonvictims—specified "victim assistance" as the most important need or 
interest of victims of an assault or theft; see Sessar (1984: table 1), 
Beurskens and Boers (1985: table 2). 
In any case it seems that in spite of the considerable expenditure of 
funds (especially in the U.S.), and of human resources (particularly where 
services are largely volunteer-run, as in Britain), the potential contribution 
of victim/witness-assistance programs is not yet entirely clear; further 
research is required, and greater attention must be paid to conceptual 
issues (cf. Mawby and Gill, 1987), such as the structure and personnel of 
the programs, the optimal balance between counseling services and mate­
rial assistance, the optimal timing of the intervention, the degree to which 
special programs and services should be developed for victims alone or for 
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victims and witnesses (cf. Knudten et al., 1976; Denton, 1979), and, if for 
victims only, whether programs should specialize further according to the 
type of victim9 (see ABA, 1981: chap. 3) or type of service. 
Fundamental Principles of Justice 
The justice considerations related to victim-assistance programs are in 
some respects similar to those arising in the context of victim compensa­
tion. These programs do not constitute an integral part of the criminal 
justice system, and the retributive aspects related specifically to righting 
the wrong inflicted do not arise here; but the question of priorities in the 
allocation of public resources—and in particular the question whether 
crime victims merit priority over other types of victims in competing for 
these resources—seems to be identical. Moreover, the possibility of draw­
ing upon the offender's assets by way of fines or penalties in order to 
finance victim-assistance programs also arises here. Indeed, the Victims of 
Crime Act of 1984 adopts the identical funding mechanism for both com­
pensation schemes and victim assistance. 
Since victim assistance is not generally governed by statute, it is less 
closely linked to the concept of rights. Victim assistance is not specifically 
referred to as a right under the Victims' Rights and Restitution Act of 1990, 
at either the federal or the state level. However, the act does require that a 
"responsible official. . . inform a victim of public and private programs 
that are available to provide counseling, treatment, and other support for 
the victim" (sec. 503(c)(l)). Moreover, the Victims of Crime Act of 1984 
requires state compensation boards to compensate for mental health coun­
seling (cf. NOVA, 1989:21-22). Insofar as these boards are governed by 
desert in their concept of the "worthy victim" (see chap. 8, above), limita­
tions deriving therefrom will apply to the funding of counseling too. 
It is an interesting question whether victim-assistance programs are 
also governed by desert considerations. In Britain, where victim support 
sometimes involves a "filtering" process, stereotypic views as to which 
victims are worthy of assistance may be introduced where the filtering is 
implemented by criminal justice officials (Maguire and Corbett, 1987:87, 
99-100), introducing an element of desert in what is otherwise perceived 
as a needs-based system (Mawby and Gill, 1987:131). Mawby (1988), how­
ever, is critical of need as a criterion for assistance, in part because of the 
difficulty of establishing objective measures of need, while survey evi­
dence indicates that subjective perceptions are very fluid (131-32). Thus 
Mawby and Gill (1987) favor a rights orientation that, in addition to infor­
 265 "Catch-All" Remedies
mation and compensation, would include "the right to specialist advice 
and support/' including "mandatory automatic referral with . . . the onus 
on victims to refuse" (231). 
British victim advocates tend to have reservations regarding a rights 
orientation, which is identified with "antioffender" overtones associated 
with the U.S. victim movement (Mawby, 1988:130) and is also seen as 
potentially derogating from the emphasis on voluntary services (Reeves, 
1988), although this emphasis is not necessarily perceived as precluding 
the advocacy of equal access to these services (ibid.)! As indicated above, 
however, the rights rhetoric reflected in the incorporation of victim assis­
tance in legislative enactments does not necessarily entail the bestowal of 
enforceable rights. There seems to be a strong case for providing all crime 
victims with a right of access to victim assistance agencies. It is much 
more problematical to define specific services that could be claimed as of 
right, particularly under a system operated largely by volunteers, which 
Mawby and Gill appear to support. 
Another justice-related issue worthy of consideration is the nature of 
the relationship of the assistance program to the community (cf. Elias, 
1986), and the extent to which there is a genuine contribution here to 
community justice (to be discussed in chap. 11). This, in turn, together 
with the question of the relationship of victim-assistance programs to 
established criminal justice agencies, will have implications for the type 
and extent of social control exercised by these programs and their ability to 
adopt nonestablishment positions on victim-related policies. 
Conclusion 
A review of the available evidence on the treatment of the victim in the 
criminal justice system (see above, chaps. 2, 4, and 5) showed that both the 
objective (coping) and the subjective (perceived) needs of crime victims are 
unmet by the traditional model of the criminal justice system. It has there­
fore been regarded as self-evident that what Biderman (1981:28) called the 
"burgeoning victim assistance industry" would meet these needs, and this 
appears to have been the assumption behind the federal legislation de­
signed to fund victim/witness-assistance programs. 
However, rather little is as yet known regarding Cronin and Bourque's 
third (and main) hypothesis relating to these programs, to the effect that 
"the criminal justice system as well as individual victims and witnesses 
will benefit from the effort." While on some level services are clearly 
being provided to some individual victims—usually generating a positive 
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response—the overall benefits both to victims and to the criminal justice 
system may be marginal and not worthwhile in cost-benefit terms. Fur­
ther, the plethora of models and objectives of such programs make it 
likely that some will be more beneficial than others, but the one study 
located that attempted to evaluate alternative approaches (Smith et al., 
1984) found no significant differences between them. There is a similar 
lack of knowledge on such issues as the need for specialized services for 
crime victims and for programs oriented to special categories of victims 
(children, rape victims, etc.), the feasibility of combining victim with 
witness assistance (cf. Weigend's thesis referred to above), and the prob­
lem of a diffusion of agencies which may be operating simultaneously (cf. 
Shapland, 1983:236). 
Further, while the need of victims for support, and in particular emo­
tional support, has been established by the research reviewed in chapter 4, 
it appears that the programs do not always place their emphasis on the 
areas of greatest need. Moreover, it may be that organized initiatives, 
whether professional or voluntary, cannot substitute for informal support 
networks (Friedman et al., 1982; cf. Skogan et al., 1990). 
The need for more research in this area was most clearly articulated by 
Cronin and Bourque (1980) in their review of the available evidence. These 
authors listed many of the issues on which such research might focus 
(appendix D). Smith et al. (1984) were generally more optimistic—an opti­
mism perhaps not altogether justified by their own findings; but they, too, 
pointed to the need for paying greater attention to the long-term needs of 
victims, and for further research (105-6). Similarly, the UN review, while 
also expressing considerable optimism, observed that "the absence of a 
theoretical framework and of scientific evaluation of most of the services 
offered prevents accurate assessments of their efficacy, despite the apprecia­
tion expressed by victims" [Victims of Crime, 1985:43-44). More recent 
researches have improved this situation only marginally. The Victims of 
Crime Act of 1984 requires that programs funded by federal subsidy demon­
strate "a record of providing effective services" (sec. 1404 (b)(l)(B)(l|). This 
requirement necessitates a more comprehensive debate on the meaning of 
"effectiveness" and of the criteria for its measurement, as well as the 
implementation of evaluations in order to determine whether these crite­
ria are being met. 
Finally, the orientation in the United States (unlike Britain) toward the 
provision of victim services on arights basis—a trend given further impetus 
by the "bills of rights," to be dealt with in the next section—necessitates 
further conceptual thinking (a) as regards the relative merits of victim­
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oriented programs as compared with witness-oriented programs, and (b) as 
to the relationship between the provision of victim assistance by the state 
on the one hand, and the enhanced role of the victim in the criminal justice 
system on the other, an issue that will be discussed further in chapter 12. 
Victims' Bills of Rights 
The concept of a victims' bill of rights is one of the more recent of the 
victim-oriented innovations discussed in this work. One of its earliest 
proponents appears to have been Reiff (1979) in his book The Invisible 
Victim, in which a chapter was devoted to his proposal for a "bill of rights 
for victims." As with many other of the victim-related proposals, it 
quickly became popular. A Victims' Bill of Rights was enacted by the state 
of Wisconsin in 1980, and by 1988, 45 states had adopted such bills (NOVA, 
1989:7). Many states have recently passed constitutional amendments 
guaranteeing victims' rights (cf. National Victim Center, 1994; Lamborn, 
1995), and in some cases, such as Arizona, the term "victims' bill of rights" 
has been expressly adopted. At the federal level, the Victims' Rights and 
Restitution Act of 1990 articulated a list of victim rights applicable to the 
federal jurisdiction and exhorted all states to adopt the "goals of the Vic­
tims of Crime Bills of Rights" (cf. above, chap. 1). At the international 
level, similar concepts have been incorporated in the UN Declaration of 
Basic Principles of Justice for the Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, 
while the British Home Office has published a "Victim's Charter." 
What are the rights of the victim envisaged by such proposals? Natu­
rally these vary from list to list. NOVA (n.d.) proposed seven main "rights 
for victims and witnesses": (1) a right to be treated with dignity and 
compassion, (2) a right to protection from intimidation and harm, (3) a 
right to be informed concerning the criminal justice process, (4) a right to 
counsel, (5) a right to reparations, (6) a right to preservation of property 
and employment, and (7) a right to due process in criminal court proceed­
ings (4-5). Each of these rights was subdivided into a number of more 
specific rights, numbering 29 in all.10 The UN declaration has four main 
components: access to justice and fair treatment, restitution, compensa­
tion, and assistance. Reiff's list comprised nine items (Reiff, 1979:114), 
while state legislation appears to focus mainly upon criminal justice pro­
ceedings and practical problems related to these (NOVA, 1989:6-7). 
How do the rights differ from the services to victims discussed in the 
previous pages in the context of victim/witness-assistance programs? First, 
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as noted in the introduction to this chapter, the perspective is different, for 
whereas victim-assistance debates tend to focus on the structure of the 
agencies concerned and the nature of the services they offer, the bill-of-
rights rhetoric relates more explicitly to the victim. By the same token, the 
ideology is different, since the term right suggests an absolute duty on the 
part of the state to respect and protect the right, whereas victim-assistance 
programs tend to use the language of "need" (see above). 
Third, the concept of a victims' bill of rights is more comprehensive 
than that of victim services, since it includes items such as compensation 
and restitution which are not generally an integral part of victim/witness-
assistance programs, although such programs may assist in the claiming of 
such remedies. Indeed, the victim-rights concept is sometimes even taken 
to include issues that relate primarily to the enforcement of law and sanc­
tions vis-a-vis the offender, and only indirectly (if at all) to the victim, such 
as the insanity defense and plea bargaining (see, e.g., the California Bill of 
Rights; McCoy, 1987:50-51). 
NOVA (n.d.: 12-13) attempted to integrate the concepts of rights and 
assistance by presenting a chart of "the victim rights system" in which the 
various services that may be offered to victims are considered on a stage-
by-stage basis. Indeed, these were the very stages proposed by Marlene 
Young (the executive director of NOVA) in her analysis of victim assistance 
considered earlier (Young, 1982a). It is evident, however, that these eight 
stages, representing the chronological order of experiences of victim/ 
witnesses from the commission of the crime to the termination of the 
criminal proceedings, differ both literally and analytically from the seven 
rights identified by NOVA as described in the previous section. Indeed, 
since this chart includes the various forms of assistance that "family and 
friends" are invited to provide the victim, it seems difficult to reconcile the 
services specified therein with the concept of victim rights, except perhaps 
in a vague moral sense. 
The issue of victims' rights is thus distinct from victim/witness assis­
tance and is deserving of independent attention. At the same time, many of 
the specific proposals designated as victims' rights have been considered 
under other specific headings: victim/witness assistance, restitution, com­
pensation, victim involvement in the criminal process, and so on. For this 
reason it will not be necessary in this section to consider most of the rights 
themselves from the particular perspective of this study—that is, their 
capacity to meet the coping needs and perceived justice needs of the par­
ties, and to comply with fundamental principles of justice. However, inso­
far as their designation as "rights," or as components of "bills of rights," 
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may raise issues that have not been dealt with adequately in earlier chap­
ters, these will be dealt with briefly below. 
Coping Needs 
In principle it may seem that the designation of certain legislative mea­
sures as a victims' bill of rights would not in itself bring any special bene­
fits to the victim, beyond those incorporated in legislation dealing with 
these same topics—victim compensation, victim-impact statements, and 
so on—but not so designated. At the same time, there may be certain 
advantages from the point of view of the victim's interests in such designa­
tion. The main advantage of such designation would seem to be the proba­
bility that a number of victim-oriented provisions will be adopted within a 
short time. The adoption of legislation is a complex procedure, and the 
likelihood that a number of different bills, sponsored by different legisla­
tors on different occasions, would all be adopted would surely be small. A 
package of proposals, however, may not be substantially more difficult to 
legislate than a bill dealing with a single topic,11 or, as in the case of 
California, may be a means whereby a popular initiative may bypass legisla­
tive obstacles (McCoy, 1987:16-17). Moreover, the addition of the attrac­
tive nomenclature "victims' bill of rights" may actually enhance the 
chances of the proposals' adoption by the appropriate body. 
hi theory a more substantive benefit might follow from such designa­
tion. It has been seen that certain benefits offered to victims are granted on 
a partial or discretionary basis: compensation schemes have eligibility 
requirements and are frequently ex gratia; victim/witness-assistance pro­
grams may be localized or selective in their target populations. The classi­
fication of such benefits as victim rights suggests the recognition of a 
general legal basis for the pursuance of such benefits, with a corresponding 
duty upon the government to provide them; this will apply a fortiori if the 
bill of rights is incorporated into the constitution, as has in effect now 
occurred in an increasing number of states. Thus the benefits would be 
offered not only to persons perceived as "suitable" or "worthy" victims 
based upon a desert-oriented philosophy, but to all victims qua victims. 
However, it seems doubtful whether this has been the result of the 
legislative technique whereby victims' bills of rights have been adopted. 
This issue could be clarified further by means of a close analysis of certain 
types of legislation, such as the introduction of victim-compensation 
schemes, comparing legislation adopted independently with legislation en­
acted as part of a victims' bill of rights, in order to determine whether the 
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latter technique results in a legally more advantageous status being 
granted to the victim, whether as a result of more positively formulated 
wording incorporated in such provisions, or of the courts' applying princi­
ples of interpretation more favorable to victims. 
While no specific study of this nature appears to have been conducted, 
some more generalized findings are available on the impact of this type of 
legislation. Clark (1986) attempted to evaluate the implementation of New 
York State's Bill of Rights, "known as the Fair Treatment Standards for 
Victims," enacted in 1984. Agencies reported being in compliance with 
many of the standards, except where lack of funding prevented this. 
In the course of a more comprehensive study, Hillenbrand and Smith 
(1989) hypothesized that "practitioners in states with specific legislated 
rights would be more likely to extend those rights to victims than practitio­
ners in other states" (162). However, they found that "with few exceptions, 
the contents of the legislation reviewed in the study made no significant 
difference in the frequency prosecutors, probation officials, judges, and 
victim-witness personnel reported they informed or notified victims, con­
sulted with them, considered their views, or provided them services" (163). 
It might be argued that this finding is actually favorable to victims' bills of 
rights. All the states in their survey had some victim-related legislation, 
which varied only "in the specific rights encompassed and in the features 
of those rights" (162). It may be that such legislation has a "halo effect," 
producing benefits in related areas not specified in the legislation of the 
particular state. 
It may also be that victims' rights legislation is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for the provision of the intended benefits. The authors 
of the above study found that "prosecutors with funds to implement vic­
tims rights said they provided certain rights in a number of specific areas 
more often than prosecutors without such funds" (163; see also 164—65). 
This confirms the findings of the New York study referred to above. 
Apart from the specific benefits generally included in victims' bills of 
rights, this concept is also sometimes seen to include far-reaching forms of 
protection, as reflected in the bill of rights advocated for the states under 
the 1990 legislation, to the effect that "victims of crime should be treated 
with compassion, respect and dignity throughout the criminal justice pro­
cess" (sec. 506(1)), and the more categorical right granted under section 
502(b)(l) "to be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim's 
dignity and privacy."12 The operationalization of such rights would clearly 
bring benefits to victims beyond those specified under other headings. 
However, apart from the question whether rights such as dignity and 
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respect should be exclusive to crime victims, it is also unclear how such 
rights could be enforced. Indeed, as noted in chapter 1, federal authorities 
initially avoided the rights terminology in favor of "standards" in order to 
prevent this issue arising. Subsequent legislation overcame the enforce­
ment issue by means of the insertion of exemption clauses. Thus section 
502 of the Victims' Rights and Restitution Act of 1990 includes a clause 
specifying that "this section does not create a cause of action or defense in 
favor of any person arising out of the failure to accord to a victim the rights 
enumerated" (cf. also NOVA, 1989:6-7). On the other hand, it has been 
suggested that the courts may nevertheless retain the formal power to 
enforce such provisions (Goldstein, 1984), in which case the question of 
the degree of dignity with which a victim is treated—or even the amount 
of compassion shown—might be justiciable. The Texas constitutional 
amendment of 1989, which grants the victim "the right to be treated with 
fairness and respect for the victim's dignity and privacy throughout the 
criminal justice process" (art. 1, sec. 30(a)(l)), provides the victim with 
"standing to enforce the rights enumerated in this section" (sec. 30(e)). 
As to the effects of victims' rights legislation on defendants, these will 
not generally differ from the implications of the specific proposals incorpo­
rated therein, as considered elsewhere in this study, except insofar as the 
rights may have been incorporated into the state's constitution; for exam­
ple, the "right to receive prompt restitution from the person or persons 
convicted" under sec. 2.1.8 of the Arizona Constitution. Indeed, the vic-
tim's right under this same constitutional amendment to be present at the 
parole hearing has resulted in the revocation of parole where the victim 
was not properly notified of this right [State ex rel. Hance v. Arizona Bd. of 
Pardons and Parole, 150 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 42, 1993). 
Mention has also been made of the extension of the concept of victims' 
rights to include matters pertaining directly to the prosecution and punish­
ment of offenders, as occurred in the case of the citizens' initiative in 
California. Thus, attempts to abolish or limit the insanity defense or plea 
bargaining, or to erode the exclusionary rule, have clear implications— 
generally detrimental—for defendants, and have resulted in objections 
from the American Civil Liberties Union (cf. Meador, 1982), as well as 
constitutional challenges (McCoy, 1987:49). 
Perceived Justice Needs 
No empirical evidence is available to me on the perceived signifi­
cance of victim-oriented reforms being designated as "rights," or being 
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incorporated in a victims' bill of rights. It seems reasonable to suppose 
that such designation is welcomed by victims, as well as by the public at 
large. Indeed, this is undoubtedly one of the attractions of such legisla­
tion: the legislators are seen to be providing a remedy for a need with 
which most of their constituents can identify. Moreover, it may be per­
ceived as having the moral equivalence of the Bill of Rights incorporated 
in the U.S. Constitution. Since the Bill of Rights is seen as protecting 
offenders and suspected offenders, the use of this terminology creates an 
aura of balance, and hence of perceived justice. The British government's 
Victim's Charter also uses an emotive term, with associations dating 
back to the Magna Carta! 
However, as noted earlier—particularly in the context of victim compen-
sation—there may be a substantial gap between the stated objectives of this 
type of legislation and its practical results. The gap is likely to be further 
camouflaged by attaching a popular slogan to such legislation, although if 
victim rights were to be effectively and comprehensively recognized by such 
legislation, at considerable financial cost to the taxpayer, popular attitudes 
might prove to be more equivocal. 
Finally, the question of the defendant's perspective of victim rights as a 
concept—as distinct from specific measures that have been considered 
elsewhere—is one of which little is known and which requires research. 
Fundamental Principles of Justice 
Various justice-related issues that arise in connection with the different 
proposals incorporated in victims' bills of rights have been discussed in 
this book in the context of these proposals, while the more general issues 
of fundamental rights, and of victims' rights vis-a-vis the state, are dis­
cussed in chapters 6 and 12. 
Advocates of victims' bills of rights have, in particular, sought some 
general overall principle of victim rights which should serve as a basis for 
their recognition. NQVA's basis for its advocacy of victim rights is rather 
nebulous.13 Reiff argues more persuasively that "every criminal act in­
volves a breach of law and a person wronged. The duty and obligation of 
the criminal justice system is to rectify both these acts, not to ignore the 
person wronged and deal exclusively with the breach of law" (Reiff, 
1979:112).u The purpose of his proposed bill of rights is "to make the 
victim whole again,"15 to guarantee that "he or she will be restored to 
whatever condition of life existed before the criminal act" (ibid.). While 
this principle appears to have a certain cohesiveness, it shares some of the 
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weaknesses of the NOVA rationale in that it ignores the justice issues— 
although these are dealt with by Reiff in his discussion—and is ultimately 
unworkable. A victim can rarely in fact be restored to his or her "previous 
condition of life/' so that the issue becomes one of compensation. Since it 
leaves open the question of who is to compensate and even how the com­
pensation is to be calculated, it does not appear to provide an adequate 
foundation for a universal principle of victim rights. 
The problem becomes more acute when it is proposed to elevate victim 
rights to a constitutional principle, or to a precept of international law. The 
attempt by Aynes (1984) to recognize the existence of such a right today 
under the Fourteenth Amendment was discussed in chapter 6 and was 
shown to be problematic. Hence victim advocates have supported an amend­
ment to the constitution for this purpose. The amendment to the U.S. Con­
stitution proposed by the President's Task Force on Victims in 1982 related 
exclusively to victim participation in the decision-making stages of the 
criminal justice system and was therefore considered in chapter 8. As noted 
above, however, a number of states have adopted constitutional amend­
ments of a more comprehensive nature, including the right to be treated 
with respect and dignity—in Rhode Island even with "sensitivity"—by 
criminal justice officials (see NOVA, 1989:9; National Victim Center, 1994). 
The provision of explicit guarantees under the Constitution is surely 
the ultimate expression of concern for crime victims. However, it raises 
more acutely a number of questions related to the role of the victim which 
have been referred to elsewhere in this book, such as whether the Constitu­
tion is an appropriate mechanism for guaranteeing rights vis-a-vis other 
individuals (as opposed to the government), and whether guaranteeing vic­
tims' rights is necessarily at the expense of the offender, and, if so, how the 
two bills of rights can be reconciled. It also raises the question of the 
justifiability of granting victims priority over other needy or injured catego­
ries, but on this issue victim advocates may now cite the UN declaration 
in their support. 
11

Informal Modes of 
Dispute Resolution 
In recent years there has developed a strong movement in favor of the 
replacement—or, more usually, the supplementing—of traditional adjudi­
catory modes of justice by informal modes of dispute resolution. Unlike 
most of the proposals under discussion in this study, the "alternatives" or 
"informal-justice" movement has not been orientated primarily toward 
the victim. In this respect it bears a similarity to the restitution movement 
discussed in chapter 7, which may be considered its stepsister. 
In another respect the "informal-alternatives" movement, as it will be 
termed here, has more in common with the just-deserts movement, in that 
both movements have taken the form of a broadly based crusade in favor of a 
major change of orientation in the justice system. The irony is that while 
these two movements were almost precisely contemporaneous in develop-
ment,1 they have been almost directly conflicting in objectives, the one 
advocating greater normative precision and formalism, and the other the 
reverse.2 Moreover, while it is true that the informal-alternatives move­
ment, unlike the just-deserts movement, is concerned primarily with civil 
justice, it is sometimes specifically applied to criminal justice, too, and 
indeed to a large degree purports to abolish this distinction. For this reason 
the topic is undoubtedly relevant to the subject matter of the present study. 
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What are the forces behind the move toward informalism? One of the 
most powerful of these forces has surely been the professional legal estab­
lishment, or at least significant sections of it. In 1976 leading jurists (in­
cluding Chief Justice Warren Burger) convened the National Conference on 
the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice. 
The conference was held in commemoration of the address delivered by 
Roscoe Pound to the American Bar Association seventy years earlier enti­
tled "The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with Administration of Jus­
tice/' with a view to reviving this theme and drawing policy implications 
from it.3 It was felt that the legal system had become overburdened to the 
detriment of the functioning of the courts and all parties concerned. At the 
conference Frank Sander presented a seminal paper entitled "Varieties of 
Dispute Processing," in which he proposed "a flexible and diverse panoply 
of dispute resolution processing" (Sander, 1976:130), including the use of 
arbitration and mediation techniques in appropriate cases.4 The Depart­
ment of Justice and the American Bar Association followed through with 
programs to develop alternatives to conventional adjudication methods 
(Bell, 1978; Erickson, 1978a, 1978b). 
If the legal establishment was interested primarily in relieving the regu­
lar system of an oppressive caseload, some supporters of informal alterna­
tives have emphasized the needs of the public, or that section of the public 
for whom the regular system was too remote, whether because of its cost 
or its technicality: the "neglect of the plaintiff"—or potential plaintiff—is 
the direct civil-law equivalent of the "neglect of the victim." This percep­
tion of "unmet needs" (cf. Curran, 1977:260-61) led to the "access-to-
justice" movement, which generated a not inconsiderable literature (see, 
e.g., Cappelletti and Garth, 1978). 
However, many advocates of informal alternatives have not regarded 
these alternatives exclusively as second-best substitutes for the "real 
thing." The more radical or romantic advocates have viewed informal 
proceedings as a desirable end in themselves, a more humane, "warmer 
way of disputing" (Smith, 1978), or a means of establishing "socialized 
courts" (Harrington, 1982). This appears to have been true of Griffiths 
(1970), who advocated a judicial proceeding that would resemble the set­
tlement of a family argument; of Danzig (1973), whose detailed proposal 
for the reorganization of the criminal justice system in urban areas stimu­
lated much of the literature on this topic,- and of Christie (1977), whose 
well-known essay "Conflicts as Property" advocated the replacement of 
prevailing systems of adjudication in criminal cases by an informal, de­
centralized, and deprofessionalized proceeding. Moreover, the last two 
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writers also adhered to a neighborhood or community orientation for the 
justice system. According to this approach, not only should dispute-
resolution proceedings treat the views of the individual parties concerned 
with greater respect, but the resolution of the dispute should also be 
recognized as being the concern of the immediate social environment in 
which the disputants reside, rather than of a distant, impersonal, and 
monolithic state. Support for this approach may also be found in the 
"republican theory" of Braithwaite and Pettit (1990; see esp. 121-22). 
Another version of the radical romantics may perhaps more accurately 
be described as the "religious romantics" (cf. Sebba, forthcoming). Some of 
the pioneers of informal alternatives, and in particular of the victim-
offender reconciliation projects (VORPs), were associated with the Menno­
nites and the Quakers (Peachey, 1989; Marshall and Merry, 1990). These 
"alternative" advocates tend to emphasize the need for the offender to 
acknowledge responsibility and to seek an informal "restorative" proce­
dure (Zehr, 1990), generally operating within the criminal justice system, 
whether in substitution for or in addition to the regular proceedings. This 
approach will often lay emphasis on meetings or confrontations (cf. chap. 
8) between offenders and victims, although not necessarily between offend­
ers and their own victims (cf. Launay and Murray, 1989). 
The above approaches reflect the three main declared objectives of infor­
malism: (1) reduction of judicial overload, (2) access to justice, and (3) a 
"superior process" (cf. Johnson, 1980). Another group, consisting of some 
criminal justice specialists, has seen informalism as bringing specific bene­
fits to the parties to the criminal act—offenders and their victims. Particu­
lar emphasis has been placed here on the offenders. Inf ormalism may in 
this context be seen as an integral part of the rehabilitation and labeling 
philosophy, more specifically, as an integral part of the concept of di­
version. Most diversion programs require an informal hearing involving 
police or probation officers, as well as quasi-judicial personnel, often pur­
porting to represent the community. Of particular relevance in the present 
context are those proceedings in which the victim also participates; restitu­
tion programs, in particular, which also may be classified as an informal 
alternative, are clearly calculated to benefit the victim. Relatively few 
studies, however, have considered the informal-alternative movement spe­
cifically from the victimological point of view (but see Sheleff, 1977), 
although there has been a greater emphasis on this approach in recent 
publications, particularly in Britain (see Wright and Galaway, 1989; 
Wright, 1991; and Davis, 1992). Finally, in addition to the supposed bene­
fits to the machinery of justice and to the parties involved, it has also been 
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suggested that informal justice—in particular community-based justice— 
can be a vehicle for social change (cf. Warhaftig, 1981). 
Further support for the various arguments in favor of informal alterna­
tives has derived from a large body of literature,5 much of it pointing to the 
existence and apparent success of informal dispute mechanisms in a vari­
ety of settings over space and time. The main focus has been upon anthro­
pological studies of primitive societies (see, e.g., Felstiner and Drew, 1978; 
Nader and Todd, 1978; Meschievitz and Galanter, 1982), famous illustra­
tions being "The Cheyenne Way" (Llewellyn and Hoebel, 1941), and the 
Kpelle Moot in Liberia (see Aaronson et al., 1977:5); but studies have also 
been reported of comrades' courts in socialist societies (Naumova, 1983) 
and specialist administrative tribunals in Western industrialized societies 
(Blegvad, 1983). Moreover, in addition to a wide-ranging academic litera­
ture on conflict resolution in various contexts of human activity, such as 
divorce mediation, labor negotiations, and international relations, special­
ist journals have emerged on the resolution of legal conflicts.6 
The result of the various pressures in favor of alternative dispute 
resolution—"the unusual alliance that makes up the ADR" (Singer, 
1990:7)—has not been confined to generating literature. It has also resulted 
in the adoption of specific programs. A number of experimental programs 
were established during the 1970s (see Cook et al., 1980:5-6), notably those 
connected with the Dorchester Urban Court, the so-called Neighborhood 
Justice Centers, and the Brooklyn Dispute Resolution Center;7 the latter 
were established and evaluated at the behest of the National Institute of 
Justice. In 1980 Congress adopted a Dispute Resolution Act, which was 
intended to provide further encouragement to new programs in their field, 
but the necessary funds were never appropriated—a fact seen by one critic as 
"an appropriate symbol of the futile effort to establish 'justice without law,' 
by law" (Auerbach, 1983:137). However, there has been considerable legisla­
tive activity on the part of the states (see Freedman, 1982), and at least 350 
Neighborhood Justice centers have been established (Singer, 1990:8). 
Among bodies established to promote informal alternatives, mention 
may be made of the Special Committee on Alternative Means of Dispute 
Resolution of the American Bar Association (now the Section on Dispute 
Resolution), the National Institute for Dispute Resolution, and the Insti­
tute for Mediation and Conflict Resolution. Following a clearinghouse for 
"grassroots" programs, a Dispute Resolution Clearinghouse was estab­
lished in conjunction with the National Criminal Justice Reference Ser­
vice (Warhaftig, 1982). Informal alternatives have also been developed in 
other countries, such as Canada, which pioneered VORP (Peachey, 1989), 
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Britain (Marshall and Merry, 1990), and France (Bonafe-Schmitt, 1989), and 
have been encouraged by legislation in the Germanic countries (Dunkel 
and Rossner, 1989). In New Zealand the Family Group Conference, in 
which the victim is invited to participate, has become, by statute, the chief 
mechanism for the processing of juveniles charged with offenses (Morris 
and Maxwell, 1993). Finally, article 7 of the UN Declaration of Basic Princi­
ples of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power specifies that 
"informal mechanisms for the resolution of disputes, including mediation, 
arbitration and customary justice or indigenous practices, should be uti­
lized where appropriate to facilitate conciliation and redress for victims." 
Is this flurry of activity an indication that the arguments of the reformers 
were received with universal approval and that their goals are now being 
implemented? Such a conclusion would be premature. Most of the argu­
ments put forward by the proponents of informal alternatives have been 
challenged, notably by Felstiner (1974, 1975), Abel and his associates 
(1982a: vol. 1), and Tomasic( 1982). It has been questioned whether informal 
proceedings are really preferable to formal ones for the parties involved, and 
whether the notions of "community" and "neighborhood" are not merely a 
myth. It has also been doubted whether such programs really provide "ac­
cess to justice," and if they do, whether this is necessarily desirable. More­
over, some radicals regard these programs as an obstacle to, rather than a 
promoter of, social change. Even the benefits to the official system in terms 
of reduced caseloads have been questioned. Indeed Tomasic (1982) listed 
eighteen assumptions upon which in his view the informal-alternatives 
movement was based, most of which he shows to be largely unproven (see 
also Felstiner, 1984; Merry, 1989). 
While some of these criticisms are ideological, others are empirically 
testable. Some evaluations of the still largely experimental programs are 
now available,8 and it is possible to determine with somewhat greater 
precision the strengths and weaknesses of these projects and of the argu­
ments invoked in their support and to their denigration. Before analyzing 
the evidence emerging from these studies, however, some consideration 
must be given to the issue of definition. 
Definition of Subject Matter 
Some of the doubt regarding the merit of informal modes of dispute resolu­
tion may derive from confusion or uncertainty over the subject matter in­
volved. Proposals for change may focus upon the identity of the adjudicator, 
the character of the norm invoked, or the nature of the procedure (Aaronson 
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et al., 1977:viii-ix). The emphasis may be either on civil or on criminal 
disputes. If the latter, divergence from the traditional criminal process may 
occur at a number of points (ibid.). The informal proceeding may from that 
point substitute for the formal one, or may be additional to it. It may be 
intended to handle all disputes, or may be limited according to the type of 
the dispute or the relationship of the parties. The technique of adjudication 
may be in the nature of arbitration or mediation. It may be coercive or 
noncoercive. It may or may not have a "community" orientation. 
The ultimate objective of the alternative processes may also vary. 
Coates (1990) lists "six goals," Marshall (1988) identifies twelve "fre­
quently cited aims," and Merry (1982:181) refers to "a wide range of con­
flicting and contradictory political goals and interests." Programs may be 
intended primarily to reduce the caseload in the existing system, to pro­
vide a forum for disputants who were previously without one, to improve 
upon existing procedures by conveying to disputants an enhanced percep­
tion of the justice of the process or of the outcome, or to resolve underlying 
conflicts between the disputants. The different possible permutations of 
these objectives, and of the procedures involved to secure their achieve­
ment, render evaluation—and even discussion of the issues—somewhat 
problematical. 
There seem to be four key characteristics of the "alternatives" move­
ment which give expression to most of the prevailing objectives and expec­
tations of this movement. These are as follows: (1) deprofessionalization of 
the procedure—the proceeding is not to be directed by a professional judge, 
nor are lawyers to be employed (but cf. Abel, 1982a:4, 9; Tomasic, 
1982:232-33); (2) informality of proceedings—the traditional adversary 
process is to be inapplicable, as are the concepts of due process and the 
rules of evidence; (3) outcome by consent—the parties are voluntarily to 
arrive at an agreed decision with the assistance of a mediator,- and (4) a 
local or community-based forum. In principle, these characteristics are 
shared by the so-called Neighborhood Justice Centers, which have often 
been regarded as the flagships of the movement toward informalism. The 
third characteristic is not always fully applicable to programs operating on 
the VORP model, since formal conviction and sentencing procedures may 
take place in addition to the mediation proceedings (cf., e.g., Marshall and 
Merry, 1990:8). 
The following discussion will relate primarily to programs complying 
with these characteristics—including VORP-type programs, in view of their 
importance in the context of victim-oriented innovations. The merits and 
demerits of these programs will be considered employing the analytical 
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scheme adopted throughout this study, differentiating between coping 
needs, perceived justice needs, and principles of justice. 
Coping Needs 
Victims. In order for mediation proceedings to be beneficial to the 
parties concerned, the first precondition is that the proceedings should 
actually take place. However, in a substantial proportion of the cases 
referred to the mediation agency this was not the case. The overall pic­
ture for the three Neighborhood Justice Centers in this respect, based 
upon 3,947 referrals between March 1978 and May 1979, was that 48.7% 
of the dispositions were classified as "cases unresolved, no hearing," 
while a further 16.5% were resolved without a hearing (Cook et al., 
1980:25, table 3.1). The most common reasons cited were "the respon-
dent's refusal to participate in mediation or the inability of the NJC to 
contact the respondent due to inadequate information"; other reasons 
included the complainant's withdrawal (ibid., 24). In the Dorchester 
study, the failure to hold the hearing, which occurred in approximately 
one-third of the cases, was attributed almost equally to complainants 
(16%) and respondents (14%) (Felstiner and Williams, 1980:22). At the 
Brooklyn Dispute Resolution Center, too, where mediation was limited 
to felony cases in which there was a prior relationship between the par­
ties, a substantial proportion of the parties did not appear, although they 
had agreed in principle to do so (Davis, Tichane, and Grayson, n.d.:15, 
95). Among 2,372 cases referred to five Florida mediation programs in 
1978, "the total no-show rate was 27.6%, and 68.8% of those were respon­
dent no-shows" (Bridenback et al., 1980:10, and table 5). An evaluation of 
VORP in Indiana and Ohio found that half of the possible meetings oc­
curred (Coates and Gehm, 1989:257), but the number of cases in this type 
of program in which at least one meeting takes place was somewhat 
higher (ibid.; Marshall and Merry, 1990:107-8). Nonparticipation here 
was more likely on the victim's part (Marshall and Merry, 1990:108, 113). 
The variables associated with nonparticipation are still relatively unex­
plored (ibid.). 
The second precondition for a beneficial outcome is that the parties 
should in fact have been able to reach an agreement. One of the characteris­
tics of mediation, by contrast with arbitration, is that the consent of both 
parties is required. In 6.3% of the cases referred to the Neighborhood Jus­
tice Centers—about 18% of those in which mediation sessions actually 
took place—no resolution was reached at the hearings (Cook et al., 
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1980:25, table 3.1). In the Dorchester program, this was true of 10.6% of 
the cases mediated (Felstiner and Williams, 1980:22, table 18). The Florida 
evaluation reported a failure to reach agreement in 19.3% of the cases 
(Bridenback et al., 1980:26, fig. 2). In the Brooklyn Dispute Resolution 
Center, there appear to have been almost no such cases.9 Similarly, the 
VORP evaluation found that in 98% of the cases in which face-to-face 
meetings occurred agreements were reached (Coates and Gehm, 1989:257). 
Marshall and Merry (1990:118, 121) also report very high rates of agree­
ment for mediated cases, but lower rates for cases that were indirectly 
negotiated. 
In the light of traditional models of adjudication, in which the judge 
imposes the ultimate solution upon the two warring adversaries, the rate 
of agreement reported here seems strikingly high. It may be that reluctant 
parties are filtered out at the "no-show" stage, and those who actually 
appear for the sessions are only the positively motivated. Moreover, respon­
dents who have been referred by criminal justice agencies in lieu of trial 
may be motivated by the latent threat of formal criminal proceedings if the 
mediation fails (see in this respect the findings of Marshall and Merry, 
1990:118). This would not apply, however, to victim-complainants, who 
are apparently free to accept or reject any proposal for an agreed outcome. 
It may be, however, that subtle pressures are exerted by the mediator, or 
possibly even by the defendant. Alternatively, it may be that complainants 
are so pleased to participate in a proceeding in which their views are 
elicited that their demands are modest. These possibilities may be further 
tested by examining the nature of the agreements and the expressed views 
of the parties (see below). 
It is also pertinent to consider the variables affecting the probability of 
an agreement taking place. Thus, it has been found that cases referred 
under threat of prosecution are more likely to result in agreement between 
the parties (Garofalo and Connelly, 1980:435, 582). Second, it has been 
found that conflicts related to property are more difficult to resolve than 
cases involving violence (ibid., 583-84). Similarly, in cases where the par­
ties had an intimate relationship, an agreement was more likely to be 
reached. These last variables may be interrelated (ibid., 1980:584). 
The next issue to consider is how far the agreements reached were benefi­
cial to the victim-complainants. Surprisingly little attention has been de­
voted to analysis of the content of the agreements. Cook et al. (1980:90, 
table 5.1) classified the agreements reached at the Neighborhood Justice 
Centers into 25 categories, the largest of which were monetary restitution, 
"no contact between parties," and "no verbal abuse or harassment." The 
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evaluation of the Honolulu center's program, in which most of the disputes 
were civil in character, classified 38% of the agreements as being concerned 
with restitution, 16% with establishment of child support or visitations, 
and 8% with "specified behavior, communication or contact"; the remain­
ing categories were smaller still (Berger, 1982:2). The Florida study, in 
which the disputes evaluated were mostly referred by law enforcement 
agencies and were thus presumably criminal in character, differentiated 
between the undertakings of respondents and complainants. Respondents 
undertook mainly "disengagement" (25.5%), "alteration of past behavior" 
(24.3%), or payment/restitution of money/property (18.0%); other catego­
ries each represented less than 6% of the sample. On the other hand, 35.2% 
of complainants undertook no obligation, 19.9% "disengagement," 13.9% 
to "establish cooperative relationships," 8.7% "alteration of past behav­
ior," and 6.3% not to pursue prosecution (Bridenback et al., 1980:12-13). 
While the categories used in these studies appear to be discrete, the Brook­
lyn evaluation [N = 144) allowed for concurrent characteristics. The most 
frequent characteristics observed in agreements in this study were "end 
harassment" (95%), establishing methods for handling future problems 
(35%), limited interaction between the parties (24%), behavioral restric­
tions (36%), restitution (20%), "express provision that the relationship be 
ended" (21%), and "express provision that the relationship be continued" 
(13%) (Davis, Tichane, and Grayson, n.d.:47). 
Coates and Gehm (1989:257), however, found that 87% of the VORP 
agreements they studied included an element of restitution; and Marshall 
and Merry (1990:116) claim that the domination of restitution is a charac­
teristic of the American programs, whereas in British programs the out­
come is often merely an apology, which also appears to have a high priority 
in France (Bonafe-Schmitt, 1989:191). 
The distribution of outcomes indicated here calls for a number of com­
ments. Many of the agreements appear to deal with the interpersonal rela­
tions between the disputants, the category with which the programs purport 
mainly to be concerned. However, an agreement to sever the relationship 
("disengagement") appears to be one of the most popular modes of resolving 
the dispute on this level. While this may be the most practical solution in an 
urban environment, it seems a far cry from the vision of reconciliation 
between the parties in a community setting; nor, indeed, was this option 
available in the primitive societies from which some advocates of infor­
malism drew their inspiration. Thus, while agreements may have been 
reached relatively frequently in interpersonal dispute cases (see above), the 
"resolution" of these cases is often a somewhat negative phenomenon. 
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At the same time, victim-complainants may be perceived to have gained 
from these proceedings, in that however slight the direct benefits may 
appear, they are more than those generally emerging from a regular crimi­
nal trial, to which victims are not even a party, although they may be 
awarded restitution. Moreover, it is probable that many of the cases, if 
handled by routine criminal justice processes, would never even reach the 
trial stage. 
On the other hand, unlike the criminal trial, at mediation proceedings 
victim-complainants may themselves be subjected to control measures.10 
A substantial proportion of agreements incorporated undertakings on the 
part of the victim-complainants, illustrations of which were presented 
above. While undertakings of this nature may be beneficial to the relation­
ship between the parties and to social tranquility, the incurring of such 
obligations by the victim-complainant must, from a legal or a civil-
libertarian point of view, be considered a loss or a burden. An analogy may 
be made here with the imposition of a rehabilitative measure on the of­
fender in a criminal case. 
To what extent does the emergence of an agreement indicate that the 
problem has been resolved? In general, there has been insufficient monitor­
ing both of the degree of compliance with any agreement that is reached 
and of the effects of the agreement on the disputing relationship. In some 
of the evaluation studies, however, disputants were questioned on these 
issues; and sometimes disputants were questioned again on the matter 
some time later, as in the Brooklyn evaluation, where respondents were 
approached at two time intervals after the conclusion of the mediation 
hearing. 
The Florida evaluation found that 75.1% of complainants and 82.8% of 
respondents declared that the problem was resolved or "partially resolved" 
(Bridenback et al., 1980: table 18; see also Felstiner and Williams, 1980:27, 
tables 30.5, 30.3; Coates and Gehm, 1989:257). The Final Evaluation Re­
port of the Neighborhood Justice Centers Field Test found that 79% of the 
complainants and 87% of the respondents stated that they had kept all 
terms of the agreement, while 69% and 67% respectively stated that the 
other party had kept all terms of the agreement. Moreover, 72% of com­
plainants and 78% of respondents stated that there were no more problems 
with the other party (Cook et al., 1980:49, table 4.2). The Brooklyn evalua­
tion found that by the second evaluation, two and a half years after the 
cases were disposed, "only a small number of disputants were still experi­
encing interpersonal problems. . . . Fewer than 8% of the complainants and 
7% of the defendants reported that they still had problems with the other 
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disputants" (Connick and Davis, 1981:31). This was partly attributed, how­
ever, to a lessening of contacts between the parties. 
The significance of the findings reported above depends to a large extent 
on what would have been expected in the wake of regular formal processes, 
an issue rarely addressed and not, of course, known to the disputants in the 
informal programs (Felstiner and Williams, 1980:26). With this in mind, 
both the Neighborhood Justice Centers and the Brooklyn evaluations com­
pared mediation samples with control groups that were processed by the 
courts. The former found that 70% of complainants passing through the 
regular system reported that the dispute was resolved, a number not sub­
stantially different from the experimental sample (Cook et al., 1980:99-
100). In the Brooklyn study, however, significantly fewer complainants 
passing through the court perceived the defendant's behavior as having 
improved (Davis, Tichane, and Grayson, n.d.:61). 
Somewhat more disturbing are the findings regarding the relative de­
gree of successful resolution according to the types of dispute involved. It 
has generally been found that interpersonal disputes—although having a 
better prognosis than property disputes in terms of the probability of a 
mediation agreement—are less likely to hold in the long run, as contacts 
between the parties are resumed. By contrast, in property disputes, where 
agreement is reached, it is more likely to be maintained (Garofalo and 
Connelly, 1980:592-95).11 
Felstiner and Williams (1982) developed a somewhat different classifica­
tion, according to "dispute level." Level 1 refers to the "one-shot dispute," 
with no underlying interpersonal problems. Level 2 denotes cases of "esca­
lating misunderstanding," and level 3 occurs where there are "underlying 
emotional and/or behavioral problems" (126). Employing this classifica­
tion, they confirmed the finding that "the higher the level of dispute the 
more it is likely to be settled at mediation" but "the more likely it is that 
an agreement will break down" (128). The authors note that although the 
informality of the proceedings and the mediator's technique may be calcu­
lated to produce discussion of the underlying problems, the mediators then 
proceed to deal with the "overlying" material, that is, the concrete issues 
referred to mediation. "Mediation is not psychotherapy and that is what 
many of the disputes that come to mediation require, if any form of social 
intervention would be helpful" (147). In this respect, the claims of media­
tion advocates, namely, the resolution of underlying conflicts, may be 
unrealistic (see also Marshall and Merry, 1990:151). 
The final matter to be considered under victims' coping needs is that of 
"access to justice." This term is generally applied to civil claimants but 
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may also be adapted to criminal complainants. Their potential gain in 
access by virtue of the establishment of informal mechanisms of dispute 
resolution may take three forms. First, as already noted, cases dealt with 
by such procedures rather than in criminal proceedings result in the vic-
tim's active participation and in an outcome for which the victim's con­
sent is required, whereas the victim's contribution to the criminal process 
is nugatory. On the other hand, the victim may have lost the supposed 
benefit of the imposition of a formal criminal sanction on the defendant, 
while at the same time being exposed to a possible measure of control 
which would not have been the case had the defendant been prosecuted in 
a conventional proceeding. 
Second, if the matter were dealt with by the routine agencies of criminal 
law enforcement rather than an informal alternative, there would be a high 
probability that no action would have been taken against the defendant. In 
the Brooklyn Dispute Resolution Center program, cases deemed appropri­
ate for mediation were randomly assigned either to the experimental (me­
diation) or to the control (court) procedures (Davis, Tichane, and Gray son, 
n.d.:14). It was found that "70 percent of control cases were either dis­
missed outright or adjourned in contemplation of dismissal" (52). The 
Neighborhood Justice Centers evaluation conducted "court comparison 
studies" (Cook et al., 1980:125); here, too, it was found that a substantial 
proportion of the comparison cases did not in fact reach the trial stage [77). 
The Dorchester evaluation reached a similar conclusion (Felstiner and 
Williams, 1982:133). It also emerged from these studies that where defen­
dants did reach the courts, sentences were mostly light. Thus, compared 
with cases which would have been closed by the prosecution authorities, 
victim-complainants make a net gain in access to justice by virtue of the 
informal proceedings, except inasmuch as this proceeding exposes them, 
too, to a possible control measure. 
The concept of access, however—and this is the third and main point— 
is really intended to apply to matters that would not otherwise have been 
dealt with in any alternative proceeding. The advocates of informal alterna­
tives motivated by the "access to justice" consideration assumed that the 
cases to be dealt with by such procedures would be instigated directly by 
the victim-complainant, or referred by a community agency. In such cases 
there would be a net gain in terms of access, if it is assumed that these 
cases would not have reached any alternative forum. However, it has been 
questioned whether there are, as often assumed, large numbers of griev­
ances "out there" vainly awaiting a resolution mechanism, or whether the 
grievances that exist are in fact amenable to resolution in a mediation 
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procedure between individuals (see e.g., Buckle and Thomas-Buckle, 
1982). It has also been asserted by radical critics that grieved citizens 
would do better not to have their disputes resolved on an individual basis 
but to seek class-oriented remedies (see Abel, 1982b:280-89; and see be­
low). Whatever the merit of these arguments, it is certainly true that the 
overwhelming majority of disputes—particularly disputes of a criminal 
character—which have been dealt with by the programs under consider­
ation here were referred by criminal justice agencies that were already 
investigating the complaints in question. It is also the case that programs 
such as those in Los Angeles (Venice) and San Francisco, which endeav­
ored to rely upon the spontaneous initiative of aggrieved citizens, had 
considerable difficulty in attracting clientele (Tomasic, 1982:229-30), and 
the San Francisco program has consequently modified its approach (Singer, 
1990:122; Shonholz, 1993:230). Thus, the potential of such programs for 
the expansion of dispute processing, at least in the framework of the pres­
ent social structure, must be questioned. 
Offenders. Defendants appear to gain in a number of ways from infor­
mal modes of dispute resolution. First, in a sense they are simply being 
provided with an additional option, since as their participation is ostensi­
bly voluntary, they may elect either to pursue this course or to opt out and 
be processed in the regular criminal (or possibly civil) justice system. 
Second, mediated agreements, as illustrated above, are less oppressive 
than traditional penal sanctions; in particular, the possibility of a custodial 
sanction does not arise. Indeed, it appears that this characteristic of infor­
mal alternatives is uppermost in the minds of defendants-respondents (see 
below). 
Third, the fact that the victim-complainant, too, may be subjected to 
some restrictive undertakings as part of the agreement ultimately reached 
may be seen as a further gain for the respondent, not only in the "zero-sum 
game" sense, whereby your opponent's loss is your gain, but also insofar as 
a respondent's genuinely held grievances vis-a-vis the complainant may be 
dealt with in the framework of this agreement. 
Fourth, as respondents are ostensibly being offered here a quasi-thera-
peutic program designed to improve their interpersonal relationships and to 
prevent their becoming involved in further conflict, the potential benefits 
may be perceived not only in therapeutic terms but also in the prevention of 
future involvement with the criminal justice system. 
However, forceful arguments can be put forward for the contrary view. 
First, participation on the part of the defendant may not be genuinely 
voluntary, since when expressing consent to the mediation proceedings the 
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defendant will generally be aware that a criminal trial would entail the risk 
of a more serious outcome. Indeed, even after the mediation proceedings 
are under way, it is not unusual for the mediator to "remind" the respon­
dent of the possible consequences in the event that no mutual agreement 
be reached (Tomasic, 1982:226). 
Further, there is some evidence that respondents, while undergoing a 
reduced sanctioning risk by agreeing to mediation proceedings, are in fact 
exposing themselves to enhanced measures of social control. The explana­
tion for this lies in the fact that mediation proceedings do not generally 
deal with serious crime but rather with minor disputes, in particular 
those involving family members and neighbors, which the regular crimi­
nal justice system would have neither the time nor the patience to pro­
cess. As noted above, control groups constructed in the Neighborhood 
Justice Centers, the Brooklyn Dispute Resolution Center, and the Dorches­
ter Mediation project found that many or most of such cases dealt with by 
conventional means would have been dismissed; and this applied even to 
the Brooklyn program, which dealt with felonies. Moreover, these studies 
also found that among those cases which did reach the courts, the proba­
bility of a custodial sentence was extremely slight (Davis, Tichane, and 
Grayson, n.d.:52; Cook et al., 1980:77). Thus it may be that the true effect 
of the mediation alternative is to "widen the net" of legal control (cf. 
Austin and Krisberg, 1981; Cohen, 1979) exercised upon offenders or re­
spondents dealt with by such procedures. Moreover, in the event of a 
defendant rejecting the mediation option, the possibility arises that if 
subsequently sentenced in a criminal court, evidence of refusal of a media­
tion offer may aggravate the sentence, on the analogy of a not-guilty plea. 
The implications of the informal processes for subsequent formal ones 
are particularly relevant in VORP-type programs, in which the mediation 
process is not generally intended to supplant the formal procedure, so that 
a subsequent formal sentence may be the norm. Coates and Gehm (1989) 
compared a VORP sample with a matched sample that was dealt with by 
conventional procedures only. They found that the incarceration rate was 
about 20% for each sample, but that the mean duration of the incarcera­
tion was substantially less for VORP offenders (258-59). However, they did 
not dismiss the possibility that the mediation process involved an "addi­
tional cost to the offender" (259). Marshall and Merry (1990:131ff.) also 
invested considerable effort in endeavoring to assess the impact of media­
tion on the outcome that would have been probable without it. They found 
some indication of a reduction in custodial sentences and an increase in 
restitution, but in particular a move from fines to community sentences. 
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This suggests somewhat mixed results in terms of net widening. They also 
noted that "a poor outcome to the intervention can have a negative impact 
on sentence" (141). 
Third, the "help" provided to the respondent toward his or her rehabili­
tation has not been established by the evaluation research. As indicated 
below, the data on recidivism rates on the part of disputants who have par­
ticipated in mediation proceedings as compared with comparison groups 
are not uniformly in favor of the former category. 
Finally, while this point has been insufficiently studied in the evalua­
tion literature, there is a clear danger that such proceedings import second-
class justice. Respondent-defendants participating in informal proceedings 
are deprived of due process guarantees such as the right to silence, the right 
to counsel, the right to cross-examine witnesses, and the right to a jury 
trial. A respondent who is legally innocent may hesitate to reject the offer 
of a mediation proceeding because of the risk of a punitive sanction that 
may result from formal proceedings, but may thereby sacrifice the constitu­
tional protections that would lead to a total exoneration. This issue will be 
further considered below. 
Society. A number of possible advantages are thought to accrue to the 
criminal justice system as a result of the establishment of alternative 
modes of dispute resolution. The first of these may be defined in terms of 
cost-benefit analysis. Alternative forms of dispute resolution have been 
encouraged by official agencies as providing an inexpensive form of justice 
for persons or disputes for which the conventional system was ineffective 
or unnecessary, thereby releasing resources that could be devoted by that 
system to the cases it retained. The experience so far accumulated suggests 
that this objective has encountered two obstacles. First, the analysis con­
ducted in some depth by Felstiner and Williams (1982:144) of the cost of 
informal processing in Dorchester concluded that "mediated costs are 1 to 
3 times the amount of court cases saved."12 This is explained by the fact 
that most of these cases would not have involved costly correctional treat­
ment had they been processed by the criminal justice system but either 
would have been dismissed or would have resulted in probation, most of 
the costs being incurred in the probation cases (145). 
Second, the alternative programs have not succeeded in releasing sub­
stantial resources within the conventional system, since the numbers han­
dled by these programs are insignificant as compared with the caseloads 
incurred by the conventional system. It could be argued that both types of 
saving would increase as the programs are expanded and more—and more 
serious—cases are diverted into the alternative programs, but this may 
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never occur, for professional criminal justice personnel, the main source of 
referrals to the programs, are unlikely to forgo cases they perceive as consti­
tuting their essential diet.13 
It might be anticipated that if the underlying causes of the parties' griev­
ances have been resolved, they—and in particular the alleged offender— 
would not constitute a further danger either to each other or to the general 
public. The critical evaluation of the Brooklyn Dispute Resolution Center 
found that continued hostility between the parties was infrequent during 
the four-month follow-up period: the police were called in only 12% of the 
cases, and an arrest made in only 4%. However, these relatively low figures 
could not be attributed to the mediation proceeding, since the figures were 
almost identical for the control group (Davis, Tichane, and Grayson, 
n.d.:62). Further, while arrests for violent acts against the other party were 
assessed at only 7%-10% of the cases during the two-and-a-half-year 
follow-up of the mediation sample, 31 % of the defendants were arrested at 
least once during this period, indicating that they remained a threat to the 
public if not necessarily to the original complainant (Connick and Davis, 
1981:33-34). Moreover, Felstiner and Williams (1980:44-45) found that 
general recidivism rates were no lower among their mediation sample than 
among the control sample; if anything, the opposite tendency was observed. 
Marshall and Merry (1990:193-97) formed the impression that some of the 
British VORC-type schemes led to a degree of "behavioral improvement" in 
terms of criminality but noted mainly the dearth of hard data in this respect 
both in North America and in Britain. It may also be noted that the Brooklyn 
study found no recognizable gain arising from the program in terms of co­
operation by victims with law enforcement authorities (Davis, Chytilo, and 
Schraga, 1980). 
It will be recalled that some advocates of alternative modes of dispute 
resolution anticipated more far-reaching societal benefits beyond those 
related directly to crime and criminal justice, such as enhancing commu­
nity solidarity, bringing about social change, or reducing the general level 
of social or interpersonal tension. The first and most specific of these 
objectives has proved to be problematical (see, e.g., Nelken, 1985),14 particu­
larly in the context of the urban metropolis. As noted above, dispute resolu­
tion centers that have attempted to develop from "the community" rather 
than relying upon professional agencies—generally pertaining to the crimi­
nal justice system—for referrals, have achieved only moderate success. 
Moreover, mediators do not seem to be necessarily identified with a specifi­
cally community role. Communities of the type in which prestigious fig­
ures are the natural candidates for the role of mediator exist in traditional, 
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particularly rural, societies and may even survive urban development in 
such societies (Nairn, 1983). However, the concept does not fit well with 
Western industrialized societies (see, e.g., Harrell-Bond and Smith, 1983). 
Indeed, the ethnic mediation systems once prevalent among certain groups 
in such societies have undergone a decline (Doo, 1973). Finally, the issues 
affecting a community, in the sense of a local geographic unit, are fre­
quently not of such a nature that they can be resolved by an internal 
mediation procedure between individuals, since they may involve public 
agencies and bureaucracies, in many cases having ramifications beyond the 
locality (Buckle and Thomas-Buckle, 1982; Kidder, 1981). 
The idea that informal justice alternatives might constitute a vehicle 
for social change is identified primarily with the grassroots concept of 
community dispute resolution, whereby the proceedings would be initi­
ated directly from the community and could accommodate disputes affect­
ing groups or classes of citizens (Warhaftig, 1981; Merry, 1982:188-89). 
However, the prevailing models—with the possible exception of the San 
Francisco Community Boards (see Merry and Milner, 1993)—are seen by 
many radicals as serving as primarily an "overflow" for the criminal justice 
system, and thus as a means of expanding state mechanisms of social 
control. At the same time, insofar as they handle "original" grievances 
raised directly by citizens, the prevailing mode of resolving disputes on an 
individual basis is perceived as a means of ensuring the atomization and 
control of such disputes and of inhibiting the development of group mo­
mentum toward changes in the socioeconomic structure (cf. Abel, 1982b). 
Which of the functions discussed here—promotion of social change or 
neutralization of social conflict—is the preferable objective is naturally an 
ideological question. 
The more amorphous idea that the existence of local institutions readily 
available for the resolution of conflicts might contribute to the general 
reduction of interpersonal tensions is perhaps less controversial. However, 
it has been argued that it may be counterproductive to encourage citizens 
to define problems as grievances requiring resolution. Our knowledge of 
the processes involved is at present still somewhat rudimentary. Seminal 
theoretical analysis has been published on the theory of dispute resolution 
(Abel, 1973) as well as pioneering research on the processes whereby an 
experience becomes labeled as injurious ("naming"), injury is attributed to 
the fault of another ("blaming") and thus becomes a grievance, and the 
grievance is referred to some agency in the pursuit of a remedy ("claim­
ing") (see Felstiner et al. 1980-81; and in the context of victim decision 
making, Burt 1983). It has been suggested that it may be preferable not to 
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encourage this "transformation" process and that the very existence of 
dispute-resolution mechanisms may encourage perceptions of victimiza­
tion (Vidmar, 1981; cf. Quinney, 1974). Alternatively, it may be preferable 
for perceived grievances to be forgotten (Felstiner, 1974) or to be handled 
on a one-to-one basis without third-party intervention (cf. Sander, 1976; 
Cain, 1983). Finally, it has been argued that whereas the mediation ethos 
regards conflict as a pathological phenomenon requiring therapeutic inter­
vention, conflict is in fact "an integral part of social relations" (Felstiner 
and Williams, 1982:120, citing the German sociologist Richard Rosellen). 
These arguments are all worthy of consideration and exploration without 
necessarily negating the positive potential of informal alternatives, if not 
for resolving innumerable unrecognized conflicts, then at least for disputes 
that are currently so recognized. 
Perceived Justice Needs 
In a number of evaluation studies, victim-complainants were interviewed 
about their attitudes to the mediation proceedings and outcome. Reac­
tions were generally favorable (Marshall and Merry, 1990:145). Cook et al. 
(1980) found that among their Neighborhood Justice center sample 84% 
of the complainants were satisfied with the process and 88% with the 
mediator. High rates of satisfaction with the process and/or the mediator 
were also recorded in the Florida study (Bridenback et al., 1980: table 19), 
in the Brooklyn Mediation proceedings (complainants, 94% of whom ap­
preciated the opportunity to tell their story), and among Dorchester inter­
viewees (both complainants and respondents). A significant minority 
(about a quarter) of a sample of victims who participated in the New 
Zealand Family Group conferences said they felt worse as a consequence 
(Morris et al., 1993:312-13), but the situation at such conferences bears 
greater similarity to the plea negotiation proceedings described in chapter 
8 than to the other procedures described here, in that the victim is one of 
several parties present. In particular, many victims were intimidated in 
the face of the defendant's family. Other studies indicating a desire on the 
part of victims to have an opportunity to meet with the offender were 
cited in chapter 8. 
As to the outcome of the proceedings, 73% of the Brooklyn sample 
expressed satisfaction (Davis, Tichane, and Grayson, n.d.:51), 78.3% of the 
Dorchester participants (including defendants) were "glad that they used 
mediation" (Felstiner and Williams, 1980), and 88% of the complainants 
using Neighborhood Justice Centers were satisfied with their experiences 
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(Cook et al., 1980:48). These attitudes may in fact be a response to the 
process itself rather than the specific outcome, which may be of lesser 
importance (Garofalo and Connelly, 1980:587). 
More notably, Davis, Tichane, and Grayson (n.d.) found that in all areas— 
opportunity to tell their story, the fairness of the judge or mediator, the 
fairness of the outcome, and satisfaction with the outcome—complainants 
referred to the Brooklyn mediation proceedings expressed more favorable 
views than the control group who were referred to traditional procedures 
(50-51; Davis, 1982).I5 Most complainants participating in the Neighbor­
hood Justice Center proceedings (72%) would wish to bring a further prob­
lem to that forum, as compared with 16% who expressed a preference for the 
courts. Similarly, 65% of the Dorchester interviewees, including respon­
dents, preferred mediation, as compared with only 11.7% who preferred the 
courts. Davis, Tichane, and Grayson (n.d.) found that "complainants in both 
the experimental and the control groups preferred mediation by a two-to-
one majority" (53); and Cook et al. (1980) also found that all satisfaction 
indices favored the Neighborhood Justice Center over the regular courts 
(99-100). Marshall and Merry (1990) found in their evaluation of British 
VORP-type reparation projects that "victims who met their offender in 
mediation were more satisfied with the sentence passed on the offender 
than the control group victims" (165-66). They concluded, "Mediation 
clearly affects victims' punitiveness towards their offenders, and leads them 
to be more satisfied with less severe sentencing" (166). However, nearly one-
half of the victims attending the New Zealand Family Group conferences 
were dissatisfied with the outcome, even though the outcome was suppos­
edly conditional on their agreement (Morris et al., 1993:314-15). Finally, 
97% (!) of the victims who participated in the Indiana VORP program indi­
cated that they would choose to do it again (Coates, 1990:129-30). Marshall 
and Merry's observation appears to have been applicable here, too, for "in 
some cases victims complained that their client was punished too much by 
having to do VORP and some jail time" (130). 
In contrast with these generally favorable findings in regard to percep­
tions of the mediation programs, mention must be made of Sally Merry's 
ethnographic study of the use of informal proceedings among working-
class communities in New England. According to Merry (1990): "People go 
to court in these three neighborhoods out of a search for an impersonal 
moral authority with the power to enforce its rules" (83). They tended to 
be dissatisfied with officials who "endeavoring to provide what they con­
sider justice, convert these problems from legal to moral or therapeutic 
discourse" (179). These reservations, which are linked also to the issue of 
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social justice considered below, suggest the need to take into account possi­
ble variations in the justice needs of different sectors of the population. 
Like their victim-complainant counterparts, defendant-respondents, too, 
have been found by most studies to hold very positive views regarding 
mediation proceedings. Respondent ratings in the Neighborhood Justice 
Center evaluation were almost identical to complainant ratings regarding 
satisfaction with the process (81%) and with the mediator (88%), the choice 
of a Neighborhood Justice Center (73%) rather than a court (12%) for the 
handling of a future problem, and overall satisfaction with the experience 
(88%). In the Florida study, too, 82.5% of the respondents expressed satisfac­
tion with the process (Bridenback et al., 1980). Among the Brooklyn sam­
ples, defendants were more likely to feel that they had an opportunity to tell 
their story in the mediation process (90%) than in the court process (44%; p 
< .01). They were also more likely to believe that the outcome was fair [p < 
.05). Satisfaction with outcome was marginally, but not significantly, 
greater, while the fairness of the mediator or judge was rated almost equally 
high by both samples. Overall, the authors found that "over nine out of ten 
defendants in both the experimental and the control groups indicated that, 
in a similar circumstance, they would rather have their case handled in 
mediation than in court" (Davis, Tichane, and Grayson, n.d.:56). Evalua­
tions of VORP-type programs, in both the United States and Britain, also 
found that offenders' views were favorable (Coates, 1990:130; Marshall and 
Merry, 1990:166). 
It may be surmised that the victim-complainant's preference for media­
tion proceedings derives primarily from the very fact of his or her involve­
ment in these proceedings, in contrast with the traditional criminal process 
to which the victim is not a party. On the other hand, as noted earlier, a 
perceived advantage to the defendant is that in truly alternative proceed­
ings there is no risk of the imposition of a severe sanction, while in VORP-
type proceedings there may be an expectation—and even a perception—of 
a subsequently reduced sentence. The defendant may also derive satisfac­
tion from the fact that the complainant-victim may be under pressure to 
reach a compromise agreement and to make certain undertakings, with the 
possible implication that he or she, too, may be partly responsible for the 
events giving rise to the dispute and the resulting proceedings. 
While these evaluations seem to support a genuine preference by the 
parties for an informal proceeding, they cannot be interpreted as an all-
embracing rejection of the established judicial structure in favor of the 
resolution of disputes at the community level. For, as previously indicated, 
most of the informal proceedings reviewed above take place in the margin 
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of the official system and under the general control of that system 
(Tomasic, 1982:231). At the same time, they undoubtedly indicate some 
perceived merit in these processes. 
Apart from the direct evidence of participant satisfaction with informal 
proceedings, two areas of experimental evidence may be relevant to par­
ties' perceptions of mediation proceedings. With regard to the proceedings 
themselves, the experiments conducted by Thibaut and Walker indicated 
that potential disputants generally favored adversary proceedings (rather 
than "inquisitorial" proceedings on the European model) because of the 
greater control this gave them. This would seem to favor mediation, since 
even though such proceedings are not formally adversarial, the parties 
actively participate and the outcome is notionally in their control. How­
ever, the authors found that where there was a high degree of conflict of 
interest between the parties, there was a need for a decision on the part of a 
third party empowered to apply objective norms (Thibaut and Walker, 
1975:20; 1978). 
With regard to the outcome of the proceedings, equity theory posits that 
benefits to the contending parties are anticipated in proportion to their 
respective inputs. A mediated settlement reached with the agreement of 
both parties may be assumed to constitute an optimal disposition for the 
parties concerned (cf. Coates and Penrod, 1980-81). This conclusion is 
consistent with the European survey evidence referred to below. Umbreit 
(1988:136-38), in his study of mediation involving burglary victims, found 
that equity theory was supported by the increased level of distress felt by 
victims as a result of the victimization and the perceived fairness of being 
compensated ("restoring equity"). However, the emphasis placed by the 
victims on the need to rehabilitate the offenders (juveniles) was seen by 
Umbreit as recognition of the principle of need. This principle may be 
expected to play a prominent role in the context of an exchange relation­
ship and is thus particularly relevant to mediation. 
As to public perceptions of informalism, little direct evidence seems to 
be available from research conducted in the United States, although a 
survey conducted in Minnesota found that 82% of respondents would 
consider a mediation proceeding if a nonviolent property crime were com­
mitted against them by a juvenile or young adult (Umbreit, 1994:11-12). 
European surveys focusing on civil disputes have indicated a preference for 
informal over formal justice, on both a procedural and a substantive level. 
Thus a Bulgarian survey (Naumova, 1983) found that, from the procedural 
point of view, peasant respondents preferred "flexibility" (61%-66% of the 
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samples) to the formality of "law" (34%-39%), while from the substan­
tive point of view, respondents preferred "compromise" (71%-79%) to 
"justice" (21%-29%).16 Similar surveys conducted in other European 
countries, including industrialized areas in western Europe, have reached 
very similar conclusions (Kurczewski, 1983:239 n. 6). However, a study 
conducted in the Soviet Republic of Georgia (Yakovlev, 1985:48) found a 
preference among respondents for "law" and "justice"; this suggests that 
expressed preferences should be seen in the context of the system prevail­
ing at the location of the survey and the degree to which it is accepted. 
A more formalistic orientation might be anticipated in respect of con­
duct traditionally regarded as criminal. A priori it seems that at least two 
areas of concern might emerge: first, that mediation proceedings do not 
allow for punitive, and in particular for incapacitative, sanctions; and sec­
ond, that disparities in sanction are likely to be arrived at for similar cases. 
Moreover, the failure to stigmatize offenders by means of degradation cere­
monies (cf. Garfinkel, 1956) might, too, be a cause of dissatisfaction for 
those for whom the "denunciatory" function of the criminal law is be­
lieved to be important (Walker, 1969:19), although stigmatization is not 
necessarily excluded by informalism (see the "reintegrative shaming" pro­
cess advocated by Braithwaite 1989). 
However, in addition to the Minnesota survey referred to above, a sur­
vey conducted in Hamburg in 1984-85, referred to in chapter 7, found that 
across 38 types of offense, 42.4% of respondents took the view that "vic­
tim and offender should privately agree on restitution or reconciliation 
(with the help of a third person if needed)" or that "victim and offender 
should agree on restitution or reconciliation mediated by an officially ap­
pointed person" (Boers and Sessar, 1991:130; the figures were 23.9% and 
18.5% for the respective responses). Other responses favored invocation of 
the criminal justice system, but these included a further 17.4% favoring an 
agreement on restitution between victim and offender initiated by the 
official system. Informal processes were less popular for serious offenses; 
they were also less popular with judges and prosecutors than with the 
public. 
Another large German survey conducted more recently (Kilchling, 1991) 
was somewhat less supportive. Out-of-court mediation was supported by 
42.1% of victim respondents, but only 31.4% of nonvictims (55). More­
over, a third of the supporters of mediation specified that it should not 
entail direct contact with the offender. Further, a large majority rejected 
the "expropriation thesis," which was intended to reflect Christie's 
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criticism of a state-sponsored justice system, in that they denied that it 
was the victim's task to negotiate with the offender. 
Fundamental Principles of Justice 
The adoption of informal modes of dispute resolution to replace traditional 
procedures, in particular traditional procedures of criminal justice, raises a 
number of issues pertaining to the fundamental issues of justice. Issues of 
substantive justice arise with regard to (a) departure from the traditional 
objectives of criminal justice, (b) departure from principles applicable in 
civil justice, and (c) the relationship between individual and social justice. 
Last, but by no means least, consideration must be given to (d) the implica­
tions of procedures that appear totally to abandon established principles of 
due process. 
Traditional Objectives of Criminal Justice. Informal alternatives are 
clearly inconsistent with principles of retribution, which require that the 
offender be punished according to his or her deserts. It will be recalled that 
for Kant this principle was a "categorical imperative." Similarly, the con­
temporary just-deserts movement has advocated standardized sanctions 
based upon the seriousness of the offense, assessed according to the degree 
of harm inflicted and the culpability of the offender. While it is not clear 
that this school insists upon the principle of universal enforcement of the 
law, following the so-called principle of legality, it does emphasize uni­
formity of punishment once the law has been invoked; and it is clearly 
inconsistent with the desert concept that the nature of the sanction to be 
imposed upon the offender should be a topic to be freely determined by the 
parties involved in a mediation proceeding. Like cases would attract differ­
ing sanctions; indeed in some cases no sanction would be imposed, if this 
accorded with the complainant's wishes. Even the restitutive theory of 
retribution, considered in chapter 7, whereby retribution may take the 
form of financial indemnification, would not be satisfied here, for media­
tion proceedings do not necessarily result in restitution, and where they 
do, such restitution is not necessarily proportional to the harm inflicted. 
Nor are other traditional criminal justice objectives met by mediation 
proceedings. Social defense is not attained, since dangerous offenders are 
unlikely to be confined as a consequence of such proceedings; nor is there 
any emphasis on deterrence either of the individual offender or of the 
public. A negotiated outcome may be consistent with rehabilitation, but 
there is no explicit attempt to determine mediated agreements according 
to this criterion. Mediation is thus unique in its radical departure from the 
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formal objectives of the traditional criminal justice system. However, 
since (a) it is generally reserved for relatively minor cases, (b) it is in some 
cases combined with an additional formal proceeding, and (c) it is per­
ceived by some to incorporate a substantial element of control over the 
disputing parties, and in particular the offender, the informal system is 
seen in practice to be quite compatible with traditional penal objectives. It 
may also be argued that the traditional utilitarian aims of punishment 
should defer to a "greater good," namely, the satisfaction of the parties 
involved. 
Principles Applicable in Civil Justice. In some respects informal alter­
natives resemble civil suits, for in civil suits, too, the course of the proceed­
ings is in principle determined by the parties involved rather than by the 
state. In regular civil proceedings, however, the outcome may be deter­
mined by the court according to accepted norms laid down in legislation 
and precedent. Tort cases—probably the most relevant in the present 
context—follow established principles of liability, and remedies are de­
signed to achieve defined, albeit controversial, objectives (see chap. 12). 
Since the outcome of informal proceedings ostensibly depends upon the 
wishes of the parties, the formalized application of such principles will be 
absent. At the same time, as noted above, insofar as the parties themselves 
make judgments about the equitability of the distribution of goods be­
tween them, as described in equity theory, the consensual outcome should 
ensure an optimal level of interpersonal or "corrective" justice. 
Individual and Social Justice. The resolution of disputes between indi­
viduals in the course of an official proceeding is generally perceived ipso 
facto as achieving justice between those parties. Where such resolution is 
arrived at voluntarily by the parties rather than being imposed according to 
extraneously determined norms, the quality of justice is thought by some 
to be enhanced (see, e.g., Christie 1977). As noted earlier, however, some 
radicals see informal alternatives as having the potential for obtaining 
more far-reaching social change; but others have criticized such proceed­
ings for "atomizing" social conflict and neutralizing the pressure for such 
change. The analysis by Galanter (1974) of the introduction of reforms in 
legal systems suggests that such reforms rarely operate to the advantage of 
the less powerful (the "have-nots"), and few writers regard informal alterna­
tives as a mechanism for redistribution of power in society (L.R. Singer, 
1979:575), which may rather require the application of formal normative 
principles.17 The desirability or otherwise of altering the power structure in 
society is of course a question of political ideology which must be taken 
into account in the present context. 
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Procedural Issues. The constitutional issues pertaining to informal alter­
native procedures have received relatively little attention (but see Aaronson 
et al. 1977:36; Cook et al. 1980:102). However, one law review article (Rice, 
1979) specifically addressed this issue, focusing on the implication of the 
"equal protection" and "due process" clauses of the Constitution. Rice's 
article dealt with a number of mediation and arbitration alternatives to 
criminal prosecution which were investigated by the author. 
The equal protection issue arises insofar as informal alternatives may be 
offered in some, but not all, criminal cases. It appears from Rice's analysis 
that such "screening" is likely to be acceptable so long as it is not based on 
clearly discriminatory criteria such as race or national origin of the defen­
dant, and so long as the criteria employed "bear some rational relationship 
to a legitimate state purpose" (Rice, 1979:40). 
The due process requirement would seem to be more problematical in 
the present context. However, Rice noted that "the state must provide 
due process protections only where its action threatens a constitutionally 
protected liberty or property interest" (46) and concluded that this does 
not apply to the informal alternatives, since "if, as is the case in most 
programs, the agreement is not judicially enforceable, no interest is jeopar­
dized by participation in the programs" (50). According to Rice, the defen­
dant is always free to reject the proposed settlement and will have lost 
nothing if then subjected to the regular criminal process. However, this 
ignores the possibility that the defendant may feel pressured to accept the 
settlement or may subsequently be penalized, whether by the prosecutor 
or the court, if he or she rejects it. 
Rice also took the view that there was no right to counsel under the 
Sixth Amendment in such a proceeding, since it was not criminal in char­
acter, nor could it be considered a "critical stage" of the prosecution. More­
over, the author invoked the analogies of probation and parole revocation 
where the Supreme Court held "that the presence of counsel would actu­
ally be undesirable because it would significantly alter the nature of the 
proceedings" (65). While this is undoubtedly true, and the presence of 
advocates would clearly derogate from the informality of the proceedings 
and their conciliatory character, the possibility of respondent-defendants 
being pressured into agreements they might have been able to avoid seems 
to be a real one. It should be noted in this context that Rice found that the 
exclusionary rule, whereby unconstitutionally obtained evidence was ren­
dered inadmissible, did not apply to informal alternatives, since the pro­
ceedings were too remote from the conduct of the police for the application 
of the rule to have a deterrent effect (29 n. 35). 
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Despite Rice's reassurances, the points referred to under the above head­
ings raise acute questions of principle regarding the propriety of informal 
alternatives from the point of view of traditionally espoused standards of 
justice. One factor accounting for the relative lack of debate on these issues 
may be the view that traditional "formal" justice has in practice become 
informalized [vide the practice of plea bargaining), while the "informal alter­
natives" have themselves become formalized (Sarat, 1988)! Nevertheless, it 
would seem arguable that (a) these alternatives are not consistent with 
traditional constitutional principles, but (b) they reflect ideals—such as 
access to a conciliatory rather than a punitive forum, or to a "community" 
rather than a state institution for the resolution of disputes—that may 
themselves be worthy of recognition, perhaps even at a constitutional 
level.18 
Be that as it may, the ideological doubts raised in this context are proba­
bly not of such magnitude that they should present an obstacle to the 
development of this type of remedy, insofar as it appears to be desirable in 
the interests of the coping and justice needs of the parties. In the latter 
respect, there is at least some evidence indicating that the parties' justice 
needs may be enhanced by this type of procedure. Greater doubts arise 
with regard to the ability of the informal dispute resolution to meet the 
parties' coping needs, particularly in view of the marginal use made of such 
procedures in the contemporary criminal justice system. They would, how­
ever, have greater merit if incorporated as an integral part of the prevailing 
system—a possibility that will be considered in the next chapter. 

Part IV

Integration: Past, Present,

and Future Remedies 

12

Models of Justice 
The purpose of this chapter is to consider the innovations and proposals 
discussed earlier in this study within a wider conceptual framework. As 
noted, discussion of justice reforms affecting victims has been character­
ized by a paucity of such conceptual analyses. While it is true that theoreti­
cal models may tend to have an abstract character that renders their direct 
applicability somewhat problematic (Verin, 1980:768), they nevertheless 
provide a useful framework for the analysis of practical as well as theoreti­
cal issues. Moreover, the adoption of this approach will not only enable the 
relationship between the various proposals considered earlier to be placed 
in perspective but will also provide a framework for the consideration of 
other possible approaches, such as the use of civil-law and private prosecu­
tions; these alternatives were not discussed in earlier chapters of this 
study, for the focus was rather on proposals that have been the object of 
recent experimentation in the context of the victim's role in the justice 
system. Further, a conceptual analysis can provide a useful basis for the 
consideration of possible long-term reforms in the justice system. 
Much of the literature dealing with conceptual models of justice has 
either been limited to abstract principles (such as those discussed in chap. 
6 above) or has been concerned with models regulating the relationship 
between the state and the defendant (e.g., Packer, 1964, 1968; Goldstein, 
1974; Griffiths, 1970; Herrmann, 1978; King, 1981; see also Damaska, 
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1986). On the other hand, models that relate to victims have tended to be 
limited in scope, focusing either on forms of dispute processing (Sander, 
1976; Thibaut and Walker, 1978) or on types of services from which vic­
tims might benefit (Mawby, n.d.)1 and the ideologies of the agencies con­
cerned (Mawby and Gill, 1987, esp. chaps. 6 and 7). 
However, somewhat more comprehensive models have been developed 
by Ziegenhagen (1977), Sebba (1982), Van Dijk (1984, 1988), and Cavadino 
and Dignan (1993). Van Dijk (1984) distinguished between "the care or 
social welfare ideology, the rehabilitation ideology, the retribution or repa­
ration ideology and the abolitionist or anti-criminal justice ideology" (6). 
Van Dijk's "care" ideology includes state compensation schemes and crisis 
centers; his "rehabilitation" ideology includes "restitution programs as 
part of probation and some mediation programs"; his "retribution" ideol­
ogy includes just deserts and restitution; and his "abolitionist" approach 
includes the use of civil-law and informal social control mechanisms. 
While these ideologies may also be seen to have relevance to the present 
analysis, its structure has reflected instead the dichotomous conceptualiza­
tion that I developed in an earlier article (Sebba, 1982). It was suggested 
there that a review of the issues and the various proposed remedies indi­
cated that in considering the respective role of the victim, the offender, and 
the state, there were basically two approaches—an "adversary-retribution 
model" and a "social defense-welfare model": 
The first model emphasizes the role of the victim both at the trial and 
sentencing stages of the penal process. It suggests, in the first place, adhe­
sion to the basic structure of the common-law trial, i.e., a confrontation 
between aggriever and aggrieved, and in the second place a determination 
of sentence which would 'fit the crime'—wherein the injury to the victim 
is the main component. At the same time, differences between civil and 
criminal proceedings would be minimized. In this model the state plays a 
somewhat subsidiary role as overseer and enforcer—acting primarily on 
behalf of the victim. The second model, on the other hand, essentially 
eliminates the victim-offender confrontation. Instead, the state plays a 
critical and mediating role vis-a-vis each party, endeavoring so far as possi­
ble to control the threat to society represented by the offender, whether by 
incapacitation or rehabilitation, and simultaneously to cater to the needs 
of the victim. . .. The key to the dynamics of these two models is in the 
following: under the adversary-retribution model the state provides the 
machinery for the victim himself to achieve the desired objectives, 
whether prosecution or compensation-restitution; under the social 
defense-welfare model the state would not only stand in the shoes of the 
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victim in prosecuting the offender, but would also stand in the shoes of 
the offender in compensating the victim. (231-33) 
These two models can effectively accommodate all the proposals discussed 
in this study—informal alternatives being classified as a derivative of the 
adversary-retribution model (ibid., p. 236)—with the possible exception of 
third-party responsibility, which will be dealt with in the next chapter. 
Subdivisions of the models, or at least of the adversary-retribution model, 
will be elaborated below. 
Ziegenhagen's conceptualization, although purporting to relate exclu­
sively to the victim, is generally consistent with the preceding dichotomy. 
Ziegenhagen (1977: chap. 5) distinguished between the "managerial ap­
proach: the inefficient victim" and the "participation approach: victim as 
decision maker." Under the managerial approach the victim is a recipient 
of services, while under the participation approach the victim would fulfill 
an active role in the criminal justice process.2 A somewhat similar dichot­
omy is also found in Black (1973) in the course of his discussion on the 
mobilization of law, where he distinguishes between the "entrepreneurial" 
model, in which the initiative for legal action is left to the citizen, and the 
"social-welfare" model, whereby the government determines the well­
being of the citizen. 
Cavadino and Dignan (1993) propose a sixfold typology that is intended 
to represent "forms of accommodation between retribution and reparative/ 
victim-oriented responses to crime" (fig. 1). These include the "conven­
tional" (traditional) model, the diversion model, the "victim allocution" 
model (a strong version of Ziegenhagen's participation approach), the "sepa­
ratist model" (similar to the managerial approach), and two reparative 
models—the "court-led hybrid model" and the "integrated 'restorative jus­
tice' model"—which bear a resemblance to the integrative proposals pre­
sented at the end of the present chapter. 
My earlier article (Sebba, 1982) briefly considered the relative merits of 
the adversary-retribution model and the social defense-welfare model. It 
was observed that "the unlimited resources and expertise available to the 
modem state should guarantee an advantage to the social defense-welfare 
model, whereby the state is directly responsible both for the correction and 
rehabilitation of the defendant and for the welfare of the victim." Neverthe­
less, the adversary-retribution model was seen to be on the ascendancy. 
Part of the explanation for this undoubtedly lies in the fact that the "unlim­
ited resources" are in fact only potentially available to the modern state 
and are in practice rationed by economic stringencies. Further, there is 
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considerable resistance to state-sponsored "expertise," as reflected in the 
antiprofessionalization movement (see, e.g., Cohen, 1983). 
The more detailed analysis conducted in the present study appears to 
confirm the ascendancy of the adversary-retribution model. While the cop­
ing needs of victims are potentially more comprehensively met by state 
agencies rather than by individual offenders, the evaluation of their 
services—in particular state compensation schemes—has shown them to 
be rather ineffective in this respect. On the other hand, the study of per­
ceived justice needs of victims appears to indicate the need for an adversary 
or quasi-adversary proceeding to meet these needs; and this may apply to 
the offender too. Finally, the dominant ideology in regard to principles of 
justice appears to have veered in the direction of retribution or restitution, 
rather than rehabilitation or social control, which is a goal consistent with 
the adversary-retribution model rather than its alternative. 
For this reason, much of the remainder of this chapter will be devoted to 
a consideration of the various forms such a model may take. The following 
variables will be taken into account: (a) the role of the victim in the 
process, (b) the civil-criminal dichotomy, and, briefly, (c) the formal-
informal dichotomy, the subject of the previous chapter. After consider­
ation of the relationships among these variables, and their relevance to the 
development of an adversary-retribution model, the possibility will be ex­
amined of integrating this model with some elements of the social 
defense-welfare model. 
The Role of the Victim in the Criminal Process 
Various developments and experiments designed to enhance the victim's 
role in the penal process were discussed in chapter 8 above. This direction 
of reform was found to be generally worthy of encouragement, particularly 
when considered against the background of the present system as de­
scribed in chapter 2 and of the assessment of the victim's perceived justice 
needs in chapter 5. The emphasis in chapter 8 was on the potential inher­
ent in various modes of participation for meeting the needs of the parties 
involved in the process. In the present section, a more formal legal 
typology of the nature of victim participation will be considered. 
Formally, there seem to be three directions in which the enhancement 
of the victim's role may develop. One radical option would be to restore to 
the victim his or her historical role in the criminal justice system as the 
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prosecutor—the original adversary facing the defendant. There has been 
some limited discussion in the literature of the desirability or otherwise of 
maintaining the "private prosecution" in those U.S. jurisdictions where its 
existence has been preserved (see McDonald, 1976a; Note, 1955; Ward, 
1972; Gittler, 1984:150-51; Meier, 1992), as well as in Canada (Law Re­
form Commission of Canada, 1986), Europe (Joutsen, 1987), and in particu­
lar Britain (Lidstone et al., 1980; Philips, 1981; Hetherington, 1989). 
Yet while support for the continued existence of this option has been 
voiced (see below), and it has even been suggested that some expansion of 
this institution might be considered (McDonald, 1976a; Goldstein, 1982; 
Gittler, 1984), there has been, to my knowledge, no comprehensive pro­
posal for its adoption as an overall solution, that is, the return of the 
prosecutorial power from the state to the individual victim,3 or rather to 
the individual citizen, for historically the power to prosecute was not 
confined to the victim. Moreover, it has been suggested by Green (1988), on 
the basis of recent case law, and in particular the Supreme Court case of 
Young v. United States ex iel Vuitton et Fils (107 S.Ct. 2124, 1987)—in 
which a private attorney was appointed "special prosecutor" to prosecute 
for contempt for violations of an injunction in a trademark case—that 
private prosecutions may today be unconstitutional under American law. 
Citing this and other cases, Green (1988) takes the view that private prose­
cutor statutes "compromise a criminal defendant's due process right to be 
prosecuted by a disinterested prosecutor" (495). 
Nevertheless, the absence of any significant discussion, even at an aca­
demic level, of the revival of private prosecutions seems surprising, in view 
of the plethora of innovative solutions being propounded generally on the 
victim's behalf; for this is a remedy that not only is supported by historical 
tradition (Steinberg, 1984; Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1986: Ap­
pendix) but also would give expression par excellence to such current 
ideals as retribution (or desert) and the involvement of the victim in the 
justice system. Indeed, it would provide a means of returning to the victim 
his or her conflict (cf. Christie, 1977). 
Moreover, if coupled with an emphasis on restitutionary justice—again, 
consistent with historical precedent (see chap. 7)—such a system could 
contribute to the alleviation of the victim's coping needs, in particular if 
the restitutional order were to have the force of a penal sanction, backed by 
state enforcement. Objections based upon the reluctance to rely upon the 
initiative of the individual citizen in instigating proceedings have not pre­
vented the advocacy of other solutions of a civil or an informal nature, 
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discussed elsewhere in this study, which share the same disadvantage (if 
such it is). It may be surmised that the reasons why this solution has not 
been more generally advocated are primarily the following: 
1. Victims would prosecute out of vindictive motives; this has been the 
type of criticism leading the courts to restrict the use of private prosecu­
tions (cf. Green, 1988:495). However, as noted in chapter 5, victims are not 
necessarily vindictive, nor prosecutors disinterested (Gittler, 1984:153-
54; Goldstein, 1982:555). Moreover, a judicial process seems the proper 
outlet for vindictiveness (Boudreaux, 1989), in particular as the court 
would be the ultimate arbiter of both guilt and punishment.4 Due process 
under the adversary system could continue, but with a change in the iden­
tity of the adversary. 
2. The "public interest" would not be taken into consideration, in par­
ticular for the purpose of refraining from prosecution in "hard" cases 
where it would be desired to avoid the infliction of stigma on the defen­
dant. This, however, ignores the victim's interest. Moreover, stigma can be 
reduced by judicial techniques such as probation without conviction. Alter­
natively, the decision to prosecute might be subjected to some form of 
control. In England, the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure sug­
gested that private prosecutions should be permitted where the Crown 
prosecutor declined to prosecute, if leave were granted by a magistrate's 
court (Philips, 1981:161); however, such judicial control of prosecution in 
the United States might be perceived as a breach of the separation of 
powers (Gittler, 1984:161 n. 135; Green, 1988:496).5 
3. There would be a danger of "compounding," that is, accepting pay­
ment in consideration for nonprosecution (cf. Gittler, 1984:155). However, 
this may be regarded as unacceptable only insofar as private prosecution is 
seen to reflect a public interest. Moreover, if prosecution were indeed to be 
perceived as a private interest, perhaps compounding would cease to be an 
offense. Indeed, provision for mediation proceedings, either in lieu of or 
integrated with the criminal prosecution (see below) would in effect insti­
tutionalize the practice of compounding. Such practices would come to 
replace the plea bargain, which dominates the current system. 
4. It is assumed that the cost of private prosecution would deter victims 
from invoking this process (cf. ibid., 130). This would depend upon the vic-
tim's access to investigatory services and upon the need for, and access to, 
legal representation. A British study found that in prosecutions conducted 
by private individuals little use was made of the services of advocates; 
among a sample of 392 cases, 90% were conducted by private individuals 
(Lidstone et al., 1980:101). There is also some basis in the research findings 
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referred to earlier for believing that prosecution without the use of counsel 
might be preferred by at least some victim-disputants. On the other hand, to 
prevent the inequality that would arise assuming that the defendant's right 
to counsel were retained, counsel would have to be made available to the 
victim-prosecutor.6 This is seen to render such proceedings prohibitively 
costly (Gittler, 1984:154] where such prosecutions would be supplementary 
to public prosecutions taking place today. 
This argument would not apply however, if private prosecutions were 
to replace public prosecutions. Prosecuting victim advocates might have to 
be paid out of public funds. The question would arise whether such advo­
cates would be personal attorneys appointed by the victim, whether they 
might be "class" advocates, or whether there would be a system equivalent 
to the public defender, namely, a system of public prosecutors. The wheel 
would appear to have turned full circle! However, such public prosecutors 
would legally be appearing on behalf of the victim rather than the state. If 
such a system seems not very different from the idea of maintaining the 
present system of public prosecution, while merely prevailing upon the 
official agencies to be more amenable to victim needs, this also indicates 
that the proposal for private prosecution may be less unthinkable than it 
seems at first glance. 
5. The victim might not wish to prosecute, or there might be no specific 
victim, and the public might be threatened by having a dangerous offender 
at large. In response to this, a supplementary role might be preserved for 
the public prosecutor in such cases, in addition to those cases in which the 
state was the victim.7 
It should be noted in this context that the private prosecution has sur­
vived, although only as an alternative to public prosecutions, in a large 
number of both common-law and civil-law jurisdictions. As to the former, 
the proposal on the part of the British Royal Commission on Criminal 
Procedure to limit the availability of private prosecution was not incorpo­
rated into the legislation establishing the "Crown Prosecution'' system in 
1985, for the view prevailed that private prosecution was, to cite one of the 
Law Lords, "an important constitutional safeguard and right of the ordi­
nary citizen" (Hetherington, 1989:86, 153ff.).8 Similarly, the Law Reform 
Commission of Canada (1986), which conducted a detailed review of pri­
vate prosecution in historical context, concluded that "it is our belief that 
a criminal justice system that makes full provision for private prosecution 
of criminal and quasi-criminal offenses has advantages over one that does 
not. In any system of law, particularly one dealing with crimes, it is of 
fundamental importance to involve the citizen positively" (3). 
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Finally, Joutsen (1987:183ff.), in his review of European practices in this 
area, noted the existence of private prosecutions in many countries. In 
Finland, in particular, "the right of prosecution is always held by the com­
plainant," who may act quite independently of the state prosecutor (187). 
Joutsen proffers the view that it is "almost always" preferable from the 
point of view of the complainant to have the offense prosecuted by the 
public prosecutor, on grounds of expertise, cost, and convenience, but he 
does not cite empirical evidence on this point. 
It is strange that while American jurisdictions have adopted a number of 
novel and radical victim-related reforms and remedies in recent years, 
there has been almost no consideration of a remedy that has obstinately 
survived—albeit not widely used—in so many other jurisdictions. Indeed, 
as noted, the scope of this remedy in the United States may even be con­
tracting, a process doubtless encouraged by the Supreme Court decision 
referred to above with respect to the defendant's right to a disinterested 
prosecutor. It is not altogether clear, however, that the revival of private 
prosecution would constitute a greater threat to the defendant than some 
of the victim-related reforms that have been adopted. Moreover, some of 
the punitive but notionally civil remedies currently gaining force on the 
American legal scene, which will be discussed below, bear a strong resem­
blance to private prosecution. 
It is thus somewhat surprising that more thought has not been devoted 
to the consideration of this institution, as well as to its evaluation in the 
jurisdictions in which it has survived and the development of experimen­
tal programs in other jurisdictions. There may be then a firmer basis for 
considering the expansion of this remedy whether generally or for certain 
categories of victims.9 
The least extreme of the three directions of reform would be to 
strengthen the victim's passive (or indirect) role in the criminal justice 
system, that is, by recognizing his or her interest in this system and the 
need for various agencies to take account of this interest. Such a trend is 
reflected in some of the reforms discussed in chapters 8 and 10, such as the 
American Bar Association's Guidelines, the federal Victims' Rights and 
Restitution Act of 1990, and the various victims' bills of rights. Moreover, 
as noted in chapter 7, the adoption of a "just-deserts" philosophy may in 
itself be seen as a reflection of this approach. 
Support for this approach has been forthcoming from the U.S. Supreme 
Court in recent years. While its most dramatic expression can be seen in 
Payne v. Tennessee, in which the relevance of victim-related information 
at the sentencing stage was recognized, the view that "courts may not 
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ignore the concerns of victims" dates back to the Burger Court (in particu­
lar to Chief Justice Burger himself).10 Thus, for example, the Court refused 
to order a new trial in a rape case—sought on the ground that the defense 
had had insufficient time to prepare—where this would be likely to prove 
excessively traumatic for the victim (O'Neill, 1984:379-80).n 
If the duty not to ignore the rights of the victim pertains not only to the 
courts but also to other state criminal justice agencies, recognition of this 
duty could lead to an enforceable right exercisable against the police and 
the prosecution—as well as against the prisons, the parole board, and the 
pardoning authority—when decisions are taken regarding the suspect-
defendant's arrest, bail, prosecution, and release. This would require the 
recognition of the victim's "standing" before the courts so that victims 
could petition for an injunction against these agencies to prevent the imple­
mentation of a decision to which they were opposed, or for mandamus in 
the case of the state's refusal to act in accordance with their wishes. 
Petitions to interfere with an agency decision have been notoriously 
difficult to pursue in the U.S. courts (Gittler, 1984:152, 162), and in Linda 
R. S. v. Richard D., the Supreme Court held that "a private citizen lacks a 
judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or non-prosecution of an­
other" (cf. Goldstein, 1982; Aynes, 1984; Gittler, 1984).12 Nevertheless, the 
possible use of such remedies has been discussed in the recent literature 
(Green, 1988; Wainstein, 1988), and they are already available in other 
jurisdictions (Sebba, 1982:221; Gittler, 1984:180). Moreover, victims have 
specifically been granted standing under the recent Texas constitutional 
amendment to enforce rights conferred under that same amendment (see 
art. 1, sec. 30(e)).13 Other possible remedies are appeals to a higher prosecut­
ing authority (Sebba, 1982:221; Joutsen, 1987:185) or directly to the grand 
jury (Gittler, 1984:162). Pursuance of this approach would give the victim 
an indirect role in the penal process in ensuring that the state, having 
usurped the victim's erstwhile role as protagonist, was now discharging its 
duty as surrogate prosecutor. 
There remains a possible intermediary role for the victim, between the 
extremes of private prosecution on the one hand and mere recognition as an 
indirect or vicariously interested party on the other. The victim could be 
given an active role in the system, not as a replacement for the representa­
tives of the state law enforcement agencies, but in addition to these represen­
tatives. Developments in this direction were discussed above, in the context 
of plea bargaining and "allocution." Such a role could be played by the 
victim either in person or through an attorney. Thus, it may be recalled that, 
according to the German Nebenklage procedure, the victim has the right to 
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be represented by his or her own advocate in the course of the criminal 
trial,14 and similar practices are admitted in a number of U.S. jurisdictions 
(see above, chap. 8). 
Some contributors to the academic debate have pointed out that grant­
ing status to the victim in the criminal process need not result in the 
conferral of total parity with the other parties, namely, the state and the 
defendant. Goldstein (1982) cited arguments to the effect that a "party's 
rights need not be unitary" and suggested that the victim's right to partici­
pate might arise only at certain stages of the process, "after conviction, on 
issues connected with restitution and sentencing, and before conviction, in 
hearings on dismissals, charge reductions, and guilty pleas" (553, 557). 
Similarly, Gittler has noted that "there can be different types of parties 
with varying attributes, playing different roles in terms of the nature and 
extent of their participation in a proceeding. Thus, the characterization of 
the victim as a party would not necessarily mean that the victim would have 
the same or comparable rights to the state or the defendant at all stages of 
the proceedings" (Gittler, 1984:177). In an earlier version of her paper, 
Gittler suggested the concept of "quasi-party" and invoked various civil-
law analogies, including the role of amicus cuiiae. On the other hand, 
Thorvaldson (1983) argued that the victim's interest in a criminal case could 
not be conceptually distinguished from the interests of the community. 
The proposals to grant the victim quasi-party status are essentially con­
sistent with the amendment recently adopted to a number of state constitu­
tions (notably Florida and New Mexico) and the proposed amendment to 
the federal Constitution (President's Task Force, 1982:114) granting the 
victim the right to be heard at all "critical" stages of the proceedings. As 
indicated in chapter 8, this solution seems potentially consistent with the 
furtherance of victims' perceived justice and possibly also coping needs, 
although research findings so far available indicate only modest success. 
One further issue that must be considered in this context is that of the 
rights of the defendant. As noted earlier, the California Bill of Rights 
("Proposition 8") for the victim was opposed by civil libertarians as a 
threat to the constitutional rights of the defendant. However, in spite of 
the nominal concern for victims on the part of the proponents of that 
reform, the controversy focused instead on the traditional balance between 
government and defendant.15 How far the enhancement of specifically 
victim-oriented rights might affect the defendant has received little atten­
tion, although an attempt to speculate on this has been made in the course 
of the present study. 
Weigend (1982), in his illuminating article on victim/witness programs, 
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asserts that criminal justice is a "zero-sum game" and that "no one can 
gain except on someone else's loss" (15), a concept that has been applied 
previously to the traditional parties in the system, the state and the defen­
dant (cf., e.g., Hogarth, 1974). If Weigend is right, it may be impractical 
merely to attach to victims' rights legislation a proviso guaranteeing the 
preservation of defendants' rights, the formula adopted in constitutional 
amendments in Florida and Kansas (see chap. 8). Rather, priorities will 
have to be established and value judgments made regarding the respective 
rights and interests of victims and defendants. 
While the available literature does not seem to have dealt directly with 
these issues, some of the relevant questions have been raised indirectly. 
Thus the restitution provisions of the Victim and Witness Protection Act 
of 1982 were initially held to be in violation of the due process clause of the 
Fifth Amendment (Gittler, 1984:176 n. 183)—that is, the constitutional 
rights of the defendant restricted the implementation of a measure de­
signed to benefit the victim. (On appeal, however, the provisions of the act 
were upheld; see chap. 7.) 
Reference was made earlier to Chief Justice Warren Burger's refusal to 
order a retrial in a rape case owing to the suffering that this would inflict 
upon the victim. Similarly, in Maryland v. Craig (497 U.S. 836 1991), the 
Supreme Court allowed the use of video testimony in order to protect a 
small child from having to face his alleged attacker in open court. In these 
cases the defendant's rights appear clearly to have been sacrificed to the 
victim's interests. In the cases dealing with victim-related evidence in 
capital cases, the justices of the Supreme Court were conscious of the need 
to determine where the balance between defendants' and victims' interests 
lay (cf. Sebba, 1994). The pendulum moved dramatically between the 1987 
case of Booth v. Maryland, in which evidence of this nature was held to be 
inadmissible at the sentencing stage, to the 1991 case of Payne v. Tennes­
see, in which it was held to be admissible. 
The more active the role conferred upon the victim, the more such 
issues are likely to arise, and only Solomonic solutions will prevent the 
occasional clash of interests and the need to establish priorities. 
Criminal Law versus Civil Law 
While a prolific literature has emerged on the use of informal alternatives 
to the criminal justice system, and some writers have referred to the adop­
tion of a more "civilized" process—that is, a process that would bear a 
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greater resemblance to the civil law (see below)—relatively little emphasis 
has been given in the victim-related literature on the availability to the 
victim of conventional civil remedies vis-a-vis the offender in respect of 
the wrong inflicted. While reviews of remedies available to victims may 
refer to the possibility of civil actions for damages (Stark and Goldstein, 
1985) and may consider their advantages and disadvantages (Karmen, 
1990:296-99; cf. O'Brien, 1992), most of the discussion of civil remedies 
has focused instead on the development of preventive measures, in particu­
lar "protection orders," intended to protect the victim from further injury 
(see, e.g., Finn and Colson, 1990), especially in relation to domestic vio­
lence and the prevention of the intimidation of witnesses (ABA, 1981). The 
development of civil actions for damages, on the other hand, has focused 
mainly on suits against "third parties," which will be considered in the 
next chapter. 
The paucity of serious discussion of civil remedies is even more surpris­
ing than the neglect of private prosecution discussed above, for the civil 
remedy, unlike the private prosecution, is not a historic relic that has 
fallen into desuetude but the official legal remedy currently available in 
principle to almost all victims. Most crimes have their equivalent in the 
law of torts: most offenses against the person constitute the tort of assault, 
trespass, or negligence (cf. Greer, 1991:145), while thefts and frauds may be 
grounds for the tort of conversion. Thus the victim may sue the offender in 
a civil suit for damages—on the face of it the obvious mechanism for 
remedying the injustice inflicted by the offender. 
Indeed, the availability of the civil-law remedy has been the traditional 
response of jurists when faced with criticism of the neglect of the victim 
in the criminal law. Moreover, in a civil suit the victim is the instigator 
of the proceedings, so that the conflict remains his or hers (cf. Nils Chris-
tie's critique referred to in chap. 11). At least in the context of the small 
claims court, the victim-plaintiff may retain some control (cf. Karmen, 
1990:298), thereby creating a greater potential for personal satisfaction in 
accordance with Thibault and Walker's theory of procedural justice dis­
cussed in chapter 5. The question therefore arises, why is this remedy not 
generally perceived to be the solution to the victim's problems? Can its 
current limitations be overcome, rendering it a viable alternative to the 
other reforms considered in this study? Further, if the civil action is to 
provide a remedy for the victim, should it be more closely linked to the 
criminal process, or should it supersede this process altogether? These 
questions will now be considered, taking into account as far as possible 
the three main issues that have constituted the framework of analysis for 
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this study: the coping needs of the parties, their perceived justice needs, 
and fundamental principles of justice. 
Current Civil Remedies 
While data regarding tort litigation practices in general are not well docu­
mented (Saks, 1992), there seems to be particularly little specific informa­
tion available on the degree to which crime victims avail themselves of 
tort remedies against offenders. For evidence of the limited use of these 
remedies, the American literature has generally relied upon a small Cana­
dian survey conducted in 1969 (see, e.g., Gittler 1984:138 n. 72). The Cana­
dian study cited found that among a sample of 167 victims of serious 
crimes of violence in the Toronto area in 1966 only 14.9% even considered 
suing the offender for damages, only 5.4% actually consulted a lawyer for 
this purpose, 4.8% attempted to obtain compensation, and only 1.8% (3 of 
the 167) in fact succeeded in doing so (Linden, 1975). The impression of 
limited recourse to tort remedies is indirectly confirmed by some other 
studies, such as the low priority given to legal advice—presumably a pre­
condition for a tort suit—in the New York study of victims' reactions to 
crime (Friedman et al., 1982:169). Similarly, the British study by Shapland 
et al. (1985) found that only 4% of their sample even knew about the 
possibility of a civil action, a finding similar to that of previous studies 
(124, 125). 
The limited potential for bringing a successful tort suit may be evident 
to most crime victims and may go far to explain their limited use of this 
remedy: the perpetrator of the harmful act may not have been identified, 
the cost of bringing the suit may be prohibitive, and the defendant may 
lack assets (cf. Mueller and Cooper, 1974:85, 87; Karmen, 1990:298-99).16 
Further, the imposition of a prison sentence will do little to enhance the 
offender's ability to pay.17 Finally, execution of judgment is left to the 
initiative of the plaintiff-victim, so that even where feasible it may be 
troublesome and expensive.18 This may explain why penal reformers have 
tended to favor solutions involving recourse to the criminal court rather 
than advocate the enhancement of the victim's civil remedy (Harland, 
1982). 
However, it should be noted that law reformers have devoted consider­
able energy in modern times to democratizing the legal system, in the 
sense of endeavoring to render legal remedies available to wider sections of 
the population—based partly on surveys of "legal needs" (Curran, 1977)— 
in order to improve "access to justice." This process is seen to have passed 
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through three stages (Cappelletti and Garth, 1978): first, the institution of 
legal aid schemes; second, the development of new forms of procedure, 
such as class and representative actions; third, a broader and more com­
prehensive approach, involving new, alternative mechanisms of dispute 
resolution, such as small claims courts, consumer tribunals, mediation 
proceedings, and so on. This approach also includes new substantive reme­
dies, such as no-fault compensation in the case of accidents. 
The last-mentioned reform has clearly had great impact,19 but it is a 
departure from the traditional tortious action—and traditional tort phi­
losophy (Englard, 1993: chap. 7)—in that it involves insurance, whether 
private or national. It has an equivalent in the context of crime victims in 
the form of the compensation schemes discussed above in chapter 9, al­
though in some cases a tort action against the offender may have greater 
potential than a claim from the compensation board (Greer, 1991:145). On 
the other hand, much of the litigation in the courts and tribunals referred 
to is of a contractual rather than a tortious nature and thus not relevant to 
the crime victim. Further, insofar as the trends described are dependent on 
legal aid, "access to justice" may be expected to be affected by prevailing 
governmental policies, such as the degree of support for the Legal Services 
Corporation. 
Calabresi (1979) reviewed some developments that were specifically cal­
culated to democratize tort litigation, in particular the contingent fee and 
the possibility of claiming damages for "pain and suffering"—especially 
before a jury—which rendered tort suits potentially more remunerative 
(177-83). However, these developments also made the whole procedure 
more complex and costly and gave rise to pressure for reform, including 
reforms designed to limit the liability of defendants (NOVA, 1989:29). More­
over, the potential benefits may still not be great enough to render litigation 
accessible to the average crime victim, for whom the harm inflicted is 
limited. Finally, the reforms did little to overcome some of the problems 
referred to above, such as that of enforcing the judgment against a defendant 
with limited assets. 
Thus, the present availability of traditional tort remedies for the crime 
victim, although unlimited in principle, seems to be limited in practice. 
Various modifications of this remedy will be considered below, including 
the possibility of tort litigation as an adjunct to the criminal process. 
However, the phenomenon of an independent legal remedy (viz., the tort 
action) that exists in theory but rarely in practice should in itself be an 
object of further study and consideration. Persons opposed to tampering 
with the criminal process for the victim's benefit have a special obligation 
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to develop this existing alternative remedy. For these reasons, further re­
search on the availability of the tort remedy seems essential. 
Linkage of Civil and Criminal Remedies 
One method of increasing the availability of civil-law remedies would be 
to strengthen their link with the criminal justice system, thereby both 
alleviating the burden imposed upon the victim who instigates proceed­
ings and reducing the costs to be incurred. There appear to be three possi­
ble levels at which such linkage may take place. 
The most tenuous type of linkage between the civil action and the 
criminal trial is reflected in some reforms carried out in the Israeli system 
a few years ago (Sebba, 1982). First, the former common-law rule applying 
to most American jurisdictions (Covey, 1975:220, 229), whereby findings 
of the criminal court could not be relied upon in the civil court but had to 
be proved ab initio by the plaintiff, was abolished. (An amendment pro­
posed to the federal Criminal Code would have gone further and enabled a 
criminal conviction to trigger a civil class action; Goldstein, 1982:542-
43.) Second, the judge who tried the criminal case could be requested to 
hear the civil claim immediately following the termination of the criminal 
trial.20 This would be expected to increase efficiency and to reduce delays. 
Such reforms do not directly affect the criminal trial but are designed to 
reduce the victim's burden in the related civil claim. However, the instiga­
tion of parallel criminal and civil proceedings might be oppressive vis-a-vis 
defendants (McDade and OTtonnell, 1992). 
The second level of linkage relates to the possibility of ancillary reme­
dies of a civil nature being administered by the criminal court judge. Many 
states have provisions for criminal courts to issue protection orders to 
prevent the intimidation of witnesses (NOVA, 1989:15), and civil protec­
tion orders in domestic violence cases are sometimes combined with the 
hearing of the criminal charge (Finn and Colson, 1990:30-31). In Britain it 
has recently been proposed that the police be vested with power in such 
cases to seek civil remedies on behalf of victims (House of Commons, 
1993:xxxviii). However, while this type of proceeding enables the victim to 
receive certain forms of assistance from the court, it is not tantamount to a 
civil claim for compensation. 
The third and most extreme level of linkage is the possibility that the 
victim would be given standing at the criminal trial as a civil party. This 
differs from the consideration of quasi-party status above, which referred 
to the victim's standing as a party to the criminal proceedings as such. 
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Reference here is to the practice recognized under many legal systems in 
continental Europe whereby the victim has official recognition as a partie 
civile, or under the so-called adhesion process. Under this system, the civil 
claim is effectively integrated into the criminal trial. 
Such integration is by no means a simple matter, and many aspects 
remain disputed among Continental jurists, as reflected by the diverse 
practices prevailing in different jurisdictions (cf. Joutsen, 1987:192-96). 
Spinellis (1986) argues that the term adhesion generally implies a more 
limited form of participation, as illustrated by the German system, com­
pared with the concept of "civil party" as applied in France, Italy, and 
Greece. There are also varying approaches on the question of whether only 
the victim or other person suffering damage may instigate the action or 
whether the state may do this on his or her behalf, and whether the victim 
bringing such an action is still a "witness" for the purpose of the criminal 
trial or whether he or she becomes a party (Kobe, 1976). 
Nevertheless, the value in principle of having such a proceeding was 
supported by a majority of the participants at the Eleventh International 
Congress on Penal Law who debated this topic in 1974, while "admitting 
however that this process may have certain disadvantages" (Resolutions of 
the Congress, 31). Surprisingly, "It was recommended, however, that the 
adhesion process should be restricted to a decision on whether the claim 
was justified, when the decision as to the amount of compensation would 
be left to the appropriate civil court or to a subsequent special criminal 
procedure" (32). While the technical difficulties of assessing compensation 
(restitution) in the course of a criminal trial have already been noted, the 
idea of a second judicial proceeding for this purpose would seem to defeat 
one of the main objectives of an integrated proceeding, namely, obviating 
the need for duplication. 
European countries that have adopted this system, which is also preva­
lent in South America (Mueller, 1977:76), seem to have had mixed experi­
ences. It has been particularly popular in the Nordic and (former) socialist 
countries (Joutsen, 1987:196). Indeed, in the Democratic Republic of Ger­
many "the presentation of a civil claim [was] an integral part of criminal 
proceedings" (emphasis added). 
The Federal Republic, on the other hand, used this system only rarely 
and reluctantly (Harland, 1982). Legislative reforms were introduced in 
that country in 1976 and 1986 in order to remove restrictions and encour­
age its wider use (Kaiser, 1991:546-49). However, a survey conducted by 
Kaiser (1991) revealed that it was perceived as a "foreign body" in the 
system by criminal justice professionals (575) and that its use, unlike 
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that of the Nebenklage or subsidiary prosecutor, remained rare (561). The 
author concluded that "the attempt of a renaissance of the adhesive 
procedure has failed" (563). In contrast, a detailed study of the practice of 
the Austrian courts revealed that whereas only a single case of subsid­
iary prosecution emerged in a sample of 624, the injured person partici­
pated as a civil party in more than one-half of the cases—particularly, 
but by no means exclusively, in cases of property offenses (Kraintz, 
1991:645, 665). The research found, however, that these civil parties 
only rarely exercised active participatory rights, such as the questioning 
of witnesses, apparently because this was not encouraged by the presid­
ing judge (ibid., 655, 666). 
In France, too, the civil party is a more popular institution than its 
German equivalent. One survey found that it was used by one-third of the 
victims (Sabatie, 1985). However, its relative popularity in France was 
sometimes attributed to motives of vengeance and extortion (Bouzat and 
Pinatel, 1970: 2:929). A 1931 law therefore limited the victim's right to set 
in motion the criminal trial for this purpose, and the Court of Cassation 
held that it should be seen as a right of an exceptional nature to be asserted 
only within the strict limits provided by the code of criminal procedure 
(ibid., 930). Amending legislation of 1983 has encouraged use of this rem­
edy by alleviating the burden imposed upon the victim of paying costs into 
court when instigating his or her civil action (Verin, 1984); it also provided 
that a valid defense to a criminal charge may not necessarily relieve the 
accused of a duty to compensate the victim under the accompanying civil 
action (Merigeau, 1991). 
These procedures appear to have considerable attractiveness in the con­
text of the present study. The victim is granted standing at the trial, but 
only as a civil party.21 Thus, the traditional balance between state and 
accused in terms of the criminal law is preserved. The victim is in a 
position to pursue his or her material interests while at the same time 
potentially deriving some satisfaction from involvement in the process. In 
this respect Spinellis (1986) notes that in many cases it is this involvement 
and the "moral recognition" of the victims' status that is the driving moti­
vation, as indicated by the fact that they are often satisfied with "nonmate­
rial" damages (413-14). 
It may be that the special characteristics of the adversary process, 
including the accused's right to silence, and the different rules in crimi­
nal and civil cases regarding burden of proof render the incorporation of 
such a procedure in countries with a common-law tradition such as the 
United States problematic (cf. Mueller, 1977:82); such considerations 
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may explain the somewhat dismissive approach to the fusion of civil and 
criminal remedies by common-law commentators (Joutsen, 1987:195). 
However, in view of the benefits deriving therefrom, and in the light of 
the observation by Joutsen (ibid.) that the "imbedded distinction between 
torts and crimes" is "not necessarily understood by the complainants 
themselves" in common-law countries, it would seem that there was 
room for further consideration of the European "combined" models con­
sidered above, if not of an integrated model. 
An Integrated Model: "Civilizing" the Criminal Process or 
"Penalizing" the Civil? 
Not only does the subject matter of tort law overlap with that of criminal 
law, historically the two areas of the law were hardly capable of differentia-
tion.22 Nevertheless, the dichotomization of the law in this respect has 
been taken for granted in modern times, and the call for unification was in 
the past heard only very sporadically.23 
Lamborn (1968) noted three main characteristics differentiating criminal 
from civil law: the identity of the enforcer (the state in criminal law, the 
private citizen in civil law), the identity of the beneficiary (the public vs. the 
plaintiff), and the nature of the sanction (punishment vs. compensation). To 
these may be added other traditional distinctions: emphasis on the moral 
turpitude of the perpetrator in criminal law (vs. emphasis on the harm 
caused in civil law) and differences in the rules of evidence as well as the 
procedural rights of the parties (cf. Mann, 1992:1813). However, many of the 
distinctions are not absolute but are instead matters of emphasis (cf. Ep­
stein, 1977). Further, it is clear that the change in orientation that the victim 
movement has sought to introduce, such as an enhanced role for the victim 
in the criminal process and an emphasis on restitution in the sanctioning 
system, would confer on this process a greater resemblance to the civil 
action than has been the case in modern times. Other writers have empha­
sized the humane aspects of "civilizing" the criminal justice system—a 
concept suggested in 1976 on both sides of the Atlantic by Gilbert Cantor 
(Wright, 1991:41) and Louk Hulsman (Wright, 1982:249), respectively. 
Conversely, tort litigation in the United States has been characterized 
by the development of the use of punitive damages, an institution that, 
while dating back several decades (Grube, 1993), has recently been forced 
into the limelight. This is owing perhaps less to the extent of its use 
(Galanter, 1991:769) than to the occasional dramatic example, such as the 
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Ford Pinto case, in which the jury awarded $125 million—subsequently 
reduced by the court—and to the passions that such damages arouse 
among legal theorists (see, e.g., Englard, 1993: chap. 11). Potential defen­
dants, and in particular insurance interests, have endeavored to promote 
"tort reform" in order to reduce potential liability. 
The use of punitive damages in traditional tort cases on the part of the 
courts has been accompanied by other related developments under statute. 
First, administrative agencies have increasingly been empowered both to 
impose punitive financial sanctions and to prosecute in civil judicial pro­
ceedings (Mann, 1992:1849-51). Second, under certain statutes, notably 
the False Claims Act, private citizens have been encouraged to instigate 
proceedings in the name of the government (so-called ex tarn actions). 
Successful prosecution in a civil court will lead to multiple damages, a 
share of which is guaranteed to the plaintiff. Although such plaintiffs are 
referred to as "private attorneys general" (ibid., 1800), the action here, 
unlike that in a private prosecution, is civil in character and is brought for 
financial profit rather than vindication. Thus it resembles the historic 
"penal action" (Kenny, 1952). Third, under the provisions of the Racketeer 
Influence and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), "Congress converted en­
tire sections of the federal criminal code into civil wrongs" (Mann, 
1992:1848), enabling injured parties to sue for treble damages ("Civil 
RICO"). This development is the most pertinent in the present context, 
since the suit is brought by the victim and the penalty related to the harm 
inflicted. 
The above types of proceedings, although civil in procedural terms, are 
at the same time unashamedly punitive in orientation and have been so 
designated by the U.S. Supreme Court (see, e.g., U.S. v. Halper, 104 L Ed 2d 
487). Indeed, they often involve sanctions heavier than a criminal court 
would be empowered to impose following conviction. They may thus be 
considered the converse of the idea of "civilizing" the criminal process. 
These convergent (or intersecting) trends raise the question of the desirabil­
ity of a merger of criminal and civil processes into an integrated system, 
whether this be perceived as "civilizing" the criminal justice system, as 
proposed in the ideological literature referred to above, or as "penalizing" 
the civil courts, in the spirit of the developments described by Mann. The 
implications of such a merger will be considered here from the point of 
view of the criteria adopted in this study. 
As to the victim's coping needs, inevitably a system designed primarily 
to determine the amount of harm inflicted on the victim-plaintiff rather 
than the degree of moral turpitude of the perpetrator, and to impose upon 
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the defendant an obligation to compensate rather than a purely punitive 
sanction, would in principle be more beneficial to the victim than the 
prevailing criminal justice system.24 This would apply with even greater 
force if an enlarged "penal" compensation—or punitive damages—were 
available. Moreover, the chances of a successful prosecution would be 
enhanced if the burden of proof was that applicable in civil cases, and if 
defendants were not able to benefit from the constitutional guarantees 
designed to protect criminal suspects, such as the right to silence.25 In this 
respect, even a "middleground jurisprudence" (Mann, 1992), that is, the 
adoption of standards between the criminal and the civil, would be benefi­
cial from the victim's point of view. 
The main disadvantage for the victim—in some respects resembling 
those mentioned in the context of private prosecutions—would be that in 
a purely civil matter between private parties the state does not conduct the 
investigation and organize the witnesses, nor does it take steps to ensure 
the execution of the court's order. A study of a small-claims court (O'Barr 
and Conley, 1988) found that plaintiffs generally assumed that this type of 
service was provided. These problems could be overcome if the instigator 
of the "integrated" process could have the benefit of the assistance of some 
of the investigative and enforcement agencies currently identified exclu­
sively with the criminal process. On the other hand, with respect to "dis­
covery" of documents, civil actions are advantageous (Mann, 1992:1855-
58). Moreover, if an element of "informalism" were introduced (see below), 
formal problems of access to information would be further reduced. 
The victim would also be deprived of the protection derived in some 
cases from having the offender incarcerated. To some extent this could be 
achieved by civil means, such as protection orders enforced by the threat of 
imprisonment for contempt of court in the event of noncompliance. How­
ever, since incarceration is generally intended to protect the public at large 
rather than the individual victim, it will be more appropriate to consider 
this issue under the heading of societal needs. 
The defendant would gain from this system because there would not 
generally be a risk of incarceration. It is true that the baseline for liability 
might be broadened, since, if the criteria were those of civil law, liability 
would be incurred even in the absence of mens rea, although proof of mental 
element may result in an upgrading of the punitive sanction (ibid., 1801 n. 
22). On the other hand, even under criminal law, responsibility is some­
times incurred without mens rea, while, conversely, some torts require 
proof of intent. As indicated above, the burden of proof would be lighter, 
although for civil actions of a punitive character some jurisdictions require 
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" 'clear and convincing evidence', a standard which lies halfway towards the 
criminal one of 'beyond reasonable doubt' " (Englard, 1993:149). Similarly, 
new standards would be developed—on the lines of the "middleground 
jurisprudence" described by Mann—in relation to both evidentiary issues 
and constitutional protections. 
With respect to civil actions instigated by victims, the degree of protec­
tion provided by the U.S. Constitution may be limited, since the Constitu­
tion is seen essentially as an instrument to control state power rather than 
the claims of individual citizens (Dolliver, 1987:91; see also above, chap. 
6). This was the reasoning behind the Court's decision in Browning-Ferris 
v. Kelco Disposal (1989, 106 L Ed 219), a case in which a jury awarded the 
plaintiff company $6 million in punitive damages—117 times more than 
the actual damages suffered by the plaintiff (243)—for an antitrust viola­
tion. A majority of the court held that the prohibition on "excessive fines" 
under the Eighth Amendment was confined to actions—including civil 
suits—that were initiated by the government, or in which the government 
had an interest; in other words, this prohibition was not seen to be applica­
ble in citizen-initiated actions.26 
Finally, what of the needs of society as a whole? While tort law has laid 
greater emphasis on the interests of the individual plaintiff and criminal 
law on the public interest, this dichotomization is not absolute (Blum-
West and Carter, 1983:548-49; Englard, 1993:147). Some of the traditional 
functions of criminal law, such as deterrence and even retribution, are 
attributed to tort law (cf. Cane, 1987). Tort law appears to lack the rehabili­
tative and incapacitative orientations generally attributed to the criminal 
law, and a special solution not covered by traditional tort concepts may be 
necessary for the "dangerous" wrongdoer (civil commitment?). Similarly, a 
solution would have to be found for offenses lacking an individual victim, 
either government-initiated tort actions or "relator" actions on the model 
described above. Some attention was given to these issues in the preceding 
chapter in the context of informal alternatives, and they will be considered 
again in the framework of the proposed model presented at the end of this 
chapter. 
As to financial considerations, the recent popularity of punitive civil 
proceedings is assumed to give rise to a saving in costs expended on the 
public prosecution agencies, in particular where private initiatives are con­
cerned (Mann, 1992:1868). In addition, the emphasis on pecuniary sanc­
tions rather than incarcerating institutions—insofar as these have been 
replaced (see below)—must surely result in a financial saving to the public 
purse. Finally, a system of punitive damages may result in a direct financial 
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benefit to state revenues (or to a designated fund, possibly for the benefit of 
victims). A number of writers and legal systems have determined that 
damages ordered for punitive purposes should be payable, at least in part, 
to the state (cf. Grube, 1993). 
What would be the consequences of adopting such a system from the 
point of view of the perceptions of the relevant parties? Evidence on this is 
inevitably of an indirect nature. However, it emerged from the studies of 
victims' attitudes that their main interest seemed to be a sense of participa­
tion in the process and the prospect of some material benefit (restitution). 
Both these subjective needs would be enhanced by the adoption of a civil or 
quasi-civil process. Moreover, the objective of meeting the claimant's per­
ceived justice needs in this respect is recognized by some of the jurispru­
dential writing on tort law, in which considerable attention is paid to the 
"satisfaction" or even "vindication" function of the tort remedy (Cane, 
1987:486), to which is attributed—at least in some legal systems—"the 
specific objective of assuaging the aggrieved party's violated sense of jus­
tice" (Tune, n.d.: 10). This appears to refer not only to the actual financial 
satisfaction represented by a successful claim but also to the psychological 
feeling of well-being that would follow such success. Thus, tort-based 
compensation has generally been found consistent with perceptions of 
equity (Harris et al., 1984:140ff.), while Walker (1982) observes that "civil 
justice or therapy may be better alternatives for relief of anger than state-
controlled penal justice" (14). 
Finally, insofar as civil remedies are more suited to conflicts of a "pri­
vate" nature, it should be noted that many conflicts formally defined as 
criminal are in fact perceived by victims as being more amenable to private 
remedies. Thus Reynolds and Blyth (1976), in their survey of residents of 
Minneapolis-St. Paul, found that a majority of victims (63%) perceived 
"private treatment" as being the more appropriate for "interpersonal" con­
flicts, while substantial minorities elected for this solution for serious 
crimes (30%), crimes of medium seriousness (44%), and minor infractions 
(38%). In the Hamburg survey conducted by Sessarj 1984), 51.6% of respon­
dents favored "private assessment outside criminal justice system"27 for 
property crimes (for some offenses the figure exceeded 85%), and 36.5% for 
violent crimes,- and these figures were somewhat higher for respondents 
with victimization experience than for those without. Moreover, a major­
ity of victims in the United States do not find it appropriate to report the 
offense to the police (U.S. Department of Justice, 1992:102), particularly in 
respect to "personal offenses." 
The defendant might also be expected to appreciate the justice of incur­
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ring the obligation to repay the victim for the damage inflicted. Such an 
obligation would be consistent with equity theory, as noted in the context 
of restitutionary remedies; indeed, according to this theory, the sense of 
equilibrium should be shared by the victim and the observers. The use of 
punitive financial sanctions, however, might be problematical from this 
point of view unless these can somehow be rationalized in compensatory 
or equitable terms (see below). 
There is also some indication that the general public, in spite of its 
presumed punitiveness, would not be entirely averse to the settlement of 
disputes along more "civil" lines. The Hamburg survey, as noted, showed 
wide support for "private assessment"; and mention was made earlier of 
evidence that the public is less punitive where the victims receive some 
attention (Cohn, 1974), as would be the case if they were to obtain restitu­
tion from the offender in a civil action. It is also well documented that law 
enforcement agencies see certain interpersonal disputes as having a private 
character (see chap. 2) and therefore more amenable to civil procedures. 
Finally, are there fundamental principles of justice requiring the mainte­
nance of a differentiation between the criminal- and civil-law systems? 
Although criminal law is traditionally seen as inflicting punishment on 
intentional wrongdoers, while tort law merely requires the payment of 
compensation for harm inflicted, we have seen from the foregoing discus­
sion that this is a simplification. As noted, tort theorists attribute to the 
civil law objectives similar to those identified with criminal law (see also 
Williams, 1951), while one writer has particularly emphasized the penal 
aspects of this branch of the law (Stoll, 1970). 
Further, the dichotomization between a criminal law based upon an 
ideology of societal retribution contrasted with a civil law concerned rather 
with a pragmatic reallocation of goods between private parties is clearly 
complicated by the conflicting schools of thought connected with each of 
these propositions. On the one hand, the schools of criminology that have 
predominated over the past two centuries28 have emphasized the utilitarian 
functions of the criminal law, even to the extent of the virtual elimination 
of concepts of guilt and responsibility (Wootton, 1959; Gramatica, 1963), or 
of imposing responsibility for unintended harm, sometimes even in the 
absence of negligence (strict liability). Only recently has the retributive 
philosophy reemerged (see chap. 6). Further, some writers now analyze 
criminal, like civil, law in terms of its economic function; indeed, it is 
perceived by some members of this school as an alternative to the civil 
where problems of detection or insolvency might render civil liability inade­
quate (Posner, 1986). 
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On the other hand, tort theorists have been similarly divided into differ­
ent schools regarding the function of this branch of the law. White's his­
torical survey of tort philosophy (White, 1980) distinguishes a number of 
competing theories. Historically, the main debate was over the degree to 
which liability in tort was to be based on fault and moral principles, or 
whether liability might be "strict" and based on a utilitarian rationale.29 
A new approach to tort philosophy, developed in German scholarship 
of the 1940s (Englard, 1993:11) and identified with much of the literature 
of the 1950s and 1960s (White, 1980), regards the main function of tort as 
the spreading of losses among different components of society and thus as 
a vehicle for administering distributive justice on a macro level rather 
than merely corrective justice, that is, between the parties concerned. 
(This is a distinction deriving from Aristotle; cf. Englard, 1993:11.) Ac­
cording to this approach, tort law is perceived as "public law in disguise" 
(White, 1980:218). By way of illustration, the principle of mutual social 
responsibility led many tort theorists to advocate no-fault insurance. 
Contemporary approaches to tort, however, tend to emphasize—or 
reemphasize—the corrective function of tort law. The corrective approach 
may be based either on an economic, utilitarian rationale (Posner) or on 
equity and morality (Fletcher). At the same time, the writings of Calabresi 
and Epstein, respectively, indicate that neither the utilitarian nor the equi­
table rationale necessarily excludes the possible relevance of distributive 
or "public" considerations (Englard, 1993:14); and a similar conclusion has 
been reached on the basis of a "communitarian" analysis (Harris, 1989). 
There are a number of key issues here that directly parallel the criminal-
law debates. Some of these controversies have been marginal in criminal-
law polemics. Thus ideological support for strict liability or utilitarian 
considerations as a basis for criminal responsibility tend to be compara­
tively rare (in spite of the pervasiveness of the former phenomenon). On 
the other hand, utilitarianism versus moral responsibility as the main 
criterion for dispositions has been a focal issue in criminal law too. Simi­
larly, analysis of punishment in terms of distributive justice has fewer 
supporters in penal as compared with tort philosophy (but see Sadurski, 
1985). Nevertheless, (a) restitutive sentencing bears a strong resemblance 
to corrective justice in tort, although arguably it has a different orientation 
(Thorvaldson, 1990), (b) the "admonitory conception of tort law" (White, 
1980:239; Veitch and Miers, 1975; and cf. Englard, 1993:153) corresponds 
directly to the revival of retribution in the criminal law, and (c) provision 
for punitive damages may render the objectives of civil actions almost 
indistinguishable from those of criminal prosecutions. Even the widely 
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held view that "tort law prices, while criminal law prohibits" (Coffee, 
1991) is disputed by at least one noted tort theorist, Ernest Weinrib, who 
posits that a tort, as its etymology implies, "is a wrong, not a permissible 
act that an award of tort damages retrospectively prices or licences" 
(Englard, 1993:56). 
Finally, reference may be made to the increasing emphasis on the public 
function of civil law. Here the issue is not limited to the above-mentioned 
controversies regarding the functions of tort law. There is an increasing 
perception that civil law generally is not confined in its effects to the 
disputing parties but fulfills a general social function. Thus Jolowicz (1983) 
observes that the class action is "much more than a means of securing 
redress for large numbers of small claimants; it provides a way of depriving 
the defendant of what are seen and described as his 'ill-gotten gains' and of 
deterring people from similar conduct in the future" (172). Such consider­
ations have led to the view that "the non-criminal as well as the criminal 
law should be upheld and vindicated in the courts regardless of the wishes 
of those who are immediately affected by its breach" (ibid.). Some of these 
trends suggest that the move toward "privatization" (or "civilization") of 
the criminal law may be accompanied by a parallel, but reverse, move 
toward the "publicization" of the civil law, in addition to its "penaliza­
tion." This, in turn, suggests a narrowing of the differential between the 
two areas. 
A few years ago, Freiberg and Malley (1984) argued that the expansion of 
the use of "civil penalties" in a number of areas resulted in a "hybridiza­
tion" that "tends to weaken or collapse the civil-criminal dichotomy" 
(390). This analysis has now been further fueled by the additional trends 
and ideologies noted above, namely, the desire to "civilize" the criminal 
law in general, the increasing "publicization" of the civil law, and the 
underlying comparability of tort and criminal-law philosophies. There is 
clearly a growing need to rethink the traditional dichotomy between crimi­
nal and civil law. This will have wide implications for theory and research, 
as well as in practical terms—not least in the context of victim-related 
remedies. 
Informalism 
The fragility of the crime-tort distinction is further illustrated by the move­
ment in favor of informal alternatives considered in the preceding chapter. 
Most of the programs reviewed under that heading deal indiscriminately 
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with both criminal and civil matters; the predominant type of conflict 
falling within the purview of the programs is primarily a function of the 
source of referral: criminal justice agencies refer primarily criminal con­
flicts, while community agencies are more likely to refer civil conflicts. 
The reason why informal programs can effectively ignore the criminal-
civil distinction without raising controversial issues is that the more tech­
nical procedural and evidentiary aspects of this distinction—relating to 
right to counsel, protection from self-incrimination, burden of proof, and 
so on—are dispensed with in the framework of these proceedings. Never­
theless, the fact remains that such programs effectively produce a merger 
of the two areas of law, criminal incidents being dealt with in an essen­
tially civil fashion, resulting in a "corrective," rather than a retributive, 
type of disposition between the two adversaries. This at least suggests that 
the concept of "merger" as such is neither totally an anathema to justice 
officials nor totally impractical in terms of implementation. 
Varieties of Dispute Processing? 
The adversary-retribution model referred to at the beginning of this chap­
ter can accommodate any of the procedural patterns alluded to above: a 
criminal process dominated by the victim (private prosecutions); a dual 
system, with both criminal and civil parties; a merged procedure largely 
civil in character; or an informal mediation procedure. The question arises, 
first, whether it is desirable that the justice system select the optimal 
procedure from among these possibilities and adopt it as a uniform solu­
tion, or whether it is preferable to maintain a variety of models from which 
a choice may be made in each case, as suggested in the well-known article 
echoed in the heading to this section (Sander, 1976). 
Second, if there is to be a variety of procedures operating concurrently, is 
the selection of the procedure to be adopted in the particular case to be 
determined by the injured party, as advocated by some writers,30 or by state 
officials, or is it to be predetermined according to the nature of the con­
flict? While inevitably some discretion as to the action to be adopted will 
always be available to the victim, who has the option of "lumping it" or of 
dealing directly with the wrongdoer (Felstiner, 1974; Sander, 1976), in prin­
ciple it may be unfair to the defendant that the victim should have the 
option of selecting a more punitive or a more compensatory mode of proce­
dure, provided that he or she is provided with at least one effective remedy. 
Moreover, the availability of both civil and criminal remedies, while in­
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tended to "shrink" the criminal law "next to an expanding arena of puni­
tive civil sanctions" (Mann, 1992:1802), may in practice lead to "net­
widening" (cf. Freiberg and Malley, 1984:380; Coffee, 1992); it may also 
discriminate against the economically disadvantaged, for whom civil sanc­
tions would be perceived as less appropriate (Galanter, 1991:775). A uni­
tary and substantially restitutional approach, on the other hand, whether 
labeled criminal or civil, would seem to cater optimally to the victim's 
needs, while the need for an additional and more punitive intervention 
would be determined by such factors as the degree of harm inflicted or the 
potential threat represented by the offender. 
Another criterion sometimes suggested is the nature of the relationship 
between the parties, but the adoption of this criterion would be more 
controversial. While research suggests that conflicts between family and 
nonstrangers differ from other conflicts in their character and their amena­
bility to resolution, there is a risk of "downgrading" the significance of 
nonstranger crime, as was the practice in the past, whereas the prevailing 
trend is rather to regard offenses committed against family members as 
equally or even more serious than other cases. 
The fundamental problem in this context seems to be that of reconcil­
ing two conflicting trends that have been referred to at various stages in 
this study. One trend is toward more formalized justice, as reflected in the 
just-deserts model, which seeks to replace the arbitrariness that character­
ized the rehabilitation model of justice with the introduction of objective 
standards, uniformity, and thus, by implication, a greater fairness in both 
procedures and sanctions. The other trend is the move toward informality, 
destigmatization, and reconciliation. The first approach would result in 
standardization of outcomes according to objective criteria; the second 
would result in variations in outcome according to the determination of 
the parties involved. The simultaneous adoption of these two inconsistent 
approaches may be seen as a form of "trade-off" whereby the more serious 
cases are destined to receive the standardized treatment, and the minor 
cases are relegated to mediation proceedings (cf. chap. 11). 
However, there is an element common to these two approaches, namely, 
a focus on the relationship between the offender and the victim—hence the 
inclusion of both under the adversary-retribution model. Under the first 
approach, a standardized equation is sought, based on a tariff reflecting 
"objective" criteria of justice (see above, chap. 7), while under the second 
model, the equation is to be determined ad hoc by the parties involved. The 
question is, can these two approaches somehow be combined? Here, again, 
the civil-law model can be of assistance, for under civil law the maximum 
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liability of the wrongdoer is determined by law, but any settlement negoti­
ated between the parties, whether before or during the judicial proceeding, is 
acceptable to the court; indeed it is encouraged. Thus, by analogy it has been 
argued that a sentencing tariff would not be required where a sanction can be 
determined by voluntary agreement (Wright, 1982:258). The tariff, which 
under a "civilized" system would involve a financial penalty directly re­
lated to the injury inflicted—although on the analogy of the punitive civil 
model it might be a multiple thereof—would thus become a maximum 
sanction held in reserve. This would be reminiscent of the XII Tables of 
ancient Rome, according to which the "talionic" punishment was due only 
if the parties did not reach an agreement (ni cum eopacit), and of contempo­
rary plea-bargaining practices. 
The dynamics of integrating a formal system and an informal one must 
also be considered, such as the question of whether they would be com­
bined in the same forum, or whether, as in the case with the German 
Schiedsmann, there would be an obligation to attempt to achieve an infor­
mal resolution to the conflict before one forum, with failure resulting in 
referral to a more formal proceeding (Dunkel and Rossner, 1989:155-56).31 
Other problems of such an integrated system have already been referred to, 
such as the issue of procedural guarantees and society's need for protection 
from "dangerous" persons (see also below). 
If the combination of an informal and a formal system raises problems 
mainly in the context of dynamics and procedure, the integration of civil 
and criminal law raises issues of a more substantial nature. Clearly, the 
nature of the remedy that the court would ultimately apply, in the absence 
of a mediated settlement, would be primarily restitutional, but what 
would be its determining criteria? Would there be an objective tariff, re­
lated exclusively to the injurious conduct and the harm inflicted, on the 
model of desert sentencing and the guidelines? Would there be individual­
ization of the tariff to take account of the perpetrator's circumstances, 
following the traditional model of rehabilitative sanctioning? Or would 
the tariff be individualized to take account of the needs of the victim, in 
accordance with the practice followed in civil actions, where the specific 
losses suffered by the plaintiff, including pain and suffering, form the basis 
of determining the compensation award? 
Clearly, sanctioning tariffs of the type falling within the just-deserts 
approach could in principle be adapted to a restitutionary model of justice 
(see chap. 7). As has been pointed out, the original form of tariff sentencing 
was a scale of financial compensation determined by the damage inflicted. 
In the case of intentionally inflicted harms, a somewhat inflated rate of 
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compensation might be applicable, on the model of punitive damages (or 
criminal restitution; cf. Thorvaldson, 1990), both by way of recompense 
for the indignity caused to the victim and for deterrence purposes. It will 
be recalled that these functions were seen to be consistent with both 
criminal and civil sanctions. This approach could also provide a solution 
for serious incidents in which the damage ultimately inflicted was slight 
(e.g., in the case of a failed attempt). 
A more troublesome issue is that of differential ability to pay. A purely 
pecuniary sanctioning system favors the wealthy—as indeed do prevailing 
civil systems (cf. Galanter, 1974; 1991:775). A poor harmdoer under a civil 
or quasi-civil system might be compelled to undergo some form of custo­
dial or noncustodial labor in order to discharge his debt (cf. Tallack, 1900; 
Ashworth, 1986:95). Some contemporary writers have considered this prob­
lem, essentially one of reconciling retributive and distributive justice. 
Thus Ashworth (1983), in the context of penal sanctions, suggests that the 
wealthy be singled out for custodial sentences, to compensate for the lack 
of impact upon such offenders of purely pecuniary penalties. Wright (1982), 
whose concluding chapter "Making Amends" lays greater emphasis on 
restitutionary justice, suggests that the sanction should take account of 
both the seriousness of the act and the harmdoer's ability to pay. A classic 
solution here would thus be an adaptation of the "day fine" or "unit fine" 
system, which takes both these elements into account. 
The problem here is that such a system would result in an indigent 
wrongdoer making only a relatively small payment to the victim. This 
result would thus be quite inconsistent with the third possibility referred 
to above—individualization of the sanction according to the victim's loss 
and suffering. On the other hand, while this last type of individualization 
may not necessarily be inconsistent with an "objective" tariff, whereby 
the victim's loss and suffering are viewed as the measure of the harmful­
ness of the act, it would clearly conflict with individualization based upon 
the wrongdoer's circumstances. This predicament exposes a deficiency in 
the adversary-retribution model which may require supplementing by its 
alternative, the social defense-welfare model. 
The Role of the Social Defense-Welfare Model 
The foregoing analysis was based upon the hypothesis that the adversary-
retribution model, besides being more in tune with prevailing philosophi­
cal attitudes, had the greater potential for meeting the needs of the victim 
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as reviewed in this study, as well as those of the other relevant sectors of 
the community, including offenders or "wrongdoers." However, it is 
equally evident that this model cannot deal adequately with all the needs 
that arise from victimization. First, there are needs that are unconnected 
with the retributive or "corrective" (in the civil justice sense) process. 
"Welfare" is a wider concept than "retribution" and may encompass such 
services as crisis intervention and other forms of service that by their very 
nature are not available from the adversary. This may even include services 
related to the legal process, such as those provided within victim/witness-
assistance programs. Second, the wrongdoer may not always be identified 
or located (apprehended) and thus may be unavailable as a source of retribu­
tive justice. Third, there may be a need for emergency or interim assistance 
before satisfaction may be obtained from the wrongdoer. Fourth, it might 
be argued that retributive justice cannot be implemented in a fully satisfac­
tory manner as long as the system within which it operates is character­
ized by imbalances in terms of distributive and social justice. Finally the 
adversary-retribution model as described above does not allow for the possi­
ble need for special measures of social protection which may be considered 
necessary, beyond the restraints on the wrongdoer which may be imposed 
for the purpose of meeting the needs of the victim.32 
Many of these measures, such as victim compensation from state 
funds, are dealt with elsewhere in this study. The emphasis here will be 
on possible mechanisms whereby the social defense-welfare model 
might optimally converge with the adversary-retribution model. Thus 
possible modes of combining state compensation and offender restitution 
were alluded to in chapter 7. Similarly, as noted, excessive punitive dam­
ages awarded in tort cases may be payable into a tort victims' relief fund 
(Grube, 1993:854, esp. n. 81). Under these systems, some victims would 
be (or are) compensated directly by the wrongdoer by means of adversary 
proceedings, while in other cases compensation is paid by state agencies 
with a welfare orientation, but partly out of monies provided by wrongdo­
ers in adversary proceedings. A more general structure for integrating the 
two models within the current criminal justice system, or its quasi-civil 
replacement, will now be considered.33 
First, neighborhood legal-aid agencies would assist the victim in pursu­
ing retributive remedies vis-a-vis the wrongdoers but would also direct the 
victim to the various support agencies. A second critical stage for the victim 
should be the preliminary court hearing—the equivalent of the contempo­
rary bail hearing—which would have an expanded function. It may already 
be used today to issue protection orders for the victim's benefit (Finn and 
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Colson, 1990). It should also provide an opportunity for a more comprehen­
sive, although interim, review of the situation regarding both the offender 
and the victim. The judge should ensure that both parties are aware of their 
rights and of the options open to them. The victim should be made aware 
not only of available options regarding the offender—the modes of proceed­
ing available, legal aid, and so on—but also of welfare options, such as 
application for an interim award from the compensation board. Indeed, 
perhaps the judge would be empowered to order such an award. 
Moreover, interim access to the court on the victim's part need not 
necessarily be dependent on a bail hearing, or even on the offender being 
apprehended. Such access might be granted as of right so that the court 
could review the action taken by the law enforcement authorities to appre­
hend the offender or instigate proceedings—insofar as they retain this 
role—as well as to ensure that the victim has been granted access to the 
welfare services to which he or she is entitled. 
A similar review, mutatis mutandis, would take place as part of the 
trial, sentencing, or dispositional process (cf. Sebba, 1994) or at the termi­
nation of the civil, quasi-civil, or informal alternative. Here again, where 
the restitution payment was reduced because of the wrongdoer's inability 
to pay, the court might have the power to order compensation for the 
victim out of public funds, in order to prevent the victim's falling into the 
"compensation trap" (Newburn, 1988:47, citing Miers). The state would 
be empowered to request supplementary remedies vis-a-vis the wrongdoer, 
insofar as these were required for protection of the public. The court 
would thus serve as guarantor both of the adversary-retributive interaction 
between victim and offender or wrongdoer and of the welfare and social 
defense interactions between the state on the one hand and both victim 
and offender on the other. 
A Model Solution 
In the course of the preceding pages, possible trends were reviewed in 
relation to the respective roles of criminal and civil law and procedures, of 
formalism and informalism, of the relevant parties—victim, offender, and 
state—and of the two models within which they interact (adversary­
retribution and social defense-welfare). A hazardous attempt will now be 
made to present an optimal integrated solution, based upon the foregoing 
analysis and against the background of the needs of the parties and the 
justice considerations reviewed in this volume. It does not specifically take 
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into account current U.S. constitutional requirements, but, as noted in 
chapter 11, these have not prevented the development of informal alterna­
tives to the justice system and thus may not constitute an obstacle to other 
victim-oriented (but also offender-oriented) reforms. 
Injuries giving rise to a cause of action would continue to be of two 
types, on the civil-criminal analogy. The terminology, however, would 
preferably be toned down; injuries with the required mental element 
would be termed "wrongs" and would be perceived to have a public 
dimension, while for civil breaches a morally neutral term would be 
employed. For this purpose some "intentional" torts—in particular those 
deemed worthy of punitive damages—would be classified with the 
wrongs, while some technical offenses might undergo the reverse reclassi­
fication. In principle, all actions would be brought by the injured party in 
a local or "community" court (echoes here of Danzig's seminal article 
cited in the preceding chapter!). Proceedings would be relatively informal, 
but a private attorney could be employed. A public attorney would be 
available to assist or represent the injured party in complex cases. 
If the cause of action involved no wrong, the defendant would be liable 
to pay compensation in accordance with the harm inflicted or to comply 
with other remedies generally available. But if the injury were accompa­
nied by mens iea and thus designated a wrong, the perpetrator would be 
liable in principle for, say, double damages. One-half of the additional 
amount would be payable, together with the basic assessment, to the 
victim, by way of recognition of the wrong inflicted; the additional 
amount (25% of the total sum) would be paid into a victim fund adminis­
tered by the state.34 It is hoped that the twofold penalty, as well as signify­
ing the wrongfulness of the conduct, would also serve as a deterrent, 
while the emphasis on restoration of the victim's personality would mini­
mize the perception of inequity in psychological terms. For offenses in 
respect of which the financial loss, if any, was not a true measure of the 
harm inflicted or threatened—for example, sexual harassment or at­
tempted assault—a penalty tariff would be developed. 
Since the additional damages would have a punitive character, these 
would be scaled down in the light of the financial situation of the defen­
dant. Alternatively, they might be translated into alternative sanctions, 
such as community service; compare the concept suggested by Wright 
(1982:283), whereby a standardized sentencing score could be compiled by 
means of individualized sanctioning "packages" comprising varying ele-
ments.35 In cases where the defendant was unable to pay, the victim would 
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receive compensation (at least in respect of the harm inflicted) from the 
victim fund, which could subsequently recover from the wrongdoer. As­
sessment of compensation in cases of wrongs would be based on culpable, 
that is, foreseen, harm. In the light of the emphasis here on the role of the 
victim, contributory fault (on civil-law principles) might be taken into 
account here, but without prejudice to the share claimable by the state. 
While the instigator of the proceedings would generally be the victim, 
the state would, or could, be represented at all "relevant" or "critical" 
stages—to adopt by analogy the terminology of the victims' rights constitu­
tional amendments—as a subsidiary party. The interest of the state would 
be twofold: (1) to protect its interest in the punitive damages payable to the 
victim fund, and (2) to consider any additional action vis-a-vis the wrong­
doer which might seem appropriate, in the interests of public safety (see 
below). The state would have independent standing in the community 
court, that is, the right to instigate a proceeding, only in respect of wrongs 
committed against the community as a whole, for example, causing dam­
age to the environment. 
Proceedings in the community court would, as noted, be somewhat infor­
mal, to ensure maximum involvement of the victim and perhaps to encour­
age consensual solutions,- mediation of interpersonal disputes would be 
either an integral part of the proceedings or would be available "in the 
shadow of the court" (cf. Mnookin and Kornhauser, 1979). In recognition of 
the low priority placed in such a setting on formal legal rights, an appeal 
would be possible to a more formal court. (It may be recalled that most of the 
studies reviewed in the preceding chapter suggested that informalism was a 
popular mode of dispute processing, but that in one study it was found that 
participant-complainants favored a rights discourse.) Analogy may be made 
here to the Sheriff's Court in Scotland, which has a supervisory role with 
regard to the informal operation of the juvenile panels (cf. Morris, 1978:67-
69). Moreover, if the state were to retain its claim to 25% of the full sanction, 
this would ensure that the sanction would incorporate a "retributive mini­
mum" (cf. Cavadino and Dignan, 1993). 
This higher court would have two additional functions. First, where the 
state representative in the community court formed the opinion that fur­
ther action was required to restrain the wrongdoer, application could be 
made to the higher court for an appropriate order, possibly involving depri­
vation of liberty. Second, for serious offenses, such as rape or murder, the 
higher court would have trial jurisdiction (involving juries where appropri­
ate). In these cases victims (and survivors) would prosecute through their 
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attorneys, while the state, too, would be represented. In such cases, how­
ever, the state would have an independent right to prosecute if the victim 
refrained from doing so. 
Finally, victims would have access to the community court on a continu­
ing basis, in particular at the complaint and at the post-trial stages, to 
ensure both the enforcement of claims against the wrongdoer, and the 
recognition of entitlements from the state, for example, access to legal or 
counseling services, or a payment from the victim fund. 
It may be noted that the emphasis in this proposal on the involvement 
of the victim and possible interaction between the parties, together with 
its lack of emphasis on offender (or "wrongdoer") characteristics, differenti­
ates it from traditional rehabilitation or social defense models. On the 
other hand its restorative and informalist orientation distinguishes it from 
the just-deserts model; it is closer in spirit to Braithwaite and Pettit's 
"republican" theory (see chap. 6). Its potential for the optimal accommoda­
tion of the coping and justice needs of the parties would naturally have to 
be tested by experimentation and evaluation. 
13

Third- (Fourth-!) Party 
Responsibility: A Third Model! 
In the previous chapter it was shown how the various proposals and devel­
opments for ameliorating the situation of the victim can be dichotomized 
according to which of the two alternative models of justice they reflect— 
the adversary-retribution model or the social defense-welfare model. 
There are, however, two developments not yet considered in this study 
which do not fit easily into either of these models.1 
The first of these proposals, third-party liability, has received consider­
able attention from some sections of the victim-rights movement. The 
term "third-party liability" refers to the attempts that have been made by, 
or on behalf of, victims to develop civil-law remedies vis-a-vis persons or 
organizations that failed to prevent the victimization. Such litigation has 
been brought against hotels, landlords, employers, and educational institu­
tions for providing inadequate security against predators, and against psy­
chiatrists and criminal justice officials who released from custody persons 
who subsequently committed crimes (Carrington and Rapp, 1991). Law 
enforcement officials have also been sued for failure to prevent the victim­
ization by unapprehended criminals (Englard, 1993: chap. 13). Moreover, 
organizations have been established to assist in developing the legal reme­
dies upon which such litigation rests (see Carrington and Nicholson 1984). 
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Although the attempt to establish a "new tort" of this nature (Carring­
ton; 1978) has not been entirely successful, in some cases a duty of care has 
been recognized. Thus, in the much-cited Tarasoff case (1974-76), psycho­
therapists were held to be under a duty (in spite of the principle of profes­
sional confidentiality) to warn a patient's intended victim, while in other 
cases landlords have been held liable in negligence for environmental con­
ditions that facilitated robbery, rape, and so on (Englard, 1993). Similarly, 
various provisions of the American Law Institute's Second Restatement of 
the Law of Torts modified the historic principle of the absence of responsi­
bility for the wrongful acts of third persons (Carrington and Rapp, 1991: 
sec. 1.02(3)(b)). Under section 315 of the restatement, a duty to control the 
actions of third parties may arise where the defendant has a "special rela­
tionship" either with the injured party or with the person inflicting the 
harm, and section 448 specifically creates liability for a third party's 
tortious or criminal behavior if the "actor at the time of his negligent 
conduct realized or should have realized the likelihood that such a situa­
tion might be created and that a third person might avail himself of the 
opportunity to commit such a tort or crime" (American Law Institute, 
1965:122,480). 
Litigation against law enforcement authorities has generally been unsuc­
cessful, perhaps owing to an unwillingness to impose too many restraints 
on police discretion. In the English Dorset Yacht case ([1970] A.C.1004), 
the government was held to be liable in principle for the damage to a yacht 
caused by escaping Borstal (reformatory) inmates only insofar as it could 
have been foreseen that the youths would be likely to steal the plaintiffs' 
boat to escape from the island where they were working. The absence of 
any general liability was reiterated in a subsequent claim directed against 
the police for their failure to protect a victim of the "Yorkshire Ripper" 
[Hill v. Chief Constable of West Yorkshire, [1989] A.C.53). The decision of 
the House of Lords in this case was based both on public policy and on the 
absence of any special characteristics of the victim rendering her a proba­
ble target. On this point Englard (1993:195 n. 58) refers to a Canadian case 
in which the police were held to be liable to a victim of a serial rapist who 
was in a high risk category in terms of location and personal characteris­
tics. In some American cases, parole or probation officers have been held 
liable for the failure to protect victims (Sluder and del Carmen, 1990). 
The second proposal involves the imposition of a general duty to assist 
victims, in particular by intervention to prevent the victimization or, mini­
mally, by the requirement of prompt reporting (Geis, 1991:300). Such a 
duty of assistance, popularly called "Good Samaritanism," exists under 
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many legal systems (Takooshian and Stravitz, 1984).2 It has been generally 
absent from common-law systems, except insofar as the Good Samaritan 
rule in tort imposes a duty of care upon persons who voluntarily undertake 
to assist (American Jurisprudence 2d, 1989: vol. 57A, sec. 208). The Second 
Restatement of the Law of Torts (American Law Institute, 1965) again 
imposes a "duty to aid or protect" given a "special relationship" between 
the parties (sec. 314A) and in certain other circumstances (sees. 321-25). A 
more broadly based duty has been imposed under pioneering legislation 
enacted in some states, notably Vermont (Takooshian and Stravitz, 1984; 
Grey, 1983; Geis, 1991), while Massachusetts and Rhode Island require 
prompt reporting by bystanders, limited in the latter jurisdiction to sexual 
assaults (Geis, 1991:300). 
This issue has been generally ignored by victimologists but has been the 
subject of a specialized literature on the "innocent bystander" (see, e.g., 
Sheleff 1978). The topic received particular attention in the wake of the 
notorious case of Kitty Genovese in 1964, when 38 persons witnessed a 
brutal murder during a period of 45 minutes without taking any action 
(Shotland, 1984). A somewhat similar situation occurred in a Massachu­
setts rape case, resulting in the reporting requirements referred to above. 
The common feature of these two proposals is that they impose responsi­
bility upon a party other than the victim or the perpetrator of the injurious 
act, hence the reference in legal terminology to third parties. However, in 
the present study it has been shown that there are already two candidates 
for such responsibility vis-a-vis the victim, namely, the offender and the 
state. And in the context of criminal proceedings, the established parties 
are the defendant and the state, and the victim is a potential third party. 
Thus, from the point of view of this study, the additional party to be 
involved under the above schemes is in effect a fourth party—hence the 
title of the present chapter. 
Each of the two proposals just mentioned involves complex issues of 
jurisprudence and philosophy. The emerging legal literature on third-
party liability raises questions about the nature of the duty of care in­
volved, the causal relationship between the breach of the duty and the 
harm resulting, and the immunities that may be claimed by public ser­
vants or professional personnel when the allegedly negligent act fell 
within their official duties (see, generally, Carrington and Rapp 1991; 
Englard 1993). Thus, for example, one writer (Schoenholz, 1980) has sug­
gested that the liability of institutions releasing dangerous persons be 
strict, thereby obviating the need to prove negligence, on the analogy of 
the similar duty laid down in the famous Rylands v. Fletcher rule with 
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regard to dangerous substances. Similarly, the question of a general duty 
of assistance or "rescue" raises such issues as the legal enforcement of 
morality, the role of causation in tort law, and the appropriateness of a 
criminal law as compared with a tortious norm (see Grey 1983: chap. 4; 
Weinrib 1980; Woozley 1983; Menlowe, 1993). 
Rather than attempt to deal with these challenging issues, the following 
brief discussion will concentrate on two aspects: (1) the possible implica­
tions of the above remedies from the point of view of the parameters of 
justice identified in the present study, and (2) the relationship of the two 
remedies to one another and to the two models of justice discussed in 
chapter 12. 
Coping Needs 
There appears to be considerable potential in both the remedies referred to. 
As to third-party liability, if the various measures advocated by law en­
forcement officials and insurance companies for crime prevention are con­
sidered, it emerges that there are large numbers of crimes where better 
lighting facilities (by house owners, institutions, municipalities, etc.), 
more secure locks, more patrols, better communication facilities for alert­
ing help, and so on, might have contributed to prevention of the offense or 
mitigation of its consequences. Thus, while the amount of successful litiga­
tion of this type has probably been modest hitherto, if the standards re­
quired from potential defendants in such cases were raised, the burden of 
proof upon plaintiffs lowered, and more legal aid provided, there would 
seem to be considerable potential for such suits. Moreover, an evaluation 
of "Tarasoff warnings"—the scope of which were subsequently narrowed 
by legislation—concluded that these, too, were effective in reducing acts 
of victimization (Fulton, 1991). 
Similarly, while no research is known to me on the number of offenses 
committed in the presence or in the hearing of bystanders (co-offenders 
are, of course, a common phenomenon), it is possible that the imposition 
of a duty to assist may also have considerable potential. However, some 
authorities take the view that the imposition of such a duty could be 
counterproductive, since persons in the vicinity would deny any knowl­
edge of the danger (Shotland, 1984). Moreover, the limitations on the 
power of legal norms to alter behavior patterns are well known (see, e.g., 
Cotterrell 1992: chap. 2). 
Further, by comparison with suits against offenders, civil actions of the 
first type against third parties are more likely to result in practical benefits, 
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since the persons or institutions involved are much less likely to be indi­
gent; indeed, this type of reasoning may have influenced the recognition of 
liability in such cases (Englard, 1993). But this may be less true of the 
second type of case (the failure to intervene), and whether victims would 
benefit financially from the establishment of such a duty would depend on 
whether the duty to assist were denned in tort or criminal law (cf. Grey, 
1983:198). However, if, in spite of the pessimistic prognosis referred to 
above, greater readiness to intervene were to result, the immediate benefit 
would be a reduction of victimization.3 It might be argued, however, that a 
system based upon rewards is preferable to one based upon obligations and 
that the principle behind the Good Samaritan compensation laws (see 
chap. 9) should be extended beyond compensation for injury suffered in 
assisting law enforcement agencies to the payment of reward for philan­
thropic acts. This would be consistent with psychological concepts of posi­
tive feedback (see also Beccaria, 1880). 
One point should be made here that might qualify the benefits to vic­
tims offered by the types of development being discussed. Insofar as strin­
gent standards are applied to the liability of third parties for the failure to 
prevent the victimization, it would be consistent to apply such standards 
to the victim as well. The concept of victim contribution to the offense 
(see chap. 4), for all the controversy attached, suggests that if strict stan­
dards were applied, the victim, too, might in many cases have been held to 
have been able to prevent the commission of the offense or to mitigate its 
consequences. If this could be shown, surely the victim would have to bear 
the loss, or at least part of it, rather than the third party? 
What would be the coping effects of the implementation of these forms 
of third-party responsibility upon the other parties considered in this 
study? Naturally, the general public—as opposed to those sections of it 
upon whom responsibility would be placed for failure to prevent or miti­
gate the victimization—would be the direct beneficiaries of the transfer 
of responsibility to those individuals, for the need for compensation out 
of public funds would be obviated. Indirectly, offenders would also benefit 
from this "sharing" of the burden. On the other hand, they could be 
harmed by two phenomena that might emerge: (1) a reluctance to release 
potentially dangerous persons from penal or mental health institutions, 
to avoid the risk of third-party liability of the first type referred to above; 
(2) a trend toward violent intervention by bystanders and vigilantes, seek­
ing to prevent the taint of passive responsibility, a phenomenon that 
might also endanger innocent citizens mistakenly suspected of commit­
ting a crime.4 
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Perceived Justice Needs 
While no survey data is known to me regarding attitudes to third-party 
liability, some tentative studies have been conducted regarding the imposi­
tion of a duty on bystanders. Thus Takooshian and Stravitz (1984) reported 
that while an earlier survey by Zeisel found that 75% of Americans felt 
that the offer of assistance should be a matter of the bystander's own 
conscience rather than a legal obligation, later surveys conducted by the 
authors showed that views had changed and this had become a minority 
view. However, from perusal of their data (6) it appears that a greater 
variety of responses were offered to respondents in the later surveys, and 
respondents in fact opted mainly for positive incentives, including "reward­
ling] involved bystanders" and "print[ing] names of involved ones in the 
press," rather than for the imposition of a legal obligation. 
Some comparative data are available from a study conducted in the 
Netherlands. Here observers' reactions to bicycle thefts were recorded on 
the basis of (a) hypothetical questions, (b) questions regarding respon­
dents' own past conduct, and (c) an experiment whereby such a theft was 
"staged." While a large majority in the first category (78%) opted for inter­
vention, whether by "addressing the thief" or by "alerting the police," 
rather fewer in the second category (45%) reported actually having done so, 
while 93% of the experimental group in fact took no action (Van Dijk et al., 
1983). This suggests that support for the norm may be at a rather superfi­
cial level. Nevertheless, the authors of both the above studies express some 
optimism about the potential for the encouragement of such a norm—if 
not by use of threats, then perhaps by incentives.5 
On the other hand, the evidence deriving from equity theory, discussed 
in previous chapters, suggests that this type of solution might be problem­
atic. None of the parties concerned—victims, offenders, members of the 
general public, or the third parties or bystanders incurring the liability— 
would gain satisfaction from compensation issuing from a source other 
than the primary cause of the harm. How far such a distribution of the loss 
among parties contributing only indirectly to its creation would be per­
ceived to be preferable to the absence of any remedy whatsoever (i.e., 
leaving the victim to suffer the full loss) is an issue for research. 
The fundamental principles of justice involved are too far-reaching to al­
low for a full analysis here and will only be considered insofar as they 
relate to the discussion on models of justice. The special feature common 
to the two proposals considered here—whose common element does not 
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seem to have been widely recognized in the literature6—is that they do not 
seem fully consistent either with the adversary-retribution model, which 
relies upon the victim's initiative against the offender as the primary 
mechanism for justice, or with the social defense-welfare model, which 
perceives the state as the primary agency of support for the victim as well 
as for the control of the offender. Here the burden is imposed not upon the 
state, which represents society as a whole, but upon certain individual 
members of the public who were in a position to prevent the victimization 
or to assist the victim. The philosophical basis for such an obligation (as 
distinct from its economic rationale) is not, as in the case of the social 
defense-welfare model, that the victim is entitled to welfare on the basis 
of need, or that the state has failed in its duty to protect the victim through 
the official law enforcement agencies; rather it seems to be that individual 
citizens are seen to have a duty of mutual protection, prevention, and 
assistance (cf. the judgment cited in Carrington and Rapp, 1991:1-9). 
On one level, this philosophy appears to be an extension of the social 
defense-welfare model. Social responsibility for acts of victimization and 
their consequences is so developed that an obligation is imposed upon each 
individual to prevent such acts or to mitigate their consequences. On the 
other hand, there is also an antibureaucratic, antistate element here.7 The 
message conveyed is that control of the offender and protection of the 
victim are not matters for anonymous state agencies but for individuals in 
proximity to the parties to the conflict. This could be perceived as an 
extension of the self-help principle, of a return to community responsibil­
ity referred to in chapter 11 (cf. esp. Nelken, forthcoming), of the recently 
developed "communitarian" philosophy (cf. Mapel, 1989: chap. 7), or of 
the abolitionist school mentioned in chapter 12. 
Clearly, these proposals require considerably more extensive analysis on 
all levels: in respect of the actual benefits they are likely to produce for 
victims and their implications for other parties involved, in respect of the 
perceived justice of these solutions, and in respect of their underlying 
philosophical premises. The preceding discussion was intended merely to 
emphasize the unique features of these proposals, as well as what seems to 
be a conceptual interrelationship between them; to point to the need to 
supplement the dichotomy presented in the preceding chapter with the 
consideration of a "third model"; and to indicate the importance of further 
study of the issues involved. 
14

Final Reflections 
The history of penal reform suggests that while pioneering enthusiasm 
may in itself produce positive results in the short run—and this in itself is 
an unproven hypothesis—this force alone is insufficient to sustain such 
reforms. Thus while Bishop Ridley's first Bridewell, Crofton's "progressive 
stage" and parole system, and Zebulon Brockway's reformatory were be­
lieved in their day to be successful, these institutions became institutional­
ized failures (see Howard, 1929; Rothman, 1971). The individualized 
model of rehabilitation on which the criminal justice system was based for 
a century was eventually seen to rest on "unfounded assumptions" (Ameri­
can Friends Service Committee, 1971), and research on this system led to 
the purported finding that in the context of the treatment of offenders 
"nothing works" (Martinson, 1974). Nor have "simple solutions" been 
found to succeed in relation to judicial structures and processes (Feeley, 
1983). Is the current victim movement destined to share the fate of these 
earlier reform ideologies? 
In the preceding pages a detailed analysis was presented of the many 
novel institutional reforms introduced in recent years to meet the needs of 
crime victims, perceived to have been the "forgotten figures" of the crimi­
nal justice system. The analysis has for the most part indicated that most of 
these reforms either appear to have a limited potential for satisfying vic­
tims' needs and expectations, or have been designed or implemented in such 
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a manner as to limit their contribution in practice. Although the book is 
based upon a very different analytical approach, the title of Robert Elias's 
recent monograph, Victims Still, may indeed reflect the progress that has 
been made in this area, in spite of a degree of satisfaction expressed with 
many of the programs reviewed in the course of the preceding pages. 
However, it would be premature at this juncture to draw the conclusion 
that "nothing works" for victims either. Rather, it will be more construc­
tive to attempt to identify some of the main problems that have emerged 
either explicitly or implicitly during the course of the analysis, problems to 
which insufficient attention may have been paid, whether in the context of 
the reforms themselves or in the literature of advocacy or evaluation. 
The first point to note is that the vast outpouring of victim-oriented 
materials and proposals in recent years has tended to be too particularistic. 
The focus on the material needs of the parties may ignore their emotional 
needs and usually ignores their justice needs. The focus on one particular 
remedy (for example, state compensation schemes) may result in a neglect 
to consider its relationship and consistency with another remedy (for exam­
ple, restitution by the offender). There has been a failure to develop remedies 
within an overall conceptual framework taking into account the relation­
ship between victims, offenders, and the general public. Similarly, conceptu­
alization of the possible role and responsibility of additional proximate 
parties has been lacking. There has also been an insufficient attempt to 
integrate the different disciplines that have contributed to the victim-
related literature, namely, social and political philosophy; jurisprudence; 
the empirical orientation of criminology, victimology, and sociology; and 
the experimental orientation of social psychology. Fragmentation in all 
these areas has contributed to the fact that the adoption of victim-oriented 
measures has tended to outpace our understanding, conceptualization, and 
evaluation of the issues involved. 
The second point relates to the delimitation of the subject matter. This 
topic has, first of all, an "inward-looking" aspect, namely, in respect of the 
definition of victims and their typology. Here the question arises whether 
remedies are to be confined to "ideal-type" victims or to be extended to the 
large numbers who do not conform with this image; and similar questions 
arise with respect to indirect victims. As to the "outward-looking" aspect, 
questions arise regarding the priority of crime victims as compared with 
other claimants on societal resources and how far victims differ from other 
claimants in the nature and the extent of their needs. 
The study conducted by the Victim Services Agency in New York (Fried­
man et al., 1982) indicates that the dominant factor determining the 
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victim's ability to cope with the effects of victimization is the strength of his 
or her social network. This, in turn, suggests that remedies focusing specifi­
cally on the needs of crime victims may have a relatively limited potential, 
since the problem lies rather with the underlying social structure. 
The disparity between victim needs and victim services noted by some 
writers suggests a possible failure to be guided by research on the issue of 
needs or a commitment to a particular type of professional service, irrespec­
tive of the victim's actual priorities. The disparity alluded to is usually that 
between material needs, such as locks for the doors, and psychological 
needs, such as counseling, both of which have been classified here as "cop­
ing needs." More neglected still is the question of the relationship between 
psychological variables relating to trauma, anger, and so on, and the justice 
needs of the victims, which are usually studied in the framework of surveys 
or laboratory experiments, notably on equity theory. In this context, refer­
ence should be made to the work of Greenberg and Ruback (1992), who 
endeavored to study—employing a variety of methodologies—the connec­
tion between emotional reactions of victims and their justice-related needs 
and decisions. Such integrative research is as yet in its infancy. 
Another core issue to which social psychologists are making a notable 
contribution is the relative importance to victims and other relevant par­
ties of procedural as opposed to substantive justice. If the contribution of 
Tyler and others, concerned primarily with the offender, has been to show 
that perceptions of procedural justice are no less important than the per­
ceived justice of the outcome, research focusing on the victim, such as that 
by Shapland and others, seems to indicate that procedural justice—as mea­
sured particularly by the degree of information imparted to the victim and 
the extent of the victim's involvement—might be the only relevant con­
cern,- in other words, as long as victims were granted "voice" (Aquino et 
al., 1992), that is, the opportunity for some input into the decision-making 
process, the actual outcome of the case may be relatively insignificant. 
Later research suggests that the outcome, too, may be of importance to 
many victims and indeed that the involvement may in itself sometimes 
raise certain expectations as to outcome. 
The main variable associated with outcome is, of course, punitiveness. 
On this issue—as on many others—methodology seems to be of the es­
sence, for while polls persistently support the demand for harsh sentences, 
more sophisticated studies alluding to particular cases present a different 
picture. Victim-focused studies tend also to conclude that most victims, 
while, as noted, not necessarily indifferent to the outcome of the case, are 
not particularly punitive. There is also some indication that victim­
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oriented remedies, such as restitution, may serve as a substitute for punish­
ment. This, in turn, raises questions regarding the appropriate functions 
and ideologies to be attributed to the justice system, and the relative sup­
port on the part of the public for noncriminal or victim-oriented alterna­
tives. On this topic it seems, surprisingly, that comprehensive studies such 
as those conducted in Germany, indicating an openness on the part of the 
public to more flexible, and in particular victim-oriented, models, have yet 
to be carried out in the United States (but see Umbreit, 1994). 
The last-mentioned topics are also pertinent to the issues considered in 
chapter 12. A focal area is that of the optimal form of adversary proceed­
ing for the parties involved: a traditional criminal proceeding, granting the 
victim a "quasi status," casting the victim in the role of prosecutor, or 
replacement of the criminal process by a civil or informal one. In this 
context the potential for changing the system, based upon the evidence 
of the needs and the perceptions of the parties, seems to be more far-
reaching than the reforms actually contemplated. The present trend in 
the United States seems to favor granting the victim substantial rights in 
the course of a government-dominated proceeding, whether or not these 
rights are actually intended to be exercised! This trend is evidenced, inter 
alia, by the spate of legislative reforms, and in particular by the recent 
constitutional amendments granting such rights, mainly of a passive na­
ture but sometimes providing the opportunity to cast the victim in a 
more active role. 
While reform legislation, including the amendments to state constitu­
tions, reflects the desire not only to enhance the victim's role in the 
criminal-justice process but also to promote welfarist remedies, such as 
state compensation and victim assistance programs, it seems that this last 
orientation is less in keeping with prevailing American social, political, 
and economic philosophy. Research findings suggest that both these 
welfarist remedies are relatively more developed and better funded in Brit­
ain, with its stronger welfarist tradition, in spite of the recent domination 
of the political right in that country. It is also no coincidence that Ameri­
can programs—in keeping with a more rights-oriented philosophy and a 
more monetarist economy—are financed to a considerable extent by levies 
and penalties imposed upon offenders, thereby mitigating the strain on the 
public purse. Thus the potential for change in the United States seems to 
be along the offender-victim axis rather than the state-victim axis, and this 
is more naturally achieved in the course of criminal justice proceedings (or 
their alternatives) than by funneling funds from offenders to victims via 
public agencies engaged in victim assistance. An alternative direction 
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more in keeping with prevailing ideologies is that of private solutions, 
including the development of third-party suits discussed in chapter 13, 
insurance, and the use of private law enforcement agencies. 
The positive side of developing the offender-victim axis is that it pro­
vides some potential for increasing victim participation and thereby in­
creasing victim satisfaction; but, as noted, the participation envisaged 
seems to be limited in scope, substantially remaining within the prevailing 
model of justice. The recent wave of constitutional amendments may pro­
vide a testing ground for the future direction of victim-related reforms. 
While they provide a potential for a more integrated and victim-oriented 
criminal justice system, there are two major "ifs" here. The first relates to 
the degree to which there is a readiness for change on the part of the 
institutionalized bureaucracies and work cultures of the criminal justice 
system. Enhancing the victim's role in the system requires that existing 
agents show a willingness to accommodate undisciplined nonprofessionals 
in a game hitherto played by established rules. On a more radical level, if 
alternative victim-oriented processes are to emerge, the established agen­
cies must be willing—or forced—to be shunted aside altogether. 
The second "if" relates to the nature of the dominant forces and ideolo­
gies involved in the victim-oriented reforms. Insofar as victim-related re­
form is merely a camouflage for tough law-and-order-oriented policies, as 
appears to have occurred, for example, in California (McCoy, 1993), the 
role of the victim is likely to be marginalized. The indications of the 
evaluations and experiments discussed in earlier chapters are that the 
trend of a genuinely victim-oriented system would be less punitive, not 
more. The future may thus depend on the political orientation of the 
reformists, on the sophistication of victim advocates, and on the latter's 
commitment to the genuine interests of their constituency.1 It could go 
either way. 
Appendix

The Contribution of 
Social Psychology 
In recent years there has emerged a developing literature in the field of 
social psychology relating to the criminal justice system in general and to 
the perceptions of victimization in particular. This literature focuses pri­
marily on three concepts. 
A. Attribution Theory. "Attribution theory has characterized people as 
'intuitive psychologists' who logically (and often illogically) utilize various 
principles and causal schemata in order to attribute causal explanations for 
social behavior" (Borgida and White, 1978:342). This theory, associated in 
particular with F. Heider and developed by E. E. Jones and K. Davis, and H. 
H. Kelley (see McGillis, 1978), has frequently been applied in the criminal 
justice area. Thus, for example, "the admission of prior sexual history 
evidence in a rape case may enhance the likelihood that jurors attribute 
personal responsibility to the victim for the sexual assault" (Borgida and 
White, 1978:342). 
A variation of this theory having special reference to victims is that of 
"defensive attribution" (Walster, 1966). Walster originally proposed that 
when hearing about an accident in which severe damage occurred, observ­
ers would act to protect themselves by assigning the person involved in the 
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mishap a high level of responsibility, thereby attempting to avoid the occur­
rence of that accident to themselves in the future, "It won't happen to me; 
I'll be more careful" (see Gold et al., 1978). This reaction is anticipated in 
particular where the observer feels some degree of affinity, either personal 
or situational, with the victim. 
B. "Just-World" Theory. This theory was formulated by M.J. Lerner in a 
series of studies (see, e.g., Godfrey and Lowe, 1975) in which he argued that 
people have a need to believe that the world is fundamentally just. Thus, 
when people observe what appears to be an injustice they tend to interpret 
the situation in a way that will reduce or eliminate the injustice, for exam­
ple, by attributing blame or responsibility to the victim. There is a clear 
similarity here with the previous theory, but the two theories may lead to 
differing hypotheses. "In contrast to just world theory (Lerner, 1970:277), 
attribution theory would predict that victims who have good motives would 
not be devalued when they are observed to suffer injustly" (Godfrey and 
Lowe, 1975:945). Such differences have led some researchers to regard the 
theories as alternative or conflicting (Godfrey and Lowe, 1975; Gold et al., 
1978). 
C. Equity Theory. This theory, developed by Walster, Berscheid, and 
Walster (1976) from earlier work by G. C. Homans and J. S. Adams, pur­
ports to be a general theory of social behavior (Berkovitz and Walster, 1976) 
based on four fundamental propositions: 
Proposition I: Individuals will try to maximize their outcomes (where 
outcomes equal rewards minus costs).... Proposition DA: Groups can 
maximize collective reward by evolving accepted systems for "equita­
bly" apportioning rewards and costs among members.... Proposition 
IIB: Groups will generally reward members who treat others equitably 
and generally punish (increase the costs for) members who treat others 
inequitably... .Proposition III: When individuals find themselves partici­
pating in inequitable relationships, they become distressed. The more 
inequitable the relationship, the more distress individuals feel.... Propo­
sition IV: Individuals who discover they are in an inequitable relation­
ship attempt to eliminate their distress by restoring equity. The greater 
the inequity that exists, the more distress they feel, and the harder they 
try to restore equity. (Walster et al., 1976:2-6) 
The fourth proposition is followed by an elucidation of particular rele­
vance in the present context: "There are two ways that a participant can 
restore equity to an inequitable relationship: He can restore actual equity 
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to the relationship, or he can restore psychological equity7' (ibid., 6). The 
first is achieved by taking some appropriate action to restore the equity, 
for example, by retaliation or compensation. Psychological equity, on the 
other hand, is achieved by various mechanisms of rationalization, such as 
derogation of the victim, denial of responsibility for the act, or minimiza­
tion of the victim's suffering (Macaulay and Walster, 1971). 
The literature on these different theories has, as indicated, for the most 
part developed independently. Although the emphasis in the first two theo­
ries is somewhat different from that of equity theory—attribution and just-
world theories focus on the interpretations of behavior by third parties, 
while equity theory focuses on reactions to behavior by the harmdoer— 
there is nevertheless a clear connection between them.1 Both equity and the 
just-world theories hypothesize that the situation will be interpreted to 
reduce or to eliminate the injustice ("inequity") only where there is no 
possibility of actually remedying the situation,2 and that the "interpreta­
tions" frequently involve attributions. Moreover, all three theories provide 
explanations of how the victim's character or conduct may be devalued by 
the parties concerned.3 
Research in these areas may be of relevance to the present study in a 
number of ways. First, since the research investigates people's feelings 
about victimization and injustice, it will be directly relevant to the discus­
sion in chapter 5 on "subjective justice needs," where the needs and atti­
tudes of victims, as well as offenders and the public, are considered. It may 
also be helpful when considering how far various innovations in the crimi­
nal justice system, such as schemes for compensation and restitution, are 
likely to meet these needs. Further, since the research also investigates 
how decision makers react to victimization and apparent injustices, it is of 
relevance in the context of the review of prior research incorporated in 
chapter 2, insofar as it may indicate the nature of the decisions that are 
likely to be reached under the present system, if the theories are valid. 
However, since most of the studies in these areas are of an experimental 
nature, their usefulness in a discussion of the actual operation of the crimi­
nal justice system is limited. Nevertheless, it will be observed that some of 
the empirical (nonexperimental) studies of the criminal justice system 
referred to in this volume have used these theories as a framework for their 
research. Moreover, even the experimental studies may be helpful in the 
understanding of areas in which little "hard data" are available—in particu­
lar the functioning of juries, where the sample populations used in the 
studies are also likely to have a greater validity. 
Finally, it should be observed that both the theoretical and the experi­
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mental literature in this field is becoming increasingly sophisticated, and 
the generalized hypotheses offered formerly are being subjected to qualifi­
cations (see, e.g., Tornblom, 1992), some of which are referred to else­
where in this volume, hi particular, there is a need to integrate the above-
mentioned literature, which deals primarily with distributive justice, 
with the emergent literature on procedural justice considered in chapters 
5 and 8. 
Notes 
Introduction 
1. Additional microanalyses of particular jurisdictions will be referred to below. 
2. A bibliography issued in Japan in connection with the Fourth International 
Symposium of Victimology in 1982 listed some 950 authors in English in this field, 
many of whom had produced several publications. Lists of German and Japanese 
authors appeared separately. Other anthologies are referred to in the United States 
survey prepared for the 1985 Milan Congress (Victims of Crime, 1985:4). See also 
the literature reviewed below relating to victims and the criminal justice system. 
3. Some European surveys, which were developed considerably later than their 
American counterpart, have been more ambitious in this respect; see Hough and 
Mayhew (1983), Hough and Moxon (1985), Van Dijk et al. (1990), Van Dijk and 
Mayhew(1992). 
4. Cf. the assertion in the literature on crime surveys that "victimization is a 
rare event" (see below). 
5. A scientific, but not entirely successful, attempt to account for the appar­
ently increasing punitiveness of the American population in terms of these factors 
was made by Stinchcombe et al. (1980). 
6. The "law-and-order" issue was first placed on the national political agenda 
by presidential candidate Barry Goldwater in 1964 (Cronin et al., 1981). 
7. See Rock (1986:221). For some general reflections on the problems of "vic­
tim talk/' see Minow (1993). 
8. See Christie (1977). 
Chapter 1 
1. The more widely discussed proposals were considered by the President's 
Task Force on Victims of Crime (1982). The degree of implementation of the Task 
353 
354 Notes to Chapters 1-2 
Force's recommendations was considered in a special report ("Four Years Later") 
by the Office of Justice Programs (1986; see also NAAG/ABA, 1986). For surveys 
of victim-related legislation, see ABA (1981), Bureau of Justice Statistics (1984), 
and the Legislative Directories prepared by NOVA for the U.S. Department of 
Justice. 
2. For the convenience of the analysis, part 3 will not follow the fourfold 
classification presented here with absolute precision. Additional distinctions will 
be made between substantive and procedural remedies, between formal and infor­
mal procedures, and between novel and existing or historic remedies, such as civil 
suits and private prosecutions. Discussion of the latter category will be deferred to 
part 4. 
3. The ABA report specified here: "(1) a list of specific economic losses,- (2) 
identification of physical or psychological injuries and their seriousness; and (3) 
changes in the victim's work or family status resulting from the offense" (ABA, 
1981:46). See also sec. 103 of the Proposed Model Legislation (NAAG/ABA, 1986); 
and see generally below, chap. 8. 
4. Restitution orders are generally advocated as part of a noncustodial disposi­
tion. However, it is also sometimes suggested that prison earnings could be at­
tached for the victim's benefit. 
5. Cf. below, chap. 11. 
6. The ABA report refers to the person who performs this function as an "om­
budsman." However, the role of an ombudsman is generally to investigate com­
plaints in cases of alleged malfeasance (or nonfeasance), rather than acting routinely 
in all cases. 
7. Another form of civil proceeding that will not be considered in detail in the 
present study (but will be referred to briefly in chap. 12) is the administrative 
proceeding. In recent times the expansion of government regulations has given rise 
to new areas of infractions of a criminal or quasi-criminal nature in such fields as 
environmental protection and antitrust, as well as taxation. These infractions are 
frequently dealt with by administrative agencies. In some cases there may be spe­
cific personal or corporate victims, and their situation must be considered in the 
context of victim remedies. 
Chapter 2 
1. The term secondary victimization, however, has different meanings; see 
below, chap. 3. 
2. This approach is consistent with the analysis of the bureaucratic character 
of the criminal justice system performed by earlier writers such as Blumberg (1979) 
and Feeley (1979). 
3. A Canadian survey (Stuebing, 1984) found that for 94% of victims the only 
contact was with the police. 
4. This study was designed "to learn how practitioners use information about 
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victim harm in their decision making and what effect practitioners' action have on 
victims' perceptions of the criminal justice system" (Hernon and Forst, 1983:5). 
Interviews were conducted with 389 victims, 112 police officers, 101 prosecutors, 
and 48 judges at eight different locations in the United States, and their views were 
elicited regarding their typical decisions in hypothetical ("scenario") cases falling 
within five offense types. These were supplemented by a small number of inter­
views related to real cases. 
5. The figures cited here are based upon victims' estimates. The police esti­
mates were sometimes somewhat different, but not substantially so. 
6. However, these responses seem to relate primarily to the police evaluation 
of how the prosecutors will act, since the study notes that it is the prosecutors who 
actually do the screening. 
7. The dependent variable was "an ordinal variable with the categories of (1) 
reviewing expert only, (2) making a few telephone calls, and (3) conducting more 
extensive investigation" (Bynum et al., 1982:307). 
8. The most important variable was the victim's attitude (see below). The 
third important variable was the previous record of the offender. 
9. This was probably due to the lack of linearity. For while the zero-order 
correlation indicated that for unemployed victims there was a very low proba­
bility that an intensive investigation would follow the complaint, for "mar­
ginally employed" the probability was relatively high (see Bynum et al., 1982, 
table 3). 
10. In Hohenstein's study (1969) of police decision making with regard to juve­
niles, "the age and sex of both offender and victim were useless in the predictive 
typology" (149). 
11. "The probability of arrest is highest when the citizen adversaries have the 
most distant social relation to one another, that is, when they are strangers" (Black, 
1980:94—95). Oppenlander (1982) found a relatively high arrest rate in domestic 
dispute cases, but the absolute rate was low (9%), and the injuries were found to be 
more serious in such cases. 
12. See Smith (1983:2), citing a Vera Institute study attributing this approach 
mainly to judges and prosecutors, but to a lesser extent also to police officers. 
13. The numbers on which these percentages are based were small, owing to the 
many cases in which the complainant expressed no preference as to the arrest of the 
suspect. 
14. However, Smith and Klein (1984) found that this was true only of neighbor­
hoods with a relatively high socioeconomic status. 
15. The authors found that 16% of their sample received no information about 
the progress of their case, and a further 5% learned about it only as a result of 
inquiries they themselves initiated. In that study, victims and criminal justice 
personnel were asked "Who keeps the victims most informed?" While 51.4% of the 
police respondents selected the police, only 25% of the victims gave this response. 
Nevertheless, among the different categories of criminal justice personnel inter­
viewed, "the police responses came closest to corresponding to victim responses" 
(Hernon and Forst, 1983:32). 
16. Similarly, in a sample of cases involving nonstranger violence, "approxi­
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mately half of the victims who came to court (51%) reported that the prosecutor 
spoke with them" (Smith, 1983:33). 
17. The selection of the 10-day hospitalization criterion might have been appro­
priate for rape, where there is a reluctance to risk prosecution in the absence of a 
strong case, but too serious a criterion to serve as a cut-off point for other offenses. 
As noted above in the text, however, the police perceived the hospitalization crite­
rion as relevant to knife assaults too. 
18. The study was limited to cases of robbery, rape, and assault. The author 
surmised that "victim credibility is less important in cases slated for disposition in 
the lower courts, since most of these cases will be resolved through plea bargain­
ing" (Stanko, 1981-82:229). 
19. Cf. the conclusions reached by Heumann (1978) and Feeley (1979) that prose­
cution decision making, and in particular plea bargaining, is influenced by profes­
sional norms rather than overcrowded court dockets. 
20. The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice (1993:79) expressed concern at 
the lack of consideration for victims and other witnesses under the prevailing 
system, noting that "the victim's views may be insufficiently taken into ac­
count"; and a majority recommended abolition of the Bar's Code of Conduct in 
this respect. 
21. The weight given to the victim's wishes varied among prosecutors. Thus 
one district attorney "while expressing concern for the victim's feelings, stated that 
he does not honor a victim's request to prosecute vigorously in either serious or 
petty cases because he considers it his duty to exercise independent professional 
judgement on the merits of each case" (Hall, 1975:949). 
22. As to the relevance of defendant characteristics in this literature, see Field 
(1978). 
23. However, the authors noted that contacts with probation officers were 
about equal in number to those with judges. Contacts with both judges and proba­
tion officers may be expected to have increased with the introduction of victim-
impact statements; see below chap. 8. 
24. The concept of l'etat dangeieux was developed by the school of social de­
fense, an offshoot of positivism (cf. Ancel, 1965). 
25. See also chap. 6, below. 
26. However, there remains a question whether unforeseen harm, which is unre­
lated to the perpetrator's mental state, should be perceived as a component of 
offense seriousness; see Schulhofer (1974), Sebba (1980). 
27. See above, n. 4. 
28. The method of measurement here was somewhat unclear: "Ratings were 
based primarily on the judges' own in-court utterances and facial cues" (Denno and 
Cramer, 1976:220). 
29. This is a major departure from the English tradition whereby all prosecu­
tions were formally brought by private individuals; see Sebba (1982), Damaska 
(1985). 
30. This may change as certain official agencies are established specifically to 
assist the victim, the most notable example to date being the criminal justice 
compensation boards. 
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Chapter 3 
1. See also the discussion of whether the criminal justice system is a "zero-
sum game," whereby the victim can gain only at the expense of the defendant (see 
below, chap. 12). 
2. In the context of imagining a Rawlsian-type social contract (see chap. 6), 
Sterba (1980) has suggested that there are four interested parties whose views must 
be taken into consideration: criminals, victims, the public, and law enforcement 
personnel. However, while practical politics may render this a prudent policy, it 
seems undesirable in principle to place a category having a vested interest in the 
status quo on the level of the three other categories referred to here. An optimal 
protection of the interests of these three categories may require a radical revision of 
the current law enforcement structure, which its a priori protection would prevent. 
For a modified version of the triadic approach, see Marx (1983). 
3. Thus, for example, supporters of "private" justice would tend to remove the 
public from the categorization of relevant parties (see below, chaps. 11 and 12). 
4. Popular definitions of criminal victimization, particularly regarding rape, 
frequently differ from the legal definitions,- see Klemmack and Klemmack (1976), 
Williams (1984). This, again, may be explained by the designation of victimization 
as a social construct; see LaFree (1989:66). 
5. A somewhat similar analysis is found in Greenberg et al. (1982). Cf. also the 
analysis of the development of civil legal disputes by Felstiner et al. (1980-81) as a 
three-stage process consisting of "naming," "blaming," and "claiming" (see below, 
chap. 12; see also Coates and Penrod, 1980-81). 
6. Cf. Hulsman (1985:12): "The most fundamental right of a victim is that his 
definition and his expressed needs are taken as a starting point for the consideration 
of an intervention in the public sphere." This concept should perhaps be extended to 
include a person who would perceive him- or herself as victim if supplied with 
elementary information. It might be argued that victim-oriented policies should 
seek, inter alia, to render victimized persons aware of their status. However, not all 
writers agree with this conflict-consciousness-raising approach: see below, chap. 11. 
7. The classification is derived from Sellin and Wolfgang (1978). The authors 
named category [a] "primary victimization," category (b) "secondary victimiza­
tion," and category (c) "tertiary victimization." The term secondary victimization, 
however, is used in at least two other senses. It may refer to the additional suffering 
inflicted on the victim by the law enforcement authorities or to the stress and 
inconvenience caused to the victim's support group. 
8. A further category to be excluded from the study will be the so-called vic­
timless crime, e.g., drug abuse, where the offender is the main victim. Wolfgang and 
Singer (1978:384) refer also to "mutual victimization." 
9. Similarly, Cannavale and Falcon (1976) found that 27% of a sample of 919 
witnesses had at one time been defendants, a finding which was "perhaps indicative 
of a 'community' of individuals who are periodically involved in criminal justice 
proceedings" (61). The "interchangeable roles of victim and victimizer" have re­
cently been reflected upon by Fattah (1994). 
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10. A somewhat extreme position was adopted in the research conducted by 
Flanagan et al. (1985), wherein a "victimization experience" was defined as person­
ally knowing someone in the neighborhood who was victimized. 
11. However, some legislation, not confined to homicide cases, grants certain 
rights to "family members"; see the Massachusetts statute cited in Waller (1988:63). 
12. However, the burden of these schemes is increasingly being placed on offend­
ers; see below, chap. 9. 
13. However, there may be an interaction between so-called abstract and empiri­
cal analysis; see below, chap. 6. 
Chapter 4 
1. Other classifications may be found in Knudten et al. (1976), Reiff (1979), 
Salasin (1981), Waller (1982), Canadian Federal-Provincial Task Force (1983), and 
Smith etal. (1984). 
2. The concepts are not identical, since Symonds uses the term secondary 
injury in a psychoanalytical sense, in which the rejection seems to be felt by the 
victim at rather a low level of consciousness, whereas the other literature referred 
to here relates to more conscious and specific tribulations suffered by the victim. 
3. However, in the same author's study of the impact of burglary it was found 
that "the emotional reactions experienced by a person immediately after victimiza­
tion are not related to immediate retributive feelings" (Waller and Okihiro, 1978:39). 
4. For victims of armed robbery, Baril and Morissette (1985) found that loss of 
confidence in other people and increased fear of another robbery were the most 
common effects, experienced by more than 70% of victims. 
5. There could have been an element of self-selection here. Victims made 
themselves known to the researchers by answering advertisements. It is possible 
that there were victims who did not come forward as they had erased the experience 
from their memories (cf. Silver et al., 1983:84). 
6. However, 31% of victims indicated a motivation to move, as compared with 
only 18% of nonvictims. 
7. "Our survey question does not ever ask about 'crime' at all, but rather about 
feelings of safety while walking alone in the nearby community" (Skogan and 
Maxfield, 1981:55). 
8. For a discussion of the alternative meanings of "need" in this context, see 
Mawby (1988:131-33). 
Chapter 5 
1. Some of the problems of attitudinal research pertinent to criminal justice 
were discussed by Hogarth (1971), in the course of his research on the attitudes of 
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magistrates. A considerable part of this research was devoted to the development of 
appropriate instruments for this purpose. 
2. Thus Hogarth's study of Canadian magistrates incorporated both a survey of 
their attitudes and an analysis of their decisions (Hogarth, 1971). Green (1961), on 
the other hand, executed the reverse of the "jump" referred to here, in drawing 
conclusions about judicial attitudes on the basis of their decisions. 
3. Reference here is to the empirical determination of "fundamental concepts" 
held by the relevant populations with which this study is concerned, rather than to 
the "fundamental principles" of justice, derived from abstract analysis, which will 
be discussed in the next chapter. 
4. The terminology is problematic, because the currently popular just-deserts 
theory of punishment (von Hirsch, 1976) is backward looking but claims to be 
nonpunitive (in the first sense). 
5. They were also more likely to favor civil liberties. However, both these 
findings may derive from the fact that the populations with relatively high probabil­
ity of being victims also have a relatively high probability of being offenders; see 
chap. 3. 
6. For African Americans, too, the assaultive categories were associated with 
higher percentages of poor ratings (Garofalo, 1977a:97). 
7. A sample of rape victims in Birmingham was added in order to augment the 
size of the sample for this offense. 
8. Dissatisfaction was expressed by only 13% of the respondents when the 
police arrived within 10 minutes of being called, rising to 78% where the police 
took over 30 minutes. "Although people's expectations obviously vary, it would 
appear that victims expected the police to arrive in about five to ten minutes" 
(Shapland et al., 1985:48). 
9. However, the findings of Hagan, discussed below, cast some doubt upon this 
hypothesis. 
10. Mean satisfaction scores (graded on a 1 to 5 scale, where 1 = "very satisfied" 
and 5 = "very unsatisfied") increased from 1.97 for Coventry and 1.77 for Northamp­
ton after the first contact, to 2.60 and 2.37, respectively, after the final interviews. 
11. The 1982 British Crime Survey found that 82% of one of the subsamples had 
had contact with the police during the 18 months before the survey (Maxfield, 
1984). 
12. Connick and Davis (1981: table 6) reported on a small New York study with 
equally high ratings. 
13. If the "good" ratings are combined with the "excellent," there were no 
substantial differences between police and district attorneys in respect of their 
ratings for effort and courteousness, but district attorneys remained lower in terms 
of effectiveness (61% as compared with 70% for the police). 
14. However, Smith found that the frequency of conversation between victim 
and prosecutor did not in itself affect the degree of satisfaction. The author con­
cluded that there was an additional precondition for this relationship, namely, that 
"the victim believed these conversations reflected an interest in their case" (Smith, 
1983:35). 
15. The figure is obtained by subtracting from the total (100%) the 36% who 
agreed that prosecutors did not care about the victim, and the 8% "don't know's." 
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16. Victims did not blame the defense attorney, for the latter was simply per­
ceived to be fulfilling his function (Shapland et al.; 1985:143). 
17. This paucity of studies was reflected in a review of previous research in this 
area (Flanagan et al., 1985:68-70). 
18. The number responding was a little less than the total responding "some­
times unfair" or "often unfair" to the first question, but there is no indication 
whether the question was directed exclusively at these groups or whether it was 
also put to those whose response was "usually fair." 
19. A third possibility might be the view that the courts were inconsistent but 
not discriminatory, merely haphazard and unpredictable. 
20. Qualities such as leniency and fairness are used here as a measure of atti­
tudes toward the courts. Some studies, however, treat these qualities as indepen­
dent variables which are hypothesized as factors likely to influence "support for the 
courts/' the latter being measured by other indicators; see Fagan (1981) and the 
literature reviewed therein. 
21. The authors' view that the level of punitiveness of the courts had decreased 
was based on a crude measure, comparing average time served in prisons with 
average arrest rates. Apart from the intrinsic limitations of this measure, it would 
be necessary for a breakdown analysis by areas to support the hypothesis cited. 
22. Account must be taken here of the methodological limitations of this study, 
in particular in relation to the dependent variable (see above). 
23. Flanagan et al. (1985:76) also favor the second of the two possible explana­
tions for the more critical attitudes held by victims, namely, that they are the result 
of contacts with the system. However, the measure adopted in their study as an 
indicator of "victimization experience" included personally knowing someone in 
the neighborhood who was victimized, an "experience" that would not necessarily 
result in contact with the criminal justice system. 
24. In effect the percentage was lower still; for 17 victims "felt unable to give a 
rating, mainly because they had never been informed of the progress of their case 
through the courts and so had little idea of what the court had actually done" 
(Smith, 1983:157). 
25. In the course of a survey conducted in different locations in Brevard County, 
Florida, the authors found that "almost one-third of the respondents in the cities 
were unhappy with the results of complaint processing, although in Melbourne 
about two-thirds were dissatisfied." 
26. Hagan also found that victims expressed very positive views about the fair­
ness of the court procedures; but the significance of this finding may be suspect in 
the present context, since the question seems to have addressed the court's per­
ceived fairness in relation to the defendant (Hagan, 1980:117). 
27. "Picture the difference between victims who sat for brief moments in small 
Minneapolis courtrooms, carpeted on the floor and walls for improved acoustics, in 
which cases are considered for several minutes, as opposed to Los Angeles victims 
who sat for long periods in large courtrooms where numerous prosecutors and 
defense attorneys mingled in front of the rail while two or more cases were being 
presented and considered in rapid succession. Is it any wonder that Minneapolis 
victims more frequently stated that they understood the proceedings and were 
satisfied with their overall treatment?" (Smith, 1983:92). 
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28. Cf. also the findings of three Canadian studies: Brillon (1983); Stuebing 
(1984:19-21), and Baril (1984). Baril found that her sample frequently described the 
court procedure in theatrical terms, particularly in the sense that the "show" was 
scripted in advance. 
29. "It may be that complainants were lenient in their ratings because they 
tended to blame 'the system' for lack of responsiveness rather than individual 
officials" (Davis, Russell, and Kunreuther, 1980:65). In Hagan's study procedures 
were rated more favorably than judges; but see n. 26 above. 
30. The first figure refers to the Coventry sample, the second to Northampton. 
In a separate question dealing with prison sentences, the numbers advocating a 
greater use of prison were smaller (Shapland et al., 1981:238). 
31. Similarly, Hagan (1982) in his Canadian study found that attendance in 
court rendered the victim less likely to perceive the sentence as too light, but 
knowledge of the disposition increased the probability that it would be regarded as 
too lenient. 
32. The outcomes sought by the sample respondents appear in table 2.5 of their 
report. Dissatisfaction with the ultimate outcome was expressed by 43% of the 
sample (Davis, Russell, and Kunreuther, 1980:65). 
33. Thus some studies have recorded "diffuse support" for the courts (Flanagan 
etal., 1985:67-68). 
34. The difference between the positive ratings of police and judges was reduced 
from approximately 30 percentage points before the court hearing to 20 percentage 
points after the hearing. Perceptions of prosecutors and defense attorneys also im­
proved slightly. But Kelly (1982) found that the perception of police tended to 
improve as a result of the case, while that of the courts (alternatively designated 
"prosecutors") tended to decline. However, in Kelly's study (a) the sample was 
confined to rape victims, (b) the changes in perception were attributed retrospec­
tively, and (c) the reference point for the changes seems to have been before the 
offense took place rather than before the court hearings, as in Hagan's study. 
35. On the "reactive" character of law enforcement, see chap. 2 above. How­
ever, the extent to which witness noncooperation will handicap the prosecution's 
ability to secure a conviction has been questioned (Davis, 1983). 
36. See also the results of the 1989 International Crime Survey (Van Dijk et al., 
1990:69); and cf. Kidd and Chayet (1984). 
37. The importance of social influence on victim decision making has recently 
been analyzed by Greenberg and Ruback (1992). 
38. However, "belief that courts would punish" did not contribute, while for 
"belief that the police would catch the person," the correlation was in the wrong 
direction. 
39. The prosecutors, however, regarded a much higher percentage of the wit­
nesses as uncooperative; see Cannavale and Falcon (1976:24-26). The reasons for 
the discrepancy are considered in chapter 6 of that study. 
40. These three offenses were "an offense similar to the present one," a bur­
glary, and an aggravated assault (Shapland et al., 1981:250-51). The fourth offense— 
being punched at a party—was considered worthy of reporting to the police by less 
than one-half of the sample. 
41. Friedman et al. (1982:206). Of those who perceived the police as having gone 
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out of their way, 62% expressed the belief that people were "willing to help more/' 
as compared with only 33% of those who perceived the police as "not helpful." 
However, these categories were rather small; most of the sample thought the police 
"just did their job" (of these, 51% believed people were "willing to help more"), and 
the tendency noted was significant only at the 0.1 level. 
42. However, Stinchcombe et al. (1980) concluded that the steep increase in 
dissatisfaction with the leniency of the courts could not be explained in terms of 
increased fear of crime. 
43. Men were more punitive than women, and African Americans more than 
whites. Income, too, affected the penalty selected, the highest and lowest income 
brackets being more punitive than the middle range,- but this variation was found to 
interact with the sex and race variables; see Blumstein and Cohen (1980). 
44. However, Wolfgang et al. (1985:74-75) found that victims attributed higher 
seriousness scores to offenses as compared with nonvictims. But Chandler and 
Kassebaum (1979), in a nonrepresentative survey conducted in Hawaii, found that 
victimized respondents were less punitive than nonvictimized respondents. Cf. 
also the findings of Stinchcombe et al. (1980) referred to earlier; and see Sessar 
(1984). 
45. Thus, 30% agreed that "only poor people get arrested and sent to prison," 
and 67% that "if you have a lot of money and get caught committing a crime, you 
will probably get off free" (Cannavale and Falcon, 1976:65-66). Moreover, 82% 
agreed that "there would be less crime if there were not so much poverty and 
prejudice in our society." On the other hand, 97% of the sample agreed that "citi­
zens should take more interest in what can be done to control crime in our society." 
46. Davis, Russell, and Kunreuther (1980: table 2.5). The distribution of "out­
comes sought" differed significantly between complainants who were previously 
acquainted with the offender and strangers. 
47. There was also considerable ambivalence regarding the earlier decision to 
press charges. Only 41% were unequivocally in favor. The main reasons given in 
favor of pressing charges were protection of others, outrage, and punishment. The 
main reasons against were avoiding the ordeal of court, fear of revenge, and avoiding 
sending the defendant to jail. 
48. Responses were differentiated according to the nature of the offense described 
(theft or assault) and the victimization experience of the respondent. Victims were 
somewhat more punitive than nonvictims for assault (21.8% as compared with 
16.6%) and slightly less punitive for theft (6.9% as compared with 8.9%). 
49. There is an analogy here with the "neutralization techniques" of delin­
quents as hypothesized by Sykes and Matza (see Walster et al., 1976:9). 
50. There is an analogy here to the framework of analysis adopted in the present 
study, in which all parties—victims, offenders, and the public—are attributed with 
both coping needs and subjective justice needs. The nature of these needs, however, 
is recognized as being different for the different parties. 
51. A more detailed social psychological analysis of retribution appears in the 
same volume as Hogan and Emler's essay (Miller and Vidmar, 1981); this analysis, 
however, makes no comparison with equity and restitutional theories but only 
with the behaviorist orientations in punishment. 
52. For the purposes of the present discussion these terms are used interchange­
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ably. Nevertheless, there is generally a difference of emphasis between them, "retal­
iation" connoting a somewhat more physical and immediate reaction on the part of 
the injured party, "retribution" implying a more abstract reaction, not necessarily 
undertaken by the same individual. 
53. Cf. the definition of harmdoei as "one who commits an act which causes his 
partner's relative outcome to fall short of his own" (Walster et al., 1976:8). While 
the term implies a value judgment, the definition is in fact morally neutral. 
54. It appears that some of this research deals with the provision of aid on an 
international level. 
55. De Carufel (1981:456, table 2). However, where the compensating body was 
seen to have been responsible for the initial inequity, the suggestion of reciproca­
tion for the subsequent "compensation" lowered the levels of satisfaction and per­
ceived fairness. 
Chapter 6 
1. "The human rights demanded and protected within any given community 
are a function of many cultural and environmental variables unique to that commu­
nity" (McDougal et al., 1980:71). 
2. At the same time, 'principles of natural justice" have been widely applied 
by common-law courts when reviewing administrative and quasi-judicial func­
tions; see, e.g., de Smith (1980). 
3. These are life, knowledge, play, aesthetic experience, sociability, practical 
reasonableness, and religion (Finnis, 1980:86-90). Cf. Rawls's list of "social pri­
mary goods": liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of self-
respect (Rawls, 1971:303). 
4. Another leading critic of the positivist approach is Ronald Dworkin, who 
has laid emphasis on the primacy of individual rights, thereby echoing the natural-
rights concept of the natural lawyers. "Individuals have rights when, for some 
reason, a collective goal is not a sufficient justification for imposing some loss or 
injury upon them" (Dworkin, 1977:xi). The elevated nature of these rights in Dwor-
kin's view is clear from their derivation from extralegal sources, in particular from 
moral and political philosophy (see esp. ibid., chap. 4). 
5. See Rawls (1971): 
First Principle. 
Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of 
equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all. 
Second Principle. 
Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) to 
the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings princi­
ple, and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair 
equality of opportunity. (302) 
6. See Lloyd and Freeman (1985: chap. 11). 
7. The authors found that this theory complied with three desiderata that 
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should characterize the "target" of a criminal justice system: (1) that it be rela­
tively uncontroversial, (2) that it should generate a stable allocation of accepted 
rights, and (3) that it should provide a "satiable goal" (Braithwaite and Pettit, 
1990: chap. 4). 
8. See Braithwaite and Pettit (1990): 
A person enjoys full dominion, we say, if and only if: 
1. she enjoys no less a prospect of liberty than is available to other citizens. 
2. it is common knowledge among citizens that this condition obtains, so that she 
and nearly everyone else knows that she enjoys the prospect mentioned, she and 
nearly everyone else knows that the others generally know this too, and so on. 
3. she enjoys no less a prospect of liberty than the best that is compatible with the 
same prospect for all citizens. (64-65) 
9. The term positivism itself is a source of confusion. Legal positivism is 
generally seen to have originated with Bentham and Austin in the early nineteenth 
century. Social scientists, however, reserve the term positivism for the empirical 
school, inventors of the discipline of sociology, founded by Auguste Comte and his 
contemporaries later in that century. Further, penal philosophy tends to identify 
Bentham (with Beccaria) as a leader of the classical school, against which the positiv­
ists rebelled. But see Mannheim (1973:24). 
10. However, it should be noted that the positivist school of the social (and 
natural) sciences was decidedly deterministic in its attitude to social change. 
11. Thus the XII Tables in fact specified the talionic penalty only where the two 
parties could not reach agreement (Jolowicz, 1939:174). The contemporary differen­
tiation between civil and criminal sanctions was less clear at that time. 
12. One may cite here Kant's well-known dictum that "even if civil society 
were to dissolve with the full agreement of all its members . .  . the last murderer 
still confined to prison would first have to be executed in order that everybody 
received what his deeds deserved" (cited in Kaufmann, 1977:223). 
13. In A Theory of Justice Rawls is concerned with the principles of distributive 
rather than retributive justice. However, Sterba (1980: chap. 3) has applied these 
principles to retributive justice and has found that they result in a deterrence 
principle of punishment, coupled with retributive principles of responsibility and 
due process principles of procedure. 
14. On the almost insuperable problems involved in determining this equiva-
lence—perceived by many as the Achilles' heel of the retributivist approach—see 
Pincoffs (1977). See also below, chap. 7. 
15. See above, n. 4. 
16. Cf. Barnett's concept of "punitive restitution" (Barnett, 1977:288). 
17. Marc Ancel, one of the leading advocates of this philosophy, insisted that 
"social defense is not a positivist doctrine" but "an indirect consequence, twice 
removed so to speak, of that doctrine" (Ancel, 1965:46). 
18. Thus "prevention" may justify pre-delictual measures. Indeed, the extreme 
wing of the social defense school identified with Gramatica would adopt interven­
tionist policies, uninhibited by the formal norms of the criminal law—including 
the notion of responsibility. This view was rejected by the "new social defense" 
(Ancel, 1965:120-22). 
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19. Miller (1976:48) finds that Rawls's two principles of justice cannot be easily 
reconciled with these three main objectives of social justice, since Rawls's princi­
ples are not "strictly distributive." 
20. Deutsch (1975:144) states, however, that while equity usually means "to 
each according to his contribution," his neo-equity analysis leads to the formula 
"from each according to his ability, to each according to his need." This would seem 
to merge equity with a socialist or welfarist orientation, with which the need 
criterion is generally identified. 
21. However, constitutional principles are not necessarily absolute and may be 
subject to "balancing" (Berger, 1992; Stein, 1992). 
22. The implications of this in terms of the feasibility of adopting mediation 
procedures are not necessarily negative; see below. 
23. Aynes also found a basis for this duty in natural law and social contract 
theory, but expressed a preference for reliance upon the more explicit Fourteenth 
Amendment. See also below, on the support for this view emanating from the 
"republican theory." 
24. Under this doctrine, a person will only be permitted to argue a claim before 
the courts if he or she is acknowledged to have a material interest in the subject 
matter of the litigation. Victims have generally not had such an interest in the 
criminal process acknowledged; but see the recent amendment to the Texas Consti­
tution (art. 2, sec. 30(e)), conferring upon the victim standing to exercise his or her 
rights under the said amendment. 
25. The immunity granted to states under the Eleventh Amendment, was, in 
Aynes's view, implicitly revoked by the Fourteenth Amendment, insofar as required 
for the effective implementation of the latter. 
26. Conversely, designation of crime victims for favorable treatment might in 
certain circumstances be perceived as discriminatory; cf. the invocation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment in regard to policies of "affirmative action" (Mason et al., 
1983:615). 
27. However, some common-law jurisdictions have recognized a legal duty on 
the part of the police to protect victims in certain circumstances, the breach of 
which can give rise to an action in tort; see below, chap. 13. 
28. Cf. Willing (1982), who argued that "standing" to pursue the right to law 
enforcement should be granted only to states, and not individuals. 
29. Of course, in many cases the victim in the instant case will have a higher 
probability of being the future victim too. This is particularly true of domestic 
disputes. 
30. See, e.g., Jeffery (1969); and see chap. 12 in this study. Compare, however, 
the restitutionary approach of Barnett, referred to above. According to his view, the 
offender's debt is not to society but to the victim (Bamett, 1977:288). However, the 
author does not consider the constitutional aspects of the issue. 
31. The solution could of course be developed outside the criminal process in 
tort law; see n. 27, above. 
32. See also the "duty to obey the law" laid down in art. 33 of the American 
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (Brownlee, 1971:394), one of the few 
such documents to specify duties as well as rights. 
33. Cf. also art. 5 of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. 
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34. Some UN declarations purport to reformulate existing principles of interna­
tional law and are thus perceived as articulations of binding norms; others are mere 
exhortations to member states to adopt the principles specified therein (Asamoah, 
1966). 
35. This approach raises the problem of which section of the public would have 
to hold the view in question: the general public? victims? offenders? all of these? 
For while democracies attach value to majority opinions per se, one of the functions 
of a constitution is to protect minority interests. 
Chaptei 7 
1. See U.S. Sentencing Commission (1987:1.3-1.4). See also Singer (1979:95), 
who found many of the determinate sentencing provisions to be inconsistent with a 
desert approach. A more consistent attempt to incorporate a desert philosophy is 
found in the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, described by von Hirsch (1982) as a 
"landmark in this country's history of sentencing reform" (215). 
2. See, e.g., sec. 2A2.2 of the federal guidelines on the offense of assault, which 
specify the addition of two points for "bodily injury," four for "serious bodily in­
jury," and six for "permanent or life-threatening bodily injury" (U.S. Sentencing 
Commission, 1994:39). 
3. This component of seriousness was also recognized in the national study 
designed by Wolfgang and his colleagues to determine public perceptions of serious­
ness (Wolfgang et al., 1985), in which some variants of mens iea were incorporated 
into the offense definitions. 
4. The commentary on this section noted that "this adjustment applies to 
all offenses where the victim's vulnerability played any part in the defendant's 
decision to commit the offense" (U.S. Sentencing Commission, 1987:3.1). This 
emphasis on the decision rather than the outcome indicates that the main consid­
eration for the additional severity in this case was in fact culpability rather than 
harm. (A slight modification of the commentary since 1987 does not affect this 
analysis.) 
5. This may be distinguished from the victim's official status. There seems to 
be a consensus that it is legitimate to specify more severe penalties for injuries 
inflicted upon such persons as heads of state or police officers. 
6. Such discussions are reminiscent of the controversies regarding the imple­
mentation of the talionic principle in ancient law (Cohn, 1977). 
7. Moral overtones are evident in one of the earliest and most influential books 
which led to these developments, published by a Quaker group (American Friends' 
Service Committee, 1971); the tenacity of Andrew von Hirsch in his articulation 
and defense of the theory may also be pertinent in this context. 
8. "The more vulnerable or weaker the victim is viewed as compared to the 
offender, the greater the severity of the act even though the physical injury is stated 
in the stimulus as invariant." The type of victim upon whom a loss was inflicted 
(individual, institution, etc.) appeared to be of minimal significance (Wolfgang et al., 
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1985:30, 29). The same conclusion was drawn by another researcher in respect of 
the relative social status of offender and victim (White, 1975). 
9. See, e.g., Rossi et al. (1975). For a methodological critique of the analyses 
upon which this conclusion is based, see Miller and Vidmar (1981:164), who cite 
findings in the psychological literature which indicate the existence of differences 
based both on cultural and on personality characteristics. 
10. Since the response rate was only 24% (603 out of 2,500 households), the 
authors caution that the responses "may represent the views of those citizens most 
concerned about the problems of prison sentencing" (Blumstein and Cohen, 
1980:230). 
11. However, a few studies have been concerned with the relative severity of 
different sanctions, without relating these to specific offenses. See, e.g., Sebba 
(1978), Buchner (1979), Erickson and Gibbs (1979), Sebba and Nathan (1984). 
12. Hamilton and Rytina (1980), however, found "support for what appears to 
have been an underlying assumption of previous researchers, that assessments of 
crime seriousness have something to do with punishment judgments as well" (1140). 
13. Cf. Hogan and Emler (1981), who contrasted the equity model, with its em­
phasis on compensation, with retribution, which is the basis of just-deserts theory. 
Yet desert is clearly related to the second alternative of equity theory (where compen­
sation is not feasible), namely, retaliation. Naturally, the third alternative of restoring 
psychological equity would be quite inconsistent with the just-deserts model. 
14. The authors note that the experimental data on this point is inconclusive. 
15. These authors in fact found that certain variables related to the offender, 
such as race and sex, "accounted for very small proportions of the variation in either 
crime seriousness judgements or punishment assignments," suggesting "little incli­
nation among the respondents towards individualized punishment." They neverthe­
less cautioned that "a study explicitly designed to pit alternative versions of justice 
against one another could arrive at quite different outcomes" (Hamilton and 
Rytina, 1980:1121 n. 5). 
16. As noted in chap. 3, law enforcement personnel are not regarded as a sepa­
rate constituency in this study. However, insofar as reforms may be advocated 
within the structure of the present system, their support may be critical. 
17. This situation prevailed until relatively recently. The Canadian Law Reform 
Commission cited a survey (covering the period 1967-72) that found that restitu­
tion was ordered in only 6 out of 6,294 cases (Klein, 1978:388). 
18. Cf. below, chap. 9; for historical surveys of the use of restitution, see Jacob 
(1970), Laster (1970), Schafer (1970), Edelhertz et al. (1975), Hudson et al. (1980: 
chap. 1), and Gittler (1984). 
19. The claim that restitution serves various objectives of criminal justice is 
also made by legal writers who seek to emphasize the criminal rather than the civil 
character of restitution; see, e.g., Note (1984). 
20. A major contribution to this literature has derived from the "Minnesota 
School." Burt Galaway and Joe Hudson organized a series of symposia, a number of 
which resulted in publications; see Hudson and Galaway (1977), Galaway and Hud­
son (1978), Hudson and Galaway (1980). See also Hudson and Galaway (1975) for a 
reader incorporating some earlier "classics" in this area, and more recently Galaway 
and Hudson (1990). A notable contributor to the legal literature on this topic has been 
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Harland (esp. 1982); see also the earlier contribution of Edelhertz et al. (1975); and see 
the proposal for a "restitutionary court" [Victims of Crime, 1985:34). 
21. "Dimly perceivable, in the eyes of a few, is the possibility that many of the 
direct dollar costs of crime can be transferred from the taxpayer and the victim, to 
the offender" (Edelhertz et al., 1975:i). If dim in 1975, such perceptions are now 
floodlit! 
22. These will be considered below, in chap. 11. 
23. The authors distinguish between a "single project operating within a rela­
tively small geographical area" and a "more extensive program containing a diver­
sity of restitution projects" (Hudson et al., 1980:44, emphasis added). A further 12 
publications were classified as assessments of "opinions or attitudes about a restitu­
tion sanction" rather than evaluations. 
24. A similar conclusion on the part of the Canadian Law Reform Commission 
was questioned by Klein (1978:404). Moreover, the data collected by Smith et al. 
(1989) suggests that the level of restitution-order awards tends to be higher than 
indicated by the above figures. The average awards made by the courts in 1987 in 
the four areas studied were $349 (New York City), $416 (Minneapolis), $3,352 (Salt 
Lake City), and $860 (Montgomery, Ala.) (see Smith et al., 1989:81). The Salt Lake 
City figure was partly explained by "a few awards exceeding $20,000" (ibid., 80). 
Similarly, the awards made by federal courts may be higher still. The mean pay­
ment ordered in U.S. Sentencing Commission Guidelines cases in 1992 was 
$52,059, and the median $2,716, but these included both restitution awards and 
fines. Moreover, the character of federal crimes tends to differ from "street crimes" 
(Maguire et al., 1993:525). 
25. A variety of methods for estimating loss were identified in the 1974 Na­
tional Crime Survey data by Harland (1981:12). These included original cost, 
replacement cost, personal estimate of cash value, insurance report, and police 
estimate. The British Home Office provides guidelines to the criminal courts 
based on the tariff of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, which in turn is 
based upon the levels of damages awarded in civil cases (Moxon et al., 1992: 
appendix A). Weitekamp (1993) has suggested the employment of psychophysical 
scaling in determining award levels. 
26. See sec. 77(c) of the Penal Law, 1977 (as amended). For a similar provision in 
Scotland, see Joutsen (1987:237). 
27. See the Uniform Victims of Crime Act, sec. 404. 
28. It has been argued that "increased burdens of restitution may be the impetus 
for further crimes by the offender" (ABA, 1981:18). This would not apply, however, 
if restitution orders were used as a substitute for fines, or if payments were to come 
from prison earnings. 
29. There appears to be a discrepancy in the method of calculation in the two 
publications reporting this survey. 
30. The connection between these two factors—type of order and location in 
the process—is indicated in table 5.1 on p. 79 of this survey (Hudson et al., 1980), 
which reveals that of the four pretrial diversion projects included in this review, 
three involved both monetary restitution and community service, while one in­
volved only community service; i.e., none was restricted to monetary restitution 
alone. 
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31. Some English studies, however, noted the victim's satisfaction at a court 
decision to award restitution, apparently signifying official recognition of the wrong 
done to them (Villmow, 1984:11). 
32. But it is not clear whether restitution as a sole sanction was presented as a 
legitimate option. The report states that the respondents were "asked to identify a 
combination" (Hudson et al., 1980:187). 
33. This calculation is based on response categories 4 and 5. While these re­
sponses do not necessarily indicate support for restitution, such support is implicit. 
34. The satisfaction rate where community service was the sole order was 73%, 
i.e., between the rates for monetary restitution alone and monetary restitution 
combined with community service. 
35. In the 1974 National Crime Survey data reviewed by Harland (1981), it 
emerged that among the cases in which a theft loss was reported, more than one-
half of the victim's annual family income amounted to $10,000 or more. This was 
considerably in excess of the estimate for prisoners referred to above. 
36. For this purpose, 705 individuals were approached, 427 of whom responded. 
The geographical location and sampling method were not specified in the publica­
tion referred to here. 
37. The other objectives specified were retribution, deterrence, social defense, 
and "impact of imprisonment." These terms were not clarified in the publication 
referred to here. 
38. In Gandy's study, agreement with the restitutional aim did not apparently 
preclude agreement with other aims. 
39. A pilot study determined that for all offenses included in the questionnaire 
there was a reasonably high probability that respondents would select a custodial 
sentence. 
40. The samples numbered 1,200 each and were drawn from the electoral roll. 
Response rates were 80% for the experimental group and 76% for the control group. 
41. Restitution was more likely to be favored by respondents who were less 
fearful of crime. However, victimization experience, as noted above, did not gener­
ally affect support for restitution. Females were more supportive than males. 
42. Comprising 57 judges, 51 solicitors, and 142 practicing attorneys. The study 
is attributed to a master's thesis by R. S. Bluestein. 
43. See the related point made by Harland (above) with reference to the economic 
inequality between the parties. From another point of view, however, radicals might 
favor direct resolution of conflicts between offender and victim, eliminating the role 
of state, and this would encourage the use of restitution; see Thorvaldson (1983). 
44. However, the author also notes some problems—both conceptual and 
practical—in equating the two approaches. He also notes that "restoration of the 
moral order is not a commercial transaction" (McAnany, 1978:26). See also the 
view that "some people feel insulted and compromised by a suggestion that money 
from an offender will put right the hurt and distress they have experienced" 
(Reeves, 1985:53) and that "there is simply no amount of money that will rectify 
certain wrongs" (Pilon, 1978:352). 
45. Utah law allows for a restitution order for up to double the victim's pecuni­
ary damages (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1984:9). This type of restitution, as noted, 
raises theoretical objections in terms of equity theory. 
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46. Cf. the "mixed" theories referred to in chap. 6. However, it should be 
noted that while Cavadino and Dignan explicitly argue in favor of a mixed theory, 
Wright (1982:244, 262) purports to reject retribution but refers instead to "natural 
consequences." 
Chapter 8 
1. Sir Henry Maine's famous dictum about substantive law being "secreted in 
the interstices of procedure" is often cited in this respect. However, it is difficult to 
make a clear-cut differentiation between substantive law and procedure; see, e.g., 
Paton (1951: chap. 23). The nature of penal sanctions is clearly a substantive topic, 
yet it is frequently dealt with in the context of procedural analyses of the court's 
function. 
2. The degrees of participation have not generally been recognized by the rele­
vant policy documents; see, e.g., the somewhat vague and imprecise presentation of 
this concept by the National Conference of the Judiciary (1983:10). 
3. Under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1987 the emotive character of the 
terminology was modified; the word "harm" was replaced by "impact," "victim" 
by "individual" (Hellerstein, 1989:405). 
4. See Bureau of Justice Statistics (1984:12). Restitution was not specified as an 
objective by the American Bar Association (ABA, 1981). The Victim and Witness 
Protection Act, 1982, amended the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure so that the 
presentence report would include information on victim harm and—in a separate 
subsection—"other information that may aid the court in sentencing, including the 
restitution needs of any victim of the offense." Thus, the requirement of the descrip­
tion of victim harm is not directly linked to the requirement of restitution needs. 
5. See Hudson (1984:53), Henley et al. (1994), and the analysis in Hall (1991: 
241-43); but see McCleod (n.d.). 
6. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 245-46 (1949). Cf. the stricter 
approach emerging in Britain in this respect (Ashworth, 1993:507). See also the 
discussion in the previous chapter on the application of due process to restitution 
orders. 
7. Weigend defines the victim advocate as a "friend in court" whose role is "to 
inform the victim about the criminal process and to represent his interests vis a vis 
law enforcement and defense personnel" (Weigend, 1986:166). 
8. In legal analysis, a party with "standing" before the court may be repre­
sented by a lawyer. This is not regarded as "vicarious" participation, since no­
tionally it is the party who is participating in the proceeding rather than the lawyer. 
From a social science perspective, however, the distinction between personal and 
vicarious participation is important. The legal approach will be adopted only in 
chap. 12, where the analysis is more jurisprudential. 
9. However, the responsible official is also expected to assist the victim in 
contacting agencies which provide services and relief, as well as arranging for protec­
tion from suspects; see sec. 503(c)(l)(D) and (c)(2). 
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10. The operational part of the formulation here laid emphasis on the informa­
tional aspect of advocacy, and as noted, this, together with the protection aspect, set 
the tone in the subsequent federal legislation. 
11. The usefulness of lawyers to battered wives has been emphasized in a study 
conducted by Bowker (1984). This study is concerned with multifaceted legal ser­
vices, however, and not specifically criminal prosecutions. 
12. However, it seems that the Nebenklage procedure is used by a cross-section 
of the population. In the data reported by Schulz (1982), at least 39% of the 
Nebenklager were workers. 
13. The comparison may have been confounded by differences between the 
samples, owing to the selection procedure adopted among the experimental sample 
(see above). Those among the experimental sample for whom no victim-impact 
statements were prepared appeared to have been significantly less satisfied on two 
of these measures. 
14. This too, however, might reflect an alteration of the "existing exchange 
relationships" (Davis, Tichane, and Connick, 1980:24) and thus bring some practi­
cal benefits to the victim. This is indicated indirectly by the dissatisfaction ex­
pressed by the defense attorneys with the role of the victim's representatives, who 
were sometimes an obstacle in concluding a negotiated outcome (ibid., p. £8). 
15. Thibaut and Walker (1975:84). An earlier experiment conducted by Thibaut 
and Gruder in 1969 found that "in negotiation research involving bargaining be­
tween dyads composed of spokesmen and constituents . .  . constituents who are not 
able to bargain directly with the opposing dyad wish to occupy the more active 
spokesman's role, whereas most spokesmen are unwilling to change roles with 
their constituents" (ibid). See also the reservations regarding the significance of this 
research by Hayden and Anderson (1979). 
16. A description of victim advocacy in the context of sexual assault offers a 
psychoanalytical explanation for the thesis that the advocate's role should be lim­
ited: "The victim must control the situation. The victim's self-esteem is at stake. 
To take decision-making power away from the victims places them in a situation 
similar to that of the attack, a time when control was taken from them" (Spaulding, 
1980:199). The idea that the victim rather than the advocate should play the domi­
nant role seems to be reflected in German law. A German Constitutional Court 
decision of 1974 accorded witnesses, including victims, "the right to legal assis­
tance of his own choosing and the right to dismiss the counsel he has chosen from 
the trial" (Ercman, 1985). 
17. See Buchner et al. (1983). Such a relationship, however, was not found in the 
first experiment (Kerstetter and Heinz, 1979). 
18. In both experiments, victim and defendant were invited, as well as prosecu­
tor, defense attorney, and judge. In the Dade County experiment, police officers, 
too, were invited. 
19. In the earlier project, 87% of the victims present made at least one contribu­
tion, but only 25% made five or more (Heinz and Kerstetter, 1980:175). In the later 
project, victims, when present, spoke for about 9%-10% of the time (Buchner et al., 
1983:21-32). 
20. This included the effect on the chances of a settlement as opposed to a trial 
(see chap. 7). Comparisons in this study were complicated by the fact that the 
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research was designed to compare the experimental and the regular plea-bargaining 
procedures, and also conference and nonconference cases. 
21. There was some evidence of more favorable defendant attitudes in the ex­
perimental groups, but there was more variation within groups than between 
groups (Kerstetter and Heinz, 1979:120). 
Chapter 9 
1. The title given to one analysis of this development, "The Diffusion of Vic­
tim Compensation Laws" (see Doerner, 1979; Doerner and Silverman, 1980), con­
jures up the memory of the sex psychopath laws, the precipitous and irrational 
adoption of which were so perceptively analyzed by Sutherland (1950) in an article 
with a similar title. In fact, however, the authors seem to have been influenced by a 
concept borrowed from the study of political innovation (Doerner, 1979:121-24). 
Closer to the Sutherland approach is the analysis of Miers (1978, 1983). 
2. McGillis and Smith (1983:3Iff.). In 1978 bills were passed by both the Sen­
ate and the House of Representatives, but the compromise bill adopted by the 
conference committee was rejected by the House (ibid., 32). 
3. See, e.g., Lamborn (1971, 1973a, 1973b), Edelhertz and Geis (1974), Drapkin 
and Viano (1974-75), Miers (1978, 1990), Meiners (1978), American Bar Association 
(1981), Merrill (1981), and Rich and Stenzel (1980). 
4. See Carrow (1980a), Ramker and Meagher (1982), McGillis and Smith (1983), 
McCormack (1991), Parent et al. (1992), Greer (1994). 
5. See also the studies reviewed therein (Elias, 1983b:34-38); and see Doerner 
and Lab (1980), Shapland et al. (1985), Villmow (1986), Newbum (1988). 
6. In the case of New Mexico, such a provision was designed to exclude claims 
by victims of the prison riots in 1980. 
7. Despite the fact that subrogation claims may be brought against insurance 
companies as well as offenders, they amount to less than 1% of total program 
revenues (Parent et al., 1992:30). 
8. To the figure of $400 million, "Meiners added 10 percent for administrative 
costs, raising the total to $440 million. Meiners then adjusted this to $500 million 
to account for an increase in the crime rate and an increase in hospitalization costs. 
Meiners then doubled the $500 million to account for what he called the 'subsidy 
effect' " (Austern, 1980). The "subsidy effect" is a reflection of the increase in state 
expenditure that would result from the grant of a federal subsidy. 
9. According to the Home Office (1993:2), the British Compensation Board 
pays out approximately 150 million pounds sterling per annum, for a population a 
quarter of the size; but in their estimate the total paid out by the United States in 
1991 was somewhat higher than the British equivalent. 
10. There is no clear relationship between relative administration costs and 
population size. New York had the second highest relative expenditure on adminis­
tration costs (25.6%), while Texas had the second lowest (5.1%). 
11. McGillis and Smith (1983:40). This assessment was put forward by Gerhard 
Mueller in 1965. 
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12. "Many of those supporting, and even some of those sponsoring, compensa­
tion schemes, later voted against the appropriations to fund the programs, or for 
extremely meager funding and very extensive and restrictive eligibility require­
ments" (Elias, 1983:214). 
13. A Texas survey found that respondents' first choice was for a compensation 
fund supported by fines paid by offenders. This applied both to respondents who had 
been victimized and to those who had not (St. Louis, 1976:27). 
14. See the references cited in n. 3 above. See also Chappell and Sutton (1974), 
Brooks (1976), Carrow (1980a), Elias (1983b:24-26). 
15. This would seem to lead to the conclusion that public compensation 
schemes should be adopted, but with a high minimum eligibility requirement—to 
cater for "costly" tragedies only. 
16. However, it may be recalled that Meiners himself believed that the pro­
grams would result in enormous public costs, benefiting not merely victims but 
also bureaucracies and lawyers. 
17. This rationale may have influenced the establishment of compensation for 
"Good Samaritans." Indeed, the logic of this recognition might lead to the bestow­
ing of additional rewards for such citizens, rather than merely compensating them 
for their loss. 
18. This being a needs-oriented approach, some reliance on means-testing is 
inevitable under their scheme (Harris et al., 1984:338). 
19. For different views on this, see Thorvaldson and Krasnick (1980) and Mc-
Gillis and Smith (1983:121). 
20. Justice O'Connor "listed numerous authors from St. Augustine to Jesse 
Jackson whose works would be covered by such a statute" (50 CrL 2019). 
Chapter 10 
1. Early developments are reviewed in Newton (19 76b), Dussich (1981), Mawby 
and Gill (1987), and Roberts (1990). 
2. The need for the last five stages only arises where law enforcement agencies 
have succeeded in apprehending and prosecuting the offender. The NOVA table 
classifying their eight stages labels them as "victim rights" or "victim and witness 
rights," but it is clear from the separate sevenfold classification of victim rights (see 
below) that the above classification is essentially a classification of services rather 
than rights. 
3. "(1) Assist every victim who reports a crime, whether or not an arrest is 
made . .  . (2) Respond to the scene of the crime to make crisis counselling avail­
able . .  . (3) Provide 24-hour telephone hotline service to victims and witnesses for 
assistance, particularly if threats or intimidation occur. .  . (4) Make emergency 
monetary aid available to help needy victims make their homes secure, replace 
such things as glasses and hearing aids, and buy food and other necessities . .  . (5) 
Refer victims to appropriate social service and victim compensation programs and 
assist in filling out forms for compensation... (6) Educate the public about the 
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operation of the criminal justice system and the way it treats victims . .  . (7) Assist 
in prompt return of victim's property... (8) Notify the victim of progress of the 
investigation, the defendant's arrest, subsequent bail determination and status of 
the case as it proceeds through the system . .  . (9) Assist victims in making appropri­
ate input on the following: bail determinations, continuances, plea bargaining, 
dismissals, sentencing, restitution and parole hearings . .  . (10) Consult with vic­
tims and witnesses to facilitate the setting of convenient hearing dates . .  . (11) 
Implement a victim/witness on-call system . .  . (12) Intercede with the employers 
or creditors of victims and witnesses . .  . (13) Assist the elderly and handicapped in 
arranging transportation to and from court . . . (14) Provide a translator service . .  . 
(15) Coordinate efforts to ensure that victims have a secure place to wait before 
testifying . .  . (16) Provide counselling or companionship during court appearances 
when appropriate" (President's Task Force, 1982:121-25). 
4. Victims of Crime Act of 1984, sec. 1404 (d)(2) and (4). "Services to victims of 
federal crime" are defined much more widely, to include training of law enforce­
ment personnel in the delivery of services, dissemination of information regarding 
services, and the payment of salaries to victim service personnel. 
5. Cf. also the somewhat similar differentiation by Roberts (1990) between 
"victim service programs," which emphasize crisis counseling, and victim/witness-
assistance programs, which have endeavored to "alleviate the stress and trauma of 
victims and witnesses who testified in court" (30-32). Cf. also the typologies re­
ferred to in Cronin and Bourque (1980:25). 
6. The INSLAW study (Hernon and Forst, 1984) referred to in chap. 2 also 
includes some useful information on some aspects of the content of victim assis­
tance, such as the number of contacts with personnel and the topics discussed. 
7. Thus Cronin and Bourque (1980) found that "on-site observation of operat­
ing projects and field data collection, while extremely useful in detailing project 
process, yielded little evidence on outcome and impacts. On-site experience did, 
however, sensitize us to methodological weaknesses in the existing studies and 
provided some strong hunches about the likelihood of discovering 'success' on 
various measures" (89). 
8. It may be that the "control group" might have been the least needful a priori 
(see above). 
9. The Victims of Crime Act of 1984 allocates funding priority for "assistance 
to victims of sexual assault, spousal abuse, or child abuse" (sec. 1404 (a)(2)(A)). It is 
possible, however, that in contradiction with the stereotypes, potential candidates 
for victim assistance may often be young males (Shapland et al., 1984:223), who 
suffer the highest rates of victimization. 
10. The rationale of the classification is not entirely clear. The "right to coun­
sel" includes some rights that do not appear to involve any counsel or counseling, 
even in the broad sense of that term used by NOVA in this context; and "the right to 
participate in the criminal justice process" would seem to belong instead to right 
no. 7, "due process." 
11. The state of Oklahoma took a middle path. Seven separate bills dealing with 
different victim-related measures were proposed simultaneously and were known 
collectively as the Victim's Bill of Rights. Five of these were adopted (see Turpen, 
1981). 
 375 Notes to Chapters 10-11
12. See also sec. 4 of the UN Draft Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice, 
which declares that "victims should be treated with compassion and respect for 
their dignity." Such expressions, which are now incorporated in some of the victim-
oriented constitutional amendments (see, e.g., the amendments adopted in Texas in 
1989 and in Arizona in 1990), appear to have originated in the earlier NOVA pro­
posal referred to above. 
13. Under the heading "Why Victim Rights?" is the following: "Recognition of 
the rights of victims and witnesses to be free from needless harm is the recogni­
tion of the human right to compassion, dignity, and justice" (NOVA, n.d.:3). This 
states both too little and too much. Too little, since NOVA's own list of rights 
goes beyond the issue of "needless harm"; it is clearly also concerned with issues 
of justice per se. Too much, since the "recognition of the human right to compas­
sion, dignity, and justice" could be the basis of innumerable laws in a limitless 
number of areas. 
14. The first sentence in this quotation is, of course, not quite accurate; some 
crimes are committed against the state or an organization, or are victimless. 
15. This expression also occurs in some of the earlier literature; see, e.g., Mac-
Namara and Sullivan (1974). See also Normandeau (1983:27). 
Chapter 11 
1. It seems that 1976 was a critical year for both developments. It was the year 
in which the National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with 
the Administration of Justice was held (see below) and in which von Hirsch (1976) 
and his associates published Doing Justice. 
2. See, on this paradox, de Sousa Santos (1982:256). It is, of course, possible to 
reconcile these conflicting developments by means of some kind of bifurcational or 
"trade-off" model; cf. Cohen (1979). Further, a "restitutive" or "reparative" para­
digm may be linked indirectly to both the desert model and informalism; see below 
and Zedner (1994). 
3. In fact, there has been a continuing advocacy of informal alternatives to 
conventional adjudication dating back to Pound's address and even before. This has 
been expressed in such developments as the establishment of municipal courts, 
domestic relations courts, and small-claims courts (Harrington, 1982). Similarly, 
advocacy of conciliation techniques by elements among the judiciary has also been 
a continuing tradition (Galanter, 1984-85). 
4. The criteria for determining the appropriate forum would be (1) the nature of 
the dispute, (2) the relationship between the disputants, (3) the amount in dispute, 
(4) the cost of the proceedings, and (5) the speed with which the proceedings would 
be held (Sander, 1976:118-26). 
5. See, e.g., Sander and Snyder (1982), a "selected bibliography" listing several 
hundred books and articles in this area. 
6. See, e.g., the Journal of Dispute Resolution, published by the Missouri Law 
Review, in conjunction with the Center for the Study of Dispute Resolution (from 
376 Notes to Chapter 11 
1984) and the Negotiation Journal ("On the Process of Dispute Settlement"), 
launched in 1985. 
7. The Dorchester Urban Court, in addition to its "mediation component," com­
prised a "victim component," in effect a victim/witness-assistance program, and a 
"disposition component," which involved the development of presentence investiga­
tion reports. Together, these programs were intended "to build a structure for active 
community participation in the criminal process" (Snyder, 1978:749). The Brooklyn 
Dispute Resolution Center Program was established in 1977 by the Institute for 
Mediation and Conflict Resolution in conjunction with the Victim/Witness Assis­
tance Project of the Institute of Justice (see Davis, Tichane, and Grayson, n.d.:7). 
8. Among these are the evaluations of the NlJ-sponsored Neighborhood Justice 
centers (Cook et al., 1980; Roehl and Cook, 1982), of the Dorchester Urban Court 
(Felstiner and Williams, 1980 and 1982), of the Brooklyn Dispute Resolution Center 
(Davis, Tichane, and Grayson, n.d.; Davis, n.d.; Connick and Davis, 1981; Davis, 
1982), of the Colorado Springs Neighborhood Justice Center (Jones and Gebhard, 
1980), of the Neighborhood Justice Center of Honolulu (Berger, 1982), and of a 
number of citizen dispute-settlement programs in Florida (Bridenback et al., 1980). 
Findings of the earlier studies were summarized by Garofalo and Connelly (1980), 
while helpful analytical surveys are found in Merry (1982) and Tomasic (1982). 
More recent evaluations have focused on VORP or VORP-type programs; for analy­
ses of these, see Coates and Gehm (1989) and Marshall and Merry (1990), surveying 
the American and British findings, respectively. 
9. The authors of the evaluation report that in 56% of the 259 cases scheduled 
for mediation (i.e., 145 cases), mediation proceedings in fact took place (Davis, 
Tichane, and Grayson, n.d.:95). They report mediation agreements in 144 cases (47). 
10. In rare instances a complainant in a criminal trial may be required to enter 
into a recognizance to keep the peace; see sec. 73 of Israel's Penal Law, 1977. 
11. In a German survey, respondents who had been victimized perceived media­
tion as useful in particular for the "reduction of hostile feelings" (as well as for 
restitution), but this view was expressed more often in connection with cases of 
assault than with cases of theft (Beurskens and Boers, 1985: table 3). 
12. See, however, McGillis and Mullen (1977:77-80) and Cook et al. (1980:99-
102), who cite some earlier and more positive findings of Felstiner and his associ­
ates and conclude that "the cost of the mechanism might well be competitive with 
those of the courts." 
13. Thus the preamble to the Dispute Resolution Act indicated that this legisla­
tion was designed to assist the establishment of informal mechanisms to deal with 
minor disputes. The German survey reported below indicated that criminal justice 
personnel were generally more reserved than the general public about the use of 
informal proceedings. However, there are some references in the literature to the 
use of conciliation procedures for serious cases, particular in the context of VORP-
type programs (see, e.g., Umbreit, 1989). Further, the New York legislature in 1986 
specified that felonies could be referred to the Community Dispute Resolution 
Centers (see World Arbitration and Mediation Report, 1992:288), but the indica­
tions are that this option is used sparingly. 
14. Nelken (1985) pointed out the confusion surrounding the proposed role of 
the community in the justice system: "Communities can be agents, locus or benefi­
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ciaries of crime control"; see also the title of a related article, "If Community Is the 
Answer, What Is the Question?" (Nelken, forthcoming). At the same time, the 
"community" rhetoric reflects some real needs and derives from a number of semi­
nal writers on sociological theory, such as Toennies and Simmel (see Alper and 
Nichols, 1981: chap. 1). See also Warhaftig (1982), Yngvesson, 1993. 
15. However, (a) not all those cases referred to mediation were actually mediated, 
(b) only one of the three differences was significant at the 5% level (the other three 
were significant at the 10% level), and (c) the differences had—in a very small 
sample—almost disappeared two and a half years later (Connick and Davis, 1981:35). 
16. Flexibility was defined as "dispute settlement leading to satisfaction of both 
sides, even if that is not strictly in accordance with the legal rules." Law was defined 
as "dispute settlement strictly according to legal rules, even if not all interested 
parties are satisfied." Compromise was defined as "elaboration of a mutual agree­
ment, according to the principle that everybody partially compromises his claims." 
Finally, justice was defined as "full satisfaction of the just claims of one of the sides, 
even though the other party is dissatisfied" (Naumova, 1983:177). The range of 
percentages derives from the fact that the sample comprised three subsamples (each 
numbering 800 respondents), representing different degrees of urbanization. 
17. It has thus been pointed out that major normative changes such as that 
brought about by the Supreme Court case of Brown v. Board of Education would 
be unlikely to be achieved by informal negotiation. Further, it has been found that 
individuals who feel substantially deprived in terms of status recognition see a 
greater potential in formal rather than informal proceedings (Kulcsar, 1983). "Com­
promise may be ill-suited to the vindication of legally protected rights, and com­
promise may be impossible when a dispute involves several strongly held, but 
inconsistent, community values" (Note, 1979). See also Felstiner and Williams 
(1978), Felstiner and Drew (1978:30). 
18. As noted, provision for informal modes of dispute resolution was incorpo­
rated into the Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and 
Abuse of Power, which was adopted by the United Nations in 1985 (art. 7). However, 
the formulation of that article ("informal mechanisms for the resolution of disputes, 
including mediation, arbitration and customary justice or indigenous practices, 
should be utilized where appropriate to facilitate conciliation and redress for vic­
tims" [emphasis added]) does not indicate the recognition of a right. The ACLU 
publication on victims' rights (Stark and Goldstein, 1985) has a chapter entitled "The 
Right to Resolve Disputes outside the Traditional Justice System," but while guid­
ance was offered as to the optional use of the various mechanisms available, the only 
right specified was that of the parties to settle their conflict between themselves. 
Chapter 12 
1. Mawby classified the sources of victim assistance as (a) statute (e.g., crimi­
nal justice agencies), (b) the private sector (e.g., insurance), (c) family and commu­
nity, and (d) voluntary organizations. 
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2. In a later article, Ziegenhagen and Benyi (1981) consider how far the various 
victim-oriented programs fulfill the following four functions: (1) normative detec­
tion, i.e., identifying the deviant conduct; (2) normative definition, i.e., labeling 
conduct as criminal or otherwise; (3) response designation, i.e., determining the 
nature of the response, and (4) response execution, i.e., playing a role in the imple­
mentation of this response. Attribution of these functions to the victim is generally 
more consistent with the adversary-retribution model than its alternative. 
3. Thus, Gittler (1984) observes that "it is possible to envisage a criminal 
justice system in which private prosecutions would be revived and the victim 
would be able to initiate a criminal action without the authorization or approval of 
the public prosecutor" and believes that "the impact of allowing victim-initiated 
private prosecutions would be beneficial" (151, 152); but what is envisaged here is 
ultimately a reserve power, to "serve as a useful safeguard and safety valve if the 
prosecutor was unwilling to take action" (154). The Helsinki Institute Seminar 
went somewhat further and passed the following recommendation: "The victim 
should be given more independence and legal guarantees in the initiation and con­
duct of the criminal process. Possibilities should be studied of transferring more 
offenses from public prosecution to private prosecution or, alternatively, of subject­
ing public prosecution to the consent of the victim" (Joutsen, 1984:12, recommenda­
tion no. 12). More radical proposals advocated by European writers such as 
Hulsman support the total abolition of the penal system. In this case, however, any 
disputational powers conferred upon the victim would not be prosecutorial in the 
criminal sense. 
4. McDonald (1976b), in considering private prosecution practices in southern 
states, cited a source who observed that the main contribution of private prosecu­
tors was to prevent plea bargaining. A generalization of this phenomenon "would 
bring the courts to their knees" (35). It is natural that victim advocates might object 
to a plea bargain between defendant and public prosecutor from which they were 
excluded. This would not necessarily apply, however, if the victim or the victim's 
advocate were the sole prosecutor, or indeed if he or she were involved in the plea 
bargain as a third party (see chap. 8). 
5. Goldstein (1982) suggested control by the public prosecutor, who "would 
probably develop criteria for the classes of cases he would allow routinely to be 
brought by private parties, as well as those he would take over or move to dismiss" 
(560). This solution, which would have some similarity to the English position 
(Hetherington, 1989), is open to the objection that bureaucratic considerations 
might influence the public prosecutor's policies. 
6. In the British study referred to, 89% of the defendants were, like the prosecu­
tors, unrepresented (Lidstone et al., 1980). The Royal Commission recommended 
that where a magistrate's court had granted leave to file a private prosecution, legal 
aid would be available. In Israel an amendment was adopted to empower the court 
to require the private prosecutor to appoint an attorney—without provision for 
legal aid—where it appears to the court that the prosecutor is unable to handle the 
matter, or does so in a vexatious manner (sec. 73 of the Criminal Procedure Law 
[Consolidated Version], 1982). 
7. A similar question was considered in the context of informal alternatives, 
namely, whether even the most serious offenses may be the subject of compromise 
between the parties. 
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8. In practice this right has been exercised mainly in cases of shoplifting and 
common assault (Hetherington, 1989:155). 
9. Cf. the second schedule to Israel's Criminal Procedure Law (Consolidated 
Version), 1982, which lists the offenses for which private prosecutions may be 
instigated. 
10. This was seen as part of a general trend by the court to differentiate between 
"good" and "bad" citizens, the victims generally being identified with the former. 
"Arguably linked to the growing interest both in 'victims' rights' and the rights of 
law-abiding citizens in general, the new 'good citizen/bad citizen' dichotomy has 
had a profound effect on the types of criminal case the Court has recently accepted 
for review" (O'Neill, 1984:364). 
11. However, the chief justice seems to have been somewhat ambivalent on this 
point, for he also asserted that "inconvenience and embarrassment to witnesses can­
not justify failing to enforce constitutional rights of an accused" (O'Neill, 1984:379). 
12. 410 U.S. 614(1973), at 619. 
13. See above, chap. 10. These rights include "the right to confer with a represen­
tative of the prosecutor's office" but not to veto the prosecutor's decision. More­
over, the section expressly provides that the victim "does not have the standing to 
participate as a party in a criminal proceeding." In a recent case following from 
Arizona's constitutional amendment (see chap. 10), the petition to vacate the parole 
decision for failure to provide notice to the victim was brought by "the State of 
Arizona, asserting the rights of the crime victim." The court cited a statute which 
provided that "at the request of the victim, the prosecutor may assert any right to 
which the victim is entitled" (State ex iel. Hance v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons and 
Parole, 150 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 42, 1993). 
14. It should be noted that these procedures generally allow for the "subsid­
iary" prosecutor to continue in his or her own right should the public prosecutor 
withdraw,- see Marek (1985), Rrapac and Loncarevic (1985). Damaska (1985), how­
ever, noted that the accommodation of additional parties is easier in the so-called 
inquisitorial system, in which the proceedings are dominated by the judge, than 
under the adversary system, where the traditional roles of the parties have a 
greater significance. 
15. Cf. the alternative dichotomy discerned by O'Neill (1984) in his analysis of 
some Supreme Court judgments whereby "gains for criminals result in losses for 
the law-abiding" (372, emphasis added). 
16. O'Brien (1992), however, refers to the "myth of uncollectability" and points 
out that courts are increasingly holding insurance companies liable for wrongful 
conduct committed by insured persons (8). 
17. This may not be applicable in jurisdictions where prison earnings are realis­
tic. The idea that prisoners' earnings should be specifically earmarked for compensa­
tion of the victim has appeared in a number of codes and has a history dating back to 
Ferri, Garofalo, and even Herbert Spencer; see Silving (1975). 
18. However, tort litigation itself has a relatively high probability of succeeding; 
see Miller (1983). 
19. Thus Professor Palmer wrote of the New Zealand accident compensation 
law: "A lot of people who received nothing under the old (tort) system are being 
compensated and compensated quickly" (cited in Cappelletti and Garth, 1978:119). 
20. Cf. Israel's Courts' Law (Consolidated Version), 1984, sec. 77. 
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21. This notionally civil character, however, is affected by the penal character of 
the proceeding "pour prendre un caractere mixte, mi-penal, mi-civil" (Bouzat and 
Pinatel, 1970:930). Cf. also the Resolutions of the Eleventh International Congress 
on Penal Law (1974): "The adhesion process must necessarily be a mixed structure 
of civil and criminal procedure elements" (31). 
22. See Sebba (1982:225-26). Even in modem times it has proved difficult to 
provide an unequivocal differentiation between the two areas; see Kenny's famous 
essay "What Is a Crime?" (Kenny, 1952; cf. Winfield, 1931). For a critique of the 
arguments invoked in favor of differentiation, see Epstein (1977). See also Shuman 
(1970), Hadden (1971), Ash worth (1986). 
23. See Holmes (1964); cf. Hall (1943), Epstein (1977). 
24. Maidment (1983) has suggested (in the context of the issue of domestic 
violence) that the effectiveness of the remedy may depend less on its designation as 
civil or criminal and more on pragmatic considerations, but that ultimately the 
efficacy of both types of remedy are limited by the underlying societal attitude to 
the form of victimization in question. 
25. For a discussion of other differences in the two types of procedures from 
which the victim would benefit—although emphasizing the disadvantages to the 
defendant—see Freiberg and O'Malley (1984). 
26. Even Justice O'Connor's vigorous dissenting opinion, which sought to apply 
the Eighth Amendment in this case, was based, inter alia, on the government's 
potential to "abuse its power by allowing civil juries to impose ruinous punitive 
damages as a way of furthering the purposes of the criminal law" (Browning-Ferris 
v. Kelco Disposal, 1989, 106 L Ed 219, p. 253). Two of the majority justices observed 
that the Fourteenth Amendment might apply in such cases to constrain excessive 
damages between private parties as an abuse of due process. 
27. This term did not apply specifically to civil procedures but to various 
nonpenal solutions, including mediation; see Sessar (1984:19). 
28. Not only was the positivist school utilitarian, but so was the classical 
school, which preceded it. It will be recalled that Beccaria laid emphasis on deter­
rence as the aim of the criminal law. 
29. The fault vs. strict liability controversy is distinguished from the morality-
utility controversy; see Englard (1993: chaps. 1 and 3). 
30. The importance of vesting this discretion in the victim is emphasized by 
Maidment (1983), in her consideration of remedies for domestic violence in Britain. 
See also recommendation no. 19 of the Helsinki Seminar (Joutsen, 1984): "The 
victim should have the opportunity of proceeding according to different options, in 
accordance with his or her own needs." 
31. It has been argued that the option of private prosecution in Germany and 
Poland is effectively a mechanism for reconciliation, since only 3%-8% of the 
cases in fact proceed to conviction (Marek, 1985). 
32. Even Christie (1977), generally opposed to any formal judicial processing 
(see above, chap. 12), seems to allow for this possibility. Similarly, Wright (1982) 
provides for various measures of restraint that the court would be empowered to 
impose in serious cases, including supervision of the wrongdoer. These are ostensi­
bly directed at protecting the victim but seem to have a wider protective purpose 
vis-a-vis society as a whole. 
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33. In this context it may be noted that the tension between the two models— 
an interparty, individual responsibility model, as opposed to a state responsibility, 
welfare model—has its direct parallel in the civil-law literature on the respective 
roles of tort and insurance (esp. public insurance) in compensating personal injuries 
(see, e.g., Harris et al., 1984). 
34. The reservations expressed in chap. 9 regarding the levy of penalties on 
offenders in order to compensate victims of other offenders do not apply, or at least 
not to the same extent, in the instant case. Here the assessment of punitive dam­
ages is determined as a matter of principle, as an appropriate sanction for the 
wrongdoing, and not for the purpose of meeting a particular social or economic 
need. 
35. See also Robinson's proposal for sanctions of equal "punitive bite," incorpo­
rated in the "hybrid approach" of Cavadino and Dignan (1993). 
Chapter 13 
1. One of the proposals was referred briefly to in chap. 1. The other does not 
generally receive mention in the victim movement literature. 
2. This expression properly refers to the acts of bystanders who take action by 
reason of good citizenship or conscience. It seems less applicable to provisions for 
the imposition of a legal obligation, or even the specification of rewards, whereby 
the action would cease to be purely altruistic. Conversely, Geis (1991) refers to the 
laws which penalize the failure to assist as "Bad Samaritan" laws! 
3. Mention may be made in this context of the alleged reluctance of physicians 
to intervene in cases of injury, for fear of negligence suits. A legal, as opposed to mere 
ethical, obligation to intervene might act as a counterweight to such inhibitions. 
4. For example, the victim of a bag snatch, on pursuing the perpetrator, might 
find him- or herself attacked. 
5. Van Dijk et al. (1984:10) expressly draw this conclusion. In the American 
study, this conclusion emerged from the data. 
6. Some legal texts, however, deal with both issues in close proximity, as part 
of the law of negligence; see, e.g., the Restatement of the Law of Torts referred to 
above. 
7. This is illustrated by the strong support for recognition of such a moral duty 
by the anarchist William Godwin. However, he was not in favor of enforcement of 
duties by legal compulsion; see Weinrib (1980:264-65). 
Chapter 14 
1. An interesting debate on the role of victim advocates and the extent to which 
victim-oriented reform may be consistent with "reintegrative" social policies has 
382 Notes to Chapter 14 and Appendix 
recently been published in the Law and Society Review, in the wake of an analysis of 
Washington State's legislation on violent sex offenders (see Scheingold et al. 1994; 
Braithwaite and Pettit 1994). 
Appendix 
1. Berkowitz and Walster (1976) include in their volume on equity theory a 
contribution from Lemer and his colleagues on the "just-world" theory. It appears 
from their preface, however, that they regard attribution theory as pertaining to a 
different branch of psychology. Other writers have criticized equity theory for pay­
ing inadequate attention to attribution theory (Kidd and Utne, 1978). 
2. See the above distinction between actual and psychological equity. For the 
application of this to the just-world theory, see Godfrey and Lowe (1975:944). 
3. Koch and Bean (n.d.) in fact note six explanations in the literature for this 
phenomenon. However, there is at least one approach that would hypothesize sym­
pathy for the victim: see Gold et al. (1978), citing studies conducted by D. Aderman. 
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